


# MATHIEU DUMAS : A BIOGRAPHY

Kenneth A. Duncan

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews



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MATTHIEU DUMAS.

*Ambroise Tardieu Del.*

## MATHIEU DUMAS: A BIOGRAPHY

KENNETH A. DUNCAN

In a career spanning nearly seven decades, Mathieu Dumas served France as either a soldier or a legislator under each successive government from Louis XV to Louis-Philippe. Born in 1753, he entered the infantry in 1773 as a sous-lieutenant. Although lacking a personal fortune and the backing of family influence, Dumas' energy and ability combined with the support of two powerful patrons, Castries and Puységur, gained him relatively rapid promotion. By 1789 he had served in America as an aide-de-camp to Rochambeau and had been appointed to replace Guibert as rapporteur to the Council of War.

Drawn into the politics of the Revolution through his association with the liberal nobility, principally Lafayette and the Lameths, Dumas became the parliamentary leader of the Feuillant party in the Legislative Assembly, a major critic of the war and one of Lafayette's most courageous defenders. However, he also worked to improve the French army and aided in the defence of Paris during the Prussian invasion. With the end of the Assembly, Dumas sought to serve the Republic, but public suspicion forced him to flee to Switzerland. There Dumas, Brémont and Theodore Lameth met with the British agent Wickham to discuss their plan for the restoration of the Constitution of 1791, but not of the émigrés.

The Thermidorian Reaction led to Dumas' return to France and to his re-entry into politics as a deputy in the Council

of Elders under the Directory. The leader of a revived Feuillant party, Dumas pursued a moderate policy, preferring the gradual repeal of revolutionary legislation and cooperation with the Directory to the restoration of an unreconciled Louis XVIII. Proscribed on 18 Fructidor V, he went to Hamburg and remained there, working on what was to become his magnum opus, the Précis des Événemens Militaires, until Bonaparte's seizure of power.

Despite his mistrust of Dumas' political opinions, Napoleon could not overlook his administrative ability and he employed him in high positions throughout the Consulate and the Empire. Dumas' support of Napoleon during the Hundred Days resulted in his forced retirement under the Restoration which lasted, except for a brief interval under St. Cyr's ministry, until 1828. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in that year, Dumas gave his support to the Liberals and to Louis-Philippe. He died in 1837, widely known and respected as a soldier and as a military historian. Although a military as well as a civil figure, Dumas exemplifies the fate of moderates caught in the Revolution and its aftermath.

## DECLARATIONS

In accordance with the regulations of the Senatus Academicus of the University of St. Andrews, I declare that this thesis is my composition and that it represents a record of research conducted by me while matriculated at the University of St. Andrews. It has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted to the University under Ordinance General No. 12 on 12th June 1969 and as a candidate for the degree under this resolution on 6th May 1970.

To the best of my knowledge and belief the conditions of the resolution and regulations have been fulfilled by Mr. Duncan.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AAG Archives administratives de la Guerre (Vincennes)  
AD (Hérault) Archives départementales de l'Hérault (the same applies for other Departments)  
AE Archives ministère des Affaires Étrangères  
AHG Archives historiques de la Guerre (Vincennes)  
AHRF Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française  
AN Archives Nationales  
AP (Carnot) Archives Privées Carnot (the same applies for other individuals)  
BM British Museum  
BN Bibliothèque Nationale  
FO Foreign Office  
HRO Hampshire Record Office  
LC Library of Congress  
NCMH New Cambridge Modern History  
PRO Public Record Office  
PU Princeton University  
UP University of Pennsylvania



## CHAPTER I

### LE MEILLEUR TEMPS DE MA VIE

The careers of few men have suffered such vicissitudes of fortune or encompassed so many severe social, economic and political upheavals as that of Mathieu Dumas. He served France as either soldier or legislator under each successive government from Louis XV to Louis Philippe and, although twice forced into exile and twice reduced to poverty, died a peer, honoured and respected. From the scanty accounts of him which exist, it is immediately apparent that his successes and recuperative ability were in no small measure attributable to his personal qualities. Few of his acquaintances were not impressed by his amiability, energy and intelligence.<sup>1</sup> One of his earliest patrons, the Count of Puységur, described him as "un officier plein de zèle et d'intelligence . . .," adding, "je l'aime et l'estime infiniment."<sup>2</sup> Joseph Bonaparte, under whom Dumas served in Naples and Spain, was of a similar opinion. He wrote to

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<sup>1</sup>The only dissenting opinion was that expressed by the British envoy to Switzerland, William Wickham, who found Dumas to be "full of trick and cunning". (Wickham to Grenville, Lausanne, 14 December 1794, PRO FO 74/4) But Wickham's relationship with Dumas was of the sort to make jaded opinions almost inevitable. See infra chapter IV.

<sup>2</sup>Puységur to Paul, Paris, 11 March 1780, AAG GD 395 (personal dossier of Mathieu Dumas).

his brother: "Ici un homme honnête vaut mieux pour moi qu'un homme habile. Lorsque ces deux qualités se trouvent réunies, ces hommes me valent mieux qu'un régiment."<sup>3</sup>

Philippe Paul de Ségur, Dumas' aide-de-camp in 1800 and who was later to deliver his funeral oration in the Chamber of Peers, was most struck by his personality: "Ce général, datait de Louis XVI; il avait l'esprit aimable, le caractère bienveillant, et les formes<sup>douces</sup> et attrayantes de l'ancien régime."<sup>4</sup>

Almost nothing is known about the childhood of Mathieu Dumas. His Souvenirs, written as a political apology, begin with adult life and the family papers contain only official documents.<sup>5</sup> He was born in Montpellier on 23 November 1753 - the eldest son of Mathieu Dumas and Anne de Loys.<sup>6</sup> Besides Guillaume Mathieu (called St. Marcel), his first brother with whom he has sometimes been confused, there was a second brother, Jerome Fulcrand (called St. Fulcrand) and a sister, Adelaide Cornelia Suzanne (St.

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<sup>3</sup>Joseph Bonaparte to Napoleon, 26 March 1807, cited by Jacques Rambaud, Naples Sous Joseph Bonaparte: 1806-1808 (Paris, 1911), p.259.

<sup>4</sup>Philippe Paul Ségur, Histoire et Mémoires (8 vols., Paris, 1910), II, p.26

<sup>5</sup>Mathieu Dumas, Souvenirs du Lieutenant Général Comte Mathieu Dumas de 1770 à 1836 (3 vols., Paris, 1839) (herein-after referred to as Souvenirs); also published in two volumes in English as Memoirs of His Own Time (London, 1839). The papers of the Dumas family are preserved in the archives of the department of Hérault, série IE 84 (famille Dumas).

<sup>6</sup>Certificate: 24 November 1753, Parish of Notre Dame, Montpellier, AAG GD 395. A copy of the "Acte de Naissance" made in 1831 gives the date of birth as 23 November 1753. AN CC 494\* f. 485.

Madeleine).<sup>7</sup>

The senior Mathieu Dumas was one of twin boys born to one Antoine Dumas, a bourgeois of Montpellier, in 1724.<sup>8</sup> He acquired hereditary nobility in 1741 through purchase of the office of Trésorier de France from Daniel Louis Vieussens. As the purchase price of this office was in excess of 50,000 livres,<sup>9</sup> independent of the incidental costs attendant upon the installation ceremony, it would appear that Dumas was possessed of considerable financial resources - a conclusion supported by a scrutiny of his suitability made by the Cour des Comptes at the time the office was purchased.<sup>10</sup> The financial security of the family was reinforced in the following year, when Mathieu married Anne de Loÿs, daughter of Jean Loÿs "conseiller en la Cour des Comptes, aides et finances de Montpellier".<sup>11</sup> However, by 1794 Dumas' total possessions were estimated to be worth less than 3,000 livres.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix I for a genealogical table of the family.

<sup>8</sup> Extrait des Registres de la Parish de Ste. Anne de Montpellier, 2 February 1724. AD (Hérault) IE 84.

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Louis Vieussens, Vente à Mathieu Dumas Son Office de Trésorier de France, 1741, AD (Hérault) IE 84. A note dated 1742, AD (Hérault) IE 84, gives the costs of the installation and reception as 243 livres with an additional 4054 livres of miscellaneous expenses.

<sup>10</sup> Mathieu Dumas (elder), À Nos Seigneurs, Montpellier, 11 January 1742, AD (Hérault) IE 84.

<sup>11</sup> "Contrat de Mariage", Montpellier, 6 April 1742, (Vezion notary), AD (Hérault) IE 84. The total dowry provided was 15,000 livres.

<sup>12</sup> Suzanne Dumas, co-signer with: Ballard, David, Prieur, and Coire, État des Meubles, Effets, Hardes, etc. Trouvés chez le cs. Mathieu Dumas ex Trésorier de France, 5 Ventôse an II, AD (Hérault) IE 84. The total valuation was 2699 livres 10 sous.

much of his wealth may have been lost during the Revolution through patriotic contributions, payments to the société du club logement des soldats, and the maintenance of a company of veterans as he claimed in a letter to the Committee of Surveillance.<sup>13</sup> Yet there is an indication in the careers of his children that the family was not as rich as it appeared to be.<sup>14</sup> Suzanne, instead of marrying into a respectable family, entered the Ursuline Convent of Saint Charles.<sup>15</sup> Mathieu, St. Marcel and St. Fulcrand all left home by 1775 and, instead of following their father's career, entered the army in positions usually filled by either the bourgeoisie or sons of the impoverished nobility.<sup>16</sup> Mathieu, as the eldest son, should have received most support, but two notes in his army dossier indicate that he had "aucune fortune"<sup>17</sup> and was "très pauvre". His commanding officer added that, "les appointements qu'il avait comme sous-lieutenant était presque toute la ressource pour s'entretenir

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<sup>13</sup>Loc.cit., 7 October 1793, AD (Hérault), série L5789.

<sup>14</sup>Unfortunately there is no reference to Dumas in the records of the Cour des Comptes, Aides et Finances de Languedoc. Cf. AD (Hérault) série B, Inventaire Sommaire, prepared by the departmental archives in 1935. Family records contain only a 'Lettre de Cachet' (22 June 1788) signed by the King, "pour qu'il assiste à l'enregistrement de l'édit de suppression des bureaux de finances de mai 1788", AD (Hérault) IE 84.

<sup>15</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.313.

<sup>16</sup>Mathieu and St. Marcel to the Infantry and St. Fulcrand to the Commissariat service.

<sup>17</sup>Régiment de Médoc, Note Sur Dumas, np, 19 March 1780, AAG GD 395.

au service . . ."<sup>18</sup> Although Dumas makes few references to his father in his Souvenirs, the indication is that the two enjoyed good relations, so that financial support should not have been voluntarily withheld.<sup>19</sup>

Mathieu Dumas had originally intended to enter the corps of engineers - a choice of service which again signified a lack of fortune since the artillery and engineers were considered to be beneath the dignity of the higher nobility.<sup>20</sup> At the age of fifteen he was enrolled in the school of Berthaud, "la plus renommée alors pour les élèves qui se destinaient aux armes du génie et d'artillerie."<sup>21</sup> Despite successfully completing the first examination for the school

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<sup>18</sup>Prince de Montbarey to ?, n p , 20 April 1780, AAG GD 395.

<sup>19</sup>Dumas did not pay frequent visits to Montpellier: "Dans le cours de ma longue carrière, et depuis mon départ pour joindre le régiment de Médoc, en 1773, je n'ai visité la carra patria que cinq fois et toujours en passant, savoir: trois mois du congé en 1774, huit jours lorsque je traversai la France pour aller m'embarquer à Toulon en 1783; huit jours encore à mon retour du Levant; vingt-quatre heures en revenant de Montauban, et un jour encore cette dernière fois (1809)". (Dumas, op.cit., III, p.312) N.B. He omits his return in 1785 for his marriage to Julia (ibid., I, p.405).

<sup>20</sup>The artillery regiment, to which the engineers belonged until 1776, ranked only as the 64th regiment of infantry. Even after the ordinance of 1781 required four quarters of nobility for entrance into the artillery the court nobility disdained service: "en premier . . . sans doute pour la raison que dans cette arme la naissance, la fortune et la faveur de la cour ne pouvaient guère augmenter les possibilités d'avancement." Matti Laurema, L'Artillerie de Campagne Française Pendant les Guerres de la Révolution (Ph.D. Dissertation, Helsinki, 1956, tomb. 96), p.47.

<sup>21</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.7.



of instruction at Mezières, he was unable to enter because the second examination had been deferred due to a reduction in the number of places in the school, resulting from Choiseul's economy measures.<sup>22</sup> By 1771, Dumas had abandoned his hopes for a commission in the engineers. He wrote to a friend:

. . . n'étant plus dans l'intention de continuer mes études relatives au génie, et ne voyant aucune espérance prochaine de pouvoir être admis dans ce corps; je vous prie de vouloir bien permettre de porter des . . . papiers que j'avais eu l'honneur de vous envoyer, à l'effet d'obtenir des lettres d'examen.<sup>23</sup>

Unable to enter the corps of his choice, Dumas became a sous-lieutenant in the regiment of Médoc on 17 May 1773.<sup>24</sup> Any advantages his training for the engineers may have given him in the struggle for promotion were more than offset by the loss of four years' seniority, because his years in school were not considered as part of his term of service. Without a powerful patron who would be able to advance him outside of the normal channels, his chances of ever obtaining the rank of colonel or above were slight indeed. By the Ordinance of 1776, an officer had to serve for fourteen years before he could command a regiment, with six of those years

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<sup>22</sup>"Il avait auparavant passé quatre années dans une école du Génie, avait subi un examen et n'avait pas été admis à cause de la réforme faite par Mons. Le Duc de Choiseul en 1770." D'Aguesseau, directeur général de l'armée, État des Services du Sieur Mathieu Dumas, April 1787, AAG GD 395 (contained in the Croix de St. Louis Folder).

<sup>23</sup>Dumas to Dupuy, Paris, 2 October 1771, AAG GD 395.

<sup>24</sup>Pension Militaire de Retraite - détail des services de Mathieu Dumas, 23 March 1832, AAG GD 395, document 33284. (cited hereinafter as Pension Militaire).

as a colonel-en-second.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the serving officers were faced with competition from the court nobility, who were given preferential eligibility for promotion, even to the point of disregarding the length of service ordinances.<sup>26</sup> This system worked so as to create a superabundance of officers, without benefitting the opportunities of any but the nobles of the court.<sup>27</sup> "La véritable hiérarchie," one French historian has written, "était, non celle des grades, mais celle de la naissance et de la fortune".<sup>28</sup>

Dumas' military career and hence political career would have perhaps been of little account had his regiment not been transferred from Montauban to Valenciennes in 1774. This transfer placed it under the Commandant Supérieur de la Flandre Française, at that time Marshal Castries, a former governor of Montpellier, who, while there, "connaissait et

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<sup>25</sup>Lt. Col. G. T. Hartmann, Les Officiers de l'Armée Royale et la Révolution (Paris, 1910) p.10. This ordinance followed the precedents of Marshal Belle-Isle which were even more severe, requiring fifteen years service for the rank of major.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p.11. By the regulation of 1 June 1781, the minimum age for colonel-en-second was fixed at 23.

<sup>27</sup>There were 1,132 colonels in the French Army (of which only 200 were with the regiments), 466 brigadiers, 540 Maréchaux de camp, 226 lieutenant generals, and 18 marshals - more generals than in all the other states of Europe combined. Ibid., p.4; Spenser Wilkinson, The French Army Before Napoleon (Oxford, 1915) p.88.

<sup>28</sup>Hartmann, op.cit., p.5. There were other discrepancies as well. A court noble would receive four times the pay for one-third the service as a provincial noble - 428,000 livres for eight years five months active service required to become a general officer as opposed to 100,000 livres for thirty one years service respectively. Wilkinson, op.cit., p.94.

protégeait" Dumas' family.<sup>29</sup> At a review of the regiment Marshal Castries recognised Dumas and gave him encouragement to continue his military studies. Later, impressed by the quality of his work, Castries introduced Dumas to Lt. General Count Puységur.<sup>30</sup> Also impressed, Puységur made Dumas one of his aides-de-camp, a particularly exciting appointment because Puységur was an inspector general of the infantry and therefore at the centre of both the reforms of Saint-Germain and the doctrinal dispute between Mesnil-Durant and Guibert.<sup>31</sup> Through Puységur, Dumas was brought to the vortex of this reforming activity.

Far from being the decrepit and antiquated machine its defeats during the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War gave it the impression of being, the army of Louis XV was progressive, dynamic and innovative.<sup>32</sup> Few armies, indeed, have ever shown such a capacity to absorb new ideas. Questions of reform and reorganisation had been the subject of sustained investigation almost since the beginning of the eighteenth century and many of the ideas and developments attributed to the period of the Revolution

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<sup>29</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.12.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., I, p.13.

<sup>31</sup>St. Germain's reforms included the abolition of the purchase of commands; an increase in the number of light infantry and cavalry regiments (paid for by the abolition of parts of the Maison du Roi), and the organisation of permanent divisions. Wilkinson, op.cit., pp. 90-92.

<sup>32</sup>"In the French Army between the Seven Years War and 1792 there was a constant effort at improvement, a serious study of war and its forms and of the organisation and training needed for it." Ibid., p.21.



actually evolved at this time.<sup>33</sup>

Experiments in tactical formations for the infantry had been conducted during the Seven Years War. At Rossbach (1757) l'ordre profond (attack by column) was introduced and at Minden (1759) l'ordre mixte (column and line in a mutually supporting formation) appeared, both unsuccessfully, however.<sup>34</sup> After the war, the controversy between Mesnil-Durand, the disciple of Folard, and Guibert kept alive the question of which tactical system was most preferable. This dispute was not about whether the army should fight in heavy columns (l'ordre profond) or in thin line (l'ordre mince), as it has often been misrepresented, but whether the main reliance should be placed upon shock and mass or upon fire-power.<sup>35</sup> Folard and after him Mesnil-Durand contended that 'cold steel' and strength of numbers could pierce an enemy's thin line before its superior fire power could take effect.<sup>36</sup> Guibert, on the other hand, developed a system

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<sup>33</sup>For evaluations of the 18th century theorists see: Jean Lambert Colin, L'Education Militaire de Napoléon (Paris, 1900); Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London, 1933); Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (Columbia, 1957); and Wilkinson, op.cit.

<sup>34</sup>Quimby, op.cit., pp.91 and 331.

<sup>35</sup>The true polar opposite of Folard from the standpoint of fire-power and manoeuvre was the Prussian or British system which relied solely upon the line during battle.

<sup>36</sup>This was in fact the traditional form of attack as Colin describes: "It is not only Louvois who for years persists in banning the musket and maintaining the pike, it is Maurice Saxe, it is Frederick himself, who will not admit the preponderating role of firearms" (at least until the end of his reign), Jean Lambert Colin, The Transformation of War (London, 1912) p.7. Folard's system is explained in Quimby, op.cit., p.116 and Wilkinson, op.cit., p.62, cf. Jean Charles Folard, L'Esprit du Chevalier Folard (Amsterdam, 1760).

which effectively combined the salient features of both column for manoeuvre and line for fire in the very influential "Essai Général de Tactique".<sup>37</sup>

A great test of the two systems, involving upwards of 40,000 soldiers, was held in 1778 at two camps, Vaussieux in Normandy and Paramé in Brittany. Dumas and his regiment were included in the former camp under the orders of Count de Rochambeau.<sup>38</sup> His conclusions about the results of the exercises leave little doubt as to which system he considered to be preferable:

J'ai acquis la conviction que le système de M. de Mesnil-Durand n'offrait qu'une vaine théorie, une formation habituelle, lourde et embarrassante, des changements de dénomination pour les fractions de la ligne de bataille qui ne présentaient aucun avantage; tandis que notre ordonnance donnait tous les moyens d'exécuter les mêmes manoeuvres, de former des colonnes ou des carrés, et de déployer avec plus de célérité.<sup>39</sup>

Rochambeau himself concurred with this assessment<sup>40</sup> and both officers saw clearly that Guibert's system of 1776 had the dual advantages of speed of manoeuvre and of choice of

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<sup>37</sup>Count Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert, Essai Général de Tactique (Paris, 1773).

<sup>38</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.19. Dumas had originally been ordered to join Puységur, who was in command of the second camp, but as he was also serving with his regiment and the regiment had been ordered to Vaussieux, his orders were modified accordingly.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., I, p.20.

<sup>40</sup>"J'eus beau lui (sic. Broglie) représenter que l'ordonnance de 1776 réunissait l'ordre profond et l'ordre mince pour s'en servir à la volonté des généraux, et leur donnait tous les moyens les plus courts et les plus simples pour se mouvoir par son centre, par ses droites, et par ses gauches." Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Count de Rochambeau, Mémoires Militaires, Historiques et Politiques de Rochambeau (2 vols., Paris, 1809 ), p.227.

formation and that these were the fundamental differences between the two systems.

By 1778, France had been supplying clandestine arms to support the rebellion of Britain's colonies in North America for some time and was now preparing to enter the struggle openly. Dumas had been involved with aid for the revolution on several occasions. Originally Marshal Castries proposed that he be one of the officers accompanying Lafayette on his unofficial journey to join General Washington.<sup>41</sup> When the King decided that he still wished to dissemble the aid going to America this proposal was abandoned and Dumas was given a far less agreeable task. He was assigned to distract the British commissioner at Dunkirk (Frazer) one evening long enough for artillery intended for the Americans to be loaded at the port.<sup>42</sup> As the eventuality of war grew more certain, a more substantive task, aiding Maillebois' preparations for the invasion of England, was given to him.<sup>43</sup>

Without ceasing to serve as a sous-lieutenant of chasseurs in the regiment of Médoc, Dumas was next selected by Rochambeau to be one of his seven aides-de-camp in the

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<sup>41</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.16. See Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Comes to America (Chicago, 1935, p.148), for details of Lafayette's departure. Louis and all his ministers had not approved of Lafayette's mission.

<sup>42</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.16. By the treaty of 1763, Dunkirk had been demilitarized - its fortifications destroyed and a British Commissioner appointed to be sure that it was not refortified.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., I, p.18.

forthcoming American expedition. This appointment was one which well reflected the high esteem his superiors had for him because he had had neither the family nor the rank to justify such a position.<sup>44</sup> No doubt the impression Dumas made upon Rochambeau while at Vaussieux had some influence on his choice, but, as Dumas himself admits, the influence of General Puységur was at least equally important.<sup>45</sup> Puységur had formed a very high opinion of Dumas and besides forwarding his career he had also obtained a commission for St. Marcel in the regiment of Aquitaine.<sup>46</sup>

The appointment to Rochambeau's staff was not without its difficulties. These were mostly financial as a sous-lieutenant's pay of 720 livres<sup>47</sup> was not sufficient to meet the expenses imposed by the expedition. However, Dumas' continuing double service was also inconvenient. These considerations prompted him to write to Montbarey, his colonel,

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<sup>44</sup>The other aides-de-camp were: Chevalier Charles de Laneth, nephew of Marshal Broglie, Marquis Charles de Damas, Marquis de Vauban, Comte de Seisen, Baron de Closen and Rochambeau's nephew, Count de Lauberbière. "Aides-de-Camp de M<sup>r</sup> le Comte de Rochambeau." *Etat de Logements*, n d - in the collection of the Newport Historical Society, Newport, Rhode Island.

<sup>45</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.23.

<sup>46</sup>Montbarey wrote: "M. le C<sup>te</sup> de Puységur prend un fort grand intérêt au S. Dumas, c'est un sujet rempli de talens et de volonté . . ." Montbarey to ?, n p , 20 April 1780, AAG GD 395. See *supra* page 1 for Puységur's opinion of Dumas. For Puységur's role with St. Marcel, see Dumas, op.cit., I, p.17.

<sup>47</sup>Régiment de Médoc, Note À M. le C<sup>te</sup> de Puységur, 24 June 1780, AAG GD 395 (attached to Montbarey's letter of 20 April 1780).

to seek promotion to the rank of captain.<sup>48</sup>

Both Montbarey and Puységur were more than agreeable to his request as their correspondence on the subject reveals.<sup>49</sup> "Il (Dumas) demande," wrote Puységur, "une grace qui j'espère ne souffrira pas de difficultés, il est très important pour lui de l'obtenir et je vous demande pour cela vos bons offices. Vous ne pouvez pas me faire de plus grand plaisir que de les lui accorder."<sup>50</sup> In addition to the rank of captain, Montbarey awarded a "gratification annuelle, pour lui donner les moyens de subsister".<sup>51</sup>

The second division of the French expeditionary army, of which Dumas was a part, departed from St. Malo on 2 May 1780.<sup>52</sup> After following a southerly course, which caused some uncertainty as to whether the ultimate destination was North America or the West Indies, the fleet reached Newport

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<sup>48</sup>Besides the financial reason, Dumas mentioned that: "cette grace lui donnera la possibilité de s'absenter de son corps sans mettra ses comarades dans le cas de faire son service . . ." Dumas to Mauroy, Paris, 8 March 1780, AAG GD 395.

<sup>49</sup>"M. le Cte de Puységur le recommande instamment. M. le Prince de Mauroy (sic. Montbarey) en rend les meilleurs témoignages." Régiment de Médoc, Note Sur Dumas, 19 March 1780, AAG GD 395.

<sup>50</sup>Puységur to Paul, Paris, 11 March 1780, AAG GD 395.

<sup>51</sup>Montbarey to ?, np, 20 April 1780, AAG GD 395.

<sup>52</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, op.cit., I, p.27. The second division consisted of regts. Bourbonnais, Soissonnais, Santonge and Deux-Ponts together with the Lauzun Legion under Chevalier de Chastellux.



Rhode Island, on 11 July.<sup>53</sup> Mathieu Dumas had made the crossing on board the ship of the line "Jason" in company with Charles Lameth, Axel Fersen and Count Charlus, the future duke de Castries. In the sixty days that the fleet was at sea, he and Lameth had become good friends - a friendship which was soon extended to Charles' brothers, Alexandre and Theodore, when they too crossed the Atlantic the following year. Although of no great importance at the moment, his friendship with the Lameths during the Revolution, when they had become the centre of the Feuillant party, was to have a major influence on Dumas' decision to enter politics himself.

While still on board the "Duc de Bourgogne" Rochambeau, preferring to develop the talents of his young officers, selected Dumas and Baron von Closen to serve as cartographers during the expedition rather than engaging regular officers of the engineers in this service as was customary.<sup>54</sup> Once in Rhode Island, Dumas and Lameth were billeted together at the home of Dr. Ephraim Bowen in Providence, the

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<sup>53</sup>Fear that it was to be the West Indies caused much uneasiness among the officers - as Dumas indicated, "j'avais épousé de coeur la cause de l'indépendance des Américains, et ce n'eût été qu'avec le plus vif regret que j'eusse renoncé à l'honneur de combattre pour leur liberté." Ibid., I, p.31.

<sup>54</sup>Rochambeau to Montbary, on board the "Duc de Bourgogne", 5 May 1780, AHG A<sup>1</sup> 3733 fol. 49. According to Rochambeau, Dumas was an excellent draughtsman - a skill he learned while studying for the engineers. Cf. Dumas' plan of Newport, Rhode Island, drawn freehand (levé à vue) in July 1780, which is reproduced in Howard C. Rice Jr. and Anne S. K. Brown, The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army (2 vols., Princeton, 1972), II, map 4.

colony's capital.<sup>55</sup> However, Dumas travelled considerably throughout the winter in the capacity of liaison officer between the French and the colonists,<sup>56</sup> a role largely necessitated by the need to procure fodder for the horses of the artillery train and the cavalry of Lauzun's Legion. Since Rhode Island was not able to meet all the needs of the French, it proved necessary to move the horses into the area of the town of Lebanon in the neighbouring colony of Connecticut. The 'official history' of the campaign, written under the orders of Rochambeau, mentioned that:

Le Duc de Lauzun, qui commandait ce cantonnement, s'y rendait par la douceur de sa société très agréable aux américaines, et réussit parfaitement dans toutes les affaires qu'il eut à traiter, soit avec le vieux gouverneur Trumbull, soit avec les autres membres du corps législatif.<sup>57</sup>

In reality, relations between the farmers of Lebanon and French were never as cordial as this passage would seem to indicate.<sup>58</sup> The Duke's true feelings were more accurately

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<sup>55</sup> État des Logements, op.cit. The house is no longer extant. Dumas and Lameth also lodged with Joseph Antony (339 Spring Street) during the winter of 1780. Cf. John Austin Stevens, "The French in Rhode Island", The Magazine of American History, vol. III, no. 7 (July, 1889). On Dumas' supposed relationship with Mary Bowen, see infra Appendix II.

<sup>56</sup> Dumas was one of the few French officers who was reasonably fluent in English. Cf. Amblard Marie Raymond Amédée de Noailles, Marins et Soldats Français en Amérique Pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance des États-Unis 1778-1783 (Paris, 1903) p.162.

<sup>57</sup> Mémoire sur la Campagne du Corps Français aux Ordres du Cte de Rochambeau en 1780 et 1781 (Manuscript), p.16, AHG MR 248.

<sup>58</sup> The scale upon which these farmers operated can be gauged from the fact that David Trumbull contracted to supply a number of horses for the American cavalry worth £10,000 as well as providing 150 tons of hay. Cf. David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789, Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, Connecticut.

expressed in his memoirs: "La Sibère seule peut-être comparée à Lebanon, qui n'est composée que de quelques cabanes dispersées dans d'immenses forêts."<sup>59</sup> Nor were the colonists pleased with the arbitrary and sometimes seemingly irrational behaviour of the French. The entire story is worth preserving from this viewpoint if only to illustrate that the French army's campaign in America was not one of continual good relations and that a great amount of understanding and hard work on both sides was required for it to have progressed as smoothly as it did.

Captain Dumas' particular responsibility was to see to preparations for the Legion's reception in Lebanon. To this end, he wrote to Joshua Elderkin, a local farmer, in October 1780, informing him of the itinerary of the march.<sup>60</sup> Preparations were then advanced to accommodate them - a letter from David Trumbull to another farmer, Nehemiah Hubbard, indicates that a great amount of care was taken to ensure the comfort of the French troops.<sup>61</sup> These preparations met with Dumas' full approval: "I found everything ready

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<sup>59</sup>Armand Louis Gontaut, Duke de Lauzun, Mémoires du Duc de Lauzun (Paris, 1858), p.281.

<sup>60</sup>Dumas to Elderkin, Providence, 7 October 1780. Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 131, Connecticut Historical Society.

<sup>61</sup>"As the French troops who are soon expected to take up quarters in this place (sic. Lebanon) are unprovided with Jacks (i.e. foot-soldiers' sleeveless tunics), I take the liberty of asking you to oblige me with the loan of one hundred for their use." Trumbull to Hubbard, Lebanon, 2 November 1780, David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789.



in Davenay's Tavern and Windham . . . thus all is well." He added that, "the forage master of the French army is coming in order to receive all the provisions for the winter."<sup>62</sup>

Thus far, relations between the two sides were excellent. Dumas was on exceedingly good terms with David Trumbull and with Col. Jeremiah Wadsworth, the American agent of the French army.<sup>63</sup> However, with the arrival of the forage master, Parizet, affairs deteriorated rapidly. In one day, Parizet seized all of Elderkin's hay so that, as the unfortunate farmer was forced to write to Dumas, "now I am obliged to put my own horses out to keep".<sup>64</sup> Elderkin admitted, however, that the fault did not lie entirely with the French because "the people think they have the advantage in their hands and will not sell their good hay at the price . . . therefore I have agreed to furnish the forage with six hundred rations of hay this day and tomorrow - the whole of my hay."<sup>65</sup> David Trumbull made good enough of Elderkin's loss to keep him through the winter, yet his own experiences with Parizet were even more exasperating. Rather than accept the hay in Trumbull's barns, the forage master insisted upon taking the hay still in the

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<sup>62</sup>Dumas to Trumbull, Lebanon, 11 November 1780, David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Elderkin to Dumas, Lebanon, 29 December 1780, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 131.

<sup>65</sup>Elderkin to Trumbull, Lebanon, 16 November 1780, David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789.

field - the same fields from which the hay in the barn came. "What can be M. Parizet's motives for this conduct I cannot account," wrote the baffled Trumbull to Wadsworth.<sup>66</sup> But worse was still to come, for Parizet next refused to provide a receipt for the forage taken without the approval of the intendant who was then in Newport and, while awaiting his decision, he sealed Trumbull's barns, thereby preventing him from putting in his own hay.<sup>67</sup> Such a violent argument ensued that even Lauzun was forced to intervene and, in the end, the combined efforts of Wadsworth and Dumas were required to quiet Trumbull and to persuade him to continue providing the army with supplies.<sup>68</sup>

When the French undertook to lay siege to Lord Cornwallis' army at Yorktown, Virginia, they were faced with a march of over 500 miles, for the most part through areas which were still little more than wilderness. As an added difficulty, by marching parallel to the coast they were bisecting rather than following what few avenues of communication did exist, so that their route was essentially along undeveloped roads and across unbridged rivers. The reconnaissance for this march was entrusted to Captain Dumas together with responsibility for crossing the two main obstacles - the unbridged Connecticut and Susquehanna

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<sup>66</sup>Trumbull to Wadsworth, Lebanon, 26 December 1780, David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789.

<sup>67</sup>Lauzun to Wadsworth, Lebanon, 20 December 1780, David Trumbull Papers, 1776-1789.

<sup>68</sup>Wadsworth to Lauzun, Newport, 23 December 1780, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 131.

rivers.<sup>69</sup>

In the course of the actual siege,<sup>70</sup> Rochambeau employed his junior officers by turns in the forward lines. There, having just relieved Dumas, Charles Lameth had both knees shattered by Hessian musketry while leading an attack upon one of the redoubts.<sup>71</sup> It was perhaps in tribute to his friend that Dumas was selected to escort the acting British commander, General O'Hara, during the surrender ceremonies.<sup>72</sup>

Before leaving Dumas' involvement in the American Revolution something must be said of its impact upon him and other young officers. From a purely military standpoint there does not appear to be any evidence in justification of the assertion made by some military writers that "the French officers who came back from America were among the first to introduce into Europe what had been learned there

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<sup>69</sup>"Je reçus de maréchal général des logis de l'Armée, M. de Béville, l'ordre de précéder les colonnes, et d'indiquer les camps et les positions que l'armée devait successivement occuper." Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.67. Cf. "Itineraries", 6 March 1781, PU Berthier Papers, cited in Rice and Brown, op. cit., II, p.27n, and George Washington, Certificate, H.Q. Head of Elk, 6 September 1781: The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, ed. by John Fitzpatrick (39 vols., Washington D.C., 1931-44), XXIII, p.90. (Hereinafter referred to as Writings of Washington.)

<sup>70</sup>For details of the French Army's participation in this campaign, see: Lauzun, "Journal des Opérations du Corps Français Sous le Commandement du Comte de Rochambeau", Gazette de France, 20 November 1781; Rostaing, Histoire de la Guerre d'Amérique 1775-1783 (Dépôt de la Guerre Monograph, 1860), AHG MR 238; and Claude Blanchard, Guerre d'Amérique: Journal de Campagne (Paris, 1880).

<sup>71</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.85n, Lauzun, "Journal des Opérations", p.442. The surgeon, Robillard, refused to operate and Charles fully recovered.

<sup>72</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.87.

about skirmishing".<sup>73</sup> In fact, the art of skirmishing had been taught by the Austrians during the War of Austrian Succession so that the French "probably had little left to learn from participation in the American War of Independence".<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, French experience during the War of Independence had been confined mainly to the siege of Yorktown, which was conducted by regular European methods. If any army can be said to have profited from its American experiences, it was the British army, for it had had to devise a means of countering the American irregulars and to adapt itself to campaigns in the wilderness.<sup>75</sup> With the French it was the political rather than the military aspects of the Revolution which impressed them most.<sup>76</sup> Dumas, for example, devoted considerable

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<sup>73</sup>Tom Wintingham, Weapons and Tactics (London, 1943), p.130. See also Captain Ronald Alcott Hall, Studies in Napoleonic Strategy (London, 1918), p.92, for a similar opinion.

<sup>74</sup>J. R. Western, "Armed Forces and the Art of War", NCMH, VIII, p.195.

<sup>75</sup>"The methods of their irregular corps (i.e. Tarleton, Simcoe and Ferguson) were to a great extent forced upon the whole of the British troops, owing partly to the deadly marksmanship of the American riflemen, but still more to the fact that almost every important action of the war was fought on heavily wooded ground." J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13 vols., London, 1902), III, p.529. The most notable of the British improvements was the reduction of the line of battle from three to two ranks; a change incorporated in the drill manual of 1788. See Fortescue (*ibid.*, pp.529-30 and 535-38) for other lesser improvements.

<sup>76</sup>"It was chiefly in the political arena rather than that of commerce, foreign policy or military strategy and tactics that the American Revolution influenced the French Revolution and related developments in Europe." Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York, 1971), p.435.

space in his Souvenirs to both the military and political affairs in America, but for the former he was content to quote verbatim the official report made by the Army; adding only details of his personal service,<sup>77</sup> while all the comments made about the latter, including the nature of local assemblies, tendencies in Quakers and Moravians, local social customs, etc., were the product of his own observation.<sup>78</sup> Even in the Précis des Événemens Militaires,<sup>79</sup> his magnum opus, which is filled with precedents from earlier campaigns, there is no intimation that the American Revolution had any profound effect whatsoever on military thinking in France.

Turning to the 'political lessons' of the American Revolution, it is clear that men such as Alexandre and Charles Lameth, Noailles, Ségur, Saint-Simon and Dumas all acknowledged their initial thinking about liberty first came from their American experience.<sup>80</sup> Soldiers generally are conservative by the nature of their profession as much as their

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<sup>77</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.85.

<sup>78</sup>America's condition, not the war, was the topic of discussion among the young officers on the voyage from Boston to the Antilles. Ibid., I, p.130.

<sup>79</sup>Mathieu Dumas, Précis des Événemens, ou Essais Historiques sur les Campagnes de 1799 à 1814 (19 vols., Paris, 1818-26) (hereinafter referred to as Précis).

<sup>80</sup>"But the future Revolutionary leaders - Lameth, Noailles, Dumas - if they had thought of reform at all at this stage (sic. voyage to America), had not strained at the thought. Their experience in America, like that of Lafayette and several of his aides, was to give them a different set of values." Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1942), p.95; Higginbotham (op.cit., p.435) supports Gottschalk's conclusion.



own inclinations, for once having defended something at the risk of their lives they are loath to see it changed or destroyed. The French officers returning from America were convinced that they had championed the cause of American liberty. However, for the most part it was a peculiarly limited form of liberty which they came to espouse, for the American Revolution was a political and not a social movement.<sup>81</sup> It was conducted throughout by the same social and political élite - primarily for the benefit of that élite even though its propaganda shared many of the elements of 18th century conceptions of liberty. Based upon this model, Dumas viewed liberty in a strictly political sense, hence his desire to bring that freedom to France while retaining the existing social order - a philosophy aptly summarised by his own device: "Principatum et libertatem".<sup>82</sup>

Dumas' impressions of General Washington conform to the usual pattern of eulogium which pervaded the French accounts;<sup>83</sup> he was especially struck by the manner of the

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<sup>81</sup>"Besides a substantial degree of continuity in leadership and stability of institutions, the Revolution was 'militarily conservative': Congress never contemplated a full scale guerrilla war likely resulting in the razing of towns and cities, the pillaging of fields and farms . . ."  
Higginbotham, op.cit., p.94.

<sup>82</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.550.

<sup>83</sup>The Marquis de Chastellux described him as "the greatest and best of men"; Axel Fersen more modestly considered his place as "illustrious, if not unique in our century". Arnold Whiteridge, Rochambeau (New York, 1965), p.101. Cf. Francois Jean Chastellux, Voyages dans l'Amérique Septentrionale dans les Années 1780, 1781, 1782 (Paris, 1786).

General and his paternal regard for Lafayette.<sup>84</sup> However, in one respect at least, Dumas was more perceptive than the others, for he had grasped that the excellent cooperation between the two armies was due in no small measure to Rochambeau's understanding of the difficulties which Washington had to endure.<sup>85</sup> Of these difficulties he wrote:

On a blâmé les Américains de s'être refroidis tout à coup après leurs premiers succès, et d'avoir bien plus manqué d'énergie que de moyens dans les dernières années. Il fallait chercher la cause de ce refroidissement dans les principes mêmes de la révolution et non dans le caractère national. Le premier enthousiasme ne pouvait durer; le fanatisme de la liberté avait fait surgir une armée, qui fut, dès son principe, soutenue par les succès; mais ces masses par leur composition même devaient se dissoudre au premier revers. On consommait à la fois toutes les ressources; chaque cultivateur, devenu soldat, dissipait le fruit de son économie, et retournait chez lui épuisé et fatigué de la guerre.<sup>86</sup>

He also realized that the desire for independence was not universal, nor was it even a majority who held it: "le parti du roi était encore considérable" while "le vœu général n'était pas pour l'indépendance" that was an "opinion fausse et trop accréditée parmi quelques Français".<sup>87</sup> He

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<sup>84</sup>Dumas served as Washington's escort from Newport to Providence during the General's first visit to the French camp and that winter met the General again at his own headquarters near West Point in New York. Dumas, op.cit., I, pp.44 and 53. Washington wrote to Rochambeau: "I had last evening the pleasure of seeing at my quarters Count de Charles (sic. Charlus), Count de Dillon and Mons. Dumat (sic. Dumas)". Washington to Rochambeau, New Windsor, 20 January 1781; Writings of Washington, XXI, p.121. Washington also wrote a letter of introduction to Congress for both Dillon and Dumas (24 January 1781, *ibid.*, XXI, p.136).

<sup>85</sup>Whitridge, op.cit., p.153.

<sup>86</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.114.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, I, p.116.

therefore reasoned that France would be able to preserve her influence in America only through strengthening her economic and diplomatic ties; otherwise she would ultimately be replaced by England because America, though no longer British politically, was still British culturally.<sup>88</sup>

Although the campaign had noticeably little effect upon Dumas in a military sense, his performance did not go unnoticed or unrewarded. Fifteen years later, Washington remembered him as "an officer of high estimation in the French Army".<sup>89</sup> When a new expedition to the West Indies was fitted out in Boston in 1782, the regiments were drawn from the force of the original army and as many of the older officers had returned to France, positions on the staff were filled by young officers.<sup>90</sup> Dumas, then the senior aide maréchal général des logis, was chosen by Rochambeau and Vioménil to be chief of staff with Alexandre Lameth, Dubourg and the two Berthiers - Alexandre and Caesar - as his assistants.<sup>91</sup> The ultimate object of the expedition was St. Domingo, but as the British had blockaded the island with eighteen ships-of-the-line as opposed to the ten French,

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., I, pp.119-22.

<sup>89</sup>George Washington to General Pickney, Mt. Vernon, 24 June 1797, LC George Washington Papers.

<sup>90</sup>For example, the Lauzun Legion was commanded by Dumas and A. Berthier on its return march to Boston because the Duke had already returned to France. Rice, op.cit., III, p.173. Dumas had also been charged with raising the fortifications of Portsmouth Va. after its capture in October 1781. Dumas, op.cit., I, pp.90-1.

<sup>91</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.107.



the latter chose instead to land at Porto-Cabello in Venezuela (10 February 1783) to await reinforcements. While there, Dumas, Alexandre Berthier, Ségur, Broglie, Champcenetz, Bozon de Talleyrand-Périgord (the younger brother of Charles Maurice) and Desoteux all set off to explore the interior "espèce de Bouffon".<sup>92</sup> In a remarkable journey lasting close to a month, they travelled over land as far as Caracas and then returned via the sea. By this time news that the war was over reached them and the entire allied fleet, including sixty three ships-of-the-line, returned to France after stopping briefly at St. Domingo.<sup>93</sup>

Return to France in June 1783 brought official recognition of his services during the campaign. On the recommendation of Rochambeau he was promoted to the rank of major and assigned to the newly created general staff (Corps d'état-major) under the Marquis d'Aguesseau.<sup>94</sup> Dumas' career could therefore be said to be continuing in the pattern first established when Puységur chose him as his aide-

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<sup>92</sup>Ibid., I, p.140; Count Louis Philippe de Ségur, Memoirs and Recollections of Count Segur (3 vols., London, 1835-27), I, pp.401-25; Alexandre Berthier, letter, St. Domingo, 26 April 1783, cited in Rice, op.cit., p.266.

<sup>93</sup>Dumas was unable to spend much time ashore at St. Domingo because he had contracted a fever. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.156.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., I, p.163. On Propose au Roi d'Accorder le Brevet de major et un traitement de quinze cent livres aux Dumas, 10 July 1783, AAG GD 395. The operation of the patronage system outside official regulations is well illustrated by the calculations made for Dumas' promotion. The normal period required for promotion from captain to major was five years but Dumas' promotion came after only three years. Cf. Hartmann, op.cit., p.17.

de-camp. As a member of the staff corps, he served as an aide, more often than not with the simple title of aide-de-camp, to the chiefs of the army, especially in matters concerning organisation. These projects varied considerably in importance and nature. One of Dumas' tasks was to sort and organise the archives of the navy (together with Capt. Bonneval and Marquis de la Prévalaye) (1785) while another was to prepare plans for the defence of all French colonies (1786).<sup>95</sup> However, there were notable exceptions to this pattern in the form of special missions of reconnaissance. The first of these, undertaken at the joint request of Marshals Ségur and Castries, was to the Levant in order to appraise the military position of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>96</sup>

The reasons for French concern over the Ottoman Empire lay in Catherine II's declaration of 19 April 1783 annexing the Crimea.<sup>97</sup> France, as the Porte's principal ally, had long feared this event as a portent of the Empire's destruction.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.405. Cf. Dumas, Traité de la Défense et la Conservation des Colonies (London and Brussels, 1777) LC JV 1861 D8.

<sup>96</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.163.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., I, p.164.

<sup>98</sup>The origins of French disquiet over the security of Constantinople go back to the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (21 July 1774) which followed the disastrous Russo-Turkish war begun in 1768. Even at that time it seemed that the Crimea, then independent, would inevitably be occupied by Russians as a *Mémoire* by the greatest contemporary French expert on the near-East had already pointed out (C. C. de Peyssonnel, "Reflexions politiques sur l'Indépendance des Tartares et sur la Navigation des Russes dans la Mer Noire", *AE Mémoires et documents*, XXX, 1758.) See Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London, 1966), pp.1-9.

Nor were the French alone in making this calculation, for Baron Thugut, the Austrian representative at Constantinople concluded that Russia would now be able to transport 20,000 men from Kerch to Constantinople in only 36 to 48 hours.<sup>99</sup> Together with the fear that Russia could soon put an end to the Ottoman Empire came the growing doubt in France as to whether it was worth preserving. Of the makers of French policy, Vergennes and Saint Priest had both served in Constantinople with the latter as early as 1770 suggesting that France should participate in, not oppose, any partition, and that she should demand Egypt as her share of the spoils.<sup>100</sup> Dumas' mission had, therefore, two purposes - first, to assess the capacity of the Turks to resist either the Russians or the French and, secondly, to determine which areas of the Levant would be most valuable for the conduct of a campaign there and to control or protect French commerce.

Dumas sailed from Toulon under the name of M. Vernon on the Corvette Badine.<sup>101</sup> Together with her captain, Bonneval, M. Vernon visited Constantinople and the Morea (September 1783), Crete (December 1783), Smyrna (January 1784), the Aegean and Troy (May 1784), Athens (June 1784), and finally Melos (July 1784). Upon their return to France in August 1784, Bonneval and Dumas prepared a joint report

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<sup>99</sup>Anderson, op.cit., p.4.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p.11.

<sup>101</sup>Also on board the corvette was an officer of the engineers, Lt. Col. Chabot, who was travelling to Constantinople under the name of M. de Serville to inspect the fortifications there. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.166.

on the state of the near East.<sup>102</sup> Their conclusion about Turkish power was indeed that it was on the point of crumbling completely.

On a dit souvent que l'Empire Turc n'était qu'un fantôme; il effrayait au moins par sa grandeur et par le rassemblement rapide de ses forces; mais aujourd'hui que nous avons divulgué le secret de sa faiblesse, ce n'est plus qu'une ombre qui n'a aucun poid dans la balance. Il est aisé de se convaincre de la nullité de ses moyens; on connaît la mauvaise constitution de ses armées et de sa marine, mais on n'imagine pas jusqu'à quel point l'esprit de rapine a corrompu toutes les branches.<sup>103</sup>

For the Russians to conquer the Turks by a land campaign via the Balkans would be long, arduous and uncertain owing to the natural strength of the area. However, a surprise naval landing at Constantinople could easily outflank the bulk of the Turkish army and secure a relatively easy victory, but absolute naval superiority, as in the last war, would have to be obtained first.<sup>104</sup> From the opposite direction, the keys to the Turkish position were the Morea, useful as a point of attack or retreat, and Crete, possession of which assured control of the communications between

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<sup>102</sup>Dumas and Bonneval, "Mémoire Militaire sur les Positions Relatives des Isles et des Côtes de l'Archipel du Levant"; 3 September 1784 - two copies are extant: ANF 1527 papiers Biron) and AHG MR 1616. A revised version is quoted in Dumas' Souvenirs, I, pp.289-304, 325-44.

<sup>103</sup>Dumas and Bonneval, op.cit., pp.29-30.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp.32-33. As for the fortifications of Constantinople itself, they had this to say: "Les anciens fortifications sont mauvaises et mal-armées, les nouvelles sont mal-entendues".



Constantinople and Europe.<sup>105</sup> It was emphasised that there was a very great danger that, were the Russians again to destroy the power of the Turkish fleet, only a few frigates would be necessary "pour gêner le commerce et les communications des Turcs".<sup>106</sup> This report was evidently well received. Marshal Castries requested that Dumas be promoted Colonel as "le prix d'un travail considérable de deux campagnes qu'il fait dans le levant . . .".<sup>107</sup> and Marshal Ségur proposed in addition to payment of 400 livres, a "gratification extraordinaire" of 7,200 livres.<sup>108</sup> The report itself did not immediately effect French policy, for growing financial difficulties made it impossible for France to take any action, but it gave added weight to later arguments for seizure of at least some Turkish possessions.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p.11. Dumas and Bonneval rightly considered these two positions to be the key to the control of trade with and within the Levant. See Maj. General I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Official History of the Second World War (5 vols., London, 1956), II, chapters V and VII for a similar assessment of the strategic importance of Greece and Crete, which indicates the soundness of Dumas' and Bonneval's views.

<sup>106</sup>Dumas and Bonneval, op.cit., p.16.

<sup>107</sup>Mémoire, s.d., AAG GD 395. This commission was accorded to Dumas on 2 December 1787. Each year is regarded as a separate campaign.

<sup>108</sup>Ségur to d'Erville, Versailles, 26 November 1784, AAG GD 395. A later letter to M. Veimerange (Versailles, 16 December 1784, AAG GD 395) attached to the former reveals that this "gratification" was accorded to Dumas by the King.

<sup>109</sup>"His (sic. Dumas') impression led Lafayette to concoct a glorious expedition against the Moslem states of North Africa through Crete and Egypt" Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Between the American and French Revolutions (Chicago, 1950), p.327.

In addition to his official report, Dumas kept a personal journal.<sup>110</sup> Extracts from it quoted in his Souvenirs reveal that he was possessed of a keen interest in antiquity as well as an avid curiosity. At Crete, for example, he thoroughly explored the remains of what he thought was the labyrinth and prepared a map of its passages.<sup>111</sup> It was the same wherever he went. At Athens:

Je m'arrêtai quelques jours chez le consul de France, M. Gaspari, pour examiner à loisir les antiquités que renfermaient la ville et la citadelle.<sup>112</sup>

The description he gives of just one temple (that of Theseus) covers two full pages and is complete with details of its structure and style as well as general appearance.

In 1784 the focus of French concern shifted from the East to Germany and the low countries. Joseph II's plan to re-open the mouth of the Scheldt was causing much animosity on the part of the Dutch, who feared a revival of Antwerp as a trade centre. Because France was desirous of Dutch goodwill as a counterbalance to British naval power, the Court of Versailles was not pleased with Austria's actions, but out of consideration for the family alliance, could not

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<sup>110</sup>"Pendant le cours de mon voyage, j'écrivis un journal sous la forme de lettres adressées à Madame de Croix, femme de beaucoup d'esprit, qui m'avait accueilli avec une bonté toute maternelle lorsque j'étais en garrison à Valenciennes, et aux bons conseils de laquelle je suis redevable de mes premiers succès." Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.166. There is no record of these letters having survived in either the Archives Nationales or the Archives de la Guerre.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*, I, pp.247-256. If the labyrinth had ever existed it was certainly not extant by the 18th century.

<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*, I, p.367.



openly enquire into her plans.<sup>113</sup> On 8 November 1784, therefore, Marshal Ségur directed Dumas to travel into Germany, incognito, and to observe the scale of Austrian preparations then in progress.<sup>114</sup> Dumas reported that magazines sufficient to support an army of 100,000 men had been assembled but that only 15,000 were actually to be sent to Belgium where, "la fermentation qui se manifestait dans ces provinces motivait assez de telles dispositions."<sup>115</sup> The importance of knowing the true Austrian intentions lay in a French note to Vienna of 17 November 1784 which made it clear that if hostilities developed France would support Holland. In this situation, were Austria contemplating the use of force, Alsace might well have been invaded.<sup>116</sup>

The Dutch were also involved in Dumas' final mission, undertaken in 1787, in company with Lambert and Saint Priest.<sup>117</sup> After first meeting with the Dutch to discuss plans for a joint defence of the country, the three journeyed to Amsterdam to assess at first hand whether the city was capable of defending itself against the Prussian invasion. Before they were able to return to France, Amsterdam

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<sup>113</sup>Ibid., I, p.397; Matthew Smith Anderson, "European Diplomatic Relations," NCMH, VIII, p.273.

<sup>114</sup>Ségur to Dumas, 8 November 1784, cited in Dumas, op.cit., I, p.398.

<sup>115</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.403.

<sup>116</sup>Anderson, op.cit., p.273. Ségur specifically mentions the security of Alsace in his instructions to Dumas (Dumas, op.cit., I, p.398).

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., I, pp.416-422.

capitulated. The Prince of Orange was reinstated and with him the country's pro-English, pro-Prussian policies. The following year, Dumas was detailed to prepare plans for an invasion of Holland intended to restore the pro-French patriot party. But events in France, particularly impending bankruptcy, soon terminated any possibility of further action.

As Dumas' military fortunes prospered so did his personal ones. Before the American campaign he had come to know André Philippe Delarue and his daughter Julie through an old friend from the regiment of Médoc, Poncet, who was allied to the family.<sup>118</sup> André was one of the *syndic des payeurs des rentes de la ville de Paris* and possessed considerable wealth.<sup>119</sup> Julie was then only ten years old and Dumas conceded that "J'osais à peine, à cause de la modicité de mes ressources, concevoir l'espérance d'un établissement si désirable."<sup>120</sup> But with his promotion upon the conclusion of the war and the excellent prospects his present position held for further advancement, Mme. Delarue was won over and convinced her husband to agree to the marriage of Julie, who was then fifteen. Mathieu Dumas the elder was delighted

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid., I, p.403. Her full name was Adélaïde Julie Delarue after her mother Henriette Adélaïde Chevenin. She was born in Paris on 24 May 1770. Acte de Mariage Dumas et Delarue, 30 Ventôse an VIII, AD (Seine) Réconstitution des Actes de l'Etat Civil.

<sup>119</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.403. These venal offices were recreated by Calonne in 1784 to sell for 300,000 livres each. J. F. Bosher, French Finances 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1970), pp.82-3.

<sup>120</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.404.

and the wedding ceremony, conducted by the local Bishop, took place at the chapel of the Royal Library in Montpellier.<sup>121</sup> There is no record of the dowry, or indeed of the marriage itself, but Dumas presumably benefited greatly from this alliance.<sup>122</sup>

Some records and accounts of the family's expenditure were fortunately preserved by the revolution when the papers of Dumas' brother, St. Marcel, who apparently was also living at 7 rue Thevenot, were sequestered.<sup>123</sup> In the months of January, May and September of 1789, for example, clothing bills were paid of 75 livres 17 sous, 411 livres 15 sous and 442 livres 17 sous respectively, all to LaGras and Co. located on rue St. Honoré. Four hundred forty-nine livres were also paid in March of that year to Guidi, a sculptor, for furnishings.<sup>124</sup> The most complete record is

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<sup>121</sup>Ibid., I, p.405.

<sup>122</sup>There is no reference to Dumas' marriage in the Archives at Montpellier (Cf. Table Alphabétique des contrôles de Mariage 1764-1791, [AD (Hérault) Série 4C.1498] nor in the family's private papers [AD (Hérault) IE 84].

<sup>123</sup>Included under the heading Guillaume Mathieu Dumas, Papiers Sequestres (AN T100) are papers belonging to Mathieu Dumas concerning forage, bills for clothing and perfume, repairs to the house, and an account of his expenses while at Metz in 1791. Various house numbers are mentioned in the address - 7, 19 and 37 - but the street is always rue Thevenot. Also seized were St. Marcel's military records from 7 rue Thevenot (AN T1619) indicating that he may have shared the address. From bills addressed to him, St. Fulcrand appears to have resided at the family's country house at Soisy-sous-Étoiles, in the department of Seine-et-Oise.

<sup>124</sup>These are all listed as "comptes acquittés: 1789". AN T100.

of forage and stable costs presented as monthly figures for the years 1786, 1787 and 1788, charged to Mathieu Dumas and Delarue. These came to over 3867 livres during 1788 alone. Dumas' salary of 2400 livres was clearly insufficient and he must have been forced to draw heavily upon his wife's resources.<sup>125</sup>

Despite the differences in their ages and fortunes and the upheavals of the Revolution, the marriage proved to be enduring. Indeed there is much evidence in their conduct during the turmoils of the Revolution to suggest that their union was based upon genuine affection as much as convenience. Julia remained faithful to Mathieu even after they had been divorced to protect her and their property, even venturing so far as to obtain a passport to visit him during his second period of exile. While Mathieu, for his part, remarried Julia upon his return to France even though by then both families' fortunes had been completely ruined.<sup>126</sup> In his Souvenirs, Dumas describes the period beginning with his wedding and culminating with the events of July 1789 as "le meilleur temps de ma vie" for it was a time of both domestic happiness and professional success.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>Compte d'achat de Fourage, Consommation et Frais d'Écurie communs entre Messieurs de la Rue et Dumas. AN T100.

<sup>126</sup>See infra Chapters IV, V and VI. After Julia's death in 1807, he never married again.

<sup>127</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.425. Two of their three children were born during this era: Cornelia (1787) and Octavia (1789).

By seniority, but again with the aid of his patrons, whose influence was needed to allow his four years at school to be counted, Dumas was awarded the Cross of St. Louis in April 1787, and that December he was promoted to the rank of Colonel as recompense for his mission to the Levant.<sup>128</sup>

When manoeuvres were held at St. Omer under the Prince of Condé, Dumas was made Premier aide Maréchal des Logis (1st. Asst. quartermaster-general).<sup>129</sup> Then he was appointed to supervise, under orders of Marquis de Lambert, all details of transport and military convoys within France, with two friends, Majors Poncet and Alexandre Berthier, as his associates.<sup>130</sup> But undoubtedly the summit of his career under the Ancien Regime came when he was selected by Puységur, then Minister of War, to succeed Guibert as rapporteur to the Council of War.<sup>131</sup> He received

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<sup>128</sup>D'Aguesseau, *État des Services du Sieur Mathieu Dumas*, April 1787, AAG GD 395 (Croix de St. Louis folder) and *On Propose au Roy d'Accorder le Rang de Mestre de Camp d'Infanterie*, n p , 2 December 1787, AAG GD 395. In addition, Dumas was granted a pension of 2,800 livres on 7 August 1788. *Brevet d'une Pension*, AAG GD 395.

<sup>129</sup>Dumas, *op.cit.*, I, p.423. In all, two camps were organised, one at St. Omer and one at Metz, each containing 18 to 20 thousand men. Cf. Hartmann, *op.cit.*, p.37.

<sup>130</sup>Louis XVI to Dumas, Versailles, 1 January 1789, AAG GD 395.

<sup>131</sup>The Conseil de la Guerre was organised on 9 October 1787 in response to a suggestion made to the King by Guibert. Included were lieutenant generals Puységur, Grib-eauval, Guines and Jaucourt; as Maréchaux de camp: Esterhazy, Fourcroy, Lambert and Autichamp with Guibert as rapporteur and rédacteur. Hartmann, *op.cit.*, p.27.



the same brevet as had Guibert, authorising him "sans voix délibérative, pour, en ladite qualité en rédiger les délibérations, les projets d'ordonnance et de réglemens, faire tenir en ordre tous les papiers relatifs au conseil" for which services he was to receive 5,000 livres.<sup>132</sup>

Whether the Revolution had taken place or not, Dumas' appointment to the Council of War would have been the summit of his military career. His rise without seniority had been the work of a few noble patrons, members of the liberal or reforming aristocracy - primarily Rochambeau, Castries and Puységur. The success of his career was due to them and was identified with them. Thus while they were in the ascendancy he could be reasonably well assured of recognition, but these nobles represented only a minority of the second estate and the reforms they had enacted in 1788 had made them very unpopular with their peers.<sup>133</sup> The nobles at Berry were so pronounced in their opposition to the reforms of the Council of War that they refused admittance to Guibert when he came to justify his position.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>Louis XVI, Brevet de Rédacteur du Conseil de la Guerre, Versailles, 3 May 1789, AAG GD 395.

<sup>133</sup>There were 154 noble officers who sat in the États-Generaux but of these, 50 or less were among the liberal minority. (Hartmann, op.cit., p.91). By the ordinances of 1788, many of the unnecessary grades of officers were eliminated - such as the Colonel-en-second - and many of the major redundancies were reduced (Ibid., p.29, and Wilkinson, op.cit., p.92).

<sup>134</sup>It was in consequence of this treatment that Guibert resigned as rapporteur and published Précis de ce qui s'est passé à mon égard à l'assemblée du Berry (25 March 1788), BN Lb39 1438, cited in Hartmann, op.cit., p.75.

Vaublanc expressed the opinion of the majority of nobles when he wrote:

par leur ridicules théories et leur instabilité perpétuelle, ils (sic. reformers) préparaient l'une des causes les plus actives du renversement de la monarchie; le profond dégoût du service qu'ils inspièrent aux officiers devait produire des fruits amers, dont la plupart de ceux - ci devaient ensuite être les victimes.<sup>135</sup>

The court and the aristocratic resurgence of the 1780s made reforms in the army a political issue and in so doing made certain that the liberal minority would eventually be defeated, as indeed they were with Necker's fall in 1789. Equally, the inescapable conclusion is that when the liberal faction lost power, Dumas would be encompassed in their ruin. The conservative nobility would not look favourably on one whose merit lay in the zeal he had shown serving their opponents. The end of the Ancien Regime may well have been the best of times for Dumas but, revolution or not, for him it was the calm before the storm.

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<sup>135</sup>Bon Vincent Marie Vienot de Vaublanc, Mémoires Sur la Révolution de France (3 vols., Paris, 1833), I, p.190. Cf. Hartmann, op.cit., p.48.

## CHAPTER II

### THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

The enthusiasm which greeted the calling of the States General throughout France was shared by the new rapporteur to the Council of War, although later, in self-reproach, he did reflect that:

Jamais peut-être le reproche de légèreté et de témérité adressé dans tous les temps au caractère français, ne fut plus mérité. On parlait de l'établissement d'une nouvelle constitution de l'Etat, comme d'une oeuvre facile, comme d'un événement naturel.<sup>1</sup>

Dumas was certainly well connected with the reforming party, both in the Assembly, amongst whose members he counted the two Lameths his best friends,<sup>2</sup> and in the army, where his patrons and colleagues were all advocates of reform. As an officer of fortune who had risen as far as he could reasonably be expected to in an army dominated by the court nobility, he was committed to challenging the traditional position

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<sup>1</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, I p.426.

<sup>2</sup>E. D. Brady, The Life of Barnave (2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1915), I, p.124. Dumas was also a friend of a third brother, Theodore (who was not a member of the Assembly), as well as of Barnave, Adrien Duport and Lafayette.

of the nobility.<sup>3</sup>

For the reasons detailed in Chapter One, the Council of War came to share the fortunes of the reforming party. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers held at Marly (19 June 1789) to discuss the royal declaration, Saint Priest and LaLuzerne joined with Necker and Montmorin to form a 'progressive party' which wished to recognise the National Assembly and to a limited extent supported voting 'par tête'.<sup>4</sup> When this policy was abandoned by Louis XVI on 11 July, he not only dismissed Necker but also Montmorin, Saint Priest and even Puységur, at which point LaLuzerne resigned.<sup>5</sup> The Council of War was immediately suspended and "bientôt après supprimé".<sup>6</sup> No member of the Council was employed by the army's new commander, Marshal

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<sup>3</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.423: For example, Chevalier de Saint-Maime, Captain commandant of the Artois Dragoons, after 26 years of service commented: "Voyant, avec un regret infini, que le zèle le plus actif et l'exactitude la plus scrupuleuse ne lui procuraient aucun avancement". Based upon "Voeux et doléances adressés à l'Assemblée Nationale par divers régiments", cited in Hartmann, op.cit., p.21. Of the army's reduced total of 9,578 officers, only a bare 1,100 were officers of fortune. Cf. Ernest d'Hauterive, L'Armée Sous La Révolution: 1789-1794 (Paris, 1894), p.41.

<sup>4</sup>Barentin, Villedieu and Puységur favoured voting 'par ordre'. Cf. Jacques Godechot, The Taking of the Bastille (London, 1970), p.185.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. Puységur was included not because of his political position but because he was part of the army's reforming group.

<sup>6</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.429 and François Emmanuel Guignard, Count de Saint Priest, Mémoires (Paris, 1929), p.230.

Broglie.<sup>7</sup> Dumas, however, was awarded a pension of 3,000 livres in recognition of his service and allowed to remain at Versailles to sort out the papers of the Council.<sup>8</sup>

News of Necker's dismissal reached Paris on 12 July, creating huge crowds at the Palais Royal, where orateurs, including Camille Desmoulins, gave the call to arms.<sup>9</sup> When this crowd was charged by dragoons of Royal Allemand,<sup>10</sup> they were attacked in turn by Gardes Françaises who had broken out of their barracks near the hotel de Montmorency.<sup>11</sup> The

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<sup>7</sup>"Aucun des membres de ce conseil ne fut employé par le maréchal Broglie." Dumas, op.cit., I, p.429; cf. Saint Priest, op.cit., p.280. André Lasseray in the Dictionnaire Biographique des Généraux et Amiraux Français de la Révolution et de l'Empire (2 vols., Paris, 1934), writes that Dumas was Broglie's aide-de-camp at this time, but the draft of a letter from the Ministry of War indicates that Dumas had been Lambert's aide-de-camp since 1 January 1789. Cf. Note Pour une Lettre à M. Dumas, np, 10 October 1789, AAG GD 395.

<sup>8</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.429. The date of the pension's consideration was 12 July 1789. Ministry of War, Note, 12 July 1789, AAG GD 395.

<sup>9</sup>Joseph Victor Pierre Besenval, Mémoires (2 vols., Paris, 1821), II, p.81.

<sup>10</sup>In the attempt by the King to regain his ascendancy over the Assembly, troops of the line were brought into Paris. Regiments of foreigners were preferred because they were considered to be less susceptible to subversion by the people. Those involved were: Salis Samade, Château Vieux, Diesbeck, Royal Suisse, Roemer, Bercheny, Esterazy and Royal Allemand. P. J. B. Bouchez and P. C. Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française (40 vols., Paris, 1834), II, p.30.

<sup>11</sup>The regiment Gardes Françaises was one of the élite formations in the French army. However, it had close ties with the city of Paris because many of the rank and file were employed in civilian professions as well. "Le régiment des gardes françaises," wrote Besenval (op.cit., II, p.358), "continuellement sollicité, gagné par l'argent qu'on lui prodiguait; donnait de jour en jour de nouvelles preuves du peu fond qu'il y avait à faire sur lui." See also Hauterive, op.cit., p.52; Godechot, op.cit., p.84, and for its ranking in seniority, General Louis Auguste Victor Vincent Susane, Histoire de l'Infanterie Française (2 vols., Paris, 1876), I, p.218.



fighting would have continued had not Baron Besenval, Commandant of Paris, intervened and ordered the Swiss and German regiments to retire to the barracks of the Gardes Françaises and that regiment to camp on the Champ du Mars.<sup>12</sup>

This was the situation on 13 July when Dumas arrived in Paris to report to Lambert. Crowds in search of arms, forced him to spend the night with General Paris at his home on rue des Vieilles Andriettes.<sup>13</sup> The circumstance that Lambert was with Besenval on the Champ du Mars made Dumas a witness to both the army's inability to take any action and to the invasion of the Invalides.<sup>14</sup> The events of 14 July caused consternation at Versailles. There LaVauguyon presented a memorandum detailing a plan for re-establishing order in Paris through the deployment of the foreign regiments. According to the Duke des Cars, to whom it was presented, this plan was the work of Dumas.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>The Champ du Mars contained one of the camps into which the regiments brought to Paris were quartered. Besenval, op.cit., II, p.364; Hauterive, op.cit., p.57.

<sup>13</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.431.

<sup>14</sup>"L'avis des officiers-généraux réunis à l'École-Militaire, fut que cette effervescence devenait impossible à réprimer, d'autant que nos troupes s'ébranlaient visiblement; qu'on les pratiquait, en dépit de notre vigilance; et qu'un colonel m'assura, les larmes aux yeux, que son régiment ne marcherait point." Besenval, op.cit., II, p.366. Over 32,000 muskets were seized at the Invalides because the veterans Besenval detailed to disarm the weapons sided with the insurgents.

<sup>15</sup>François Joseph de Perusse, Duke des Cars, Mémoires de Duc des Cars (2 vols., Paris, 1890), II, p.78. "Je ne passerai pas sous silence que le mémoire était de M. Mathieu Dumas." The plan was presented on the evening of the 14th.

The Duke considered that:

Le Mémoire était excellent, les moyens indiqués aussi parfaitement appliqués aux lieux et aux circonstances. S'il eût été suivi, le Palais Royal, vrai foyer de tout désordre, et Paris entier étaient contenus. La conception du plan était aussi militaire que l'exécution en devait être humaine et conforme aux vues si pacifiques de Louis XVI.<sup>16</sup>

But events had already gone too far, and Marshal Broglie was forced to advise Louis that the army could no longer be relied upon even to restore order. Dumas' plan was abandoned and Louis capitulated.<sup>17</sup>

Dumas, in preparing this plan, appears not to have intended the preservation of royal power so much as the restoration of order. He had been alarmed, as had many of the officers present on the Champ du Mars, by the breakdown of civil order. Therefore, he readily accepted Lafayette's request for aid in organising the Paris militia, to which the general had given the new title of National Guard.<sup>18</sup> In one sense, Dumas' involvement with this corps antedated Lafayette's, for Lafayette was proclaimed the

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., II, p.79.

<sup>17</sup>Godechot, op.cit., p.253 and 257. The King had been left with only two alternatives: either to proceed to Metz and lead the army from there or concede to the Assembly and Paris by recalling Necker. Louis adopted the latter course against the advice of his queen and Breteuil because it would have been extremely hazardous to travel through an excited countryside with an unreliable escort and because he feared that the Assembly might make Orleans king, were he to leave Paris. On this last point, see Albert Mathiez, La Révolution Française (3 vols., Paris, 1922), I, p.61.

<sup>18</sup>This proposal was made by Lafayette to the Assembly on 16 July 1789, Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., II, p.130.

commander of the militia during a visit of deputies to Paris following the 14th of July,<sup>19</sup> while Dumas had already been at work preparing another memorandum on the organisation of a Garde Bourgeoise, another name for the Paris militia.<sup>20</sup> Thus, when Lafayette and his military committee began the task of organising a national guard, he had a ready-made plan available:

Les bases contenues dans cette note (sic. Note Pour Servir Au Mémoire Sur la Formation des Milices Parisiennes) furent unanimement adoptées par la comité militaire, et le général laFayette, chargé de l'exécution de ces dispositions, me remit la minute écrite de ma main et que j'ai conservée.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup>The proclamation of LaFayette as commander of the militia and Bailly as mayor of Paris occurred as the deputies were preparing to depart the Hotel de Ville for Notre Dame; according to most authorities the event was spontaneous. Extrait du Procès-verbal de la Commune, Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., II, p.122. Cf. Bailly, op.cit., II, p.24-7. The then commander, LaSalle, graciously volunteered to resign and serve as LaFayette's second-in-command. On 16 July, LaFayette proposed to the Comité Permanent de l'Hôtel de Ville and the Assemblée Générale des Electeurs to form a military committee from deputies selected by each district of Paris. Sigismond Lacroix, Actes de la Commune de Paris Pendant la Révolution (1 série, 8 vols., Paris, 1884), I, p.16.

<sup>20</sup>Dumas received this assignment on the recommendation of his friend Alexandre Lameth. Alexandre, when asked to organise the militia by Moreau de Saint-Mery, had responded: "Membre des États-Généraux, je ne puis pas disposer d'un moment; mais si vous l'approuvez, je vais prier mon ami Mathieu Dumas, qui en est très capable, de faire promptement une organisation de ce projet, et il vous la soumettra." Theodore de Lameth, Mémoires, ed. by Eugene Welvert (Paris, 1913), pp.110-17. The Garde Bourgeoise was first proposed on 25 June 1789 by the Assemblée Générale des Electeurs but serious study only began on 11 July. A total of 48,000 men were enrolled on 13 July as a result of Louis' actions. Lacroix, op.cit., I, p.69. (Eclaircissements.)

<sup>21</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.439. Lafayette considered Dumas to be the permanent Rapporteur of the committee. Louis Gottschalk and Margaret Maddox, Lafayette in the French Revolution: Through the October Days (Chicago, 1969), p.105.

With the aid of Dumas' plan, the Military Committee was able to complete the "Règlement" for the organisation of the National Guard on 31 July.<sup>22</sup> In almost all matters of organisation, Dumas' ideas were accepted with little or no modification.<sup>23</sup> Each district would contain one battalion composed of five companies of 100 men, the total infantry for Paris thereby comprising six divisions (31,058 men).<sup>24</sup> In each battalion there would be one professional, full-time company; these companies were to be formed from the Gardes Françaises and the Swiss and they would be responsible for everyday routines of police duty. The remaining companies, composed of volunteers, were to be utilized solely for parades and for emergencies.<sup>25</sup> Only on the matters of

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<sup>22</sup> Comité Militaire (N.B. this was a committee of the Commune de Paris and should not be confused with the Assembly's Comité Militaire), Règlement Pour la Formation, Organisation, Solde, Police et Administration de l'Infanterie Nationale Parisienne (Paris, 31 July 1789) BN Lb<sup>40</sup> 24.

<sup>23</sup> Comité Militaire, Procès-Verbal de la Formation et des Opérations du Comité Militaire de la Ville de Paris: 1<sup>ere</sup> Partie 16 Juillet au 30 Septembre 1789. BN Lf<sup>133</sup> 122.

<sup>24</sup> "Chaque bataillon serait formé de cinq compagnies, chacun de cent hommes . . ." composed of "d'une partie de soldats réguliers, engagés et tenus dans une exacte discipline, payés pour faire continûment le service que les bourgeois ne pourraient faire à des périodes fixes sans se déranger de leurs utiles occupations; et d'une beaucoup plus grande partie de bourgeois, volontairement immatriculés dans chaque district et dans une proportion relative à la population et à l'espèce de population". Dumas, op.cit., I, pp.435-37. Dumas also specified that there were to be six divisions of ten battallions each.

<sup>25</sup> "Les compagnies des gardes françaises seraient conservées entières, et celles des grenadiers seraient attachées au premier bataillon de chacune de six divisions". Ibid.



cavalry and artillery did the committee differ with Dumas' proposals. Whereas Dumas wished to attach ten cavalrymen to each professional company, they decided to form autonomous units and instead of the sixty piece artillery train Dumas advocated, they decided not to form any units at all.<sup>26</sup>

Dumas continued to aid the committee throughout the summer and he also seconded Lafayette in the latter's negotiations with the Gardes Françaises over their terms of entry into the National Guard.<sup>27</sup> Although Dumas was not included in Lafayette's staff when it was organised on 12 August, he was made Adjudant-Général des Logis in the guard to correspond with his rank in the regular army.<sup>28</sup> This confirmed his role in the guard as an organiser rather than as an officer of the line exercising direct command in day to day situations. St. Marcel Dumas, who was at this time director of the hospital of the Gardes Françaises which now became that of the National Guard, was nominated by Lafayette, on his brother's recommendation, for the rank of major in one of the six divisions into which the guard had been formed.<sup>29</sup> The first battalion of the National

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<sup>26</sup> Comité Militaire, Règlement Concernant la Cavalerie Nationale Parisienne, 20 September 1789. Bibliothèque Carnavalet, dossier 150. Cf. Lacroix, op.cit., I, p.238.

<sup>27</sup> Dumas, op.cit., I, p.442. Cf. Lacroix, op.cit., I, p.121.

<sup>28</sup> Dumas, op.cit., I p.442. Dumas was also enrolled as a simple fusilier in his own district Bonne-Nouvelle. Lafayette's staff consisted of Gouvion (chief of staff), Lajard, LaColombe, Jacques Souet d'Ermingny and Joseph Leonard Poirey. Gottschalk and Maddox, op.cit., p.189.

<sup>29</sup> Lacroix, op.cit., I, pp.559-60.



Guard, that of St. André des Arts, was assembled by 24 August; by the end of September the regulations for service were ready and on 27 September a mass consecration of sixty standards of the guard was held at Notre Dame.<sup>30</sup>

One result of the Great Fear and the events of July was that citizens in Paris and throughout the countryside had armed themselves and were therefore better able to disrupt the flow of provisions, through the seizure of grain convoys, both to the capital and within Paris herself. On 28 July, Dumas was dispatched by Necker to Rouen to organise an escort of armed National Guards for the protection of the grain convoy there on its journey to Paris.<sup>31</sup> Saint Priest, reinstated as a minister with the return of Necker, later gave him a similar mission, but instead of grain, Dumas was to convoy 6,000 muskets destined to arm the Parisian National Guard.<sup>32</sup> Dumas acquitted himself successfully on both these missions, and while they were not of great significance in themselves, they do serve to illustrate the extent of his contact with the guard and the wide scope of his assignments.

September brought Dumas new duties similar to those which had been performed under the Council of War. Working

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., II, p.89.

<sup>31</sup>Gottschalk and Maddox, op.cit., p.135; Dumas, op.cit., I, p.443. Cf. Lacroix, op.cit., I, p.331.

<sup>32</sup>Saint Priest to Bailly, Versailles, 17 August 1789, and LaTour du Pin (Jean Frederic Gouvenet) to Lafayette, Versailles, 17 August 1789, cited in Lacroix, op.cit., I, p.254-55.

with the Minister of War, LaTour du Pin,<sup>33</sup> and his son Gouvernet (brother-in-law to the Lameths), Dumas aided in the preparation of a Mémoire to the King summarising the reforms needed by the army.<sup>34</sup> This work was divided into three sections covering the constitution, composition and reorganisation of the army. It not only dealt with the structure of the armed forces, but also their employment - advocating the formation of four permanent active territorial armies along lines similar to those in which the Prussian and Russian forces had been divided.<sup>35</sup> As this report became the basis of the work of the Assembly's military committee, Dumas was consulted by its president, Alexandre Lameth, and by other members, such as Bureau de Pusy, on matters relating to the organisation of the army.<sup>36</sup>

Because of his work with the Minister of War, Dumas was present at Versailles during the October days. As a representative of the National Guard, he even attended the infamous banquet held by the Gardes du Corps in honour of

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<sup>33</sup>Puységur had been Minister of War until 12 July 1789. He was succeeded in turn by Broglie (12-16 July), Saint Priest (16 July - 4 August) and then LaTour du Pin (4 August - 8 November 1790). Emile G. Léonard, L'Armée et Ses Problèmes au XVIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (Paris, 1958), p.306.

<sup>34</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.444. Dumas adds that this was in his capacity as Director General of the Dépôt de la Guerre but this appointment was not made until May 1791 according to a Note dated 13 May 1791. AAG GD 395.

<sup>35</sup>The armies to be created were those of Flanders, Alsace, the Alps and Mediterranean, and the Pyrenees and Ocean. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.450.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., I, p.466.

the Flander's regiment.<sup>37</sup> But although he was a witness to the events of 5 and 6 October, Dumas was without authority and hence did not participate other than as a spectator and companion to Lafayette. His sole contribution to the affair came during the night of 5 October, when Lafayette was attempting to persuade his escort of national guardsmen to wait outside the chateau of Versailles and to allow him to enter alone. Dumas and Gouvernet, who were escorting the general had themselves to plead with the grenadiers and were successful because Dumas was well known to the men, presumably because of his contact with them during the period of their formations.<sup>38</sup>

Although he had been more a hostage than a leader during the crisis,<sup>39</sup> Lafayette emerged from the event as

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<sup>37</sup>The Flanders regiment had been ordered to Versailles as part of the court's renewed attempt to use force to break the dead lock in the Assembly over the powers to be granted to the King under the proposed constitution. Dumas claims to have been "profondément attristé" by the conduct of officers after the appearance of the royal family, when they trampled the national cockade underfoot. Dumas, op. cit., I, p.450. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., V, p.54. The parisiennes were upset as much by the fact that these banquets (held on 2, 3, and 4 October) occurred during a time of food crises as they were by their royalist nature. Gottschalk and Maddox, op.cit., p.323, and Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., V, p.62-67.

<sup>38</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.456.

<sup>39</sup>"...Lafayette, ce jour-là, n'était pas un chef, mais un ôtage." Jean Egret, La Révolution des Notables: Mounier et les Monarchiens (Paris, 1950), p.187.

the most powerful man in France.<sup>40</sup> His power ultimately rested upon the reliability of the guard to preserve order in Paris and in the surrounding countryside. Within the city discipline in the guard was improved to such an extent that by the end of the month (21 October) Michel Adrien was hanged for trying to foment disorder.<sup>41</sup> To secure the countryside, Lafayette accepted the command of the guard in an area extending for 20 miles around Paris, and to organise the various guard units which were now included within his enlarged command, he turned once again to Dumas, whom he made his aide-de-camp on 10 October.<sup>42</sup>

Although Lafayette's personal position may have profited from the aftermath of the October Days, his party and the moderates in general suffered from an erosion of their support caused by a hardening of political attitudes. Dumas concluded that for this reason the October Days were one of the most crucial events in the entire course of the Revolution:

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<sup>40</sup>"He was now Louis XVI's majordomo, a sort of shogun to an irresolute occidental mikado, and for months to come he was to be the most powerful man in France." Gottschalk and Maddox, op.cit., p.385. Lafayette also profited from the departure of his major rival in popularity, the Duke d'Orleans, for England, on 7 October.

<sup>41</sup>George Rudé, "The Outbreak of the French Revolution", NCMH, VIII, p.679.

<sup>42</sup>Note Pour une Lettre à M. Dumas, 10 October 1789, AAG GD 395. Dumas was now aide-maréchal général des logis with the rank of colonel. Besides organising the National Guard in the area around Paris he was also responsible for surveillance outside of Paris. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.466.

Dès ce jour, l'opposition aristocratique du haut clergé et de la majorité de la noblesse considéra le roi comme prisonnier, le trône comme renversé et vacant, tous les actes du pouvoir royal comme frappés de nullité, et la couronne de France comme déposée entre les mains et sous la protection des armes de l'étranger. D'un autre côté, un parti républicain, faction de niveleurs, d'abord insignifiante et méprisée, égarait l'esprit public et devenait de plus en plus redoutable aux amis d'une sage liberté sous le prétexte spécieux de combattre cette opposition . . . <sup>43</sup>

He considered that the moderates, placed between these two factions, could not effectively curtail the excesses of one without giving advantage to the other.<sup>44</sup> Though these observations were written with the benefit of thirty years' hindsight, Dumas' ensuing conduct during 1790 and 1791 revealed that even at the time he well understood the need for moderation.

By February 1790, the decrees relating to the reorganisation of the army along the lines determined by LaTour du Pin's report were passed and commissioners were selected to carry out this reorganisation in the departments. Dumas, Segrettier and du Tremblay were sent to Seine-et-Marne.<sup>45</sup> Following the completion of this work, Dumas began the first of four assignments that were to occupy him until he entered the Legislative Assembly in 1791. Viewed collectively, the missions to Montauban and Strasbourg,

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<sup>43</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.460.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., I, p.466. Details of the debates on the reorganisation of the army are given in Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., VI, pp.406-434.



his role in the return of the King from Varennes and his governorship of Metz, represent an initial exposure to the responsibilities of command in situations of civil and military disorder.

The problems encountered in Montauban and Strasbourg were of a similar origin. In both cases the Assembly's legislation regarding the Roman Catholic Church and the attendant hostility in Catholics which it produced, was exploited by the aristocratic party for counter-revolutionary purposes. In the first of the areas with which Dumas was concerned, Périgord, Guyenne and Languedoc, the hostility between Catholics and Protestants provided the immediate cause of the civil disorder. As the Protestants, who were generally merchants, had enthusiastically supported the Revolution, many Catholics, as much in opposition to the Protestants as out of any conviction, declared themselves opposed to it.<sup>46</sup> At Turin, the Princes were persuaded by Froment, a lawyer from Nîmes, that this hostility could be developed into an insurrection against the Assembly. He returned to Nîmes as the Princes' plenipotentiary just as the disturbances broke out.<sup>47</sup> Froment and others like him<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Jacques Godechot, La Contre-Révolution: Doctrine et Action: 1789-1804 (Paris, 1961), p.164.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Dumas was convinced that Count de Lautrec and Viscount de Mirabeau were also engaged in similar activities. The latter was with his regiment in Perpignan at this time. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.468.

may not have begun the trouble, but their presence to capitalize upon it made the preservation of order all the more imperative.

The specific problem in Montauban had its origins in July 1789 with the formation of a local National Guard.<sup>49</sup> At that time three battalions and one squadron of dragoons were organised consisting almost exclusively of Protestants, although they represented only one-sixth of the total population.<sup>50</sup> Catholics organised a new unit of volunteers in February under the pretext of fighting brigands; these volunteers became a fourth battalion on 30 April in defiance of the Assembly's ordinances limiting the number of battalions.<sup>51</sup> During the same month a pamphlet appeared entitled, Avis aux catholiques de Montauban which incited

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<sup>49</sup>Principal sources for the disturbances in Montauban are: the procès-verbal of the municipality and various proclamations contained in the Archives Départementales Tarn-et-Garonne, série L Cote L199; Pierre Jacques Vieillard, "Rapport fait sur les Troubles survenus dans la ville de Montauban" (Paris, 1790), B.M. F.1247 (1); and the "Rapport fait à l'Assemblée Nationale par les Citoyens Militaires, qui furent assaillis et Emprisonnés dans cette desastreuse journée," B.M. R.251 (15). For an excellent description of the formation of National Guards in one of the provinces, see Grenier de Cardenal, Recrutement de l'Armée en Périgord Pendant la Période Révolutionnaire (Périgueux, 1911), chapter I.

<sup>50</sup>Vieillard, op.cit., p.22.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p.20. "Rapport fait à l'Assemblée Nationale par les Citoyens Militaires," op.cit., p.2.

the inhabitants to oppose the National Assembly.<sup>52</sup> Violence between Catholics and Protestant national guardsmen broke out during an attempt to inventory the monastery of the Cordeliers, on 10 May, which unfortunately also happened to be the first day of Rogation and hence a public holiday.<sup>53</sup> Five dragoons were killed by the crowd and fifty-five others, after being paraded through the streets, were placed in prison.<sup>54</sup> News of the events at Montauban was spread by other Protestants who had been forced to flee the city. In Bordeaux the National Guard organised a relief expedition 4,000 strong under their local commander, M. de Courpon. The mayor and municipal officers of Bordeaux issued a proclamation which spoke of: "le sang des citoyens a coulé à Montauban, et tout nous porte à croire que c'est celui de vrais patriotes" and referred to the Catholics as "fanatiques qui ont fait servir la religion de prétexte à

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p.23. The pamphlet contained an invitation to meet at the church of the Cordeliers (23 April) and four principal points:

- 1) to declare the Catholic religion the sole religion of state;
- 2) to preserve Montauban's episcopal seat, religious orders, seminary and hospital;
- 3) to force the administration to petition the King and the Assembly to suspend the inventory of the religious orders;
- 4) to request the vicaires-généraux to order public prayer for all communicants.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p.25; D. Ligou "Jeanbon Saint-André et la Journée du 10 Mai 1790 à Montauban", AHRF (XXI, 1949), pp.229-40. Cf. "Rapport fait à l'Assemblée Nationale par les Citoyens Militaires", op.cit.

<sup>54</sup>Vieillard, op.cit., p.33. Jeanbon Saint-André to l'Assemblée Nationale, auprès Montauban, 11 May 1790, AHRF (XXI, 1949), p.233.

leurs abominables complots".<sup>55</sup> In response to the march of the Bordelais, the count d'Esparbès, commander of Périgord, prepared to resist their entry into Montauban with the regiment of Languedoc.<sup>56</sup>

The attitude of the Assembly was far from conciliatory. Thouret, acting in his capacity as president, wrote to the municipal officers of Bordeaux:

vous vous êtes empressés de faire marcher un détachement pour rétablir le calme dans cette ville. Secourir des frères en péril, ramener un peuple égaré à sa douceur naturelle sont les devoirs les plus pressants de tous les bons citoyens.<sup>57</sup>

Dumas was dispatched by Saint Priest with orders from the King for Lieutenant General de Verteuil to assume command of Périgord, Guyenne, and Haut-Languedoc and to suppress all resistance.<sup>58</sup> As the courier was also to serve as M. de Verteuil's chief of staff, an officer with experience in handling national guardsmen and the regular army was an invaluable asset. Dumas filled this requirement admirably, holding as he did commissions in both the army and

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<sup>55</sup>Fumel, Maire de Bordeaux, Arrêté de MM. Les Maire et les Officiers Municipaux Relatif aux Troubles de Montauban (Bordeaux, 15 May 1790), pp. 3-4, BM R251 (15).

<sup>56</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.457. The existing documents for Montauban support the accuracy of Dumas' Souvenirs for this mission.

<sup>57</sup>Thouret to the Mayor and Municipal Officers of Bordeaux, Paris, 19 May 1790, BM R251 (15).

<sup>58</sup>Mayor and Municipal Officers, Procès-Verbal, Montauban, 31 May 1790, p.3, AD (Tarn-et-Garonne) série L cote L199 (hereinafter referred to as Montauban Procès-Verbal); Dumas, op.cit., I, p.469.

National Guard: he also had the recommendation of being known and respected by Saint Priest and by the dominant party in the Assembly.

At Bordeaux Dumas found M. de Verteuil literally on his death bed<sup>59</sup> and so resolved to assume the command himself, although he was not strictly entitled to do so by the King's commission.<sup>60</sup> He further radically changed the nature of the mission from one of suppression by armed force to one of reconciliation through disengagement.<sup>61</sup> There is no evidence to suggest that this decision was anyone's but his own and to him therefore belongs the credit for both the courage and wisdom to have made it. The first necessity was to prevent the two armed masses from meeting. To do this he went to the Bordelais at Moissac (less than 30 Km. from Montauban) and there employed his usurped authority to order Courpon not to advance further.<sup>62</sup> Reaching Montauban on 28 May accompanied only by Delarue, his brother-in-law and aide-de-camp, he again used the King's commission

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<sup>59</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.469. M. de Verteuil died several days later.

<sup>60</sup>"Je me déterminai sur-le-champ à me rendre à Moissac, et à me présenter à l'armée bordelaise comme chargé de pleins pouvoirs et sans parler de M. de Verteuil." Ibid., I, p.470.

<sup>61</sup>"L'objet de la mission de ces officiers généraux était l'exécution pleine et entière des décrets de l'Assemblée nationale et le retour du calme et de la paix dans la ville de Montauban avec ordre d'y employer les troupes réglées de la province et les troupes nationales". Montauban Procès-Verbal, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>62</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.470. Courpon to Dumas, Moissac, 29 May 1790, 12:30 a.m., BM R251 (15).



to convince d'Esparbès, a lt.-general, to retire to his chateau and to order the regiment of Languedoc to return to its barracks.<sup>63</sup>

Dumas next confronted the municipal officers of Montauban and presented the King's commission to them. He also indicated that the Bordelais would not retire from Moissac until the Assembly's decrees had been executed and until all citizens had been given the full safeguard of the law.<sup>64</sup> The following day, Dumas was able to secure the freedom of the prisoners after persuading the population that their present course of action would only lead to civil war. That night several of the released prisoners disobeyed his request that they remain at home and made their way to Moissac.<sup>65</sup> The next morning brought renewed disturbances when an officer of the Bordelais was recognised in Montauban. Dumas was able to rescue him from a crowd eager to throw them both into the river, by the fortunate arrival of a letter from Courpon written the preceeding night reporting the disturbances caused by the arrival of released prisoners. Reading only the passages containing fraternal connotations, Dumas used the letter to restore

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<sup>63</sup>"Je ne pouvais hasarder d'employer la force armée, le régiment de Languedoc, sans risquer d'occasionner un tumulte qui aurait compromis la vie des prisonniers, et certainement allumé la guerre civile, à cause de la proximité de l'armée bordelaise que rien n'aurait pu contenir." Dumas, op.cit., I, p.471.

<sup>64</sup>Montauban Procès-Verbal, op.cit., p.3.

<sup>65</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.473.

good feelings, and secure the release of the officer.<sup>66</sup>

No further trouble arose and on the following day the Bordelais returned to Bordeaux. With tranquility restored to Montauban, Dumas proceeded to Toulouse, where Lautrec, one of the royalist agitators, was under arrest. After dispatching him to Paris in order to face the Assembly, he proceeded on towards Nîmes only to learn that the troubles there had subsided. His mission completed, he then departed for Paris.<sup>67</sup>

In his report to the Assembly on Montauban, Vieillard praised the "intrépidité de M. Dumas";<sup>68</sup> the commander of the Bordelais went further: "Les disposition que vous avez prises, celles que vous avez fait prendre, tout est également sage . . . notre confiance est entière en vous".<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., I, p.474. Dumas had written to Courpon on 28 May and again on 29 May to reassure him that affairs were going well and in the second letter to announce the release of the prisoners. Courpon's reply was written at midnight on the 29th: "Une ordre de votre main détermine notre marche; c'était assez pour notre tranquillité; mais trop peu pour notre bonheur; vous ajoutez à cet ordre l'assurance touchante d'une reconciliation parfaite du Peuple avec ses amis, ses devoirs et ses droits; la délivrance des malheureuses victimes de son égarement; l'espérance de les voir et de les embrasser demain, enfin l'exécution pleine et entière des Décrets de l'Assemblée Nationale. Nous partons contents, mon Général . . ." Courpon to Dumas, Moissac (Bordeaux, 1790); all letters are to be found in BM R251 (15).

<sup>67</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.477. The order for the departure of the Bordelais was recorded as 30 May in the Montauban Procès-Verbal, op.cit., p.7.

<sup>68</sup>Vieillard, op.cit., p.47. For the Assembly's debate on this report, see Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., VI, pp.420-430.

<sup>69</sup>Courpon to Dumas, Bordeaux, 1790 (Imprimé sur l'invitation du club de Café), p.3.

But not all the parties were as enthusiastic. Jeanbon Saint André, after a conversation in which Dumas reported the pacification of Montauban to him, wrote: "Je n'eus point aux paroles de M. Dumas une confiance si aveugle que de porter ma tête aux fanatiques, mais je supposai que ma femme pouvait aller voir en quel état étaient nos affaires."<sup>70</sup> But despite Saint André's misgivings, Dumas had achieved a notable success. In contrast to Montauban, where not a single citizen was killed after Dumas' arrival despite the proximity of two hostile armed bodies, at Nîmes the violence subsided only after a counter-massacre of Catholics on 13 and 14 June.<sup>71</sup>

Successful in his first mission, Dumas was selected by the Assembly to lead a commission of three to the departments of Haut and Bas Rhin.<sup>72</sup> Once again, as at Montauban, Nîmes, Troyes and in the Franche-Comté, the religious policy and particularly the civil constitution the clergy was being used by the émigrés to raise the Catholic population against the Assembly.<sup>73</sup> However, the

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<sup>70</sup>Jeanbon Saint André to Rabant, Bordeaux, 24 July 1790, AHRF (XXIII, 1951), pp.61-64 and AN DXXIX bis II, n.122.

<sup>71</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., VI, p.186 and pp.315-16; Godechot, op.cit., p.164.

<sup>72</sup>This commission was selected on 20 January 1790. The two members chosen to accompany Dumas were: Hérault de Séchelles, a former advocate general of the Parliament of Paris, and Jean Baptise Foissey, procureur général of the Parliament of Nancy. This mission was proposed by Broglie and strongly seconded by the deputy from Alsace - Reubell. J. M. Madival and M. E. Laurent, eds. Archives Parlementaires (1 série, Paris, 1885), XXII, p.352 (hereinafter referred to as Archives Parlementaires); Gerlof D. Homan, Jean-Francois Reubell (the Hague, 1971), p.43; Dumas, op.cit., I, p.480.

particular situation in Alsace was made more complex and more severe by the province's geography, history and culture.<sup>73</sup> Only the width of the Rhine separated the émigrés from the interior of the province, affording them open communications with their partisans. Besides the religious question, émigré propaganda was able to capitalize upon the economic fears which the Assembly's decrees had created,<sup>74</sup> upon the cultural differences between her and the rest of France and upon the guarantees of her legal status made by the Treaty of Westphalia.

As Dumas left Paris, Lafayette somewhat naively assured him that the Marquis of Bouillé, with whom he had been in correspondence for some time and who was military commander of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, had promised to give his support to the commission.<sup>75</sup> At Nancy, however,

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<sup>73</sup>Godechot, op.cit., p.167. "Les principales causes de l'agitation que régnait en Alsace et à Strasbourg, pendant les années qui précèdent les journées de Septembre 1792 et la terreur, résidaient dans l'exécution du décret sur le clergé, et dans le rassemblement des émigrés sur les frontières . . ." Louis Spach, Frédéric de Dietrich, Premier Maire de Strasbourg (Paris, 1857), p.51.

<sup>74</sup>The Assembly's programme of rationalization of all tariffs threatened Alsace's profitable position as a province d'étranger effectif under which she was not subject to import and export duties, except from the rest of France. Homan, op.cit., p.4.

<sup>75</sup>Rodolphe Reuss, La Constitution Civile du Clergé et la Crise Religieuse en Alsace (2 vols. Strasbourg, 1922). Lafayette and Bouillé had known each other since childhood. Their correspondence during the Revolution began when Bouillé became the commander at Metz. They were not, however, true friends. Cf. Francois Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé, Mémoires (Paris, 1823), pp.83-190.



the conduct of Desotaux, Bouillé's chief of staff, in Reuss' words: "ne laissa plus aucun doute . . . sur les véritables intentions de ce général et sur son loyalisme douteux".<sup>76</sup> Bouillé did not even reply to Dumas' invitation to go to Strasbourg "de soutenir par sa présence et par l'influence d'autorité militaire" the difficult task of the commissioners.<sup>77</sup>

By the time the commissioners reached the city, propaganda emanating from the émigrés, led by the Prince Bishop, Cardinal Rohan, and disseminated by the local priests, had agitated the Catholic parishes around Strasbourg.<sup>78</sup> In

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<sup>76</sup>Reuss, op.cit., I, p.71. Desotaux had served with Dumas during the American campaign and again in 1786 when the two officers jointly prepared reconnaissances of the battlefields of Malplaquet and Fontenoy (AHG MR 1446). After emigrating with Bouillé following the flight of the King, Desotaux became the Vendian leader known as Cormatin. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.71. However, the secret correspondence of Charette, Strofflet, Puisave, Cormatin, d'Autichamp, Bernier, Frotte, Scépeaux and Brotherel, published in Paris in 1799 (BM 1195, I, p.56, 2 vols.) contains no reference to Dumas.

<sup>77</sup>Reuss, op.cit., I, p.71. Bouillé had been at Strasbourg but left for Metz when news of the Assembly's decision to appoint a commission reached him. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.481.

<sup>78</sup>Cardinal Rohan's letter to the authorities of Strasbourg of 12 January 1791: "L'exercice du culte public est assuré aux protestants avec la liberté la plus illimitée, celui des catholiques sera reserré et circonscrit de la manière la plus violente; le nombre des paroisses protestantes sera conservé et respecté; celui des paroisses catholiques sera peut-être réduit de moitié, malgré que la nature du culte, et la majorité de la population exigent une proportion tout à fait opposée à celle qu'on introduit". F. C. Heitz, La Contre-Révolution en Alsace (Strasbourg, 1865), p.68.



response the Protestant communities offered their aid to the municipality.<sup>79</sup> The situation was described in a letter written at the time as comparable with Nîmes:

Les scènes de Nîmes sont prêtes à se répéter dans cette ville. La fermentation est extrême. Près de 2,000 citoyens se sont rassemblés pour demander l'exécution du traité de Westphalie, et la retractation des décrets sur le clergé."<sup>80</sup>

Nor was Strasbourg the only municipality affected. During an excursion to Colmar, made on 8 February, the commissioners were greeted with shouts of "vive la Comte d'Artois, les Commissaires à la lanterne!";<sup>81</sup> local National Guards refused to provide them with an escort, one company of which, known as the Chasseurs de Colmar, openly declared for the émigrés and marched across the river to join them. The Commissioners were only saved by the arrival of a group of patriotic bargemen armed with clubs (batons), led by Stockmayer, who dispersed the crowd.<sup>82</sup>

In both Strasbourg and Colmar many members of the departmental directory were openly hostile to the Assembly. Fortunately, its most powerful opponent, Mathieu the procureur général syndic of the Bas Rhin, withdrew on grounds

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<sup>79</sup>Spach, op.cit., p.52.

<sup>80</sup>Quoted in a speech to the Assembly delivered by Broglie on 20 January 1791. Archives Parlementaires, op.cit., XXII, p.352.

<sup>81</sup>Muquet, "Rapport sur les Départements du Haut et Bas Rhin," 11 February 1791, Ibid., XXII, p.134. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., IX, p.68. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.484.

<sup>82</sup>Muquet, op.cit., XXII, p.134; Dumas, op.cit., I, p.485.

of ill-health.<sup>83</sup> But even with the aid of Frederic de Dietrich, mayor of Strasbourg and a Constitutionalist, the first attempts of the commissioners to combat the émigrés were failures. A broadsheet published on 28 January, the day after their arrival, while inspired by the best of intentions, only supported the fears of the Catholics through its vague references to concord,<sup>84</sup> fears which a second proclamation confirmed. The latter was a declaration supporting the decision of the council-general to ban meetings of the "Citoyens Catholiques, apostoliques et Romain ou Société d'Union".<sup>85</sup> Within three days of the appearance of the first proclamation appeared the following satire:

Proclamation des trois Commissaires:

Envoyés par le Roi, pour vous faire connaître le véritable sens des décrets de l'Assemblée nationale, pour répandre au milieu de vous des vérités nécessaires à votre bonheur; . . .

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<sup>83</sup>Emmanuel Vingtrinier, La Contre-Révolution: Première Période 1789-91 (2 vols., Paris, 1924) II, p.313. According to Reuss, Mathieu withdrew because he was not a separatist and, while he opposed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, he did not support the émigrés. Rodolphe Reuss, L'Alsace Pendant La Révolution Française (2 vols., Paris, 1881) II, p.237.

<sup>84</sup>Reuss, La Constitution Civil du Clergé, I, p.74.

<sup>85</sup>Dumas, Hérault and Foissey, "Délibérations de MM les Commissaires du Roi sur une Pétition de Quelques citoyens de Strasbourg", 31 Janvier 1791, BN Lk7 9513. Cf. Reuss, *op.cit.*, I, p.90.

Proclamation démasquée:

Le club des jacobins de Paris, composé d'enragés et en grande partie de députés à l'assemblée dit nationale, frère aîné du club des cordonniers de Strasbourg, à la réquisition du maire de la même ville, ordonna à l'Assemblée nationale et celle-ci au Roi son prisonnier, d'envoyer vers vous trois commissaires, pour donner une interprétation aussi séduisante que mensongère des décrets de l'assemblée nationale . . .<sup>86</sup>

In order to control the émigrés and their sympathisers in the church and government, the commissioners sought stronger powers - authority to actively direct the departmental government rather than just to advise it. When this power was granted by the Assembly,<sup>87</sup> the commissioners suspended the department's directory and appointed their own agents to provisionally fulfil its functions. To cut

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<sup>86</sup>Heitz, op.cit., p.95. Printed at l'imprimerie de la Foy et de la Vérité, rue de la vrai Religion, 4 February 1791. As Alsace was strongly prejudiced against the Jews (cf. Homan, op.cit.) the commissioners were also satirized for their efforts at integrating them into society: "je vis le moyen de resserrer par des liens indissolubles l'ancien et le nouveau testament, ou plutôt de les confondre, et d'abolir à jamais toute distinction entre juif et chrétien, entre l'Eglise et la Sinagogue, et de donner à l'univers une seule religion comme bientôt il n'aura plus . . ." Cerf-Behr Aux Trois Rois, 23 March 1791. AD (Bas Rhin) 38 J 278.

<sup>87</sup>They were authorised to:

- 1°: provisionally suspend the administration of the Bas Rhin;
- 2°: administer that department through the agency of as many persons as they chose to appoint;
- 3°: proceed to the nomination of Bishops for both Haut and Bas Rhin;
- 4°: dissolve the chasseurs of Colmar.

Muguet, op.cit., XXIII, p.135. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op. cit., IX, p.68. The Assembly approved of the commissioners' conduct as witness the passage of Roederer's motion of approval, 11 February 1791, Archives Parlementaires, XXIII, p.135.

communications with the émigrés they authorized the formation of a commission of surveillance, with powers to inspect suspect packets and letters.<sup>88</sup> The handicap in military affairs caused by Bouillé's non-cooperation was also overcome with the appointment of General Kellermann to take command of all forces in both departments.<sup>89</sup> Prior to this, officers in the garrisons at Landau and Huningen had been engaged in discussions with the émigrés, causing apprehension that these fortresses would be delivered to Artois.<sup>90</sup> On the very day of Kellermann's arrival, several officers did emigrate, but Dumas, assisted by Kellermann and Desaix,<sup>91</sup> managed to prevent a breakdown in discipline resulting from their departure.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>Reuss, *L'Alsace Pendant la Révolution*, II, p.141. Deliberation du Directoire du Département du Bas-Rhin, 3 March 1791. This committee of surveillance was composed of five of the members of the municipal government.

<sup>89</sup>Dumas, *op.cit.*, I, p.485. The commander of Strasbourg, Klinglin, was in sympathy with Bouillé and proved very uncooperative.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, I, p.485. There was a great deal of fear of an attempt to separate Alsace from the rest of France and then to use her as a base for further counter-revolutionary activity. Alsace was considered to be extremely vulnerable to a movement of this nature because of her many differences with the rest of France and her close cultural ties with Germany.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.* Dumas says of Desaix, who was to die at Marengo, that he was "fort lié avec ma famille" and the two officers appear to have been close friends. See *infra* Chapter VI.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.* Kellermann and Dumas used the local Jacobin Clubs to help popularise the decrees of the Assembly and to counter the royalist agitation in the army. Cf. Reuss, *op.cit.*, II, p.175.

Although the success of the commissioners in Alsace was notable it was not complete. Order was restored, the decrees of the Assembly implemented, the émigrés' communications with the interior disrupted and their plans, such as they were, for separating Alsace from France, frustrated. Yet order was not harmony and in their final proclamation the commissioners indicated the limits of their achievements:

Nous n'annoncerons point que nous laissons les départements du Rhin dans un calme profond; mais nous disons que la révolution est faite dans les lieux où on avait corrompu les principes, et que la Constitution est raffermie partout où l'intrigue et le fanatisme l'avaient ébranlée.<sup>93</sup>

The flight of the King has rightly been described as a turning point in the course of the Revolution, for it brought the issue of republicanism before the entire French nation in a manner to which few people could remain indifferent.<sup>94</sup> Louis XVI never truly accepted the changes caused by the Revolution. He had accepted Lafayette only because of his promises to maintain and strengthen what power remained with the executive.<sup>95</sup> If Bouillé's Mémoires

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<sup>93</sup>Dumas, Hérault and Foissey, "Proclamation: les Commissaires Du Roi dans les Départemens du Haut et Du Bas Rhin, Aux Français Habitant les deux Départemens", Strasbourg, 23 Avril 1791, BN Lb39 9892.

<sup>94</sup>A. Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France", NCHH, VIII, p.692. "La fuite du roi fut un des rares événements de la Révolution qui émurent toute la nation, qui furent connus et sentis de tous." François Victor Alphonse Aulard, Histoire Politique de la Révolution Française: 1789-1804 (Paris, 1903), p.118.

<sup>95</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.159.



are to be believed, ever since the summer of 1790 Louis had been seriously considering joining the army at Metz,<sup>96</sup> and his mind was decided by the refusal of the National Guard and the Parisian crowd to allow the royal family to leave for Saint-Cloud on 18 April. After this occurrence, the King fixed the date of his departure for the beginning of May, but was delayed until the night of 20 June.<sup>97</sup>

His flight, which seemed to presage the beginning of civil war and foreign invasion,<sup>98</sup> caused grave anxiety and, for this reason, when news that the royal entourage had been halted at Varennes reached it, the Assembly attached supreme importance to the securing of his safe return.<sup>99</sup> Three commissioners were selected to escort the King on his journey - each represented one of the major factions of the left - Barnave for the party of the Lameths, Latour-Maubourg for the Club de '89, and Pétion for the more extreme left.<sup>100</sup> Because orders from Bouillé, enclosed with the letter announcing the King's detention, indicated that

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<sup>96</sup>Bouillé, *op.cit.*, p.187ff. Aulard (*op.cit.*, p.119) believed Bouillé's account to be correct.

<sup>97</sup>Aulard, *op.cit.*, p.117.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, p.118.

<sup>99</sup>The person responsible for arresting the flight of the King was Drouet, the village postmaster. His report reached the Assembly at 10:30 a.m. on 22 June. Drouet's letter, written at 3:00 a.m. that morning, is printed in Bouchez and Roux, *op.cit.*, X, pp.319-321.

<sup>100</sup>Assemblée Nationale, Procès-Verbal - Decret, 23 June 1791.

he might attempt to reach the royal party,<sup>101</sup> a serving officer was selected to accompany the commission, to supervise the escort and to provide for the protection of the King. On the recommendation of the Military Committee, the officer chosen was Mathieu Dumas.<sup>102</sup>

While Dumas was nominally subordinate to the commissioners, in reality his role was the most important of all. Lenotre summarised his position as "le stratège de l'affaire".<sup>103</sup> The task which faced Dumas was far more difficult than just ensuring that Bouillé never reached the royal party. There was also the danger of popular violence against either the King or his escort, and with every passing hour ever larger numbers of national guardsmen and the curious were gathering along the route of return. The escort left Paris at 2:00 a.m. on 23 June; by 3:00 p.m. they had reached Dormans and by a cave just past Dormans they came upon the royal party. The King's berline was surrounded by a gathering of approximately 2,000 persons - some armed, some horsed and all certain that Bouillé was

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<sup>101</sup>At Varennes Drouet acquired Bouillé's orders to the 1st and 13th Dragoons and the 6th Hussars. These he sent to Paris together with his letter. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., V, pp.321-22.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., X, p.323. Dumas reflected on this mission that: "j'eus d'abord beaucoup de peine à sacrifier au bien de mon pays et à la sûreté des personnes royales la répugnance que m'inspirait cette pénible mission." Dumas, op.cit., I, p.487. He was the logical choice, however, as the National Guard would be employed and as Lafayette was arranging for the King's escort through Paris.

<sup>103</sup>G. Lenotre, Le Drame de Varennes (Paris, 1906), p.230n.

not far off.<sup>104</sup> Into the midst of this already confused group came a courier announcing that: "L'armée de Bouillé est à la poursuite du roi; on a vue de la cavalerie sur les coteaux de la Marne . . . Varennes est détruit et ses habitants massacrés".<sup>105</sup> As the commissioners and the royal party mounted the carriages,<sup>106</sup> Dumas, playing on fears of a royalist coup, detached all the crowd but a handful of national guardsmen to blockade the road and halt Bouillé's cavalry. This detachment served two additional purposes, regardless of the seriousness of Bouillé's intentions.<sup>107</sup> It helped reduce the fear of royalist seizure and it disembarassed the royal party from the mass of people who had gathered around them and who would only

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<sup>104</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.490.

<sup>105</sup>Lenotre, op.cit., p.226.

<sup>106</sup>Barnave and Pétion rode in the royal berline with the King, Queen and Dauphin and Mme. Elizabeth, the King's sister. Latour-Maubourg, embarrassed by the plight of the royal family, rode in a second carriage.

<sup>107</sup>These rumours of Bouillé's intentions were not unfounded. When he learned of the King's detention at Varennes, Bouillé set off to rescue him, accompanied by Royal Allemand, but the transmontane march from Stenay to Varennes so retarded their progress that the King had already begun his return to Paris by the time they arrived. "J'envoyai des cavaliers", Bouillé recalled, "le long de la rivière, chercher des gués, au-dessus et au-dessous de la ville, où je vis beaucoup de gardes nationales sous les armes. Quoiqu'il y eût des passages, on n'en trouva pas." Bouillé, op.cit., pp.232-246. For the pursuit, see also: Louis, Marquis de Bouillé, Mémoires sur l'Affaire de Varennes (Paris, 1823); Charles de Damas, Rapport sur l'Affaire de Varennes (1791); and Francois-Florent de Valory, Précis Historique du Voyage Entrepris par S. M. Louis XVI (Paris, 1 March 1815).

have retarded the coach's progress.<sup>108</sup>

The return journey itself was largely uneventful. Each town or village the procession passed through increased the numbers of national guardsmen who wished to accompany the coach. At Dormes they were led off ostensibly to halt Bouillé, while at Château Thierry, Dumas ordered the mounted national guards of Soissons to block the Marne bridge after the coach had passed.<sup>109</sup> Only on the final day's journey did trouble occur, when crowds threatened the postillions, who were still wearing the royal livery. But after Dumas posted two national guardsmen to ride with them no further difficulties were encountered until the Tuileries were reached.<sup>110</sup>

Between and perhaps because of these various missions, Dumas' regular career in the army had been advancing. Following his return from Alsace he was made director of the Dépôt de la Guerre, an appointment for which he had been preferred over several better qualified candidates.<sup>111</sup> Then

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<sup>108</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.491; Lenotre, op.cit., p.236.

<sup>109</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.494; Lenotre, op.cit., p.244.

<sup>110</sup>At the Tuileries a near riot broke out when the carriages halted - the most serious incident of the whole journey. For the official reports of the return, see Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., X, pp.372-75.

<sup>111</sup>One officer who felt that either he or his father should have been awarded the post was Lt. Col. Louis Alexandre Berthier, who wrote a "Mémoire à Monsieur Duportail, Ministre de la Guerre, à l'époque de la nomination de M. Dumas comme Directeur de Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Guerre, et dont copie a été remise à M. Dumas". AAG Berthier dossier pieces 59-60. See Rice and Brown, op.cit., II, p.117n. The letter of appointment is dated Paris 13 May, AAG GD 395. Cf. Bon "On propose au Roi de charger M. Dumas . . . De La Direction de Dépôt de la Guerre", n.d., AAG GD 395.

in June, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and posted to Metz as military governor, replacing Bouillé, who had emigrated following the failure of the King's flight.<sup>112</sup>

The problems of discipline and disorganisation Dumas encountered at Metz were universally present in the army by 1791, but the particular circumstances of the garrison's involvement with the affair of Varennes and Bouillé's personality accelerated desertion amongst the officers and the insubordination of the garrison. Soldiers there wrote to the Assembly that:

Dans Artois-dragons, il n'y a plus que trois officiers au corps, dans les Chasseurs de Flandre, il n'y en aura plus un seul à la fin de cette semaine. Dans Condé Infanterie, il n'y en a plus qu'un seul.<sup>113</sup>

At the time of his arrival, the regiment of Nassau was in open revolt, refusing to obey the orders of its officers to march to Nancy and opening its barracks to an immense crowd of townspeople who had come to fraternize.<sup>114</sup>

Dumas' handling of the affair was characteristic. He began by sealing off the barracks with two piquets of cavalry and then ordered the regiment to assemble, stack arms and retire to its quarters. This accomplished, the civilians were removed and by nightfall sufficient

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<sup>112</sup>The date of Dumas' promotion was 30 June 1791. Dumas, op.cit., I, p.509. Pension Militaire, op.cit.

<sup>113</sup>Lt. Col. G. L. Hartmann, Les Officiers de l'Armée Royale et la Révolution (Paris, 1910), p.261.

<sup>114</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.510.



discipline had been restored to enable the regiment to depart for Nancy on the following morning.<sup>115</sup> On that day Dumas inspected the entire garrison and became convinced that the problems of discipline were due in part to boredom and idleness. As a remedy he decided to unite his entire command and conduct manoeuvres in attack and defence.<sup>116</sup> This expedient not only enlivened the troops but also provided an excellent method for familiarising former sous-officiers newly promoted to replace missing officers with the duties of command. Although this expedient could only fill the vacancies in the lower grades, by 28 July Dumas was able to write that "la machine se rétablit ici".<sup>117</sup>

The sole opportunity to observe Dumas in the exercise of a regular military command during the entire course of the Revolution comes while he is at Metz. Prior to this time he was a staff officer and after it he was to be caught up with politics, and although during both periods he dealt with matters of organisation, neither was a full test of his professional ability. His conduct at Metz revealed him to be an officer who was both progressive and innovative.

Every army is maintained in two distinct manners - a military way and a militaristic way. "The distinction is

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<sup>115</sup>Ibid., I, p.511.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., I, p.513.

<sup>117</sup>Dumas to Delalain, Metz, 28 July 1791, AAG GD 395.

fundamental and fateful . . ." wrote Alfred Vagts. The military way concentrates on the men, material and their most efficient means of employment; the militaristic way is concerned with the customs and traditions which "transcend true military purposes".<sup>118</sup> Similarly, officers are either military or they are militaristic in their profession. They are either concerned with the reality of war or the ceremonial of it, the two being largely incompatible.

Dumas reveals himself as an officer of the former category through his choice of exercise for the garrison and his reasons for that choice:

Je reconnus (et l'expérience de la guerre m'a de plus en plus affermi dans cette opinion) que la perfection de l'instruction mécanique, pour laquelle en temps de paix on ne cesse de fatiguer, d'ennuyer et d'user de hommes, est la chose la plus inutile, la plus nuisable à la conservation de l'esprit militaire et à plus contraire au caractère national . . . J'ajouterai que cette manie de perfectionnement des détails, dont le résultat le plus positif n'est qu'une vaine satisfaction de parade, est le plus grand obstacle à l'établissement d'un bon système d'organisation d'une armée nationale.<sup>119</sup>

By contrast, in the armies of Prussia, Russia, Austria and Great Britain the drill field dominated military thought - for them it was a matter of fitting the battlefield tactics to the drill manoeuvres and not the reverse. Guibert had,

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<sup>118</sup> Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York, 1937), p.13.

<sup>119</sup> Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.513. This statement would have marked him as progressive no matter whether it was made in 1792 or 1827 or 1927.

indeed, already simplified the drills for deployment, making precision less necessary and mass semi-trained armies possible, but the essence of Dumas' statement is that not even these drills should be practised as an end in themselves but rather only as part of a combat.

Dumas was progressive in another field as well. With the authorization of the Minister of War, Duportail, he successfully created the first experimental batteries of horse artillery in the French army.<sup>120</sup> Correctly foreseeing that mobility of fire-power was the principal quality of this branch, he followed the Prussian fashion of mounting all the gunners individually rather than the Austrian or Wurtz system of placing them on the ammunition caissons as Sorbier was doing in an experimental company at Strasbourg.<sup>121</sup> The company was raised by taking half of the total men required from the artillery and half from the cavalry, then allowing each half to train the other in gunnery and equitation respectively.<sup>122</sup> The superiority of the Prussian

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<sup>120</sup>Because records of the departmental archives at Metz for the Revolution were destroyed by the retreating German army in 1944 and the Archives de la Guerre's records (Compagnies d'Artillerie à Cheval, AHG X<sup>d</sup>40 dossiers 1 to 30) begin with the horse artillery's official creation on 11 January 1792, the sole source of material on Dumas' activities is his Souvenirs.

<sup>121</sup>Matti Lauerma, op.cit., p.98. The advantages of the Wurtz system were that it did not require the gunners to be able to ride, thereby shortening their training and that for the same reason it did not require as many horses.

<sup>122</sup>After only six weeks of training, the company was ready for manoeuvres. "Je ne fus pas moins satisfait d'obtenir le suffrage des officiers d'artillerie qui avaient le plus douté du succès, et particulièrement celui du colonel Senarmont." Dumas, op.cit., I, p.516.

system employed at Metz was fully recognized by the army in the following year, when it was determined: (1) that the men should be trained primarily as gunners and never employed as cavalry or mounted infantry; (2) that all the men should be mounted; (3) that to avoid stripping the artillery, only two gunners from that arm should be attached to each piece.<sup>123</sup> The Metz solution to the third point had proved so successful that when the Legislative Assembly resolved to create official batteries it was incorporated into the decree.<sup>124</sup>

Dumas' success as an organizer and leader of semi-trained or ill-disciplined troops was at least in part due to the personal interest he took in their welfare and his understanding of the soldier's conditions. During the return of the King, for example, when Château-Thierry was reached after a march so fatiguing that one guardsman's horse dropped dead from exhaustion, Dumas requisitioned two wagons to transport those guardsmen who were on foot the remainder of the route to Paris.<sup>125</sup> Nor did he forget the incident or the volunteer whose horse was lost - a year

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<sup>123</sup>Dumas, Précis. "Note: Sur l'Artillerie légère," I, p.415, and Dumas, Campagnes du Comte Suwarrow-Rymnisky et du Prince Charles (Hambourg, 1799). "Note: Sur la Artillerie à Cheval, p.124."

<sup>124</sup>Lacombe Saint-Michel, "Rapport sur la Création d'un Corps d'Artillerie à Cheval," 13 March 1792.

<sup>125</sup>AN M 664, f 23 (minute) Dumas Lettre à M. Cahier de Gerville, Réclamant la Prix de la Location de Deux Voitures pour servir au Transport des Gardes Nationaux Fatigués de Châteaux-Thierry à Paris lors du Retour de Louis XVI, Paris, 7 March, 1792.

later he added a postscript to his request for payment:

"S<sup>r</sup> Evrard, Grenadier volontaire du Bataillon de St. Roch qui a perdu un cheval mort de fatigue sous ses yeux".<sup>126</sup>

Dumas was fortunate too in being exposed to what was to become France's 'new model' army from the beginning, through his work with the National Guard. How much he was able to profit from this experience is immediately discernable in the contrast between his plan for re-establishing order in Paris after the 14th of July through the use of armed force and his mission to Montauban, where he did restore order by assiduously avoiding the use of force.

Joined by his wife, two daughters and mother-in-law, he spent the summer at Metz.<sup>127</sup> Duportail, the Minister of War, was in declining health and wished to propose to the King that Dumas be his replacement.<sup>128</sup> However, the same courier who brought this news also brought word that he had been placed by his political friends (the Lameths and Barnave) on the list of candidates for the Legislative

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<sup>126</sup>AN M 664, f 23. M. Dumas chargé de Tous les details du retour du Roi, 17 March 1792. The final report, on 7 April 1792 (AN M 664, f 23) was for "21,128 non compris la reclamation particuliere d'une somme de 50 livres (voitures) et du prix d'un cheval". Dumas received 1,176 livres according to a receipt dated 5 July 1791 (AN F<sup>4</sup> 2135).

<sup>127</sup>One of his additional activities while military governor was the organisation of battalions of National Guards. Cf. Moniteur no. 256, 13 September 1791: "lettre de Mathieu Dumas au ministre de la guerre sur le formation des bataillons des Gardes Nationales volontaires de la Meurthe et de la Moselle".

<sup>128</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, op.cit., I, p.522.



Assembly in his department of Seine-et-Oise. Dumas chose to enter the new assembly reluctantly and only at the bidding of his friends,<sup>129</sup> but this decision was really no surprise for he had become steadily more involved in politics ever since 1789. A bordereau from the printers Baudouin shows that he purchased the entire Ordre de Travaux de l'Assemblée for that year.<sup>130</sup> In 1790 he was elected president of the Primary Assembly for Corbeil (Seine-et-Oise) which selected juges de paix and other public officers,<sup>131</sup> and he was included in a list of the Jacobins made for that year.<sup>132</sup> Dumas spoke at sessions of the Jacobins on several occasions and made great use of them when in Alsace to popularise the Revolution.<sup>133</sup> So it was not at all unexpected when Barnave, Duport and the Lameths found themselves unable to serve in the Legislative Assembly that they would seek Dumas to represent them and that Dumas would accede to their wishes.

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<sup>129</sup>Ibid., I, p.523.

<sup>130</sup>AN T100, Papiers Sequestres, op.cit.. The amount paid was 212 livres 5 sous.

<sup>131</sup>Dumas, op.cit., I, p.479.

<sup>132</sup>Alphonse Aulard, Jacobins, I, p.xxxiii.

<sup>133</sup>Dumas, "Discours à la Société des Amis de la Constitution, séante à Paris, eu lui présentant MM. Hérault et Poincy, ses collègues, dans la commission aux départements du Rhin" (Paris, 29 April 1791), BN 8°Lb<sup>40</sup> 591; Aulard, op.cit., II, pp.361-69; Dumas, "Discours Prononcé à la Société des Amis de la Constitution de Paris, Par M. M. Dumas, Membre de la Société de Corbeil, à la Tête d'une Députation" (Paris, 12 December, An II), BN 4°Lb<sup>40</sup> 564.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

When Dumas took his seat in the Legislative Assembly he had theoretically the potential to become one of the most powerful and influential men in France. As the friend of Lafayette, the Lameths, Barnave and Duport, he was closely allied with the old leadership of the Feuillant party and had a strong claim to the leadership of that party in his own right as an authority on the reforms in the army, as the man who had restored order and preserved liberty in the south and east of France and as the man who had brought the King safely back to Paris. Dumas did play a significant role in the Legislative Assembly and rose to the first rank of deputies in influence,<sup>1</sup> but he failed to secure either

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<sup>1</sup>The opinion of a majority of Dumas' contemporaries was that he was the outstanding spokesman of the Feuillants. Barnave wrote to Theodore Lameth (12 May 1792): "If they (sic. spirit of faction) were destroyed your legislature would be nothing but a ship without sails, for there is some cleverness on your side but, except for Dumas, no moving principle . . ." (cited in Bradby, op.cit., II, p.296). Brissot's opinion [Jacques Pierre Brissot, Mémoires: 1754-1793 (Paris, 1912) p.154] was that "Mathieu Dumas est le seul des Feuillants qui ait montré du courage jusqu'à la fin de la législature . . ." Madame de Staël included him with Raymond, Jaucourt, Beugnot, Girardin as "parmi les constitutionnels: ils avaient du courage, de la raison, de la persévérance, et l'on ne pouvait les accuser d'aucun préjugé aristocratique." Germaine de Staël, Considérations sur les Principaux Événemens de la Révolution Française (3 vols., London, 1818), II, p.26.

of his faction's major aims: the preservation of peace and of the monarchy. This was only in small part due to his personal limitations. Rather the most important single factor in the failure of the Feuillants lay in the composition of the party itself.

By simple head count, the Feuillants were the most powerful group in the Assembly. Of the 745 deputies, 246 were identifiable as Feuillants (rising by December to 334) as opposed to only 136 registered Jacobins or Cordeliers, constituting the opposition.<sup>2</sup> There were also 345 "independents" who could be won to either side on a particular issue, but these were mainly moderates and, taken as a whole, the 745 deputies contained in Lefebvre's words: "une énorme majorité de constitutionnels sincères".<sup>3</sup> The Feuillants had other advantages: the government's ministers were all men of this party; and, through Barnave, Duport and Alexandre Lameth, it was in secret contact with the King. Yet the Feuillants lacked the unity necessary to capitalize upon their position. Georges Michon, in his

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<sup>2</sup>These figures are taken from the membership of the Feuillant and Jacobin clubs respectively, cited in Georges Michon, Essai Sur l'Histoire du Parti Feuillant: Adrien Duport (Paris, 1924), p.374; Marcel Reinhard, La Chute de la Royauté (Paris, 1969), pp.203-05; Albert Mathiez, La Révolution Française, I, p.179; and Georges Lefebvre, op. cit., pp.224-25. Dumas gives the figure of 160 deputies (Souvenirs, II, p.5), this being the membership of the Feuillant club at its opening on 7 October. By the end of the month, its strength was in excess of 250.

<sup>3</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.224.

celebrated essay, penetrated to the heart of their problem when he described the party as consisting of two groups or clienteles.<sup>4</sup> Because the divisions between these two groups were so great as to prevent effective cooperation or opposition to the Jacobins until after 20 April 1792 (the declaration of war), it is more useful to regard the Feuillants as two virtually independent factions.

The first of these were the Triumvirists, so called because they were the faction or clients of Barnave, Duport and Alexandre Lameth. What today would be referred to as its parliamentary party, was led by Dumas, Vaublanc, Dumolard, Jaucourt, Theodore Lameth and Becquey.<sup>5</sup> The faction following Lafayette, or the Fayettestistes as they are known, was led in the Legislative Assembly by Ramond, Beugnot, Pastoret, Daverhoult and Girardin. The division between the leaders of these two factions was in many ways older than the party itself,<sup>6</sup> although it became significant

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<sup>4</sup>Michon, op.cit., p.347.

<sup>5</sup>Michon (ibid.) and Mathiez (op.cit., I, p.179) give exactly the same list of deputies with the exception that Mathiez omits Becquey. Dumas (op.cit., II, p.4) does not distinguish between factions. He lists Theodore Lameth, Ramond, Jaucourt, Lebrun, Becquey, Girardin, Vaublanc, Lafon-Ladebat and Vimar as being among his chief allies.

<sup>6</sup>"De 1789 à 1792, la Révolution fut dirigée par cette minorité de la noblesse, tour à tour par le groupe de Lafayette et par le groupe Duport-Barnave-Lameth, qui se disputèrent le pouvoir et ne s'entendirent que contre l'ennemi commun: d'abord l'aristocratie d'Ancien Régime jusqu'en Octobre 1789, puis le peuple à partir de mai 1791". Michon, op.cit., p.446.

only after the Feuillants split from the Amis de la Constitution following the affair of Varennes.<sup>7</sup> From the beginning of the debates upon the Constitution in the National Assembly, Lafayette had been opposed to the proposal of a bicameral legislature after the English fashion, whereas the Triumvirs had by 1791 come to accept the principle of two chambers and even an absolute veto for the King. This issue was especially important after the affair of Varennes because Lafayette no longer trusted Louis XVI's motives and possibly suffered from wounded vanity caused by the hostility of the Court and his omission from the secret correspondence.<sup>8</sup>

The existence of this discord cost the Feuillants dearly outside the Assembly. Control of the National Guard slipped from their grasp when Lafayette resigned his command and was not replaced by a single officer but by the

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<sup>7</sup>Lafayette, Sieyès, Mirabeau, and Bailly withdrew from the Jacobins forming the Société de 1789 in April 1790, but later rejoined. The final separation came in July 1791 when the moderates separated completely, forming the Société des Amis de la Constitution, séante aux Feuillants. Some discussion of reuniting the society took place, but ended in failure by September 1791. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XI, pp.140, 164, 478 et passim. Cf. Michel Vovelle, La Chute de la Monarchie (Paris, 1972), pp.209-12.

<sup>8</sup>"Lafayette, qui était odieux à la reine, souffrait dans sa vanité de n'être pas dans le secret des relations des triumvirs avec la Cour. Alors que ceux-ci allaient très loin dans la voie de la réaction, jusqu'à accepter les deux Chambres, le veto absolu, la nomination des juges par le roi, Lafayette s'en tenait à la Constitution et répugnait à sacrifier les principes de la Déclaration des droits qu'il considérait comme son oeuvre." Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.179. Cf. Michon, op.cit., p.348.



six divisional officers serving in rotation for one month each.<sup>9</sup> This law of 12 September 1791 destroyed the guard's unity of command and, because the divisional officers lacked the status of Lafayette or even of a single permanent commander, it curtailed still further its effectiveness as a police force.<sup>10</sup> Lafayette's retirement was followed by Bailly's as mayor of Paris.<sup>11</sup> Had the Feuillants acted jointly, Lafayette would undoubtedly have been elected to succeed him, thereby retaining at least part of the party's former control over the city. But Court financed newspapers, advised by the Lameths, failed to support him, and he received only 3126 votes, as compared with the Jacobin candidate's (Pétion) 6728. The number of abstentions was enormous as there were then 80,000 electors in the

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<sup>9</sup>Dumas, (op.cit., II, p.6) attributes Lafayette's retirement to "généreux motifs", that is, to his desire for popularity and the grand gesture. Lafayette did not appear to want to retire from public life, as witnessed by his standing for mayor of Paris in the following month.

<sup>10</sup>"L'effet immédiat de cette disposition . . . , fut de rompre l'unité et la force du seul corps capable de maintenir l'ordre public . . ." Dumas, ibid., II, p.6. Lafayette formally resigned his command on 8 October 1791 in accordance with article X of the law of 12 September, which read "Il n'y aura pas de commandant-général de la garde nationale parisienne . . ." Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, n, p.304-05.

<sup>11</sup>Bailly first offered his resignation on 19 September on the grounds of ill health, but the Assembly requested that he remain in office a short time further. Bailly, op.cit., IV, pp.392-93. (Bailly to Officiers Municipaux, Paris, 19 September 1791). However, throughout September, October and November he had been under constant attack, notably from L'Orateur de Peuple, over the management of the provisioning of Paris. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, pp.316-324.

city. In retribution for his humiliation, Lafayette refused to support d'André, the Triumvirs' candidate, for the post of procureur-général-syndic of the department of Paris, and instead helped to obtain the appointment of Roederer, a friend of Brissot.<sup>12</sup> Thus, by December 1791, the mutual hostility between these two factions, combined with the machinations of the Court, had ended Feuillant control over the city of Paris.

The issue of whether war was desirable as a means of influencing France's domestic policy also split the Feuillants: "la guerre était," wrote George Michon, "pour ces parties une formidable manoeuvre de politique intérieure".<sup>13</sup> The Fayettistes favoured war because, as the liberal nobility, they could rely upon being given command of the army and because through command of the army they hoped to regain their lost civil authority.<sup>14</sup> To a lesser degree, they also viewed the war as a means of strengthening the power of the executive (King). This same idea split the Triumvirs because Barnave gave it his support but the Lameths did not:

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<sup>12</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.180.

<sup>13</sup>Michon, op.cit., p.359.

<sup>14</sup>"La plupart étaient d'anciens nobles, militaires dans l'âme" wrote Mathiez (op.cit., I, p.188). Among the army's leaders were found several members of the Feuillant party: Alexandre and Charles Lameth, Latour-Maubourg, Beauharnais, Menou and Bureaux de Puzy who, Michon (op.cit., p.353) commented, "sous les ordres de LaFayette, étaient disposés à un coup de main contre les Jacobins".

Les Lameth demeuraient persuadés qu'elle (sic. Peace) était la condition nécessaire à tout réaction intérieure alors que la prolongation de la guerre ne pourrait être au contraire que favorable aux Jacobins.<sup>15</sup>

The Lameths placed their trust in cooperation with the Austrians to settle the problem of the émigrés and, in so far as this cooperation could be achieved only through the King's offices, they viewed it as a means of re-establishing his prestige. Since a declaration of war would ruin this policy, clearly the success of one faction's aims implied the failure of the other's - either way, a situation in which the Feuillants as a whole could not but lose.

Fayetist reliance upon the army as the primary means of regaining their political position reflected the decline in the quality of the parliamentary Feuillant party. Its leaders and most able members had always come from the liberal nobility, many of whom were now ineligible to serve in the Legislative Assembly because they had been deputies in the Constituent Assembly and who were to abandon Paris for the army in the hope that they could use it as a political weapon. The result was that only a second line of Feuillants, in either faction, were elected to the Legislative Assembly - men who were "tous inférieurs aux orateurs du côté droit de l'Assemblée constituante".<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Michon, op.cit., p.392.

<sup>16</sup>Louis Marie de LaReveillière-Lépeaux, Mémoires de LaReveillière-Lépeaux (3 vols., Paris, 1895), I, p.282. "Mauvais esprit" was Pellenc's summary of the party (Reinhard, op.cit., p.205). Theodore Lameth, for instance, spoke little in the Assembly because he had a weak voice. (Bradley, op.cit., II, p.263).

Only three ci-devant nobles sat in the Legislative Assembly: Jaucourt, a former marquis, Kersaint and Theodore Lameth, both former counts.<sup>17</sup> Although not strictly a noble, Dumas fully participated in their general desire to join the army. In January 1792 Marshal Rochambeau made a special request for the services of Dumas, d'Opterre and Daverhault. This request had Dumas' full support, and only the Military Committee's refusal to allow his departure kept him in Paris.<sup>18</sup>

Before turning to examine the opposition, mention must be made of the secret correspondence between the Triumvirs and the King. This correspondence began in July 1791 and was conducted through the Queen principally by Barnave for a committee of five, including Duport, Alexandre Lameth, d'André, Dumas and Barnave himself - in other words

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<sup>17</sup>Reinhard, op.cit., p.198.

<sup>18</sup>This letter was submitted on 27 January 1792. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIII, p.63, Assemblée Législative, Procès-Verbal, p.323. Cf. Dumas, op.cit., II, p.72-74, and Moniteur, no. 28, 28 January 1792. When the Military Committee refused to allow Dumas to leave, Rochambeau gave the post of chief of staff to Alexandre Berthier, the future marshal, then only a colonel (Phipps, op.cit., I, p.78). Dumas displayed other characteristics of behaviour in common with the liberal nobility. He did not accept pay for his service as deputy, although he was not financially independent. "Pendant que j'exerçais les fonctions de député à l'assemblée législative, je ne touchais point le traitement de député, mais seulement celui de mon grade comme maréchal de camp directeur du dépôt de la guerre." Dumas to Bouchotte, Paris, 16 May 1793, AAG GD 395.

the leaders of the Triumvirist faction.<sup>19</sup> The purpose behind this communication was to advise the King on what measures he should take to concert his actions with the efforts being made by the Triumvirists to restore his popularity. However, neither the King nor the Queen were truly in accordance with the Triumvirs' policies. Marie Antoinette described the constitution as "un tissu d'absurdités impraticables"<sup>20</sup> and while professing to follow the advice given through Barnave, Lameth and Duport, the Court welcomed the movement towards war with secret joy. "La force armée qui a tout détruit, il n'y a que la force qui puisse tout réparer," wrote the Queen to the Emperor on 8 September 1791, expressing the true desire of the Court.<sup>21</sup>

Amongst the groups on the left there was more unity than within the Feuillants, but not unanimity. The left was dominated by a coalition of two factions: the Brissotins, led by two Parisian deputies (Brissot and Condoret), and a group led by Vergniaud, Gensonné and Guadet of the department

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<sup>19</sup>These names appeared in a marginal note on a letter written by Marie Antoinette to Fersen in July 1791. The note also referred to a larger committee (less intimate) containing Lafayette, Maubourg, Lacoste and Emmercy, among others. Cited in O. G. Heidenstam, The Letters of Marie Antoinette, Fersen and Barnave (London, 1926), p.37.

<sup>20</sup>Jean Jacques Chevallier, Barnave ou les Deux Faces de la Révolution: 1791-1793 (Paris, 1936), p.299. Madame Elizabeth, the King's sister, also carried great influence with the King and she opposed all concessions "même apparente, même provisoire" with the Revolution. Even the Queen found her "tellement indiscrete" (Reinhard, op. cit., p.221).

<sup>21</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.189.



of the Gironde, from which the combined groups derived their name of Girondins.<sup>22</sup> Whereas the Feuillants were a less capable version of their predecessors, these deputies were new to the government. They were "bourgeoisie d'affaires" in Lefebvre's terminology, still dedicated to the social order but not opposed to popular democracy and, since Varennes, increasingly hostile towards the King and the émigrés.<sup>23</sup> The Cordelier deputies, Basire, Merlin de Thionville and Chabot, were also vital to this party. Although none played a prominent role in the Assembly, they had a considerable influence in the popular clubs, an element which proved invaluable in the struggle between the factions of the left.<sup>24</sup>

A party representing the large mercantile interests of Bordeaux, the Girondins saw the war as an opportunity to force the émigrés and foreign powers to cease their intervention in France's affairs - interventions to which they attributed the country's growing financial difficulties. On the issue of the war, therefore, they were allied with the Fayetteistes.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, Brissot and Condercet, who had been a member of the Société de 1789, were both elected

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., I, pp. 186-8 and Lefebvre, op.cit., p.225. The combined party was called Brissotins then, but today is generally known as Girondins.

<sup>23</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.225.

<sup>24</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.186 and 193 et passim.

<sup>25</sup>Girondin policy is referred to in Mathiez, op.cit., I, pp.187-88 and Lefebvre, op.cit., p.225.

only with the aid of the Fayettiste vote as was Roederer, as has already been mentioned.

A minority of the left, however, did not follow Brissot's lead. Led by Robespierre, who for three months attacked his policies in the Jacobin Club and in the press,<sup>26</sup> this faction was composed of the future leaders of the Mountain in the Convention: Billaud-Varenne, Camille Desmoulins, Marat, Panis, Santerre and, at first, Danton. Ostensibly the split was over the Girondins' desire for war, which Robespierre regarded as creating a risk to liberty and providing opportunities for a Caesar to arise.<sup>27</sup> But the dispute was far more fundamental than a mere matter of tactics. Robespierre desired no less than the removal of the perjured King through an internal crisis, using the constitution and parliamentary tactics as the weapons in this struggle. Brissot, on the other hand, despite his earlier advocacy of a republic, did not seek to remove the King. His aim was instead to coerce the Court through the pressure of war.

The total strength of the left is taken as 136, the number of deputies belonging to the Jacobin Club. Of this total, only five (of twenty-four) were from Paris, their

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<sup>26</sup>For the debates on the war, see Aulard, Jacobins, vol. III.

<sup>27</sup>Robespierre "perça à jour le jeu de Louis XVI et de Marie-Antionette, celui de Feuillants, celui de Gironde." (Michon, op.cit., p.359) Cf. George Michon, Robespierre et la Guerre Révolutionnaire (Paris, 1937).

main concentration being in the west, south west, south east and centre of France.<sup>28</sup> However, just as the Feuillants were weaker than their numbers would indicate, the Jacobins were potentially much stronger. This was largely the result of the timing of the elections for the Legislative Assembly. As Aulard observed, the majority of electors who were to select the deputies proper had themselves been chosen before the flight of the King "quand le roi inspirait encore généralement confiance, en pleine paix publique". These electors were moderates and, accordingly, selected deputies "presque tous partisans de la constitution"<sup>29</sup> - men who would tend to be sympathetic towards Feuillant objectives of one shade or another. The complexion of electors chosen after Varennes is vastly different, reflecting the new mood of France. In Paris, for example, twenty of the forty-eight sections had not completed their elections by the time of the King's flight and these are the sections which chose the most democratically oriented electors. Their choice of deputies

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<sup>28</sup>Jacobins comprised the majority of deputies for Bouches-du-Rhône, Gironde, Meuse and l'Oise. They were "la moitié moins un" in Côtes-du-Nord, Maine-et-Loire, Haute-Marne, Meurthe, Haut-Rhin and Vosges. Thirty-two departments sent no Jacobins at all. The Feuillants did no better in Paris, having only five deputies there themselves and twenty-five departments did not send any deputies of this faction. Their main strength lay along the coast of the Mediterranean, the Gironde, Landes, Dordogne, Bretagne and the east. Reinhard, op.cit., pp. 203-05. N.B. For the Feuillants these figures are based upon their initial strength of 160.

<sup>29</sup>Aulard, op.cit., p.170.

as is to be expected, continued this trend:

comme ils ont été nommés après la fuite à Varennes, il s'est glissé parmi eux des démocrates, des hommes qui, selon la politique cordelière-jacobine se méfient du roi, le veulent tenir en tutelle, presque prisonnier, et qui deviendront aisément républicains.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, by the opening of the Legislative Assembly, the Feuillant party was weakened internally by dissension, by the desertion of its men of talent, and externally by the loss of control of Paris and by the unreliability of the King. It was faced too with the problem that its deputies were no longer representative of popular feeling as they were far more favourably disposed towards the King than was France as a whole.

From the beginning of the Legislative Assembly the question of war was the grand issue; "discutée sous toutes les formes par les journaux, par les clubs, par l'assemblée, par le ministère."<sup>31</sup> Until February 1792, when the threats of foreign intervention and the plots of the ministers superceded it, the problem of the émigrés provided the context for debates over the war.<sup>32</sup> The Girondins, as was mentioned above, saw in measures against the émigrés and the foreign powers harbouring them, a panacea for the internal problems of France. They were aided in their

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid. Among the deputies elected at this time were: Merlin de Thionville, Basire, Chabot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné and Brissot.

<sup>31</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, p.2.

<sup>32</sup>Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution Française (8 vols., Paris, 1889), II, p.360.

belief and in their actions by the behaviour of the émigrés themselves:

L'Obstination des émigrés à résister aux injonctions du roi, et à méconnaître son autorité; leurs intrigues dans tous les cabirets de l'Europe, leurs apprêts de guerre, leurs rassemblements tolérés et protégés dans les électors de Trèves, de Mayence, et chez d'autres princes voisins de nos frontières, tout devint bientôt, non plus seulement un prétexte d'agitation, mais bien un juste motif d'alarme.<sup>33</sup>

Above all, the émigrés' own propaganda provided the orators of the left with ample material to proclaim that the safety of France required their expulsion from France's borders. Artois' letter of 27 August announcing the Declaration of Pillnitz added to the repugnance already felt for the re-establishment of the ancien régime the fear of foreign invasion and conquest.<sup>34</sup> The attack upon the émigrés and upon Austria for supporting them, was developed, in Jaurès' phrase, with an "audace surnoise", by the Girondins.<sup>35</sup> Their tactics, summarised by Dumas, consisted:

. . . en agitant dès l'ouverture de la session les questions qui pouvaient le plus émouvoir les passions populaires. Dernière cette espèce d'avant-garde ils se tenaient en réserve, toujours prêts à appuyer son attaque en profitant des moindres circonstances pour gagner du terrain, tantôt par des discours violents, tantôt en affectant une fausse modération. Ce tactique fut constamment suivi pendant tout le cours de la session; et le parti constitutionnel,

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<sup>33</sup>Dumas, op.cit., II, p.17. Cf. Jacques Godechot, La Contre-Révolution, pp.153-54.

<sup>34</sup>Sorel, op.cit., II, p.262. "Le public français prit la déclaration de Pillnitz, non pour ce qu'elle était, un expédient dilatoire de chancellerie, mais pour ce que la lui donna le parti qui s'en réclamait et qui paraissait avoir intérêt à s'en réclamer." (Ibid., II, p.264.)

<sup>35</sup>Cited in Lefebvre, op.cit., p.227.



réduit à la défensive ne se soutint pendant les premiers mois qu'à la faveur de la neutralité vacillante du plus grand nombre de membres de cette assemblée qui, même en jetant beaucoup de lumières dans les discussions, évitaient toujours de se décider entre les deux minorités et finirent par nous abandonner.<sup>36</sup>

The Feuillants and Triumvirists in particular, were immediately placed in a very difficult position. In response to the manoeuvres of the Girondins, their policy was to oppose a confrontation with Austria, while Barnave, Duport and Lameth secretly advised the King to pressure the Emperor into expelling the émigrés, in the hope of avoiding the possibility of war with Austria and simultaneously restoring the King's popularity. The Court acted accordingly, at least in public; on 13 and 14 October, Louis issued letters to the commandants of the ports and the officers and men of the army instructing them that their duty was "de rester fidèlement à votre poste".<sup>38</sup> The King also issued a proclamation concerning those who had already emigrated instructing them to return to their country.<sup>39</sup>

The Girondins were quick to respond to these moves.

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<sup>36</sup>Dumas, op.cit., II, p.8.

<sup>37</sup>Although Barnave desired war, he counselled the King to veto these measures because he wanted to have the King, not the Assembly, triumph over the émigrés. Cf. Chevallier, op.cit., p.324.

<sup>38</sup>Louis XVI to Commandans des Ports, Paris, 13 October 1791 and Louis XVI to Officiers Généraux, Paris, 14 October 1791. Cited in Bouchez and Roux, XII, pp.157-160.

<sup>39</sup>Proclamation, 14 October 1791, ibid., XII, pp.160-62.

When the debate on the question of the émigrés opened, Brissot challenged the government:

Si l'on veut sincèrement parvenir à arrêter l'émigration et l'esprit de rébellion, il faut punir les fonctionnaires publics qui ont abandonné leurs postes; mais il faut surtout punir les grands coupables qui ont établi, dans les pays étrangers, un foyer de contre-révolution.<sup>40</sup>

Dumas' maiden speech was delivered as the Feuillant response to this pressure.<sup>41</sup> His argument was essentially that laws contemplated against emigration in general were unconstitutional. His basis for this claim was founded on the principle that emigration was not "un mal positif, une résistance que la loi doit réprimer: mais . . . un mal négatif, une sorte de privation de civisme et de vertu, que l'opinion publique peut réprover, mais que la loi ne saurait saisir". Because emigration was "une renonciation au pacte sociale", those who left France could not be punished as they had deliberately put themselves outside of her laws. Furthermore, he argued that to act now, passing a rigorous law against the émigrés, before the effect of the King's proclamation was known, was to "présenter la marche du corps législatif en opposition avec celle du roi". However, Dumas was not content to advocate that no action should be taken. A soldier himself, he viewed with distaste

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., XII, p.162. The debates began on 16 October with the report of the minister. Brissot's speech was delivered on 20 October 1791.

<sup>41</sup>Brissot was followed by Couthon, who demanded that Monsieur renounce his future rights as regent and then by Dumas who was the last to speak. Both Brissot's and Dumas' speeches were printed. Ibid., XII, p.174.

officers abandoning their posts, regardless of the reason, and he therefore proposed three measures be taken against the émigrés who were also deserters from the army: first, that the King should strike off their names from the rolls if they had given their resignations; second, that those who had not resigned be considered as deserters and tried by military law; and, third, that courts martial to implement this be established at Metz, Lille and Strasbourg.<sup>42</sup>

The Triumvirists were thoroughly defeated on the question of the émigrés. The Assembly passed a decree on 31 October depriving Monsieur of his right to become regent were he to remain outside of France. It was followed by the more draconic decree of 9 November 1791 which ordered the émigrés to return before January 1792 on pain of death and confiscated their revenues without, however, prejudicing the rights of their wives and children to them.<sup>43</sup> The Triumvirs counselled Louis to sanction the first of these decrees but to veto the second together with the decree of 29 November against refractory priests. He was also to accept the decree calling upon him to negotiate with the Emperor and to send the Electors of Treves and Mainz an

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<sup>42</sup>Dumas, "Opinion Sur La Loi Contre Les Émigrations," Paris, 20 October 1791. BN 8° Le<sup>33</sup> 3.A.(3) and UP MSS 52.853. This occasion is also referred to in his Souvenirs (loc.cit., II, pp.9-12) and in the manuscript "Mémoires" of Théodore Lameth (BN Papiers de Théodore Lameth: Nouveau Fonds Français, no.1387). It was reported in the Moniteur, no. 295, on 22 October 1791.

<sup>43</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, p.218. Cf. Godechot, op.cit., p.154.

ultimatum ordering them to expel the émigrés.<sup>44</sup> Louis appeared to follow the advice of the Triumvirs on every point. On 14 December he came before the Assembly and declared that if the Elector of Treves had not ended the assemblies of émigrés before 15 January he would henceforth be regarded as an enemy of France. But without the Triumvirs' knowledge he instructed Breteuil to inform the Emperor that his real desire was for the Elector not to yield as "le parti de la Révolution en concevrait trop d'arrogance et ce succès soutiendrait la machine pendant un temps".<sup>45</sup>

Had the King sincerely followed the advice he was given, the policy of the Triumvirs might have succeeded. As it was, the King's speech restored his popularity and, according to Dumas, heartened his supporters in the Legislature.<sup>46</sup> Leopold was himself afraid that Austria could not stand the strain of war and he brought pressure to bear on the Electors to disperse the émigrés.<sup>47</sup> But the Triumvirists were unable to profit from Leopold's moderation and the announcement of the Elector of Treves' complaisance made on 31 December 1791 proved a hollow victory, for the Girondins were neither defeated nor silenced. They continued

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<sup>44</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.192; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.228; Chevallier, op.cit., p.324. These proposals were filed by Louis as "Projet du Comité des Ministres, concerté avec MM. Alexandre Lameth et Barnave".

<sup>45</sup>Cited in Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.192.

<sup>46</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.17

<sup>47</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.190.

to attack the leaders of the émigrés and pressed for further action and guarantees on the part of Austria.<sup>48</sup> Brissot, in a speech which occupied eight columns of the Moniteur, declared that the Emperor was "en état d'hostilité ouverte avec la France" because he had not used his forces to disperse the émigrés and, above all, because of his adherence to the agreements of Pillnitz and his alliance with Prussia.<sup>49</sup>

In response, Dumas called for the Emperor to be summoned to force the Electors to remove the émigrés by virtue of his obligations under the treaty of 1756, rather than by the threat of open hostilities.<sup>50</sup> At the end of several days' debate, the proposal of Hérault de Séchelles was adopted. It stipulated that if a satisfactory reply from the Emperor was not received before 1 March 1792, a state of war would exist between France and the Empire.<sup>51</sup> Although war was not declared until 20 April 1792, from January the Assembly had a growing majority in favour of it. The death of Leopold and accession of the more bellicose Francis I was another step towards the brink and

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<sup>48</sup>The Emperor's reply, announcing the acquiescence of the Elector of Treves, did not contain any disavowal of the declaration of Pillnitz. Cf. Sorel, op.cit., II, p.360

<sup>49</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIII, p.50. Cf. Moniteur, no. 19, 19 January 1792.

<sup>50</sup>Dumas, "Opinion Sur le Rapport du Comité Diplomatique Concernant l'Office de l'Empereur", Paris, 18 January 1792. BN 8° Le<sup>33</sup> 3.K.(19), and UP Maclure Collection MSS La972, La1009 and La994.

<sup>51</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIII, pp.60-61.



the opposition led on the left by Robespierre and the right by Dumas gradually melted away. When the vote came<sup>52</sup> it was Pastoret, described by Sorel as a moderate and a Feuillant, who spoke first on its behalf and only Jaucourt was permitted to speak in opposition.<sup>53</sup> Seven deputies had the courage to vote against the war: Dumas, Lameth, Becquey, Hua, Baërt, Gentil and Jaucourt. On this decisive issue, at least, they constituted the effective strength of the Triumvirist faction.<sup>54</sup>

What emerges as the most significant factor in the demise of the Triumvirists was not the power or ability of the Girondins but the absolute failure of their own tactics. Of the ten presidents elected between October and February at least five were identifiable as Feuillants (Pastoret, Ducastel, Vaublanc, Daverhoult, and Dumas) while only three (Vergniaud, François de Neufchâteau, and Guadet) were Girondins.<sup>55</sup> As late as 19 February, Dumas was able to

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<sup>52</sup>The Girondins wished to follow the parliamentary forms in declaring war as they considered themselves to be "hommes d'état". Accordingly, they moved to send the decree to the diplomatic committee, but when the galleries clamoured for immediate action they reversed themselves. "Ce qui subsiste de la droite, Mathieu Dumas et ses rares amis tâchent vainement de s'y opposer. On crie: A l'ordre! et la discussion immédiate est votée, presque à l'unanimité". Sorel, op.cit., II, p.431.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., II, p.432. Dumas wished to speak but it was prevented: "Je me présentai pour parler contre la clôture; j'insistai malgré les huées; l'assemblée décréta que je ne serais pas entendu." Dumas, op.cit., II, p.123.

<sup>54</sup>Sorel, op.cit., II, p.434.

<sup>55</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, p.36. There were eleven presidents in all. Bautauld, the first, was 'président d'âge'; Lacépède and Lémontey were of the centre.

obtain 229 of 407 votes to become President. With his election he considered that "la balance penchait donc encore de notre côté".<sup>56</sup> But he was wrong, for by that time the policies of the Triumvirs had shattered the Feuillant party. In an Assembly in which the true counter-revolution was not represented at all, in which the deputies were all beneficiaries of the Revolution, and in which there was considerable distrust of the King's loyalties, proposals to allow the King to settle the problem of the émigrés had little chance of success.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, open opposition to measures against emigration when considered together with the justifiable suspicions of secret negotiations with Austria left the faction open to the accusation of disloyalty to the Revolution.

This suspicion of the faction's motives was especially damaging to the Feuillant Club. The Club des Feuillants was "resurrected" on 7 October 1791. Its sessions, held in the hotel de Richelieu, were closed to the public until December 1791,<sup>58</sup> when rumours about its doctrines and expressions of unconstitutional views forced the Feuillants

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<sup>56</sup> Dumas, op.cit., II, p.80.

<sup>57</sup> "Dès lors l'opposition à la Révolution n'était plus représentée à l'Assemblée. Les députés se retrouvaient donc entre citoyens, représentants et bénéficiaires du nouveau régime." Reinhard, op.cit., p.1991

<sup>58</sup> "Ce fut donc une sorte de société privée qui se forma, et sur laquelle on est très mal informé, les documents sont rares et ont été mal interprétés." Ibid., p.204.

to open them.<sup>59</sup> Violent clashes occurred almost immediately the public was admitted. In response to these disorders, Pétion posted national guardsmen to control access to its sessions.<sup>60</sup> As for the authors of the Feuillant strategy, after December most ceased to attend the club or to defend their policies at all. Alexandre and Charles Lameth later joined Lafayette's army, while Barnave, after having made only two speeches, both on the colonies, left Paris for his home in Dauphiné in January.<sup>61</sup>

Fully as important to the fate of the party was the rapprochement between the Fayettistes and the Girondins over the war, which took its definite form in December, when Narbonne, a Fayettiste, became Minister of War with the backing of both groups.<sup>62</sup> The summoning of Leopold and the formation of three armies to be commanded by Rochambeau, Lafayette and Luckner were further successes gained by this alliance in December. These measures brought to an end what little cooperation had existed amongst the

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<sup>59</sup>Papers of the left such as Patriote Français, Révolutions de France et Brabant and Annales Patriotiques contributed greatly to the distrust of Feuillant motives, both before and after its meetings were declared open. Cf. Camille Desmoulins, Révolutions de France et Brabant, no. 3, 2 January 1792 (Paris, 1908), pp.42-43, and Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, p.344-45 for excerpts from the other two.

<sup>60</sup>Cf. Bouchez and Roux, XII, pp.347-359.

<sup>61</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.228; Bradby, op.cit., II, p.276. Only Duport continued to oppose the policies of the war party.

<sup>62</sup>Narbonne often met with Brissot, Clavière, Isnard, Condorcet and Talleyrand in Madame de Staël's drawing room to discuss common policy. Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.187 and Lefebvre, op.cit., p.228.

Feuillants over the war and convinced Barnave and the Lameths that their cause was lost.<sup>63</sup>

During the period covered by the debates on the émigrés and then on the war, numerous other issues were also discussed, but these had far less influence upon the fate of the Feuillants than did the question of the war and they were influenced to varying degrees themselves by the outcome of that question. On these lesser questions Dumas remained consistent with the Triumvirists' position. He voted against the decree on refractory priests; against amnesty for the massacres at Avignon; against the granting of arms for the Marseillais to march against Arles; and against the immediate emancipation of negroes in St. Domingo (23 March 1792). Except for the last issue, Dumas' opposition was based on constitutional grounds, but in the case of St. Domingo he admitted that on one side was the declaration of rights and on the other the planters who viewed nine-tenths of the population as "matériel de leur industrie".<sup>64</sup> Dumas considered the question of St. Domingo to be one of the most important discussed after that of the war;<sup>65</sup> his support of the latter group despite the unconstitutionality of their position requires some explanation.

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<sup>63</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.228.

<sup>64</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.26.

<sup>65</sup>"Ce honteux succès du parti de la Gironde (sic. the vote on Avignon) avait été préparé par des discussions antérieures sur deux questions importantes: celle de la guerre et celle des colonies." Ibid., II, p.23.

In essence, his position on the colony was simply that "le problème était insoluble".<sup>66</sup> The Girondins, led by Brissot (1 December 1791), wished to extend the declaration of rights to all the negroes of the colonies by revoking the decree of 24 September 1791 which left their status and emancipation in the hands of the colonial assembly.<sup>67</sup> Dumas opposed this view because, in his own words:

Le principe fondamental de la révolution opérée dans la métropole était inapplicable aux colonies, parce que les éléments de la société y étaient non-seulement différents, mais tout contraires. L'admission des affranchis aux droits de cité, cet acte de justice si naturel, amenait inévitablement à l'abolition de l'esclavage; mais pour remplir ces vœux des amis de l'humanité au gré de leur impatience, il eût fallu pouvoir changer tout à la fois le caractère distinctif des trois races, radicalement séparées par le préjugé de la couleur, réformer et fondre leurs mœurs, déplacer leur intérêts, leur créer une patrie.<sup>68</sup>

He considered the troubles which the colony was experiencing at the moment were caused by the "marche impolitique, imprudente" and "destructive" taken by the Constituent Assembly to procure freedom of the blacks. His motives may not have been entirely altruistic, however, for Tarbé, whose proposal for gradual emancipation he supported, was one of those deputies who profited from the sugar industry

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., II, p.25.

<sup>67</sup>For a summary of conditions on St. Domingo and the legislation which affect it, see Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XII, pp.295-303, and Léon Deschamps, Les Colonies Pendant La Révolution: La Constituante et la Réforme Coloniale (Paris, 1898).

<sup>68</sup>Dumas, op.cit., II, p.25. Cf. Moniteur, no. 83, 23 March 1792, "Saint Domingue".



and would therefore have been extremely loathe to see its foundations destroyed.<sup>69</sup>

Although Dumas had been consistent and persistent in his opposition to war, he had from the beginning of the Assembly directed a considerable proportion of his effort into measures for improving the French army. Because of his reputation in military affairs he was elected to the Military Committee on 25 October 1791,<sup>70</sup> and often selected by the Committee to present its opinions and to propose legislation to the Assembly - even at times when he had himself opposed the legislation in committee. This is a fair estimation of the esteem in which he was held by his colleagues and a tribute to his abilities as an orator. His own contributions can be discussed under three main headings: the recruitment, the organisation and the question of discipline in the army.

Dumas supported the views of Narbonne that the 51,000

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<sup>69</sup>Dumas, "Opinion Sur les Troubles de St. Domingue", Paris, 1792, BN Le<sup>33</sup> 3.E.(1(6)), and UP. Maclure Collection MSS La977 and Lal007.

<sup>70</sup>Assemblée Législative, Procès-Verbal, Seance, 25 October 1791, p.231. The others were: Lacombe Saint-Michel, Gouvion, Delacroix, Carnot (jeune), Du Petit-Bois, Delmas, Louvet, Pérignon, Beaupui, Albitte, Lolivier, Ritter, Jouneau, Choudieu, Blanchard, Gasparin, Bezancon-Perrier, Lacuée (jeune), Calvert, Coustard, Crublier d'Obterre, Dubois de Bellegarde and Soubrany. Carnot (jeune) was Claude Marie, known as Feulint, not Lazare Nicolas, the later member of the Committee of Public Safety, who was at this time on the Committee of Public Instruction which met at the same time as did the Military Committee. Cf. Marcel Reinhard, Le Grand Carnot (2 vols., Paris, 1950), I, pp.197-99.

men the army was short should be obtained from the battalions of the National Guard and incorporated directly into the existing line regiments.<sup>71</sup> There were considerable advantages to this system: because the National Guard at the time comprised a high proportion of men who had had previous military experience either in the militia or in regiments of the line, such as the Gardes Françaises,<sup>72</sup> it would have provided the army with recruits of the highest quality; by introducing these volunteers directly into existing regiments it would have <sup>a</sup>levé<sup>d</sup> the volunteers with seasoned veterans and it would have increased the battle efficiency of the veterans by bringing their formations up to strength; and, finally, the infusion of patriotic volunteers would have increased the political reliability of the line. On all these points, however, the majority of the Military Committee voted against Dumas, largely for political rather than military reasons. In their opinion the National Guard was needed at home to protect the interior from traitors and aristocrats. Therefore, volunteers were to be raised for the army and they were to be organised into separate battalions to prevent their being contaminated by the aristocrats in the line regiments.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>AN AF I 18, fol. 59v. Comité Militaire: Registre: Séance 18 January 1792. Jean Popereu and Georges Lefebvre, "Études Sur Le Ministère de Warbonne", AHRF (XIX, 1947), p.24, and Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.65.

<sup>72</sup>Phipps, op.cit., I, p.16.

<sup>73</sup>Hauterive, op.cit., p.185 and Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIII, pp.52-57.

Had the views of Narbonne and Dumas prevailed, it is possible that the performance of the army in 1792 would have improved considerably as it did in 1793 when the amalgamation of line and volunteer battalions was at last achieved.<sup>74</sup> Although Dumas was selected to make the committee's report despite his opposition to its conclusions,<sup>75</sup> he continued to press his own views and two days after this report was made he proposed an amendment to allow volunteers to enlist in the cavalry and artillery.<sup>76</sup>

His opinions were more successful in the less politically oriented area of army organisation. In this category of military affairs he proposed only one measure himself, on the technical question of whether the miners should be reincluded in the Corps of Engineers,<sup>77</sup> while Lacombe Saint-Michel delivered the most important report on the creation of horse artillery. But the system for raising the troops, their composition and organisation were all modelled on the experimental companies created by Dumas at Metz the

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<sup>74</sup>Another disadvantage lay in the distinction between volunteers and regulars. The higher incentives and better terms of service for the former encouraged the regulars to desert and then re-enlist in the volunteers.

<sup>75</sup>Cf. Dumas, "Rapport sur la Mode de Recrutement des Cinquante - un mille Hommes", 19 January 1792, BN 8° Le<sup>33</sup> 3.V.(19). Dumas, op.cit., II, p.65; Moniteur, no.20, 20 January 1792.

<sup>76</sup>Popereu and Lefebvre, op.cit., p.24. This proposal, too, was defeated. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIII, p.57.

<sup>77</sup>Dumas, "Rapport et Projet de Décret Concernant la Réunion des Compagnies de Mineurs au Corps du Génie", 11 June 1792. UP Maclure Collection MSS La 1003.

previous summer.<sup>78</sup> Another innovation for which Dumas shares credit was the introduction of the legion. Modelled upon its Austrian counterpart, it was to be a balanced composite unit of light infantry, cavalry, regular infantry and artillery - designed specifically for independent operations and resembling a miniature corps d'armée.<sup>79</sup>

Neither of these areas was as vital to the success of the war nor as politically charged as the question of discipline. The war had not begun well for the French army. Its first offensive developed into a fiasco within days of its opening. Rochambeau's army suffered most; one column retired before a town which the enemy had already evacuated; another, when ordered to retreat, broke into a panic and eventually arrested its general; while the main body advanced to Mons but then retreated on the pretext that the Belgians had not rallied to its appeals.<sup>80</sup> Lafayette's army, which was to have supported this advance, checked its march with the news of these failures. Luckner's army on the Rhine did not move at all. The commanding generals, who had never favoured this plan of campaign and

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<sup>78</sup>See in supra, Chapter II.

<sup>79</sup>Reinhard, op.cit., I, p.233-35. Cf. Moniteur, no. 116, 25 April 1792.

<sup>80</sup>Lefebvre, La Révolution Française, p.239; Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.200-01. In the case of Theodore Dillon, the unfortunate general who was arrested by his own men, he was killed at Fives by national guardsmen of that town. Cf. Reinhard, La Chute de la Royauté, pp.277-282.

who considered that their armies were not ready, sought to cover their own indecision by laying the full blame for these disasters upon the indiscipline of their men.<sup>81</sup> Adopting the opposing attitude, the parties of the left, led by Robespierre and Marat, held the officers responsible and demanded their dismissal with renewed vigour.<sup>82</sup> Both sides were correct to a point. The soldiers' distrust of their officers led them to regard incompetence or caution as treason and their cry "Nous sommes trahis!" occasioned panic, confusion and rout.<sup>83</sup>

In the debates attendant upon the campaign's failure and Rochambeau's resignation, Dumas became the spokesman for the reform of military justice; "le seul moyen d'assurer l'obéissance et la discipline". This he considered to be absolutely fundamental to the armies' survival:

Si vous n'établissez dans les armées une forme de jugement militaire, qui prévienne le danger des délais dans la punition des délits, la force

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<sup>81</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.201; Hartmann, op.cit., p.446.

<sup>82</sup>Robespierre wrote in Le Défenseur de la Constitution, "L'Indiscipline! ce mot odieusement répété par l'aristocratie et le machiavélisme . . . Ce mot ne fut jamais appliqué aux officiers de la caste privilégiée, qui n'a cessé de persécuter le patriotisme et d'insulter à la liberté", cited in Georges Michon, "La Justice Militaire Sous La Révolution", AHRF, (XIV, 1922) p.24. Cf. Maximilien Robespierre, "Discours Sur le Licenciement des Officiers de l'Armée", Paris, 1792.

<sup>83</sup>Hartmann (op.cit., p.442) cites the example of the 5th dragoons whose flight was "provoked" by the desertion of several officers as they advanced towards Mons. In this case, as in that of General Dillon, it should be noted that the panic occurred amongst the troops of the line, not the volunteers.



morale du général est détruite, et vainement les lois lui auront-elles confié le pouvoir de faire des réglemens, et d'attacher des peines aux délits au'il aura prévus qui les fera exécuter, qu'il n'y aura plus de subordination, dès lors le succès des opérations, le sort journalier des armes, seraient la mesure de l'obéissance des troupes,

Discipline was also the only means of preventing suspicions and rumours from completely disorganising an army. Such submission to laws is not "obéissance servile" as among other nations, for the French soldier has "un intérêt personnel à ce que la force de l'armée se conserve dans toute son intégrité" and therefore "la soumission aux lois de discipline est la véritable preuve de son patriotisme". Because the French soldier is free to obey his submission does not conflict with his freedom.<sup>84</sup>

The law which Dumas proposed in the name of the Military Committee retained the institution of court martial for serious crimes and instituted 'tribunaux de police correctionnelle' for minor offenses.<sup>85</sup> Dumas and Daverhoul also proposed to make the penalties for the desertion of officers more severe than those for enlisted men but on this point they were defeated in favour of equal penalties.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Dumas, "Rapport Sur la Forme des Jugemens Militaires en Campagne et la Police Correctionnelle de l'Armée", Paris, 5 May 1792, BN Le33 3.V.(44), cited in Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIV, pp.251-56. Cf. Moniteur, no. 127, 6 May 1792; no. 131, 10 May 1792; and no. 133, 12 May 1792.

<sup>85</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIV, p.257. In this manner "la sainte institution des jurés" was preserved for serious crimes. For a history of military justice, see George Michon, La Justice Militaire Sous La Révolution (Paris, 1922).

<sup>86</sup>Moniteur, no. 139, 18 May 1792.

With the support of every officer in the Assembly (except Lazare Carnot)<sup>87</sup> and the Girondins, who wished to reassure the generals, Merlin de Thoinville's objection that the entire decree was "impolitique, immorale, inconstitutionnelle et inutile" was decisively defeated as was an amendment of Albitte and Delacroix which would have referred to the Assembly all death sentences imposed by court martial.<sup>88</sup> The decree was adopted on 16 May and sent to the army together with an address which spoke of the necessity for unconditional obedience.<sup>89</sup>

The period immediately following the opening debacle of the war and preceding the Prussian invasion was one of relatively little military activity but of great political importance. In March, during the manoeuvres leading towards the declaration of war, the Feuillant ministers had been replaced by either Girondins or their allies led by Dumouriez, who replaced Delessart as Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>90</sup> As Lafayette had always considered himself to be on an equal

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<sup>87</sup>Carnot was an officer of the engineers and as such had never actually commanded troops in peace or war. Reinhard, *Le Grand Carnot*, I, p.218.

<sup>88</sup>*Moniteur*, no. 131, 10 May 1792; Antoine Merlin, "Opinion Contre le Projet de décret Proposé par M. Dumas", Paris, 9 May 1792, p.2.

<sup>89</sup>The Assembly had been strongly influenced by the timely arrival of a message (in favour of these measures) from Luckner, who then enjoyed a considerable reputation. Reinhard, *op.cit.*, p.283.

<sup>90</sup>The other ministers were Clavière (Finance), Roland (Interior), Duranthon (Justice), Lacoste (Marine), de Grave (War), "presque tous amis de Brissot ou des Girondins". Mathiez, *op.cit.*, I, p.198.

level with the ministers of the government, he was offended when, without consulting him, Dumouriez substituted Servan for de Grave (Minister of War) in May. He was also alarmed by the growth of democratic feeling in Paris, which convinced him that the Revolution was getting out of hand.<sup>91</sup> In an effort to restore what he considered to be the proper balance of power, Lafayette drew closer to the Lameths and to Adrien Duport, thereby reuniting the Feuillant party. He also began negotiations for an armistice with Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador in Belgium.<sup>92</sup> This was a preliminary step towards freeing his army for a march on Paris - a plan which Lafayette pursued in various forms until himself forced to flee in August. At a meeting between the commanders of the three armies, held at Valenciennes (18 May 1792), Lafayette and Luckner (Rochambeau attended but had already resigned his command) decided to cease hostilities unilaterally and to inform the government that the army was no longer capable of acting offensively.<sup>93</sup>

When the memorandum from Valenciennes reached the

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<sup>91</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.202; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.242.

<sup>92</sup>"Lafayette voulait restaurer les autorités légales, rétablir le pouvoir royal 'dans toute son étendue constitutionnelle', briser les Jacobins". Reinhard, op.cit., p.309. Reinhard disagrees with Mathiez (op.cit., I, p.202) and Lefebvre (op.cit., p.243) who both felt that Lafayette also now agreed to revising the Constitution.

<sup>93</sup>Reinhard, op.cit., p.286. Reinhard (ibid., p.310) argues that even had Austria assented to an armistice the army would not have marched on Paris because: "toutefois le prestige de l'Assemblée était trop grand pour que l'opération eût été possible contre sa volonté".

ministers it convinced them that the generals were in league with the Court. Unable to control the generals directly, the Girondins sought to intimidate them through pressure upon the Court. Accordingly, an Austrian Committee, working under the Queen's direction, was denounced by Carra in the Annales Patriotiques of 15 May and then by Brissot in a speech, delivered on 23 May, in which he named Duport, Montmorin, Bertrand de Moleville, Lafayette and Delessart as members.<sup>94</sup> The Garde du Corps, the next target, was ordered to be disbanded by the decree of 29 May, which also cited its commanding officer, Crossé-Brissac, before the High Court. On 4 June Servan proposed to form a camp of 20,000 Fédérés, just north of Paris, ostensibly as an additional war measure but in reality as a measure of security against a coup d'état on the part of Lafayette.<sup>95</sup>

This mutual hostility between the two factions made the position of the Triumvirists in the Assembly untenable. Hitherto, according to Dumas, they had been able to support the war effort and the throne, at least in principle:

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<sup>94</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIV, pp.278-297. Dumas had ample warning of Lafayette's intentions. As early as 27 April 1792, he wrote to Biron: ". . . Je sais, à n'en pouvoir douter, qu'il est coalisé avec eux, Clermont-Tonnerre, les deux Duport, Bertrand et le Château, que le projet est de vous gagner, espérant que lorsque vous aurez eu des succès, vous vous rendrez maître de l'armée, que vous la remènerez sur Paris . . ." (AN F<sup>7</sup> 4691) cited in Albert Mathiez, "L'Intrigue Feuillantine Au Lendemain de la Déclaration de La Guerre", AHRF (I, 1924), p.559.

<sup>95</sup>Mathiez, La Révolution Française, op.cit., I, p.203; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.243. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XIV, pp.297-338.

La situation du parti constitutionnel, depuis la déclaration de la guerre, devenait de jour en jour plus pénible; il était de notre devoir, il était de notre honneur de concourir franchement à tous les moyens qui seraient proposés pour mettre la France en état de combattre avec vigueur; et cependant nous devions repousser les mesures qui, sous le prétexte d'exciter l'esprit belliqueux de la nation, étaient évidemment dirigées par les factieux vers le renversement du trône.<sup>96</sup>

But once the generals had broken with the government the two aspects of this policy were incompatible. A definite choice had to be made to support either the war and with it the measures of the Gironde to pressure the generals and the Court or to defend the Court and the generals and to accept their virtual abandonment of the war.

From May until August, Dumas led Feuillant resistance to the measures of the Gironde against the King and Lafayette. Although he simultaneously prepared several reports on military affairs, the evidence is that his major concern was to prevent the Girondins from exploiting the war rather than to aid them in waging it.<sup>97</sup> He argued that the Austrian Committee should not be investigated "afin que l'on connaisse à quoi se réduisent toutes ces conspirations, dont on nous berce depuis si long-temps".<sup>98</sup> On constitutional grounds, he strongly opposed disbanding.

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<sup>96</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.131.

<sup>97</sup>Of the Military Committee's twenty-two sessions in May, Dumas attended eight, of the seventeen in June, eight, and of the ten in July, one. Comité Militaire, Registre, AN AF I 18 fol. 59v.

<sup>98</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XV, p.6.



or suspending the Garde du Corps,<sup>99</sup> even while he admitted that the accusations made against it were not unfounded.

Its officers

travaillaient par toutes sortes de moyens à éteindre le patriotisme, en tolérant l'indiscipline, les violences, les propos et les actes les plus séditeux, et qu'ils avaient, par ces incorporations vicieuses, augmenté la force numérique de ce corps bien au delà du nombre fixé. Malheureusement ces reproches n'étaient pas sans quelque fondement.<sup>100</sup>

In place of action to be taken against the entire guard he proposed specific sanctions against the guilty: first, to have a commission appointed "pour vérifier la composition actuelle"; second, in investigating the conduct of the various officers denounced for "délits relatifs à la sûreté de l'État" to follow the normal procedure in such cases; and, finally, to allow the King to redress matters of "mauvaise conduite". He also opposed Servan's proposal for a camp of *Fédérés* because he feared that "elle voulait s'emparer du roi par la terreur".<sup>102</sup>

Despite Feuillant opposition, the first proposal was passed and Louis was forced to sanction the decree disbanding the guard because the ministers refused to countersign his veto. But he was able to avoid sanctioning the second measure as the ministry was no longer united.

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<sup>99</sup>Cf. Carnot-Feuillins, "Garde du Roi", 29 May 1792, Archives Parlementaires, XLIV, p.286.

<sup>100</sup>Dumas, op.cit., II, p.174.

<sup>101</sup>Dumas, "Garde du Roi", Seance, 29 May 1792, Archives Parlementaires, XLIV, pp.284-85 et passim.

<sup>102</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.187. The original plan called for 50,000 *Fédérés* to assemble on the Champ-de-Mars. Dumas considered that this would serve only to rob the armies of that many recruits.

Servan had made this proposal without consulting or informing Dumouriez, who was Minister of War in everything but name. Dumouriez's anger led to the dismissal of Servan, Roland and Clavière, on 13 June, and that in turn angered the Girondins in the Assembly. Attacked by his own supporters, Dumouriez was forced to resign two days later.<sup>103</sup>

The new government was drawn from supporters of the Feuillant party: Lajard (War), Chambonas (Foreign Affairs), Terrier de Monciel (Interior) and Beaulieu (Finance) with Locaste (Marine) and Duranthon (Justice) remaining in their ministries. With the government and the army under their control, the Feuillants put Lafayette's plan in motion. Duport's paper, L'Indicateur, advised the King to dissolve the Assembly and seize the dictatorship.<sup>104</sup> Lafayette sent an address to the Assembly denouncing the clubs and the former government. An additional boost to this campaign was given by the invasion of the Tuileries on 20 June<sup>105</sup> by a crowd led by Santerre and Alexandre but organised by the

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<sup>103</sup>"Les Girondins firent décréter par l'Assemblée que les trois ministres révoqués emportaient les regrets de la nation". Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.205.

<sup>104</sup>This paper was subsidized out of the Court's Civil List. Ibid., I, p.206.

<sup>105</sup>Having seen for himself the scene at the royal apartment, Dumas went before the Assembly and demanded that the National Guard be given orders to rescue the King from "des furieux, des hommes égarés". Dumas, "Surêté du Roi", 20 June 1792, Archives Parlementaires, XLV, p.421. A narrative of these events is to be found in Dumas, Souvenirs, II, pp.215-220 and Theodore Lameth, Notes et Souvenirs, ed. by Welvert (Paris, 1914).

Gironde.<sup>106</sup> This demonstration initially rebounded against its organisers, for it occasioned a royalist reaction throughout the departments and led to the suspension of Pétion, the mayor, and Manuel, the procureur syndic, by the Feuillant controlled departmental administration.<sup>107</sup> Lafayette, in an effort to capitalize on the revulsion caused by the 20th of June, came before the Assembly and demanded the dissolution of the Jacobins as well as the punishment of those responsible for the invasion of the Tuileries.

Lafayette had hoped to be able to back his demands with force, using the division of the National Guard which was to be reviewed by the King on the following day.<sup>108</sup> But his plan was defeated by the Queen who had revealed

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<sup>106</sup>The demonstration of 20 June was not spontaneous. Four days before a deputation had approached the commune for permission to march with arms to petition the Assembly and the King. No precautions were taken to control this crowd by Pétion until 19 June when instructions were given at last to the police and the National Guard of the two sections concerned. But the bulk of the responsibility for the crowd's entrance lay with the Guard's command. Only six of sixty battalions were assembled and these received no orders at all during the day. "En somme personne n'était résolu à défendre le roi". (Reinhard, op.cit., p.325).

<sup>107</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.207. The triumph of the Feuillants was short lived because they dominated only the departmental administration: "corps artificiels et nés de la pensée des législateurs". Aulard, op.cit., p.192. Their actions were soon reversed by the commune and the Assembly. Cf. Reinhard, op.cit., p.332.

<sup>108</sup>This review was to have been of the 1st division commanded by Acloque, who was devoted to the King. Reinhard, op.cit., pp.345-46; Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.208.

his intentions to Pétion, causing the review to be cancelled. Able to rally only a handful of men, Lafayette returned to his army. Undaunted, he tried one final attempt to reverse the situation. Recalling the plan of 1791, he proposed that, in concert with Luckner, the King should escape from Paris and shelter with the army at Compiègne.<sup>109</sup> This last plan was set for 12 and then 15 July, but was abandoned because Louis was loathe to become a 'hostage' to Lafayette.<sup>110</sup> By this time the Feuillant ministers had resigned en masse (10 July) in the face of the crisis provoked by the Prussian advance and the hostility towards the Court which it produced.

Dumas undoubtedly knew of Lafayette's intended march on Paris for he had been in private communication with the general. His presence during Lafayette's attempt to raise the National Guard against the Jacobins on 29 June<sup>111</sup> and his support of La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt's plan to bring the King out of Paris and under the protection of Lafayette's

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<sup>109</sup>Luckner's attitude towards the Jacobins was very probably influenced by his general staff which comprised Alexandre Berthier, Charles Lameth and Montmorency.

<sup>110</sup>"Le roi répondit (to Mercy) donc qu'il ne pouvait se diriger vers le Nord car il paraîtrait se rendre au-devant des Autrichiens." Reinhard, op.cit., p.363. However, he did nothing of the sort because Bertrand, who did not trust Duport and, hence, Lafayette's plan, counselled the King to remain and to denounce the factions in the Assembly, and also because the Girondins had entered into secret negotiations with him and again began to adopt a more moderate attitude. Cf. Mathiez, op.cit., I, p.211.

<sup>111</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.248.

army,<sup>112</sup> strongly indicate that he was in common accord with the objectives of his party. However, in the absence of his correspondence with Lafayette, the full extent of his involvement cannot be ascertained.<sup>113</sup> His Souvenirs offer only a general reference:

Quelques membres du parti constitutionnel, et j'étais de ce nombre, se mirent en correspondance avec le général La Fayette . . . Nous complotâmes donc pour le salut de notre pays, pour le maintien de nos lois, pour l'inviolabilité de la couronne. La Fayette s'offrit le premier à remplir ce devoir, qui lui était plus particulièrement imposé, et par sa position présente, et par tout ce qu'il avait déjà fait pour la cause constitutionnelle.<sup>114</sup>

Publicly Dumas did much to support his old comrade through his dogged defence of Lafayette's policies and person. In the Assembly, he spoke on Lafayette's behalf after the general's denunciation of the Jacobins by letter (16 June) and in person (28 June).<sup>115</sup> According to Brissot, when Luckner was interviewed by the Military Committee and the Commission of Twelve, Dumas, who was present in his capacity as president of the former, "chercha plus d'une

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<sup>112</sup>An estimated sixty deputies supported this scheme as offering "le seul moyen qui restât de sauver le roi". Ibid., II, p.363. Cf. George Dubois, "Les Intrigues Contre-Révolutionnaires à Rouen", AHRF (XIV, 1939), pp.481-517.

<sup>113</sup>Dumas must have destroyed all of his communications for when the commune examined his papers on 2 September 1792 they reported that "toutes nous ont offert rien de suspect et de contraire à la loi". Jacques René Hébert, Copie du Procès-Verbal de la Levée des Schellés Apposées chez M. Dumas, Paris, 1792.

<sup>114</sup>Dumas, loc.cit., II, p.196.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., II, pp.240-48; Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XV, pp.69, 78 and 199.



fois à interrompre, car il s'apercevait bien que le bonne foi de vieux militaire démasquait trop ouvertement l'intrigue qu'on avait si maladroitement filée".<sup>116</sup> He admits to this ruse because he knew "que le général LaFayette n'avait donné aucun ordre qui n'eût été communiqué au maréchal; je ne pouvais douter que le secret de faire sortir le roi de Paris ne lui eût été confié . . ."<sup>117</sup> Dumas continued to be one of Lafayette's "plus dévoués défenseurs"<sup>118</sup> and although it was Vaublanc who delivered the most telling speech in his defence when the final vote on the accusation came, Dumas had spoken out enough to earn himself the hatred of the crowds outside the Assembly.

Dumas' most significant speeches, delivered on the subject of the conduct of the war, were also an indirect defence of Lafayette and Luckner against the allegations of the Girondins that they had left France open to invasion. Taken together, these three speeches<sup>119</sup> present a comprehensive analysis of the strategic errors committed by

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<sup>116</sup>Brissot, op.cit., p.147.

<sup>117</sup>Dumas, op.cit., II, p.378.

<sup>118</sup>Brissot, op.cit., p.154. Cf. Bon Vincent Marie Viénot de Vaublanc, Mémoires sur la Révolution de France (3 vols., Paris, 1833), II, p.165.

<sup>119</sup>Dumas, "Discours Sur les Motifs de la Dénonciation du Ministère qui formait le Conseil du Roi", Paris, 20 June 1792, BN 8° Le33 3.A.(118); Dumas, "Réponse au Discourse de M. Vergniaud", 4 July 1792, Extrait du Journal Logagaphic, BN 8° Le34 100, and Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XV, pp.285-299; Dumas, "Réponse de la Proposition de M. Gensonné", 5 July 1792, *ibid.*, XV, pp.376-380.

Dumouriez in pursuit of "la chimère de l'invasion soudaine du Brabant".<sup>120</sup> Dumas argued that as the treaty of Pillnitz was one of the principal causes for the declaration of war, "je ne crois pas qu'il y ait personne de bonne foi puisse dire que nous ayons déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche, sans la déclarer en même temps à la Prusse".<sup>121</sup> Yet this was exactly how the government had acted, by ordering the invasion of Belgium and so drawing the army away from the Rhine. It was this strategic error at the beginning of the war, not the subsequent conduct of the generals, which uncovered the frontier from Sedan to Strasbourg. Dumas showed that in place of this misdirected assault France should have adopted an offensive-defensive by launching a pre-emptive strike, the purpose of which would have been to delay or prevent the Austrians and Prussians from launching a united attack.

On a dit: Nous serons infailliblement attaqués par les deux puissances à la fois, qui se concertent à cet effet: prévenons la réunion de leurs forces, et commençons par attaquer, avant qu'elle soit en mesure de défense, celle des deux qu'il nous est le plus facile de prévenir par la vicinité de ses possessions. Je n'attaque point ce calcul, dans la supposition que la guerre avec ces deux grandes puissances eût été

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<sup>120</sup> Dumas, "Discours", 20 July 1792, p.16.

<sup>121</sup> Dumas, "Réponse", 5 July 1792, op.cit., XV, p.377.

<sup>122</sup> "Songez que si vos frontières sont dégarnies dans la partie actuellement menacée, c'est parce qu'on a cru qu'il était bon, au moment où nous commençons la guerre, de rassembler tout ce que nous avons de force d'élite pour envahir la Belgique." Dumas, "Réponse", 4 July 1792, op.cit., XV, p.290.

inévitables; mais ici la question change de face, et voici sous quel rapport j'attaque l'ancien ministère. Je l'accuse de n'avoir point porté les premières hostilités sur les Palatinats, . . . Je dis que du moment où la guerre a été déclarée, et que l'on voyait que des magasins se formaient sur les bords du Rhin, il fallait, comme le proposait le général Luckner, détruire sur-le-champ ces magasins.<sup>123</sup>

The failure to prevent Austria and Prussia from assembling in the Palatinate reduced France to a system of pure defence. Thus the fault for the present state of emergency lay not with the army (Lafayette and Luckner) or the present ministers (Feuillants), but with the former government and its plans.<sup>124</sup>

This analysis, brilliant and correct as it was, revealed the major flaw in the Feuilleant programme. Nowhere in Dumas' three speeches can be found any positive measures to check the Prussian invasion, because the Feuillants seem not to have had any. They opposed the camp of 20,000 Fédérés, they opposed the declaration that the country was in danger and they opposed measures against the King, but they did not propose any alternatives other than closing

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<sup>123</sup>Dumas, "Réponse", 5 July 1792, op.cit., XV, p.377.

<sup>124</sup>Mathiez's conclusion that "les intrigues des généraux avaient fait gagner à l'ennemi deux mois précieux pendant lesquels il put préparer tranquillement sa concentration . . ." [Albert Mathiez, "L'Intrigue de Lafayette et des Généraux au Début de la Guerre de 1792", Annales Révolutionnaires (XII, 1921), p.105)]. This represents only half the truth. The Girondins did as much as Lafayette to compromise the war through their faulty strategy, a fact often overlooked by historians. Cf. E. Bonnal de Ganges, Les Représentants du Peuple en Mission Près les Armées (4 vols., Paris, 1898), I, p.98, for support of Dumas' opinion.

the popular clubs. Lafayette's attempts to remove the King only split the party once again into a faction favouring this action, led by Duport, and one led by Bertrand favouring the King's remaining in Paris to lead an attack upon the factions in the Assembly.<sup>125</sup>

Dumas and the Feuillants were not defeated by the Gironde or the Jacobins. Neither initially had the strength for that. They were defeated because at the same time they attempted too much and too little: too much by seeking to preserve a compromised King, which inevitably created the impression that they had become partisans of the ancien régime, thus costing them popular support and the votes of the moderates; too little because their policy of obstruction was not a viable alternative with which to meet the proposals of the Gironde or the Jacobins. They relied first upon secret diplomacy and later upon naked force, both without sufficient foundations to ensure success, while the real bases of power - public opinion and control of Paris - slipped from their grasp forever.

The Feuillants were finished as a political force in the Legislative Assembly by the end of July. But the collapse of the Feuillant party was by no means the end of Dumas' personal role in the Assembly although, as August began, it certainly appeared as if it was. On 8 August, as the deputies left the Assembly after the final

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<sup>125</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., II, p.211.

vote on the motion of accusation against Lafayette,<sup>126</sup> those who had defended him were attacked by a mixed crowd of men and women. Dumas sought to escape, but:

deux hommes très animés, m'ont nommé, et me saisissant l'un par le bras gauche, et l'autre par le collet de mon habit, ils m'ont entraîné au milieu du groupe où j'ai été maltraité et même pendant quelque moments en danger.<sup>127</sup>

Rescued by Girardin and several other colleagues, he was again set upon when a woman cried, "C'est ce scélérat, c'est Dumas; tombez sur lui". Another mêlée resulted and yet again his colleagues had to save him. Similar experiences befell several other deputies as the letters of complaint from Mézières, Regnault-Beaucaron, Froudières, Lacretelle, Soret, Calvert, Quatremère, Chapron and Dejoly testify.<sup>128</sup> In reporting the incident, Dumas threatened to cease attending the Assembly should these disturbances go unpunished or be repeated,<sup>129</sup> and following the Journée of 10 August he did cease to attend regularly, because on that day Delmas (de Toulouse) was murdered by a crowd which mistook that name for Dumas'.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>126</sup>Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XVI, p.368.

<sup>127</sup>Dumas, Déclaration, Paris, 9 August 1792, AN AA 56 no. 1522.

<sup>128</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XVI, pp.378-384. A similar occurrence took place on 27 July when D'Epresmenil was attacked by Fédérés on the Terrace des Feuillants and dragged to the Palais Royal. Gower to Grenville, Paris, July 1792, PRO FO 27/39.

<sup>129</sup>Dumas to the President of the Assembly, Paris, 9 August 1792, AN Cl58 no. 327.

<sup>130</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.461.



Even though Dumas could accurately summarise his role in the Journée of 10 August in the phrase "Je n'y fus ni acteur ni témoin"<sup>131</sup> that day was one of the most decisive in his career. The Brunswick manifesto, the advance of the Prussian army, and then the removal of the King, combined to leave him a clear choice to side with either the Revolution and France or the counter-revolution, the Bourbons and the foreign armies.

He could have followed the course taken by Lafayette, who deserted both his army and his country after failing yet again to persuade his army to march on Paris,<sup>132</sup> but instead Dumas accepted Brissot's offer to join in the national defence.<sup>133</sup> The offer was not in itself extraordinary, for the Girondins had been calling for national unity since the beginning of the crisis. After the Journée of 10 August, their need for unity to stop the Prussian invasion was all the greater because success of the invasion would benefit their enemies on the far right while the tension its presence created benefited the extreme left - the true victors of 10 August.<sup>134</sup> Towards Dumas it was

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<sup>131</sup>Ibid., II, p.459. He had spent the day with another deputy, Deville, on Place Louis XIV, watching the statue of the King go down.

<sup>132</sup>Lafayette, accompanied by part of his staff, went over to the Austrians on 19 August. Cf. Reinhard, op.cit., p.414.

<sup>133</sup>Theodore Lameth, op.cit., p.141.

<sup>134</sup>Cf. Mathiez, op.cit., II, p.2; Aulard, op.cit., p.220; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.248.

a testament of the general esteem in which the Assembly held his military abilities and general character, as had been his re-election to the Military Committee on 27 July.<sup>135</sup>

At the time when the fall of Paris was considered to be only a matter of days away, even by the deputies of the Gironde,<sup>136</sup> it took considerable courage and devotion to associate oneself with the cause of the Assembly. But this is what Dumas did, to the fullest extent of his ability. As a gesture of his devotion on 23 August he offered the Assembly his Cross of Cincinnatus, his most treasured award, given him for service in the American Revolution by the United States government.<sup>137</sup> Most of his activities, however, occurred not in the Assembly but in the Military Committee, where he was safer from the dangers

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<sup>135</sup>Assemblée Législative, Procès-Verbal, 27 July 1793, p.136. "J'avais, sans doute, beaucoup d'ennemis politiques, mais aucun ennemi personnel, et, parmi mes collègues, les plus ardents révolutionnaires rendirent quelque justice à mon zèle et à mes motifs patriotiques." Dumas, op.cit., II, p.468.

<sup>136</sup>Carnot said to Theodore Lameth on 10 August: "Dans six jours, les Prussiens seront à Paris." Lameth, op.cit., p.140. Roland and Servan, ministers again, intended to set up a republic behind the Loire as early as 10 August. "Il est certain qu'il régnait parmi les Girondins, qui avaient si légèrement déchaîné la guerre, un état d'esprit que nous appellerions défaitiste." Mathiez, op.cit., II, p.16.

<sup>137</sup>Dumas, "Offrante Patriotique", Paris, 23 August 1792, AN Cl55 no. 299.

of crowd violence.<sup>138</sup> He also directed the construction of the fortifications for Paris, by volunteers - a measure which he considered to be "les plus efficaces pour rétablir l'ordre et calmer la population".<sup>139</sup>

This renewed association with the war effort did not, however, place him above popular suspicion. As the nearness of the Prussian army caused a mounting hysteria in Paris,<sup>140</sup> Dumas continued to reside in the dépôt de la guerre and took the additional precaution of keeping a postillion with a cabriolet and two horses always in close proximity.<sup>141</sup> His papers were sealed by the section Bonne-nouvelle on 21 August, provoking him to write a letter to the Committee of General Security demanding that the seal be lifted and that his papers be examined so that his sentiments for "la liberté et de l'Égalité" would be made known.<sup>142</sup> A

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<sup>138</sup>This did not prevent him from presenting a considerable number of decrees, including those for the creation of two troops of light cavalry (2 September 1792, AN Cl63 no. 371) and the incorporation of the Swiss officers into the light infantry (23 August, AN AF I 18 fol. 59 v<sup>o</sup>).

<sup>139</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.468. The main works were constructed at Montmartre. For details, see Mortimer-Ternaux, Histoire de la Terreur, 1792-1794 (Paris, 1870), IV, pp.224-230. Cf. Dumas, "Decret Décidant que les Officiers, Désigneront 48 Postes et Parties de Retranchements pour les 48 Sections de la Capitale", 13 September 1792, AN Cl63 n. 378.

<sup>140</sup>Pierre Caron, Les Massacres de Septembre (Paris, 1935), p.473.

<sup>141</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.469. Prior to the fall of the throne, Dumas had sent his wife and family to Le Havre for their own safety.

<sup>142</sup>Dumas to Committee of General Security, Paris, 22 August 1792, AB F<sup>7</sup> 4687.

second domiciliary visit was conducted by Hébert on 2 September 1792 as part of the commune's three day search for suspects.<sup>143</sup> Again he refused to accept their authority, but he permitted them to examine his papers "tranquille sur le résultat de ses recherches".<sup>144</sup> As he expected, Hébert reported that "rien de suspect et de contraire à la loi" was found.<sup>145</sup>

The rest of the family fared better: his father-in-law, Delarue, was well respected in his section and not troubled after Dumas ceased to live with him; his brother-in-law, and St. Fulcrand, were with the army, as was St. Marcel who had been dismissed by Dumouriez on account of his name on 3 September, but reinstated on the recommendation of Servan.<sup>146</sup> Dumas was not molested during the massacres of September, but equally he was powerless to do anything to prevent them. Having refused to stand for the new Assembly, he resolved on fleeing France when the Legislative Assembly broke up on 20 September.

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<sup>143</sup> Although never named as a member of the Austrian Committee, he had been associated with Lafayette, and denounced by Marat in April as one of the "enragés royalistes" who "trouve nuit et jour . . . pour le forcer à la retraite". Marat, L'Ami du Peuple, no. 636, 21 April 1792, p.6. Cf. André Anatole Bernadé de Saintes to the Police Municipale, Paris, 1 September 1792, AD (Seine) 3AZ 271 piece 2; Edem-Bonaventure Courtois, Mon Ultimatum Réplique à M. Dumas, Paris, 1792, BN 8° Ln<sup>37</sup> 5046 and Dumas, A Mes Collegues, Paris, 1792, BN Lb<sup>39</sup> 5851.

<sup>144</sup> Dumas, Souvenirs, II, p.471.

<sup>145</sup> Hébert, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>146</sup> Dumas, op.cit., II, p.474.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERLUDE AND EXILE

Having successfully 'escaped' from Paris after the final session of the Legislative Assembly, Dumas was reunited with his wife and children at Le Havre.<sup>1</sup> Charles Lameth and his family joined Dumas there and together they slipped away to England in October.<sup>2</sup> Very little is known about the three months Dumas, Lameth and their families passed in voluntary exile in London, except that the Duke and Duchess d'Aiguillon joined them in November at which time they moved from Piccadilly to Hackney.<sup>3</sup> The importance of their sojourn lies in the choice of England as an asylum and in Dumas' intention to return to France, despite his two companions' departure for Hamburg.

There can be little doubt that accessibility was a

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<sup>1</sup>Because of his unpopularity, Dumas was forced to travel under a false passport, obtained by St. Fulcrand. At Yvelot a post of the local National Guard discovered his true identity and would have sent him back to Paris had not Lacroix and Aréna, two colleagues from the Assembly, intervened. Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, pp.6-9.

<sup>2</sup>Charles Lameth was arrested at Barentin and brought to Rouen where the departmental administration set him free after being pressured by Danton at Theodore Lameth's request. *Ibid.*, III, p.3; Dubois, *op.cit.*, p.512. On the relationship between Theodore and Danton, see F. Vermales, "Barnave, Théodore de Lameth et Danton", *AHRF* (XV, 1938), pp.551-52. Bradby (*op.cit.*, II, p.313n) felt that, "Charles was probably in Rouen as part of Liancourt's scheme to get the King there".

<sup>3</sup>Dumas devoted only three pages of his Souvenirs (*loc. cit.*, III, pp.14-16) to these months.



strong factor in all three men's decision to seek refuge in England, for she offered the dual advantages of proximity and neutrality. But England had other advantages as well. As a neutral country, she provided a haven which did not necessitate or imply contact with the émigrés or with the powers at war with France and this was a major consideration for Dumas and his companions because, although they had felt compelled to leave France, they had no desire to join her enemies.<sup>4</sup> In Dumas' case, there is evidence to suggest that from the beginning his intention was to return once the political climate in Paris had moderated to some extent and the memory of his defence of Lafayette had receded from the public consciousness. Just prior to his departure from France he had written to the new Minister of War:

Le repos est nécessaire à mon santé . . . dès que ma santé sera rétablie; j'attendrai avec impatience que vous m'ordonnez de me rendre auprès de vous, en attendant je m'occupe utilement pour la partie intéressante que m'est confiée et, qui a toujours été le but de mes études et de mes voyages que le fruit de mon expérience sera digne d'être offert à ma patrie . . .<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Their sole contact with the émigrés while in London was Charles Lameth's long delayed duel with Chauvigny in which Lameth was seriously wounded. Bradby, op.cit., II, p.313n.

<sup>5</sup>Dumas to Pache (Minister of War 18 October - 2 February 1793), Le Havre, October An I de la République, AAG GD 395. The style of the date indicates that Dumas accepted the proclamation of the Republic (22 September 1792), especially as many of his own letters, as well as those of the ministry, written the following year, continued to bear the Gregorian date. Dumas' position is explained more thoroughly in another letter: "Après la session de la Législative, pensant que je pouvais, indépendamment de mes fonctions de directeur du dépôt des cartes, être employé d'une manière plus active et plus utile auprès des armées, je le proposai au Ministre Servan qui ne jugea pas à propos de m'employer; il m'accorda un congé pour rétablir ma santé . . ." Dumas to Bouchotte (Minister of War 4 April - 13 June 1793), Soisy-sous-Étoiles, 16 May 1793, AAG GD 395.

Although he had intended to stay the winter in London, by the end of December Dumas was back in Le Havre, where he was hidden by a friend of Charles Lameth, Delavigne, until sometime in January 1793.<sup>6</sup> Shortly after his arrival he was joined by the rest of the London group with the exception of Charles and d'Aiguillon.<sup>7</sup> The reason behind this sudden change of plan had to do with the law of 8 April 1792 which ordered sequestration of the property of all "absents" from France after 1 July 1789.<sup>8</sup> Initially, Dumas had managed to evade this law through his secret departure from France,<sup>9</sup> but, as he explained in his Souvenirs, suspicions of his absence had made it imperative that he return and immediately verify his presence.<sup>10</sup> With the aid of Delavigne, Dumas claims to have been able to do this, and his statement is supported by a certificate from the Ministry of War attesting to his official absence from the Dépôt de la Guerre.<sup>11</sup> Presumably Lameth and d'Aiguillon felt that they could not return to France and so sent their families back to safeguard their

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<sup>6</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.16.

<sup>7</sup>The Duchess d'Aiguillon was the Lameths' sister.

<sup>8</sup>Emphasis has been placed upon the word "absents" because the law did not distinguish between émigrés and persons who were outside France for other reasons. Godechot, La Contre-Révolution, p.155.

<sup>9</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.10.

<sup>10</sup>"Je fus le premier à tenter le retour en France, parce que mon respectable beau-père, M. Delarue, allait être arrêté et garde en otage, jusqu'à ce que ma présence sur le territoire français eût été constatée." Ibid., III, p.15.

<sup>11</sup>Blanchard, "Certificat: 15<sup>e</sup> Division Militaire", Paris, 5 January 1793, AAG GD 395.

possessions.<sup>12</sup>

At the end of January the group at Le Havre split up. Dumas' wife and children returned to their country house at Soisy-sous-Étoiles, Lameth's family, including the Duchess d'Aiguillon, returned to their chateau at Osny, while Dumas went into hiding. At the request of another former colleague in the Assembly - Vimar - he was kept by M. Goux, a Justice of the Peace in the canton of Neufchâtel.<sup>13</sup> Some time in February, Dumas made his way back to Soisy-sous-Étoiles, where, his wife assured him, his continuing popularity in the canton would protect him from persecution.<sup>14</sup>

The law of 8 March 1793, which cancelled all official leaves from the army, put to the test Dumas' earlier resolve to resume active service. Dumas responded to the call and the records of the ministry show that he was re-employed "en son grade à l'armée de réserve et plus particulièrement au dépôt de la guerre pour en suivre et diriger le travail."<sup>15</sup> From the evidence of the official correspondence, Dumas did not appear to have had any difficulty in returning to his

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<sup>12</sup>Their departure from England was due to the growing possibility of her declaring war on France, after the French invasion of Belgium. This factor may also have influenced Dumas' own decision.

<sup>13</sup>Vimar was one of three deputies from Rouen (Ducastel and Tarbé were the other two) who had participated in the abortive plot to remove the King from Paris. Goux was his nephew. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.18.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., III, p.21. Dumas is not precise about the date of his return. At this time Dumas, his wife, children and mother-in-law were all living at Soisy. M. Delarue continued to live in Paris.

<sup>15</sup>Note, March 1793, AAG GD 395. Cf. "Certificat", 14 March 1793; and Dumas to Bournonville, (Ministry of War 5 February - 30 March), Paris, 12 March 1793, AAG GD 395.

old duties, even though the actual post of director had been abolished on 1 January 1793.<sup>16</sup>

At this point, Dumas felt secure enough to demand his back pay as a brigadier general and as director of the dépôt for the entire period of his leave (i.e. September to March).<sup>17</sup> At first he was denied both claims by the Minister because he had not been employed as a brigadier general since the end of the Legislative Assembly, because he had not exercised the functions of director since the end of the Assembly and because, at his own request, the 6,000 livres salary of the director had been paid to Jarjayet, the deputy director, from July 1792.<sup>18</sup> A second letter from Dumas<sup>19</sup> produced a more favourable reaction and a note attached to it indicates that the sum he claimed was "légitimément acquise".<sup>20</sup>

Initially, there was little real pressure upon Dumas at Soisy. The national guardsmen, who conducted the domiciliary visits, always acted in a deferential manner because their officers were all his appointees.<sup>21</sup> But this relatively

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<sup>16</sup>Bouchotte to Dumas, Paris, 17 May 1793, AAG GD 395.

<sup>17</sup>Dumas to Bouchotte, Paris, 16 May 1793, AAG GD 395.

<sup>18</sup>Bouchotte to Dumas, op.cit. Bouchotte wrote as spokesman for the Commission des Guerres.

<sup>19</sup>Dumas to Bouchotte, Paris, 21 May 1793, AAG GD 395.

<sup>20</sup>Commission des Guerres, Note, 29 June 1793, AAG GD 395.

<sup>21</sup>"Le garde nationale, que j'avais formée, les officiers municipaux, que j'avais fait nommer, pour la plupart ouvriers que j'employais, vinrent fouiller ma maison, chercher des armes, du linge, des effets superflus; je me souviens que, réunis dans mon appartement les plus ardents me donnèrent des témoignages de respect." Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.22.

secure and stable situation deteriorated rapidly in April.. On the 7th the Convention placed a watch (gardé à vue) upon him and upon the assistants to the Ministries of War and Marine, "comme mesure de précaution et de sûreté public, sans rien préjuger de défavorable aux individus".<sup>22</sup> Eight days later, however, Dumas and Ramond were placed under "surveillance" after they had been denounced at the bar of the Convention as flatterers of Lafayette and of Dumouriez:

Cette preuve n'est pas la seule de leur complicité avec ce soldat rebelle (Dumouriez); leur conduite, leur correspondance désposent contre eux sans réplique.<sup>23</sup>

The connection between Dumas and Lafayette is obvious but Dumas could hardly have been described as a flatterer of Dumouriez. The fact that St. Marcel deserted with Dumouriez on 5 April 1793 may have been the link or it may have been that, as Lafayette and Dumouriez were both deserters and as only 'aristocrats' deserted, they were both of the same faction.<sup>24</sup>

Surveillance in Dumas' case took the form of the permanent residence in Soisy of a police officer called Arbelleter. He seems to have trusted Dumas and to have done much to prevent his being sent to Paris until Julia, Dumas' wife, was able to have the surveillance lifted by pleading

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<sup>22</sup>Convention Nationale, Procès-Verbal, Séance, 7 April 1793.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., Séance, 15 April 1793.

<sup>24</sup>Dumas' own version was that the denunciation was the work of his former deputy director of the dépôt de la guerre who accused him of giving plans to the enemy. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.23. However, the Procès-Verbal contains no reference to this denunciation.



with Thuriot, the President of the Convention.<sup>25</sup> For the protection of his family and himself, Dumas moved away from Soisy once the surveillance was ended. Two notes to the Committee of General Security, made sometime during the summer, give his residence as "un domicile à Paris où il se fait des rassemblements" and "chez ses amis à Rosny près Montreuil où il se fait aussi des rassemblements."<sup>26</sup> The latter report also adds the detail that: "il a une petite jument qui est chez le cit Burdelot en pension rue de franc Bourgeois au Marait et est louer de cabriolet."<sup>27</sup> As Dumas continued to work at the dépôt de la guerre, at least until the end of September,<sup>28</sup> the cabriolet may have been a precautionary measure similar to the one he had taken the previous summer.

Not wishing to compromise his family again, he arranged to meet them periodically at the Lameths' chateau, which remained safe until November. Then on 16 November, an order for the arrest of Theodore, Dumas, d'Aiguillon and Charles Lameth was issued by the Committee of General Security.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., III, p.24.

<sup>26</sup>Rosni, Dénonciation relative au cit. Dumas, canton de Montreuil, n<sup>o</sup>, AN F<sup>7</sup> 4687; Rapport par Etoille (ville) sur le citoyen Dumas, n<sup>o</sup>, AN F<sup>7</sup> 4687.

<sup>27</sup>Rapport par Etoille, op.cit.

<sup>28</sup>Rousseville, Rapport de l'Observateur Rousseville, Paris, 26 September 1793, AN F<sup>7</sup> 3688 f.3.

<sup>29</sup>Comité de Sureté Générale, Le Comité arrete que les nommés Theodore Lameth et Dumas . . ., Paris, 26 Brumaire an 2<sup>eme</sup>, AN F<sup>7</sup> 4573. The papers seized at Osny were returned to Mme. Charles Lameth on 2 Messidor an V. AD (Seine-et-Oise) IV:Q 150 (Inventaire des Séquestres - Osny).

Theodore attributes this order to the animosity of another Dumas, the former mayor of Lons-le-Saulnier and future president of the Revolutionary Tribunal, who was a personal enemy of the family.<sup>30</sup> But it is more probable that this order was the result of the connection of Theodore and Dumas with Barnave and through him with the Austrian Committee.<sup>31</sup> Rough drafts for letters to both Dumas and Theodore were found when Barnave was arrested in Grenoble. These documents would have reached the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal when Barnave was brought for trial.<sup>32</sup> As Barnave's interrogation began on 18 November, it is quite possible for the Committee to have known the contents of these drafts on the 16th when the order for arrest was prepared.

Only Mathieu Dumas, of those persons named in the order, was at Osny when the volunteers arrived. Although he did not then know of the existence of either Barnave's letters or the order for his arrest, he eluded the guardsmen and, altering his passport to read "Danias", he made his way south to Montigny in Languedoc.<sup>33</sup> There he was sheltered

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<sup>30</sup>Theodore Lameth, Notes et Souvenirs, p.288.

<sup>31</sup>Barnave was implicated by his and Alexandre Lameth's joint letter of advice to Louis which was found in the Iron Chest after the 10th of August (1792). Cf. Bradby, *op.cit.*, II, p.306; Chevallier, *op.cit.*, p.335.

<sup>32</sup>Barnave refers to these drafts in a letter to Boissy d'Anglas written on his way to Paris for trial. Barnave to Boissy d'Anglas, 4 November 1793, cited in Bradby, *op.cit.*, II, p.329.

<sup>33</sup>Dumas (*op.cit.*, III, p.31) learned of the order for his arrest shortly before he departed for the south.

by the Girard brothers, banker acquaintances from Montpellier. They introduced him into the community as their nephew and by adopting the provincial dialect, Dumas was soon accepted by the community and passed the winter without trouble.<sup>34</sup>

There is some evidence to indicate that at this time Dumas made one final attempt to reconcile himself with the government of the Republic and to render service to his country. An intelligence bulletin from the Count d'Antraigues to Sir Francis Drake, British envoy in Italy, contains the following report:

Le 30 au soir, le Ministre de la Guerre lût au Comité de Salut Public un très longue mémoire sur la position militaire de la République, et sur la campagne prochaine . . . Le Ministre déclare que ce mémoire n'était pas de lui; qu'il était d'un officier de l'état-major de l'armée, rempli de génie et de talents, appelé Dumas de Montpellier, qui ayant été l'ami de LaFayette et membre de la seconde Assemblée, se croyait suspect, et vouloit par quelque grand service mériter l'indulgence et la confiance de la République.<sup>35</sup>

In a later bulletin d'Antraigues submitted extracts from Dumas' observations and proposals. Unfortunately, neither the contents of the report nor its author can be completely substantiated<sup>36</sup> because d'Antraigues so altered and even

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<sup>34</sup>"On venait me consulter; j'étais une espèce de secrétaire de la commune: on m'appelait M. Danias." Ibid., III, p.33.

<sup>35</sup>Bulletin 8, Paris, 31 January 1794, contained in Drake to Grenville, Leghorn, 27 February 1794, published in the Historical Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue Esq. Preserved at Dropmore (10 vols., London, 1892-1927), II, p.515 (hereinafter referred to as Dropmore Papers). The original bulletins are in the Drake Papers, BM Add MSS 46831, vol. I.

<sup>36</sup>Reinhard (Le Grand Carnot, II, p.116) in discussing this report concluded that "le dossier de Mathieu Dumas prouve qu'il s'appliquait à se justifier, à rendre des services et à fournir des suggestions". Dumas' dossier (AAG GD 395) does contain requests for service, but these were all made in the spring of 1793. There are no papers at all for 1794. There is no reference whatsoever to this in Dumas' Souvenirs.

invented his agents' reports before forwarding them to Drake that they are unreliable as sources. The potency of an insurrection in the Vendée is one of d'Antraigues' favourite themes,<sup>37</sup> and accordingly "Dumas' plan" contains the statement that:

l'existence de la Vendée était le ver-ronger de l'état; que ce danger serait toujours réel de ce côté là, parce que toute cette partie de Normandie étaient infectées, et que des descentes, de succès sur ces points là, renouvelleraient une Vendée.<sup>38</sup>

Dumas' true feelings about the Vendée, expressed eight months later, were quite different: "le Drapeau religieux de la Vendée l'a tuée dans l'esprit public, et ne ralliea jamais cent individus au de la des limites ou se cachent. . ."<sup>39</sup> Elsewhere the bulletin adds that the Committee authorised the Minister to "accorder sa sauvegarde" to Dumas and another officer, but Dumas' actions suggest that he received no such safeguard.<sup>40</sup> By the spring of 1794 he

<sup>37</sup>"The bulletins often exceed the limits of credibility by creating the impression that the Committee of Public Safety would be overwhelmed by Britain's recognition of the Bourbons and the infusion of strength to the Vendée." Harvey Mitchell, The Underground War Against Revolutionary France: The Missions of William Wickham 1794-1800 (Oxford, 1965), p.76.

<sup>38</sup>Bulletin 10, Paris, 1, 4 and 7 February 1794, in Drake to Grenville, Leghorn, 7 March 1794, Dropmore Papers, II, p.521.

<sup>39</sup>Mallet du Pan (for Dumas), "Mémoire", np, 16 September 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

<sup>40</sup>Bulletin 10, op.cit., p.523. Cf. Francois Victor Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public (Paris, 1879), X (1 January 1794 - 8 February 1794) which contains no reference to this matter at all.

had fled to Switzerland where Theodore Lameth had prepared a retreat, and he had also ordered his wife to obtain a divorce for her own protection.<sup>41</sup>

Dumas left France compelled by the force of circumstances, not by the force of conscience, for his actions had clearly shown that, regardless of the authenticity of d'Antraigues' bulletin, he had been willing to accept and serve the Republic. Ironically, his attempt to re-enter the army came at a time when experienced staff officers were desperately needed because of the levée-en-masse, but also when the purge of the officer corps made it impossible for 'aristocrats' to serve.<sup>42</sup> As the procurement of capable officers was to be one of the main military problems facing the Committee of Public Safety,<sup>43</sup> and considering Dumas' past accomplishments and future career under the Empire, his loss to the Republic in 1794 was one of the minor tragedies of the Terror.

Dumas entered Switzerland near Nions, disguised as a contractor of military supplies. Concealed in the hollow springs of his coach were 1,000 gold crowns - his total wealth at the time.<sup>44</sup> Theodore Lameth had prepared a retreat for

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<sup>41</sup>Divorce was granted on 24 Floréal an II. Cf. L'Administration du Département to L'Administration Municipale 6eme Arrondissement, Paris, 14 Thermidor an VI, AD (Seine) VD\* 6192.

<sup>42</sup>Hartmann, op.cit., p.528. Whether or not Dumas was actually an aristocrat himself is a moot point. He was certainly 'guilty' by association.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. Richard R. Palmer, Twelve who Ruled (Princeton, 1965), p.96.

<sup>44</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.47.



him at Morat where two other colleagues, Brémont and Jaucourt had already settled. Here they were relatively secure as they enjoyed the patronage of M. de Frishing, "l'un des personnages les plus illustres du sénat," and the secret protection of Barthélemy, the French Ambassador.<sup>45</sup>

The importance of this sojourn in Switzerland derives from Dumas' progressive involvement in overtly counter-revolutionary activities. His first effort was a play in three acts: "Une Nuit du Comité de Salut Public". It was a double intrigue of politics and love (according to the author), the first act of which contained an introduction relating the overthrow of the Constitution in 1791. When he read the play in 1799, the philosopher Jacobi persuaded Dumas to burn this act because of its distortion of events:

. . . il me reprocha d'avoir cédé à mes ressentiments, et d'avoir avancé, sans preuves suffisantes, des faits que l'histoire contemporaine ne pourrait consigner que d'une manière conjecturale . . . il exigea de moi de détruire ce qu'il appelait une injuste et violente satire.<sup>46</sup>

"Une Nuit du Comité de Salut Public" was followed by Dumas' first true plan for counter-revolutionary action written, at the request of M. de Frishing, for the Austrian government.<sup>47</sup> It was prepared in the form of a letter

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<sup>45</sup>"J'écrivis à M. Barthélemy, ambassadeur de la république, qui résidait à Bâle, de qui j'étais très-connu. Je lui confiai mon secret (his true identity), bien certain de sa discrétion, et de sa disposition à me protéger . . ." Ibid., III, p.49.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., III, p.50. See infra Chapter VII.

<sup>47</sup>"Celui-ci encourageait nos espérances et prévoyait la chute prochaine du gouvernement révolutionnaire. Il pensait que cette circonstance produirait une réaction inévitable, et que si la cour de Vienne était bien éclairée sur les intérêts du parti constitutionnel, on pourrait ouvrir des voies de conciliation." Ibid., III, p.51.

entitled "L'Espérance Volontaire de l'Armée du Nord à S. M. le Prince de Saxe-Cobourg". No copies survive but a summary is presented in Dumas' Souvenirs which, because of its resemblance to a later plan, appears to be an accurate reconstruction:<sup>48</sup>

Je démontrais que l'influence de ces moeurs et la saine opinion publique réparaitraient dans toute leur force aussitôt que la double compression de la tyrannie démocratique et de la coalition des puissances cesserait de les étouffer. Je disais aux ministres des cabinets étrangers, que leur intérêt le plus pressant était de faire cesser cet état violent, cette irritation des esprits, qui menaçaient de bouleverser tout l'ordre social de l'Europe; que ce but ne serait point atteint par la force des armes; que les anarchistes n'étaient parvenus à détruire la constitution monarchique, et à faire subir à la nation française le joug de leur domination, qu'en provoquant la guerre; qu'on ne ferait que servir leurs projets en l'enflammant de plus en plus.<sup>49</sup>

Dumas concluded with a request for the prisoners of Olmutz (Lafayette, Alexandre Lameth, etc.) to be freed "comme un signe évident des dispositions loyales et pacifiques de la cour de Vienne",<sup>50</sup> a request which was to be characteristic of all three plans.

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<sup>48</sup>The manuscript was brought to Vienna by General Hotze from where it somehow found its way to Paris. There Julia Dumas purchased and destroyed the only copy. Ibid., III, p.53. A similar plan was later sent to the Spanish Court. William Wickham, the British envoy to Switzerland, knew of both plans as he wrote: "I recollect the two memoirs delivered by that same Dumas, the one to the Court of Madrid through the Chevalier Caemano, the other to the Court of Vienna through the Prince of Saxe Cobourg . . ." Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 30 June 1796, published in The Correspondence of the Right Honourable William Wickham: 1794-1800 (2 vols., London, 1870), I, p.392. (Hereinafter referred to as Wickham Correspondence.)

<sup>49</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, pp.51-53.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., III, p.53.

A second plan, produced jointly by Theodore Lameth, Brémont and Dumas, was presented to Mallet du Pan in June 1794.<sup>51</sup> While the object of this plan was similar to Dumas' first - the overthrow of the Committees of Public Safety and General Security - the means of achieving it were in many ways dissimilar. Both recognized that action by the Convention was essential but, where in the first plan the Convention's action was to be stimulated by a relaxation of external pressure upon France, in the second plan this object was to be achieved through a coalition of moderates and royalists in the Convention "manoeuvrant de concert avec les royalistes dehors et la marche des armées étrangères."<sup>52</sup> Although Mallet du Pan does not reveal the authors of the individual parts, this violent element was in all probability the contribution of Theodore Lameth, who also figures in an attempted insurrection in the Jura.<sup>53</sup>

Dumas, Lameth and Brémont revised plan two in the light of the events of 9 Thermidor to produce a third plan which

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<sup>51</sup>Jacques, Mallet du Pan, Mémoires et Correspondance Pour Servir À L'Histoire de La Révolution Française, ed. by A. Sayous (2 vols., Paris, 1851), II, p.94 (hereinafter referred to as Sayous). Brémont was Jean Baptiste Jerome Brémont, the former secretary to Terrier de Monciel, the Minister of the Interior in the last Feillant government (1792).

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>"Les principaux chefs de cette manoeuvre sont Dur-overay . . . Théodore Lameth demeurant à Nion sous un nom supposé . . ." Extracts from a letter to Roybaz, Bâle, 27 June 1794, AE Correspondance Politique: Suisse, no.446, p.443. In July Theodore confessed to knowledge of plans for an insurrection to the bailiff of Nion, but he denied taking part. Cf. Extract from a letter from Berne, Berne, 13 July 1794; AE Correspondance Politique: Suisse, no.447, p.116, and Frising to Barthélemy, Berne, 9 September 1794, AE Correspondance Politique: Suisse, no.447.

more closely resembled Dumas' first - "L'Espérance". Once again, Mallet du Pan, the only source for these activities,<sup>54</sup> does not mention the individual contributions of the three Feuillants. However, in a note which he prepared to introduce the authors to the Court of St. James, he does indicate that the "Mémoire" presenting the plan was agreed to by all three.<sup>55</sup>

The "Mémoire" begins with a general criticism of the Allied policy of seeking a restoration of the monarchy by force. The approach, in the authors' opinion, could never succeed because the Allies lack the resources necessary to completely defeat the French nation, which is what this policy requires.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, the use of force is counter-

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<sup>54</sup>Jean Joseph Mounier, Mallet's co-negotiator with the British, left no account of these negotiations. "La plus grande partie des archives constituées par Mounier, au cours de sa carrière révolutionnaire, a été perdue et sans doute même détruite." Jean Egret, La Révolution Des Notables: Mounier Et Les Monarchiens: 1789 (Paris, 1950), p.230. Neither Egret nor Lanzaac de Laborie [Jean Joseph Mounier: Sa Vie Politique Et Ses Ecrits (Paris, 1887)] make any reference to his connections with Dumas, Brémond and Theodore Lameth.

<sup>55</sup>Mallet du Pan, Note, np, 16 September 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

<sup>56</sup>Mallet's note (ibid.) contains the following summary of the "Mémoire's" analysis: "La force des armées étrangères est restée si insuffisante, la guerre a eu des résultats si contraires à ce qu'on en attendait, le faible lien de la coalition Européenne est si fragile, si relâché par les revers, il faudrait maintenant des efforts tellement gigantesques . . . Les anciens chefs de la convention, surtout Robespierre et ses collègues, . . . ont réussi à exalter le sentiment de l'ancienne rivalité de la France et l'Angleterre, jusqu'à l'énergie qui approche de la fureur. On rassort de cette passion devenue générale dans toute les classes du peuple, comme d'un antidote à toutes les démarches, à toutes les déclarations Britanniques. Ainsi, la moyen inévitable de finir à jamais les Princes, la Noblesse, le Royalisme, la Vendée, c'est de les présenter armes par l'Angleterre pour combattre les français, on les rendra, ainsi, les objet d'une detestation implacable . . ."



productive because it associates the cause of the monarchy with the enemies of France. For this reason, British recognition of Provence as regent far from encouraging his cause would only discredit it.

Je puis assurer d'après une connaissance exacte des dispositions publiques, que cette reconnaissance ne donnerait, au moment présent, ni un bataillon, ni une commère au parti de la Royauté, qu'elle rallierait les différentes factions de l'intérieur, et qu'elle exciterait contre les alliés et le Regent une haine encore plus générale et un mépris plus insolent.<sup>57</sup>

No significant amount of assistance can be expected from the absolute royalists; within France there are very few 'aristocrats' left and their party is moribund.

Quant au Partie Royaliste-Aristocrate, c'est un cadavre, presque tous les grands Propriétaires sont émigrés ou guillotines; il ne reste plus d'entr'eux que des Vieillards, des infirmes, ou des gens absolument nuls, suspectés ou enfermés, tous entièrement effacés, de l'opinion, et hors d'état de regagner la moindre influence. La Vendée et les Royalistes épars dans quelques provinces n'offraient pas plus des réponses.<sup>58</sup>

Having dismissed the absolute royalists as impotent, the "Mémopire" proceeds to an analysis of the présent composition of the Convention. Again, the point is made that the use of force is counter-productive as military pressure has been sustaining the very system it was employed to overthrow. At the beginning of the Convention "elle ne renferma pas trente individus au plus, qui croient à la future existence du Royaume en République organisée" the rest supported the Republic as a means of preserving order and waging war.

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<sup>57</sup>Mallet du Pan, "Mémoire", np, 16 September 1794, PRO FO 74/4 (hereinafter referred to as "Mémoire").

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.



"L'habitude, la nécessité, et l'intérêt sont donc les trois pivots de l'esprit Républicain dans toutes les classes de citoyens." While Robespierre and his colleagues were in control "la terreur ne le permettait à aucun député de s'écarter du voeu d'un bourreau absolu" and therefore the divisions within the supporters of the Republic have become perceptible only after his fall.

The "Mémoire" divides the republicans into four distinct factions: the original '30 republican fanatics' - those deputies close to the Jacobins and led by Sieyès; the early members of the two great committees - more moderate than the fanatics but still connected with the Jacobins, including Barère, Billaud-Varenne, Collot d'Herbois, Vadier and Voulland; the partisans of revolutionary government such as Bourdon de l'Oise, Cambon and Bernard de Saintes; and finally the more moderate supporters of revolutionary government, the greatest faction in size, including Tallien, Merlin de Thionville, Merlin de Douai, Courtois, le Cointre, le Gendre, Fréron, Dubois-Crancé and Lindet - all "plus convaincus que tous autres de l'impossibilité de constituer la République . . ." The final group was made even stronger by the adherence of the rump of the Gironde and the right.

Il existe encore à la convention environ 160 à 170 membres qui n'ont pas voté la mort du Roi. Restés sous la hache et condamnés au silence depuis cet événement ils affectent aujourd'hui de se neutraliser; quelques uns cependant ont déjà repris la parole dans le sens modéré; ils sont les alliés encore timides du 4<sup>e</sup> partie.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

However, the Convention is not France and no longer represents the opinions of the majority of Frenchmen. It is isolated and tolerated only because of the war.<sup>60</sup> Were the Allies to abandon their campaigns against France, then the moderates would be able to assert themselves. This victory of the moderates will inevitably bring in its wake a restoration of a constitutional monarchy for, as the "Mémoire" modestly asserts, three-quarters of the population are Feuillants at heart because they "adhérait à la constitution de 1791" as the best means to reconcile "l'amour de la monarchie et la haine de la monarchie absolue."<sup>61</sup>

The calculations about the possibilities for a constitutional monarchy made in the "Mémoire" had a sound foundation. The only significant difference of opinion between the Feuillants and the moderate republicans, to whom they looked for support, lay in the nature of the executive. In most other matters they were closer to each other than they were to the respective extremes of their own parties - the Montagnards on the left and the absolutists on the right.<sup>62</sup> Even the restoration of the monarchy need not have been an

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<sup>60</sup>"La convention est maintenant isolée; elle sait, elle sent que le peuple devenu indifférent à ses intérêts ne protégera plus aucune des factions dont le but ne serait pas évidemment de lui rendre la paix, la sécurité et des lois quelconques." Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>D'Antraigues' agents reported six months later: "Au moment où j'écris il y a lutte ouverte entre les Constitutionnels de 1793 et ceux de 1795". Vernégue, *Nouvelles de la France*, 13 January 1795. BM Add MSS 46832, Drake Papers, Vol. XI, 1795-1798.

insurmountable barrier to cooperation because at the time Louis XVII was still alive in the Temple. Under a boy king France would have a regency and under the Constitution of 1791 this was an elective office. Therefore, a restoration along Feuillant lines would keep political power with the Convention to the exclusion of the émigrés. This reconciliation of the principle of the monarchy with the new leaders of France made the "Mémoire" one of the most realistic approaches to a restoration produced during the Revolution.

In many respects, the note added by Mallet du Pan was more important than the "Mémoire" itself, for it was in the note that Mallet proposed to Grenville a plan drawn up by Dumas, Brémond and Lameth for the union of the old Feuillant party, now in exile, with the moderates of the Convention.<sup>63</sup> In pursuit of this object, Mallet added that contact had already been made with Tallien. As with the "Mémoire", this too had Mallet's and Mounier's endorsement. Mallet undoubtedly accepted the feasibility of these proposals for two reasons: the accuracy of the second or June plan's forecast of Robespierre's overthrow<sup>64</sup> and what he then considered to be the genuine existence of communications

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<sup>63</sup>"Suivant le plan d'exécution, le parti modéré formera une ligue intime avec les 166 modérés actuels de la convention qui n'ont pas voté la mort du Roi, et réunira tous ceux des membres des autres partis qui se rapprochent de ses vues . . ." Mallet, note of 16 September 1794.

<sup>64</sup>"Les moyens qu'ils se proposaient à cette fin sont précisément ceux qui amenèrent en effet la perte de Robespierre." Sayous, op.cit., III, p.95.

with the moderates of the Convention.<sup>65</sup> (Mallet and Mounier were unaware that Tallien had made no reply).

Mallet prefaced the exposé with a list of conditions the Feuillant proposers considered were necessary to assure the cooperation of the moderate Republicans. First among these was a guarantee that the regicides would not be tried or punished. Second was a request for passports to America should the plan miscarry, and this was followed by one for a guarantee of non-intervention on the part of the foreign powers in France's domestic affairs. Freedom for the prisoners of Olmutz was the next request, as a token of Allied goodwill. Lastly, to sustain the secret correspondence with Paris, funds were sought to be dispensed by an agent appointed by the British government.

Both the "Mémoire" and the plan accompanying it were forwarded by Mallet to Lord Robert Fitzgerald who dispatched them to London by special courier on 24 September 1794.<sup>66</sup> News of the fall of Robespierre and the closing of the Jacobin Clubs (following an attempted assassination of Tallien) certainly encouraged the British to conclude that the Republic was at last crumbling from within. "Grenville,

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<sup>65</sup>"Mess. de l'ancien parti constitutionnel ont conservé des relations intérieures avec des membres de la convention. Ils se sont adressés à M. Mallet du Pan et à M. Mounier qui ont la certitude de leur correspondance. . . M. Mallet du Pan offre ses services pour travailler aux moyens de rapprochement." Mémoire donné par Monsieur M. to Lord Robert Fitzgerald, 1794, HRO, Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 15.

<sup>66</sup>Fitzgerald to Grenville, Berne, 24 September 1794, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 15.

himself, rejoiced because he believed that Robespierre's successors would be forced to 'lower the despotism of the Revolutionary Government'.<sup>67</sup> But far from believing that moderation and peace would permit a limited restoration both Pitt and Grenville believed that now more than ever the pressure should be continued in an effort to completely crush the Republicans.<sup>68</sup>

The reasons behind Grenville's and Pitt's hostility to the Revolutionary Government lay in no small measure in their ignorance of affairs in France and in the sources of what little information they did receive.<sup>69</sup> Mallet du Pan was neither the sole nor the major source of British intelligence about the state of France. Grenville's and, through him, the cabinet's main source was the bulletins dispatched by Sir Francis Drake, the British Minister at Genoa. Grenville never knew the ultimate source of Drake's information but he thought these dispatches "comme si importants qu'il les communiqua au roi."<sup>70</sup> Historians

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<sup>67</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.40.

<sup>68</sup>Philip Henry Stanhope; The Life of the Right Honourable William Pitt (4 vols., London, 1861), III, p.53.

<sup>69</sup>"Above all Pitt and Grenville believed the French Government to be incompetent as well as exasperatingly cruel. In their eyes the Jacobins were sworn foes to all that made government possible. The mistake was natural. The English ministers knew little of what was going on in France . . . ." John Holland Rose, The Life of William Pitt, vol. II: William Pitt and the Great War (London, 1934), p.196.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid. Gettschalk, op.cit., p.194.



are today reasonably certain that the sole source of Drake's bulletins was the Count d'Antraigues, who operated what can best be described as a cut-rate information service.<sup>71</sup>

Both d'Antraigues' character and purpose made his bulletins extremely prejudicial to the chance of Grenville's ever accepting a course of moderation towards France. Richard Cobb's observation that "there could be no greater enemy of compromise;" aptly sums up the nature of the man. Like most of the absolute royalists he hated the Constitutionals even more than the Republicans. Indeed, so strong was his aversion to Constitutionalism that Mallet du Pan described him as a genuine 'aristocratic terrorist'.<sup>73</sup>

To just what extent d'Antraigues edited or invented the information from Paris which he transmitted to Drake remains a matter of continuing disagreement. Mathiez discounted the bulletins because of their, at times, enormous inaccuracies, and concluded that, "d'Antraigues composa ses

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<sup>71</sup>"It is clear from the Drake Papers in the British Museum that his correspondent was in fact the Comte d'Antraigues." Harvey Mitchell, "Francis Drake and The Comte D'Antraigues", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (XXIX, 1956), p.127. Cf. Gottschalk, op.cit., pp.190-197; Leonce Pingaud, Un Agent Secret Sous La Révolution et l'Empire - Le Comte d'Antraigues (Paris, 1884); Jacqueline Chaumié, Le Réseau d'Antraigues et la Contre-Révolution: 1791-1793 (Paris, 1965).

<sup>72</sup>Richard Cobb, "The Comte d'Antraigues and the Counter Revolutionary Mentality", A Second Identity: Essays on France and French History (Oxford, 1969), p.179. Cf. Mitchell, "Counter Revolutionary Mentality and Popular Revolution: Two Case Studies", French Government and Society: 1500-1850 Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban, Ed. J. F. Bosher (London, 1973), p.239.

<sup>73</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.241; Mallet to Trevor, 8 September 1795, PRO FO 67/8.

bulletins de la même façon que le faux rapport qu'il mit sous le nom de Saint-Just".<sup>74</sup> In agreement with Ollivier, R. de Gandsaignes considered that d'Antraigues had his reputation for reliability to consider and so would not have invented his material as it would be self defeating if no-one believed it and, furthermore, that experienced diplomats such as Las Casas and Drake would probably have wanted guarantees of accuracy.<sup>75</sup> Unfortunately, unless a technique for restoring invisible ink is perfected and the agents' reports can be read, it is doubtful that a final decision can be made.

Quite probably, d'Antraigues' bulletins were a mixture of both fact and invention, as is most successful propaganda. As with all propaganda, there was a definite objective - "Le but du comte d'Antraigues et, sans doute, aussi de Louis XVIII, est de dissuader le gouvernement anglais d'entrer en rapport avec les monarchiens, avec ceux qui voudraient instaurer en France une monarchie constitutionnelle."<sup>76</sup>

Considering the nature of Grenville's source of information, and his disposition to distrust compromise with the Republic, it would seem that he would not be disposed to

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<sup>74</sup>Albert Mathiez, "La Police Royaliste Sous La Terreur: Les Correspondants Parisiens de D'Antraigues", Annales Révolutionnaires (X, 1918), p.387.

<sup>75</sup>R. de Gandaisgnes, "Enquête sur les Bulletins de Dropmore", AHRF, (XXIX, 1957), p.223; Albert Ollivier, Saint-Just et La Force des Choses (Paris, 1954), p.572.

<sup>76</sup>Godechot, op.cit., p.193. Cf. Mitchell, The Underground War, Chapter V.

accept the proposals sent by Mallet du Pan, yet he sent the dispatch immediately to Pitt<sup>77</sup> and on the following day presented the cabinet's proposals for a response to George III:

Lord Grenville had conversed with the Lord President, the Duke of Portland and Mr. Pitt respecting it, who all agree with him in thinking that, supposing this overture really to come from the now prevailing party at Paris, considerable use might be made of it for accomplishing the great object on which the safety of Europe seems to depend - that of restoring a government in France capable of giving protection to the inhabitants of that country and security to the other nations of Europe.<sup>78</sup>

George III in his reply instructed Grenville to choose "some very wary men to go to Switzerland".<sup>79</sup> The man he selected was William Wickham, "a relatively obscure government official in the foreign office" at the time.<sup>80</sup> Mitchell, who attempted a character study of both Wickham and d'Antraigues, characterized the former as one who possessed "a temperament that delighted in the game of espionage and conspiracy . . ."<sup>81</sup> as well as a high degree of naivete for "he was ready to finance a scheme of direct collaboration, with a number of generals and politicians in Paris, into which he was led

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<sup>77</sup>Page one of the "Mémoire" is marked in pencil "for the perusal of Mr. Pitt".

<sup>78</sup>Grenville to George III, 5 October 1794, Dropmore Papers, II, p.638.

<sup>79</sup>George III to Grenville, Windsor, 6 October 1794, *ibid.*

<sup>80</sup>Mitchell, *op.cit.*, p.43.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, p.243.

like a blind man by a group of double-crossing agents,"<sup>82</sup> (most of his own selection). While these elements of Wickham's character do come to predominate after 1795, the man who negotiated for the first time with the Feuillants exhibited almost the reverse characteristics. He was described by Barthélemy's agents as 'both cold and reserved',<sup>83</sup> and was extremely sceptical of the Feuillants and their plans. This difference is largely accounted for by the fact that after December 1794 Wickham had a virtual "carte blanc" with regard to his activities as he had been appointed as Robert Fitzgerald's successor, while during negotiations with the Feuillants he was bound by Grenville's very explicit instructions.

The instructions drawn up by Lord Grenville for the conduct of negotiations reveal his concept of the nature of an "acceptable" restoration and the extent of the chasm which separated his views from those expressed in the "Mémoire".

Mr. Wickham will endeavour to learn from Messrs. Mounier and Mallet du Pan the names of the persons from whom the overtures now made have proceeded,

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p.244. Mitchell agrees almost verbatim with Albert Sorel's description of Wickham (op.cit., IV, p.209). "C'était un homme d'action, de ressource et d'intrigue; il aimait les complots, il en aimait les moyens; l'espionnage le passionnait; c'était un conspirateur autant et plus qu'un diplomate . . . Il paya tous les agents qui s'offrirent et crut tous les agents qu'il payait. C'était sa grande faiblesse: comme tous les agioteurs politiques, il était dupe de la corruption qu'il nourrissait."

<sup>83</sup>"Rapport", Lausanne, 23 November 1794, AE Correspondance Politique: Suisse, n.451, p.198.

and also the origins of the proposal, whether it came first from Paris to these gentlemen, or whether it originated with them . . . He will take as the ground of his discussion the paper called "Notes sur le mémoire remis à Lord Robert Fitzgerald".<sup>84</sup>

Grenville continues and the amplification he gives makes it certain that he accepted neither the philosophy nor the assessment of the action needed made in the "Mémoire". The sine-qua-non of the Feuillant proposals was the retention of power with the Convention and a recognition of the gains made by the Revolution through a return to the Constitution of 1791. This Grenville regarded as completely unacceptable:

The Constitution of 1789-90 has always been considered as vicious and destructive, containing in itself the seeds of its own ruin, and having led by a natural progression to all that has since happened. No approbation can therefore ever be expressed from hence of any Government founded on that basis.<sup>85</sup>

In place of the Constitution of 1791, Grenville instructed Wickham to press for the complete restoration of the monarchy, vesting power with the émigré princes:

The restoration of the monarchy, if really intended must necessarily imply the recall of the Princes and vesting of powers meant to be left to the king

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<sup>84</sup>Grenville to Wickham, Wickham Correspondence, I, p.9.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p.12. Mitchell (op.cit., p.45) states that: "Grenville was prepared to negotiate with a government founded on the basis of the 1791 Constitution, provided that it did not thereafter threaten the security of its neighbours." But this is directly contradicted by Grenville's instructions to Wickham on the subject. Fryer gives a more accurate appraisal: "Britain was apparently committed, if not to 'la contre-révolution absolue' in the full extent of the words, at least to the basic features of that policy." Walter Ronald Fryer, Republic or Restoration in France? 1794-7 (Manchester, 1965), p.24.



in the hands of some person intended to maintain and support them. No personal objection can justly be made to Monsieur and any other plan is full of insurmountable difficulties.<sup>86</sup>

Mitchell concluded that Grenville's source of optimism was that the French princes would "pursue a policy of conciliation and moderation 'conformable to the representations which have been made from hence'".<sup>87</sup> Rather, it appears that the opposite was true, and that Grenville expected the moderates to accept the return and triumph of the émigrés - thereby committing political suicide themselves.<sup>88</sup>

The real purpose of Wickham's mission was not to negotiate but to determine whether or not Dumas, Brémond and Lameth were in contact with Tallien and, therefore, able to speak for a party in the Convention. The "Mémoire" was irrelevant from Grenville's point of view because his intentions were to restore the émigrés, not the Feuillants, to power in France.<sup>89</sup>

Bound by Grenville's instructions, Wickham arrived in Berne on 1 November and remained there about twelve days before travelling on to Lausanne on family business. In

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<sup>86</sup>Grenville to Wickham, op.cit., I, p.13.

<sup>87</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.46.

<sup>88</sup>"There was nothing in the document (Declaration of Provence to the French People upon assuming the regency, 28 January 1793) which suggested a temper of clemency, still less of compromise, towards either the principles or the persons of those whose errors had become manifest at any date later than August 1788." Fryer, op.cit., p.11. Cf. Ernest Daudet, Histoire de L'Emigration Pendant La Révolution Française (3 vols., Paris, 1904), I, pp.218-219; Jacques Godechot, op.cit., p.181. Godechot concluded: "Il n'en changea guère avant la fameuse déclaration de Saint-Ouen en 1814."

<sup>89</sup>Cf. Grenville to George III, 5 October 1794, op.cit., II, p.638.

Berne he immediately began conversations with Mallet du Pan and Mounier.<sup>90</sup> This first series of negotiations was completed to the mutual disapproval of both sides by the time Wickham left for Lausanne. In his reports to Grenville, Wickham, in accordance with his instructions, reported almost exclusively on the state of communications with France:

I am sorry to inform your lordship that the persons who taught me to believe that they had had an established correspondence with the leaders of the government at France have completely misled me . . . and I am almost inclined to believe that they have endeavoured to draw me with the affairs principally with a view of having some private means of their own which they could not accomplish without me (sic. freeing Lafayette and his fellows and obtaining money) . . .<sup>91</sup>

Two days later, in a second letter to Grenville, he set out in detail the circumstances of the supposed correspondence with Tallien.

Lord Robert Fitzgerald, having approved of my entering into conversation with Mess. Mounier and Mallet before I had the honour of waiting upon his Lordship, I sent for these gentlemen and endeavored to obtain from them a very particular account of all the circumstances attending the transaction alluded to in the mémoire transmitted by his Lordship.

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<sup>90</sup>Already the French agents suspected Wickham's true mission "Pendant son petit séjour à Berne, il a eu des entretiens à très longs avec Mallet du Pan et Mounier, j'en ignore le sujet. Je doute qu'on l'apprenne car si Wickham est chargé d'une commission de son gouvernement, il est à supposer que le secret est le premier article de ses instructions." Magistrat de Berne to Barthélemy, Berne, 17 November 1794, AE Correspondance Politique: Suisse, n.451, p.141.

<sup>91</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 12 November 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

I was informed by them that the only persons in Switzerland concerned in this transaction, or who to their knowledge were at all acquainted with it were M. Theodore de Lameth, M. Dumas, well known leader of the party of La Fayette in the second assembly, and M. Brémont, late secretary of the Department of Paris.

That the negotiations alluded to in the mémoire had been commenced by Theodore de Lameth who had written to Madame de Fontenay in sympathetic ink upon a piece of gauze immediately after the death of Robespierre, that he had the certainty of this letter having been communicated to Tallien, and had received the most favourable assurances of his disposition in favour of monarchy, that in consequence of these assurances he had written to Tallien himself in the same manner and through the same person, and had sent him instructions for his conduct to the same effect with the plan of operation proposed in the second part of the Mallet du Pan Mémoire, that he had in point of fact received no direct answers from Tallien himself but mentioned to receive the same assurances from Madame de Fontenay . . . (there is also reference to an agent at Paris - Saint-Didier, a friend of Lindet).

In part explanation, part excuse, of their conduct they stated that tho' in truth they had not yet any direct correspondence of the kind expected, yet from their previous knowledge of the persons, the information they had received . . . they had not the smallest doubt of the views and intentions of the moderate party in the assembly being such as they had represented them to be . . .

P.S. On the ninth, Mounier informed me that M. Dumas was arrived and had brought a written answer from the agent at Paris (M. S. Didier) which they considered as highly satisfactory, . . .<sup>92</sup>

Wickham still persevered in the hope that something would yet develop from these overtures. He wrote to Mallet du Pan that he had been extremely disappointed with the progress made so far, but added that "it is one thing to be disappointed

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<sup>92</sup>Wickham to Lord Grenville, Lausanne, 15 November 1794. Dumas' elder daughter later married a Saint-Didier, but no connection between the two has been established. PRO FO 74/4.

and another to be discouraged".<sup>93</sup> Wickham became discouraged the following month, after Dumas and Lameth had refused to meet with him because of his hostile attitude. He reported "with respect to the persons here, I have heard nothing more from them, and I am now satisfied either that their proposals never were received or at least never fully attended to . . ." <sup>94</sup> or that subsequent events such as the success of the Republican armies has changed opinions in Paris. Robert Fitzgerald reported similar observations and added that Wickham considered the whole affair to have been fabricated "by the friends of Lafayette, who have no other motive than that of engaging the British Cabinet in a negotiation with Prussia for the recovery of his liberty."<sup>95</sup>

Mounier, by December, had come to agree with him on this point,<sup>96</sup> and Mallet du Pan also acknowledged the strength of this suspicion. In a letter to Theodore Lameth he describes himself and Mounier as being "cruellement compromis en nous rendant les organes d'un projet chimérique, d'après les conversations et le concert qui

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<sup>93</sup>Wickham to Mallet du Pan (draft), Venay, 19 November 1794, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 79.

<sup>94</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Crassier, 10 December 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

<sup>95</sup>Fitzgerald to Grenville, Lausanne, 13 December 1794, Dropmore Papers, II, pp.651-652.

<sup>96</sup>"Il est maintenant bien démontré que toute cette trame a eu pour unique objet de tirer La Fayette et A. Lameth de leur prison . . ." Mounier, "Extrait d'une lettre à Wickham", Berne, 9 December 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

eurent lieu entre vos deux amis et nous."<sup>97</sup>

The request for the release of the prisoners was certainly part of Mallet's original note and was again repeated the letter Dumas wrote to Wickham. In both cases, freedom for Lafayette was not sought as the price of Feuillant support, but only as an act of justice and a gauge of intention:

M. de L(ameth) en a ressenti le plus vif chagrin, et sur ce point essentiel, je ne parviendrai point à le modérer: en effet, Monsieur, avons-nous jamais dit que leur liberté dut être le prix de nos succès? . . . non pas même de nos soins. Nous demandons leur liberté par le seul droit que nous avons de réclamer auprès d'hommes justes contre la plus horrible comme la plus impolitique injustice - mais ensuite nous ne pouvons rallier nos amis en France sans leur présenter un gage évident des nouvelles vues, et des nouveaux sentiments des étrangers.<sup>98</sup>

The logic of Dumas' argument is irrefutable. Lafayette was a political prisoner, and his detention was a sign of the Allied position with regard to the Revolution. Were the Allies to reverse their position and accept the Revolution then Lafayette's and his fellow prisoners' release must follow, not only as an act of goodwill but also because there were no longer any grounds for their continued detention. However, the falsity of the Feuillant position over the communications with Tallien made Wickham's suspicions that this release was their sole object fully justified.

Admitting that nothing had been organised, in the same letter Dumas offered to rally and give consistency

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<sup>97</sup>Loc.cit., Berne, 25 November 1794, Sayons, op.cit., II, p.102.

<sup>98</sup>Dumas to Wickham, Morat, 8 November 1794, HRO Wickham Papers 38M, 49 bundle 115.



of purpose to all those "qui veulent la monarchie" but who also know the insufficiency of what Dumas termed the 'constitution' of 1789. These he defined as the elements of the right and the moderates in the government and the army; significantly there is no mention of the émigrés or any attempt to include them in the restoration.<sup>99</sup>

After the second meeting with Wickham, at which Dumas was present, the Feuillants refused to have any further dealings with the British agent<sup>100</sup> because Wickham was bound to the Royalists by his instructions and inclination while the Feuillants would have nothing to do with them. "He is necessarily obliged", wrote Trevor, "to put his trust in Princes and in emigrants - and he is to be pitied, perhaps as much as blamed."<sup>101</sup> Mallet du Pan went further and considered that Wickham himself was, "à la vérité très prononcé royaliste".<sup>102</sup> Indeed Wickham's position was as false in regard to his government's acceptance of the Constitution of 1791 and the other bases of negotiations as was the Feuillants' position in regard to their

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid.

<sup>100</sup>"L'envoyé de Lord Grenville avait contre les constitutionnels des fortes préventions que renforçaient encore leurs exigences inopportunes; une seconde entrevue eut moins de succès que la première. Ces messieurs refusèrent d'abord nettement de s'aboucher avec un agent anglais." Sayous, op.cit., II, p.101.

<sup>101</sup>Trevor to Drake, Turin, 18 November 1795, BM Drake Papers Add MSS 46825. Cited in Mitchell, op.cit., p.50.

<sup>102</sup>Sayous, op.cit., II, p.101.

communications with France. There was quite simply no common ground between the two parties - Wickham desired communications which the Feuillants could not offer, while the Feuillants desired assurances of moderation and universality of agreement among the powers, which Wickham could not provide.

Wickham also mentions the 'notorious indiscretions' of the Feuillant agent as having compromised not only the communications with France but also the disposition of Tallien and the moderates towards the plan.<sup>103</sup> No other party refers to these 'indiscretions' but one of Barthélemy's information sources known as the 'Magistrat de Berne' in a letter on 20th November was aware of the nature of Wickham's mission.<sup>104</sup>

If the ultimate source was the agent of Dumas and Lameth it is odd that their names were not also disclosed as well. Stranger still is the attitude which the Magistrat adopts towards Wickham - the conclusion of the letter is almost in his defence and cites Wickham's opinions of

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<sup>103</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Crassier, 10 December, 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

<sup>104</sup>"Voici quelques données sur Wickham et les motifs de son voyage dans ce pays. Mounier et Mallet qui désiraient la paix et plus encore d'y jouer un rôle pour la faire . . . ont fait sonder le ministre anglais par Fitzgerald, sur ses intentions en lui faisant parvenir un plan d'un gouvernement monarchique, qu'on tâcherait d'établir en France . . . Il paraît que ce plan a attiré l'attention de M. Pitt et que pour cet effet on a envoyé Wickham en Suisse pour sonder le terrain et juger de la possibilité de l'exécution du projet. Il y a apparence qu'on lui a surtout recommandé de s'aboucher avec Mounier et Mallet du Pan, personnages célèbres en qui les coalisés ont placé quelque confiance." Magistrat de Berne to Barthélemy, Berne, 20 November 1794. AE Correspondence Politique: Suisse, n.451, p.170.

the plan which the Feuillant agent would certainly not have known.

J'ai d'ailleurs dû le croire parce que j'ai appris du caractère et de la justesse d'Esprit de Wickham et par les rapports qui m'ont été faits de plusieurs apropos qu'il a tenu ici, qu'il regarde lui même comme chimérique le retour de la monarchie en France.<sup>105</sup>

It is, therefore, more probable that this information came somehow from undetected indiscretions on the British side. Regardless of origin, however, it did help to discourage any further contact - the inevitable result when plans are known to be no longer secret.

The inescapable conclusion is that these negotiations were not important in any positive sense because there was so little that could have been accomplished given the respective positions of the two sides. However, indirectly and in a negative sense, they were very important for they were not only the first but the only time Wickham and Dumas conferred directly. The opinions each formed of the other after these meetings were to have a great bearing upon their future relations and thus a substantial influence on the chances for the success of a counter-revolutionary movement.

Wickham summarized his impressions in a letter to Grenville: "From my first interview with Mes. B(rémond) and D(umas) I was fully satisfied that no confidence whatever ought to be placed in them. I found them full of trick and cunning extremely insidious in all their efforts, and totally destitute of shame when detected in any of

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<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p.171.

their artifices."<sup>106</sup> Feeling unable to trust or rely upon the moderates, he became an even greater partisan of 'la contre-révolution violente' and its advocates. Wickham remained in Switzerland, replacing Lord Robert Fitzgerald there after December 1794. His new mission was to gather intelligence on the interior of France, to raise recruits for and to facilitate the movements of the armies in the field, and to support those factions inside and outside France which wished to overthrow the Republic.<sup>107</sup>

Dumas' estimation of Wickham was much the same as Wickham's was of him. The meetings had heightened his suspicions of the motives and ultimate purpose behind the diplomacy of 'Perfidious Albion.' Henceforth he could never be sure that the British efforts in France were not directed ultimately towards placing the émigrés in power and undoing all that the Revolution had accomplished.

With the conclusion of this period of Dumas' life, the perimeters of his political conscience can be established. His republicanism, or at least his patriotism, had been put to the test by the Terror and the Allied invasion. His royalism had also been tested by the

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<sup>106</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Lausanne, 14 December 1794, PRO FO 74/4. Grenville and George III expressed their complete satisfaction at Wickham's conduct and their indignation at the "premeditated falsehood" of Mounier and Mallet du Pan regarding the existence of correspondence with the interior. George III to Grenville, Windsor, 4 December 1794, Dropmore Papers, II p.649. Grenville to Wickham, Downing Street, 9 December 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

<sup>107</sup> Grenville to Wickham, Downing Street, December 1794, PRO FO 74/4.

uncompromising attitude of Wickham and the Bourbons. He had shown that he was willing to support the Terror in order to prevent foreign conquest of France and an aristocratic restoration. Yet politically he continued to give allegiance to Louis XVII and when the opportunity presented itself, he did all that was in his power to effect a restoration on a constitutional basis. This did not make him a true counter-revolutionary, for above all Dumas wished to preserve the new political order of the Revolution. In all his plans and aspirations for the triumph of the 'moderates', he sought to preserve the primacy and sovereignty of the legislature, whether it be the Legislative Assembly or the Convention. As a necessary corollary he realized that the government of France had itself to decide to restore the monarchy for only in that way could it effectively control it. A restoration by force, from without, would undermine the assembly and leave the émigrés triumphant. Thus he was committed to upholding the independence of the legislature against all threats from both right and left as the only possible means of ever obtaining a constitutional monarchy.



## CHAPTER V

### DUMAS AND THE DIRECTORY: I

The 'Thermidorian' reaction was not a single event but a series of events by which the Convention gradually shifted towards the right. It began with the fall of Robespierre on 9 Thermidor II and can be said to have culminated by the Journée of 13 Vendémiaire IV. Although the Republic's policies towards émigrés, especially those who had fled from the Terror, moderated considerably during this period, general sympathy within the Convention was still predominantly republican and "the rapid revival of a Right, passionate, vengeful and vindictive, inevitably caused a resurgence of the Left."<sup>1</sup> For these reasons the movement towards the right was never more than a gradual one and at times checked or even reversed.

Throughout this period Dumas' fortunes wavered with the mood of the Convention. By the spring of 1795, he considered that he could safely return to France and according to his Souvenirs he did so clandestinely in May.<sup>2</sup> However, the Moniteur reported that he departed for France

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<sup>1</sup>Michael J. Sydenham, The First French Republic: 1792-1804 (London, 1974), p.27.

<sup>2</sup>Dumas, loc.cit., III, p.56. Brémond remained in Switzerland and began a glassworks at Semsales in Fribourg. Theodore Lameth returned to France the following year and was restored to his civic rights on 24 October 1796. T. Lameth, Notes et Souvenirs, p.296 and Lameth to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, St. Maurice, 23 Fructidor IV, AE Personnel, vol.42, no.385.

in April<sup>3</sup> and there is some reason to believe that he could have entered France as early as March 1795.<sup>4</sup> Two days after the article appeared in the Moniteur, the Committee of General Security issued an order for his arrest.<sup>5</sup> Again there is a discrepancy between the account of his movements in his Souvenirs and what little documentary evidence exists. According to the former, with the issue of this order he returned to hiding in the South and remained with M. Lefebvre, the author of Don Carlos, for three months.<sup>6</sup> Yet in Brumaire IV, Dumas submitted a "Compte Rendu" reclaiming expenses which he incurred "pendant la mission qu'il a remplie à l'armée des Alpes et d'Italie, depuis le mois de Ventôse dernier, jusqu'au 10 Fructidor suivant."<sup>7</sup> These armies would have made an excellent refuge for him because his friend General Kellermann was the commander of

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<sup>3</sup>"Départ pour la France de l'émigré Dumas, ex-législateur du parti de Lameth, porteur des instructions de l'ex-constituant Mounier, pour le rétablissement du roi, avec la constitution anglaise." Moniteur, no.212, 2 Floréal III (21 April 1795).

<sup>4</sup>The decree of 22 Nivôse III (11 January 1795) authorized peasants and workers who had fled the Terror to return before 1 Germinal (21 March). That Dumas may have taken advantage of this decree to obtain a certificate, as did many nobles and bourgeois, is indicated by the Committee of General Security's "Rapporte la mise en Liberté accordée le Vingt Cinq Ventôse Dernier (15 March) au Cit. Dumas ex-législateur", Paris, 5 Floréal III, AN F<sup>7</sup> 4687. Cf. Georges Lefebvre, The Thermidorians (London, 1965) n.59.

<sup>5</sup>"Le Comité de Surêté Générale Rapporte la mise en Liberté accordée le Vingt Cinq Ventôse dernier au Cit. Dumas, ex Législateur, et arrêté que le d. Dumas sera de suite arrêté, traduit dans l'une des maisons d'arrêt de Paris ..." Committee of General Security, op.cit.

<sup>6</sup>Dumas, loc.cit., III, p.61

<sup>7</sup>Dumas, "Compte Rendu", Paris, Brumaire IV, BM F.1552.(3). Dumas also omitted mention of his employment with the army in 1793. Cf. supra Chapter IV.

the Army of the Alps until sent to command the Army of Italy in June 1795 and his chief of staff was Dumas' old comrade from America - Alexandre Berthier.<sup>8</sup>

The events of 1 Prairial III renewed the movement towards the right and this movement was reflected in turn in the monthly renewals of the Committee of General Security.<sup>9</sup> The renewed Committee cancelled the order for Dumas' arrest and restored him to his civic rights on 24 Messidor III.<sup>10</sup> His name cleared, Dumas returned to Soisy-sous-Étoiles on 15 September 1795.<sup>11</sup>

The political situation in which Dumas found himself under the Directory was considerably different from that which had prevailed during most of the Thermidorian Reaction or from that which the Thermidorians had envisaged when they prepared the Constitution of the year III. The principal cause of this difference lay in the events of the summer of 1795. Until that time the Convention had been controlled by a coalition of the centre consisting of moderate republicans and constitutional monarchists. It was a positive alliance in the sense that both parties had in common the same regard for property and for the maintenance

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<sup>8</sup> Phipps, op.cit., III, p.67 ff.

<sup>9</sup> On 15 Messidor Delaunay le jeune, Perrin (des Voges), Bailleul, Bailly and Mariette replaced Mornayou, Ysabeau, Gauthier (de l'Ain), Calés and Pémartin. They joined M.J. Chénier, Courtois, Sevestre, Kervélégan, Guyomar, Bergoeing, Pierret, Genevois, Lomont, Rovère and Boudin on the Committee. Aulard, op.cit., p.508n.

<sup>10</sup> Committee of General Security, Arrête, Paris, 24 Messidor III, AN F<sup>7</sup> 4687.

<sup>11</sup> Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.61.

of the status quo which had emerged after 9 Thermidor II and they were also united by their fear of the left, either in the form of popular movements or another dictatorship.

However, the royalist landings at Quiberon and the White Terror revealed a royalist threat to the government which was as great as the Jacobin. Furthermore, the death of Louis XVII (8 June 1795) ended any possibilities for a constitutional monarchy acceptable to the moderates; under Louis XVIII regicides and early supporters of the Revolution would be lucky to escape with their lives let alone their wealth or position.<sup>12</sup> At the same time as the royalist movement was emerging with renewed vigor the worsening economic situation<sup>13</sup> was alienating the very people to whom the new Constitution gave power.<sup>14</sup> These developments created a state of panic among the left and moderates of the Convention.<sup>15</sup> As the safe-guards of

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<sup>12</sup>See supra Chapter IV.

<sup>13</sup>The assignat had lost 97% of its value by June 1795 and this caused untold hardship and grief not only to the poor but also to that section of the middle class which derived its income from mortgages and investments. Jacques Godechot, "The Internal History of France During the Wars, 1793-1814", NCMH, IX, p.285.

<sup>14</sup>Through the principle of indirect election only approximately 30,000 Frenchmen actually had a voice in the final election of deputies. Sydenham, op.cit., p.66; Lefebvre, op.cit., pp.154-57; Aulard, op.cit., p.549. Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVI, pp.487-90. Church, op.cit., p.274.

<sup>15</sup>"The constitution was partly aimed at buying the support of the social élite by offering it a virtual monopoly of power, but the pace of reaction which led to Quiberon, and the White Terror began to make many members of the Convention have second thoughts. In a state of panic they proposed the decrees of the two-thirds in order to ensure the main lines of the revolutionary settlement." C.H. Church, "In Search of the Directory," French Government and Society: 1500-1850, ed. by J. F. Bosher (London, 1963), p.274. Cf. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.169; Aulard, op.cit., p.573.

the Constitution were directed primarily against the left, because the Convention had feared the revival of another Committee of Public Safety more than the royalists, the law of two-thirds was adopted by which the Convention declared, in effect, that it had no confidence in the electors it had just created.<sup>16</sup> The events of 13 Vendémiaire intensified the republicans' fears of the right to the point where they were no longer prepared to risk cooperation even with the moderate right.<sup>17</sup> The Thermidorian coalition had dissolved.

Although Dumas was living in Paris at the time, he claimed not to have taken part in the Journée of 13 Vendémiaire.<sup>18</sup> His sympathies at the time were quite probably with the Convention, not only because of his dislike of insurrection, but also because he favoured the new Constitution. This, the Constitution of the Year III, he described as being "équitable et modéré" and as offering to France the opportunity "faire goûter et chérir la liberté, et réparer, avec le temps, les malheurs causés par la révolution."<sup>19</sup> As with his testimony about 13

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<sup>16</sup> As Terrorists were already excluded from voting and any deputy of the Convention who was under arrest had been declared ineligible for re-election, the law of two-thirds was directed exclusively at the royalists.

<sup>17</sup> It is Sydenham's opinion (op.cit., p.87) that 13 Vendémiaire revived the fear of the right "when the advent of the Constitution might have opened the way to a reconciliation" but 13 Vendémiaire was only a reaction to the abandonment of the policy of cooperation as evidenced by the law of two-thirds. It was therefore more of an effect than a cause of the breakdown.

<sup>18</sup> "J'évitai de prendre aucun part à une entreprise si peu ou si mal concertée." Dumas, op.cit., III, p.66.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., III, p.153.



Vendémiaire, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of his statement, for the Constitution was a product of a moderate coalition which was almost identical to the one he had sought to create from Switzerland.

Dumas also supported the Conventions' virtual decree of self-preservation - the law of two-thirds. He realized that the gulf of bitterness caused by the Terror had yet to be closed and that because of it "la conciliation que désiraient certainement le plus grand nombre des membres de la convention n'était pas possible."<sup>20</sup> Under these circumstances he concluded that the Conventionnels had no other choice but to ensure that they retained control of the next legislature to overcome the partisans of hatred and of extremism who would inevitably be elected.

S'ils s'étaient bornés à décréter leur libre ré-élection, ils n'auraient qu'une garantie insuffisante; il leur fallut donc prolonger leur existence législative. La Constitution républicaine de l'an III fut faite dans ce seul but, et le décret qui impose la continuation des deux tiers des membres de la convention dans leurs fonctions législatives fut la condition sine qua non de la mise en activité de ce nouveau pacte.<sup>21</sup>

Dumas did not initially intend to re-enter politics. He did not trust the permanence of the Thermidorian settlement and his own position under it sufficiently even to remarry Julia, and he had been threatened with denunciation of his Swiss activities by Tallien.<sup>22</sup> However,

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., III, p.63

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Tallien had been pushed into a more extreme position after he had allowed the émigrés taken at Quibeion to be shot, angering the right of the Convention. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.146.

the affinity between Dumas' and the Thermidorians' position made a natural ally of the moderates, one of whom, Lebrun, convinced him that it was his duty to stand and offered their support were he to do so.<sup>23</sup> In the event, Dumas was elected and Tallien made no reference to him although he did denounce several deputies, including Barbé-Marbois for treason.<sup>24</sup>

The elections themselves were a massive repudiation of the personnel of the Convention.<sup>25</sup> Among the 234 deputies of the freely elected 'nouveau tiers' only 4 Conventionnels were re-elected<sup>26</sup> and among those elected in accordance with the law of two-thirds, there were many multiple elections of moderates which was "moins un indice de popularité qu'une tactique en vue d'éviter d'élire le nombre de conventionnels exigé par la loi."<sup>27</sup> While the

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<sup>23</sup>"Une estime réciproque et la conformité des sentimens m'unissait à plusieurs de mes collègues." Charles François Lebrun, *Opinions, Rapports et Choix d'Écrits Par son Fils Aîné*. (Paris, 1829), p.68; Dumas, op.cit., III, p.68.

<sup>24</sup>Lefèvre, op.cit., p.182; Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.82. Dumas attributes his 'escape' to the efforts of Tallien's wife and Mme. Beauharnais, both old friends. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.69.

<sup>25</sup>"Le véritable caractère de ces élections, ce fut une protestation générale contre la politique de la Convention s'obstinant à se survivre, contre le décret des deux tiers, contre l'influence que les Montagnards avaient reprise depuis quelque temps sur cette assemblée. Anti-jacobins, anti-anarchistes, anti-terroristes, comme on disait alors, voilà ce que furent ces élections de l'an IV." Aulard, op.cit., p.578.

<sup>26</sup>They were: Meillan (Basses-Pyrénées); Coutesson-Dumas (Creuse); J. B. Leclerc and Pilastre (Maine-et-Loire). J. Suratteau, "Les Elections de l'An IV", *AHRF* (XXIII, 1951), p.384.

<sup>27</sup>Aulard, op.cit., p.578.

deputies who replaced the Conventionnels in the 'nouveau tiers' were opposed to the march of the Revolution after 1793 they were not partisans of Louis XVIII - they were counter-revolutionaries in Robespierre's use of the word not in d'Antraigues',<sup>28</sup> just as were the Thermidorians themselves.

Suratteau described the deputies of the 'nouveau tiers' as a "syndicat des profiteurs de la Révolution,"<sup>29</sup> but to the republicans of the Convention, viewing their position in the light of the summer's events, they represented the counter-revolution absolute because of the danger of the extension of their position by the powerful royalist movement. Barras spoke for the majority of the left and centre when he observed: "On sent qu'il s'agit du nouveau tiers entré au corps législatif, par le choix des contre-révolutionnaires vaincus le 13 Vendémiaire."<sup>30</sup> The Constitution of the year III had been the covenant of the alliance between the moderates of the centre after 9 Thermidor II, for this reason when the republicans came

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<sup>28</sup>"Ces députés, même les plus violents, ne sont pas des partisans du retour à l'Ancien Régime mais des contre-révolutionnaires au sens employé par Robespierre: contraires à la marche de la Révolution. Ils étaient avant tout contre la révolution de 1793; du retour du roi, la plupart ne se souciaient même pas." Suratteau, op.cit., p.391. Cf. Jean Bourdon, "Le Mécontentement Public et les Craintes Des Dirigeants Sous le Directoire", AHRF (XVIII, 1946), p.221.

<sup>29</sup>Suratteau, op.cit., p.329.

<sup>30</sup>Paul F. J. N. Barras, Mémoires (2 vols, Paris, 1895), II, p.132. La Revellière-Lépeaux (op.cit., I, p.325) concurred: "Les uns, élus par les assemblées primaires vendémariques, étaient totalement dévoués à la contre-révolution."

to distrust the right they also lost their confidence in the Constitution. Following the elections, Tallien pressed to have the Constitution put aside and the results of the election annulled, thereby returning France to revolutionary government.<sup>31</sup> Although his proposals were rejected other measures were taken which destroyed the spirit of the Constitution.

According to the new procedure, deputies over the age of 40 were formed into the Council of Elders and the remainder into the Council of Five Hundred. Possibly because the Revolution tended to bring younger men to the fore as it progressed the Five Hundred contained a majority of the ex-conventionnels and republicans and the Elders a majority of conservative deputies drawn from the 'nouveaux tiers'. The distrust which had arisen between the left and right had an immediate effect upon the selection by the Councils of the five Directors who were to form the executive. The Five Hundred dictated its will to the Elders by nominating only non-regicides of such mediocre abilities that the Elders had no choice but to select regicides.<sup>32</sup> The composition of the Directory, therefore, came to be far more republican in sentiment than the Elders and to the extent that the right was not represented at all within the Directory, it was even more republican

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<sup>31</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.182; Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.82.

<sup>32</sup>Georges Lefebvre, The Directory (London, 1965), p.16; Aulard, op.cit., p.579; Sorel, op.cit., IV, p.441.

than the Five Hundred.<sup>33</sup> Because the position of the Directory was to the left of the Councils, its policy was to seek a coalition of the left both inside and outside the Councils to replace the now defunct one of the centre. Towards this object Jacobins were reinstated as local administrators and even Babeuf was approached for support.<sup>34</sup>

However, the discovery of Babeuf's conspiracy and the continuing attacks upon the government in the papers of the left convinced a majority of Directors that the left remained unreconciled and potentially as dangerous as the right.<sup>35</sup> Carnot, through his disclosure of Babeuf's conspiracy<sup>36</sup> and direction of the Directory's anti-jacobin counter-measures, emerged as the leader of the majority's volt-face.<sup>37</sup> Supported by Latourneur and LaRevellière<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Those elected were: La Revellière-Lépeaux; Latourneur, Reubell, Sieyès and Barras. Sieyès refused to serve and Carnot replaced him. Cf. Albert Mathiez, "La Personnel Gouvernemental Du Directoire", AHRF (X, 1932), pp.385-411.

<sup>34</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.22.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.23.

<sup>36</sup>According to LaRevellière (op.cit., I, p.417) Carnot revealed the conspiracy's existence to all the Directors except Barras, "qui était nous assurait-il, en grands rapports avec une partie des conjurés." Further indication of Barras' involvement comes from his connection with the Panthéon club and with the Police Legion, which Babeuf's agents had infiltrated and which was disbanded on Carnot's insistence after a vote in which Barras was the only opposer.

<sup>37</sup>Carnot was genuinely surprised and alarmed by Babeuf's conspiracy. In his counter measures he sought to pursue the "juste milieu" (Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.181). Godechot (op.cit., p.300) best summarises his position: "Carnot n'était pas hostile à la République . . . mais c'était avant tout un homme d'ordre."

<sup>38</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., p.392.



and to a lesser extent by Reubell<sup>39</sup> he sought a new rapprochement with the moderates and constitutional monarchists of the right to gain the support the Directory had failed to obtain from the left. Carnot calculated that by demonstrating that the Directory was prepared to act in defence of property, he could create a Thermidorian type coalition of moderates and so frustrate both the 'anarchists' and the 'absolutists'.<sup>40</sup>

These overtures towards the moderates of the right were made during the winter and spring of 1796,<sup>41</sup> by which time Mathieu Dumas had emerged as the Leader of a revived Feuillant faction. It was with this faction that the Directory made its "bargain." However, before looking at Dumas' group something must be said of the right as a whole in order to place it in perspective.

Based upon Suratteau's analysis of the election results, Godechot reached a total of 300 "députés royalistes ou républicains modérés" in the two councils.<sup>42</sup> Were these

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<sup>39</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.23. There was a considerable amount of animosity between Carnot and Reubell. Carnot had voted for Reubell's recall from Mainz and both Reubell and Barras had voted for Carnot's accusation on 9 Thermidor. Mathiez, op.cit., p.397.

<sup>40</sup>Fryer (op.cit., p.75) saw in Carnot's action "a calculation worthy of Thiers." Mathiez (op.cit., p.398) regarded Carnot as a realist who followed a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire policy."

<sup>41</sup>Although Babeuf was not arrested until 10 May 1796, action against the left began in February with the closing of the Panthéon Club.

<sup>42</sup>Godechot, op.cit., p.299. Mitchell (op.cit., p.132) also accepts Suratteau's figures and the addition of the moderate republicans to reach the figure of 300 (i.e. 161 royalists and 139 moderate republicans). Cf. Suratteau, op.cit., AHRF (XXIV, 1952), p.47.

deputies to constitute a single party they would have had a strength just short of an absolute majority. But this sort of arithmetic is extremely misleading because the right was far stronger in the Elders than in the Five Hundred and because it gave a false impression of unity where there was none.<sup>43</sup> The right was, in fact, composed of a heterogeneous conglomeration of deputies each with conflicting viewpoints and loyalties. For this reason the classification of these deputies into various factions is difficult and in certain cases deceptive. Suratteau, for example, includes Siméon, Dumolard and Barbé-Marbois as examples of "contre-révolutionnaires" and "royalistes avérés" when at the beginning of the Legislature they supported Dumas' policy of cooperation with the Directory, while Thibaudeau a "constitutionnel modéré" appears on a list of d'André's closest supporters.<sup>44</sup>

The smallest faction was that of the Orleanists for although many persons were suspected of supporting the Duke, including Madame de Staël, Sieyès, Carnot and Dumas,<sup>45</sup> only Morisson and Rouzet were openly favourable

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<sup>43</sup>Mitchell (op.cit., p.132) observed that "they were more in agreement on what they were fighting against than on what they were fighting for." Yet even this statement can be considered to be an over-estimation of the right's unity. When Tarbé attacked the government on the issue of the colonies (3 June 1797) Thibaudeau and Pastoret joined with the left to defend the Republic much to d'André's chagrin. See Fryer, op.cit., p.240 for an account of the incident.

<sup>44</sup>Suratteau, op.cit., p.32.

<sup>45</sup>Fryer (op.cit., p.68) considered that Louis Philippe was too republican in his sympathies for Dumas and the Feuillants but it is more probable that the principle of legitimacy and the Duke's own actions were enough to discourage 'potential' supporters, as Fryer admits.

towards him.<sup>46</sup> The absolute royalists, those in favour of Louis XVIII, were not much stronger. Wickham, reporting a conversation with Pichegru, indicated that there were no more than "eight or ten persons (chosen as Deputies from the southern Departments) who are really attached to the ancient government."<sup>47</sup> A royalist committee known as the "club de Noailles", consisting of Lemerer, Durand Maillane, Henri Larivière, Thibaudeau (initially), and Ribufet, was in contact with the émigrés through the two independent royalist organisations operating in Paris.<sup>48</sup> The meetings, communications with Louis XVIII and the very existence of this committee was unknown to the government and to Dumas.

Besides Dumas, the unofficial leader, the Feuillants included Portalis, Tronçon Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, Lebrun and Dupont de Nemours in the Elders and Gibert Desmolières and Dumolard in the Five Hundred.<sup>49</sup> Lebrun also mentions Malleville, Torcy and Paradis, bringing the total to

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<sup>46</sup> Godechot, op.cit., p.303.

<sup>47</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Chateau de Riegel (Prince of Condé's H.Q.), 4 May 1796, Wickham Correspondence, I, p. 357.

<sup>48</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 11 December 1796, *ibid.*, p.485. Durand Maillane was in contact with Wickham's agent, d'André, and Lemerer with the Paris Agency, as d'Antraigues' agency was called after the Peace of Bâle ended the Spanish subsidies. Pingaud, op.cit., p.113.

<sup>49</sup> Dumas, op.cit., III, p.73; Lebrun, op.cit., p.68.

about twelve.<sup>50</sup> The influence exercised by Dumas' group far exceeded its numbers because, in the mediocre circumstances in which they found themselves, these Feuillants were "natural leaders." This was especially true in the Elders where "nous exerçâmes long-temps une grande influence sur la nomination des présidents, des secrétaires et des commissions."<sup>51</sup> Another factor which tended to increase its influence was its participation in the Club of Clichy.

During this first period of the Directory, that is until the elections of the V (1797), the reunion of Clichy was only an assemblage of moderate and rightist deputies. Its meetings were held in a building placed at the deputies' disposal by Bertin, a former intendant of commerce, located on rue de Clichy (hence the name).<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>The exact number cannot be established because, lacking a sense of party discipline, its membership was in a constant state of flux as deputies adhered to or withdrew from Dumas' position.

<sup>51</sup>Lebrun, op.cit., p.68. Of the 23 presidents of the Elders between Brumaire IV and 18 Fructidor V, five were from the Feuillant group: Lebrun, Portalis, Paradis, Barbé Marbois and Dupont de Nemours. In the Five Hundred, where their support was much weaker, all three Feuillant members were elected president. Aulard, op.cit., p.598.

<sup>52</sup>Dumas' Feuillant group also met separately on rue de Clichy at the home of Gibert-Desmolières (Dumas, op.cit., III, p.73) and for this reason it has sometimes been confused with the larger group. Pontécoulant, for example, considered Dumas' group to be the Clichians because they met "chez l'un d'entre eux, Gibert Demolières, dont la maison était située rue de Clichy . . ." Louis Gustave le Doulcet Pontécoulant, Souvenirs Historiques et Parlementaires (3 vols., Paris, 1861), II, p.136.

They were open to all deputies and for this reason, Wickham observed, "no confidential communication ever takes place there."<sup>53</sup> The principles of Clichy were almost indistinguishable from those of Dumas' Feuillant group, for Dumas was one of the club's founders and regularly attended its sessions.<sup>54</sup> Later, especially after the elections of the year V, Clichy fell under the domination of extreme royalists and its sessions became a forum for denouncing the Directory;<sup>55</sup> but in the year IV membership implied only constitutionalist principles.

In as much as the right had any sort of collective desire, it was the retention of the advantages which the Revolution had brought to the middle classes, but without the changes which accompanied these advantages. Hence it opposed complete democracy, the prolongation of the war, the war on Catholicism and above all financial collapse.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Wickham to Grenville, op.cit. Wickham believed that "Mr. Lemerer's committee is confounded with the club of Clichy in general."

<sup>54</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.87. "Parmi les premiers Clichyens, on trouve des députés tels que Durand-Maillane, Dupont de Nemours, le physiocrate, Boissy d'Anglas;" Godechot, op.cit., p.304.

<sup>55</sup>See infra Chapter VI.

<sup>56</sup>Bourdon, op.cit., p.222, writes: "La grande majorité des Français n'entendaient nullement renoncer à l'égalité devant la loi et devant l'impôt, à l'abolition des droits féodaux, de la corvée et de la dîme, ni à la possession des biens nationaux: pourquoi élisaient-ils des députés dont le passé ni les relations ne garantissaient qu'ils défendraient ces conquêtes?" He answers that it was because they were opposed to the problems these advantages brought - the war, the war on catholicism and the financial crisis. But it is also true that they elected deputies who reflected their position - that is, who supported the gains and were hostile to the effects of them.



Dumas recalled that the Feuillant programme was in accord with these feelings:

Nous voulions rétablir l'ordre et l'économie dans les finances, une bonne et impartiale administration de la justice. Nous désirions que l'emploi des forces nationales et les opérations militaires fussent de bonne foi dirigées vers la conclusion d'une paix honorable et sûre.<sup>57</sup>

But he qualifies this position with a definite denial of royalist activities:

Il n'est pas vrai, qu'elles que fussent au fond nos opinions monarchiques, que nous ayons servi la cause royale. Nous n'avions d'autre but, d'autre intention que de prévenir le retour de l'anarchie et d'amener le gouvernement républicain.<sup>58</sup>

Indeed at the outset of 1796 they were prepared to support the 'Jacobin' Directory rather than the royalists as these were the only two viable alternative policies until Carnot offered the prospect of a moderate coalition.<sup>59</sup>

The famous dinner at the Luxembourg given by Carnot for Dumas, Muraire, Dumolard and Pastoret in June 1796 is regarded as the confirmation of this alliance. Mallet du Pan saw it thus:

Il s'est opéré aussi quelque rapprochement entre certains Directeurs et quelques-uns des principaux membres du nouveau tiers dans le Corps Législatif. Dumas, Muraire, Dumolard, Pastoret dînent au Luxembourg. Le gouvernement a besoin d'eux momentanément;

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<sup>57</sup> Dumas, op.cit., III, p.75

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p.73.

<sup>59</sup> The assessment was made by Wickham from personal letters of Dumas written to Theodore Lameth "which have lately fallen into my hands". Wickham to Grenville (Draft), Berne, 5 January 1796, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 22.

il redoute les terroristes qui ont des appuis jusque dans son propre sein; car Letourner et Barras tiennent aux jacobins et aux meneurs du club de l'hôtel de Noailles qui travaillent réellement à renverser à sa manière la Constitution de 1795.<sup>60</sup>

Mallet felt that the Directory was being used by the Feuillants to increase their own position and to prepare for the removal of the government:

Une partie des deux conseils législatifs a formé une coalition positive, tendante à opérer une révolution d'abord parmi les personnes qui gouverne, et ensuite dans le gouvernement lui-même. Cette coalition formée et existante est composée de tous ceux qui ont de la prépondérance dans le nouveau tiers, tels que Dumas, ancien adjudant général de M. de Lafayette, émigré rentré . . .<sup>61</sup>

Wickham reached the opposite conclusion - that it was Dumas, not the Directory, who had been deceived, as he reported to Grenville:

The committee discovered about two months since, what nothing but the personal vanity and presumption of Mr. Dumas could have prevented them from learning long before, that they had been in every point the Dupes of the Directory.<sup>62</sup>

Modern scholars are also critical of this alliance; Carnot's attempts at conciliation obtained only "illusory success" because the Feuillant leaders, though "superficially impressed" still made demands that would "place the governing party at their mercy."<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Mallet du Pan to Vienna, Berne, 11 June 1796 cited in Jacques Mallet du Pan, Correspondance Inédite Avec La Cour de Vienne: 1794-98, ed. by A. Mitchell (2 vols., Paris, 1884), II, p.95. (Hereinafter referred to as Mitchell).

<sup>61</sup> Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 3 April 1796, *ibid.*, II, p.43.

<sup>62</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 11 December 1796, Wickham Correspondence, I, p.485.

<sup>63</sup> Fryer, *op.cit.*, p.77. Mitchell (*op.cit.*, p.137) reaches the same conclusion.

Undoubtedly there was an element of duplicity in all these negotiations and agreements, but duplicity was not, as Mallet and Wickham imply, the dominant factor behind this cooperation.<sup>64</sup> Rather it arose from two sources - Carnot's modified position and the similarity of the immediate objectives of the two parties.

Although Dumas did join with the right in general in applauding the Directory's anti-Jacobin campaign, his most important service to the government was in the area of military affairs.<sup>65</sup> It was in this area that he wielded considerable influence. He was a member of several of the most important committees: the commission of five appointed to study the state of the army (29 Nivôse IV), the commission on the navy (1 Pluviôse IV); the committee on military justice (11 Germinal IV); the committee on the grenadiers of the Councils (1 Prairial IV); and the committee on Councils of War (10 Brumaire V).<sup>66</sup>

In the year IV discipline had again become a major problem in military affairs. Several insurrections occurred during the year - in Aix-en-Provence, for example, the 22 Hussars refused to march to Italy and cried "Vive le roy

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<sup>64</sup>However, there was a considerable degree of mistrust of the motives and intentions of each party: "The men whom his (Louis XVIII's) intransigence drove into the Directors' arms were treated by all save Carnot with profound distrust." Sydenham, op.cit., p.109.

<sup>65</sup>Praise for the policies of the Directory also appeared in the *Historien Dupont de Nemours'* gazette, the favourite paper of the *Feuillants*.

<sup>66</sup>Conseil des Anciens, Procès-Verbal; Seances: 29 Nivôse, 1 Pluviôse, 11 Germinal, and 1 Prairial an IV and 10 Brumaire V.

et m... pour la République!"<sup>67</sup> In Pichegru's army of the Rhin-et-Moselle the privations of the men were exploited by royalist propaganda to cause unrest.

Elles ont aussi une autre cause, moins nette, mais qui n'est pas niable: L'exploitation de la misère de la troupe par les royalistes dans le but de désagréger la défense nationale de la France, dans l'espoir d'utiliser un jour les troupes du Directoire pour renverser la république.<sup>68</sup>

As he had when in the Legislative Assembly, Dumas devoted his efforts in military affairs towards the improvement of the army. He corresponded with General Kellermann throughout this period and sought his advice on the best measures to restore discipline<sup>69</sup> - the army's major problem in their opinion.. Accordingly, in his "Rapport" on Councils of War, Dumas advocated, successfully, a toughening of the army's penal code and enforcement procedure.<sup>70</sup>

Dumas also gave direct support to the military policy of the Directory both inside and outside of the Councils. On the day before the dinner at the Luxembourg, he delivered a eulogy on the armies of the Republic and the conduct of the war.<sup>71</sup> Prior to this, he had served as a special

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<sup>67</sup> Another mutiny occurred at Landau and lesser troubles at Metz, Sarrelibre, and Huningue. Jacques Godechot, "Les Insurrections Militaires Sous le Directoire", AHRF (X, 1933), pp.131-145.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p.135.

<sup>69</sup> "Je vous ai envoyé par le dernier courrier mon projet sur les administrations militaires." Kellermann to Dumas, Chambery, 12 Ventôse V AN. ch.705, 3-6.

<sup>70</sup> Dumas, "Rapport sur les Conseils de Guerre", 13 Brumaire V, BN 80 Le<sup>45</sup> 2089. Cf. George Michon, "La Justice Militaire", pp.201-04,

<sup>71</sup> Moniteur, no.268, 28 Prairial IV.

commissioner of the Directory in the department of Maine-et-Loire, where he gave valuable assistance to general Hoche in subduing the Chouans.<sup>72</sup>

There was, however, a distinction in Dumas' policy between support of the war effort and support of the prolongation of the war. Thus at the same time as he was supporting the Directory's military measures, Dumas was preparing his major statement upon the war, Les Résultats de la Dernière Campagne. The work was an argument for a victorious peace, but, significantly, the terms of this victory were not stated as the conquest of France's natural frontiers which was the policy of the majority in the Directory. In place of the natural frontiers, Dumas defined several prerequisite conditions necessary for "l'intégrité de notre existence et la garantie de notre indépendance," and these France had obtained through the strength of her army despite the reverses in Germany suffered by Pichegru, Jourdan and Moreau.<sup>73</sup> As these disasters in the autumn of 1796 had lost the boundary of the Rhine, Dumas was in fact calling for the 'natural frontiers' to be abandoned.

The conclusion of an immediate peace was only one of several concessions Dumas expected from the Directory in exchange for Feuillant support. He also pressed to have the anti-jacobin campaign continued, to have the war on

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<sup>72</sup>Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 7 Prairial IV, AN 108 AP 1 (Carnot).

<sup>73</sup>Dumas, Les Résultats de la Dernière Campagne (Paris, V), p.35.



Catholicism ended, to have the law of 3 Brumaire IV against émigrés and priests repealed and to have the more republican ministers, such as Merlin de Douai, replaced by Constitutionalists or Feuillants.<sup>74</sup> This last concession was of major importance because it was a necessary preliminary towards building a strong Directorial party in the Councils, Carnot realized as much when he proposed the same measure to his co-directors in 1797:

. . .qu'il n'a voulu me donner aucune impression défavorable aux ministres dont il a demandé le renvoi, ni reconnaître dans le Corps Législatif le droit que lui refuse la Constitution de renvoyer ou désigner les membres du ministère, mais . . .il est impossible de faire marcher la constitution sans une réunion du Directoire à la majorité du Corps Législatif, il a cru devoir, cette preuve de déférence à ce que lui paraît être aujourd'hui l'opinion bien prononcée que lors même que la majorité des deux conseils. <sup>75</sup>

Fryer has observed that "the effect of such changes, if motivated, as Carnot suggested, by regard for 'le voeu du Corps législatif', would, constitutionally, have been to convert the regime from a 'presidential' system to a 'parliamentary' one,"<sup>76</sup> but this interpretation is only partially correct. Although the Directory's ministers were independent of the legislature as under a presidential system, the overall conception of the Directory was

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<sup>74</sup>Sydenham, op.cit., p.108. The most notable success of this policy was the replacement of Fréron by the pro-royalist Willot to enforce martial law in the south after riots in Marseilles.

<sup>75</sup>Directoire Executif, Procès-Verbal, 28 Messidor V, p.3, AN 201 AP 1 (Reubell).

<sup>76</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.248n.

parliamentary, for the Directors were elected by the Councils not by the people at large. The intention of the Constitution was clearly that as the Directors were to be selected by the majority party in the Councils they would be drawn from the majority and so be prepared to follow its policies. Dumas' request, therefore, was not for a violation or modification of the Constitution as Fryer implies,<sup>77</sup> but for a return to the spirit of the Constitution, by again making the Directory representative of a majority in the Councils.

Wickham regarded the Feuillant alliance with the Directory as a "coalition between Dumas and Carnot" and this is a just observation.<sup>78</sup> Within the Directory Carnot was the major advocate of cooperation with the Feuillants and of their policies. After the discovery of Babeuf's conspiracy, his position had come increasingly to coincide with theirs on the dominant issues, such as the re-establishment of the Catholic church and the desirability of an immediate peace - even at the price of the 'natural frontiers'.<sup>79</sup> There were also strong personal factors behind the accord between Dumas and Carnot. Both came from similar military backgrounds and had served together in the Legislative Assembly. They both had a deep distrust

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<sup>77</sup>"Carnot . . . could appeal to nothing in the Constitution to support his proposal to make the regime parliamentary." Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 30 June 1796, op.cit., I p.392.

<sup>79</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., p.399.

of British motives for supporting the émigrés which gave them a common outlook upon negotiations with "Perfidious Albion".<sup>80</sup> Carnot's brother Feulint, an associate of Dumas', was another personal link between the two men.

During the summer of 1796, d'André made tentative overtures towards Dumas' committee through his friend Dupont de Nemours. His objective was "de voir les principaux membres du comité Constitutionnel, de les sonder . . ." (sic. on the possibilities of an electoral alliance between the royalist factions).<sup>81</sup> At the time d'André made his approach, Dumas fully believed in his alliance with the Directory and accordingly gave d'André the "rather unencouraging reply" that "nothing remained . . . for all well meaning people but to rally themselves round the new government, which was alone capable of saving them from . . . the Jacobins."<sup>82</sup> However, by September Dumas' attitude had changed, presumably because he had become convinced that the Directory was not prepared to make the concessions which were the essence of the agreement. According to d'André, furious on discovering that the Directory was playing a double game with his committee, Dumas sought to join "tous ceux qui voudraient

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<sup>80</sup> Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.215; Fryer, op.cit., p.80n; Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 30 June 1796, op.cit., I, p.392.

<sup>81</sup> Cited in Fryer, op.cit., p.129.

<sup>82</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 3 July 1796, cited in *ibid.*, p.132. Antoine J. B. d'André was a former Feuillant deputy in the National Assembly and was well known to Dumas. See supra Chapter III.

les attaquer."<sup>83</sup>

In making contact with d'André, Dumas had not abandoned his constitutionalist position. Having determined that the Directory was unlikely to aid the Feuillants to gain an electoral victory in the forthcoming elections, he turned to the British for support. This was a change of tactics but not of objective; that remained constant - the establishment of a constitutional government. It was an uneasy alliance for the Feuillants, apart from their suspicions of British motives, "their subsequent conduct was to show how extremely nervous they were, that in working for a legitimist solution they should betray themselves into the hands of the pure Royalists and of the emigration."<sup>84</sup>

Dumas' approach to d'André did not unite the royalist factions into one powerful party. The absolutists of the Noailles group (Lemerer, Larivière, Thibaudeau, Durand Maillane and Ribufet), although in contact with d'André, remained aloof from Dumas' group and, unknown even to Wickham, were still in contact with the Paris Agency.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>D'André to Wickham, Morages, 15 September 1796, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 67. Wickham outlined their points of discontent as: 1) the refusal of the Directory to remove the commissioners who were connected with the Jacobins; 2) the refusal of the Directory to remove Merlin de Douai and to replace him as Minister of Justice with Demousseau; 3) the pursuit by the Directory of policies opposed by the committee (e.g. the pursuit of the war); and 4) the electioneering of the Directory in the southern departments instead of allowing free elections. Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 11 December 1796, op.cit., I, p.487.

<sup>84</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.157n. This concern shows most strongly in a list of questions concerning British intentions which Dumas' group put to Wickham through Bayard, ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.138. See Fryer, op.cit., p.130 for reservations about Thibaudeau's identification as part of this group.

Dumas' group itself remained on the periphery of d'André's 'Great Design' as the royalists' election preparations were called.<sup>86</sup> Apart from Dumas' Résultats de la Dernière Campagne which appeared in February<sup>87</sup> the Feuillants did not contribute to the royalists' attacks upon the Directory's military policy. Indeed at the time when royalist propaganda was scoffing at Bonaparte's abilities,<sup>88</sup> Dumas joined Lacombé Saint-Michel in celebrating the "Valeur de la brave armée d'Italie" and the "génie audacieux et intrepide de son chef."<sup>89</sup> Nor were the Feuillants a party to the secret of the "Instituts Philanthropiques"<sup>90</sup> - that there were two classes of members: the "amis de l'ordre" who were those pledged to vote the right way; and the "fils légitimes" who were "en cas d'échec, organiser une insurrection générale de toute la France."<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>D'André began the physical preparations for the elections in November 1796 after Wickham gave him virtual carte blanc on the "Great Design"; see Fryer, op.cit., part II, "D'André and the 'Great Design', 1796-7" and Mitchell, op.cit., pp.140-161.

<sup>87</sup>The notice appeared in the Moniteur, no. 159, 27 February 1797. The Résultats did not criticise the Directory's waging of the war, it only argued that it was now time to negotiate.

<sup>88</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.248.

<sup>89</sup>Moniteur, no.14, 29 Pluviôse V.

<sup>90</sup>The "Instituts Philanthropiques" were created by d'André and Despomelles from the secret royalist organisation known as the "Amis de l'Ordre". See G. Caudrillier, L'Association Royaliste de l'Institut Philanthropique à Bordeaux et La Conspiration Anglaise en France Pendant la 2<sup>e</sup> Coalition (Paris, 1908), p.xi; and M. Dupont Constant, Essai sur l'Institut Philanthropique (Paris, 1823).

<sup>91</sup>"Les 'amis de l'ordre' (Royalistes constitutionnels) ignoraient l'existence des 'fils légitimes'." Godechot, op. cit., p.307.



Dumas' alliance with Carnot also held up during this period of cooperation with d'André. With the loss of the Rhine after the reverses suffered by the French armies in Germany, the Directory split over the question of negotiations. Reubell, Barras and LaReveillière favoured a continuation of the war until the 'natural frontiers' could be made secure or Bonaparte could secure Italy so that she could be used in exchange for the Rhine and Belgium.<sup>92</sup> Carnot, however, seconded by Latourneur held out for an immediate settlement. By December he had ceased to follow Reubell's lead in foreign affairs and on his own authority he dispatched Zwanziger to Vienna to sound the Austrians secretly and Clark to Italy to watch Bonaparte.<sup>93</sup> As late as February 1797, Mallet reported:

Carnot seule est aujourd'hui ouvertement prononcée contre ses collègues et les Jacobins: il s'est lié avec . . . l'opposition de tout guerre; ses confidents sont Dumas l'ancien aide de camp de La Fayette, et Lacue de Cessac . . .<sup>94</sup>

Mallet also mentioned that Dumas was under consideration for the post of Minister of War at this time.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>These negotiations were begun in April 1796 through overtures made to Britain by Ramel (Minister of Finance). Lord Malmesbury was not received by Delacroix (Minister of Foreign Affairs) until 22 October 1796. Raymond Guyot, Le Directoire et La Paix de l'Europe: Des Traités de Bâle à La Deuxième Coalition (Paris, 1911), pp.271-93.

<sup>93</sup>Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.212.

<sup>94</sup>Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 7 February 1797; p.3. AN AF III 44(159).

<sup>95</sup>"Sur la liste des promotions se trouvait pour la ministère de la guerre, Dumas, . . . homme d'esprit, souple, ambitieux, rusé, et qui s'est insinué dans la confiance de Carnot . . ." Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 15 February 1797, Mitchel, op.cit., II, p.281.

Viewed as they were by both the royalists and the Directory as potential allies and supported by Carnot the Feuillants should have been in an excellent position to profit from the coming elections. But the Feuillant position was based upon trust - that of Dumas in the royalists' intentions and that of the Directory in Dumas' and both were undermined in January 1797 by the discovery of the Conspiracy of Duverne de Praille and the Paris Agency.<sup>96</sup>

In the history of this Conspiracy are revealed the weaknesses, follies, miscalculations and sheer incompetence which characterised so many of the royalist operations. Mallet du Pan, who claimed to have known the three principal agents personally, observed:

L'ineptie, l'indiscretion, la folle confiance le bavardage de ces messieurs n'ont pas besoin d'être remarquées, mais on retrouve dans leur conduite le résultat de l'erreur inévitable, ou les absurdes rapports maintiennent les Royalistes de l'extérieur et leur conseils . . .<sup>97</sup>

Duverne, Brottier and LaVilleduernois intended to subvert the garrison of Paris and have them declare for Louis XVIII by offering the garrison commander, general Ramel and the commander of the 21st dragoons, Colonel Malo, a reward of 150,000 livres, the cross of St. Louis, and 50,000 livres

<sup>96</sup>The three major conspirators were: Duverne de Praille, known as Théodore Dunand or Dunant; Charles Honorine Berthelot de LaVilleduernois; and Abbé André C. Brottier. A fourth individual, Baron Poli or Poly, was also involved. Caignart, Liste Officielle des Individus Prévenus et Arrêtés pour la Conspiration Tendant à Rétablir Louis XVIII Sur le Trône (Paris, V), BN Lb<sup>42</sup> 1245. Cf. Mitchell, op.cit., pp. 103-117 and Fryer, op.cit., p.183.

<sup>97</sup>Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 13 February 1797, p.1. AN AF III 44 (159).

for their troops.<sup>98</sup> The idea was a favourite one among the royalists and the English and in its pursuit Pichegru, Moreau and Hoche had also been approached.<sup>99</sup> The usual purpose behind these attempts was to get an army to proclaim for Louis XVIII and overthrow the government. However, a conversation of Dutheil with Grenville indicates that Duverne may have had a different purpose in mind:

The object stated by M. D(uvergne) had been the being enabled to keep together a party sufficient (particularly in point of military strength) to resist any attempt of the Directory to prevent the elections from taking place.<sup>100</sup>

According to Mitchell, "The evidence seems to point to the

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<sup>98</sup>Ramel and Malo were also to approach Cochon, the Minister of Police. Malo, "Rapport officiel et Liste des Noms, Demeure, et Profession des Conspirateurs Arrêtés à l'Ecole Militaire", Paris, An V, p.7. BN L6<sup>42</sup> 1243.

<sup>99</sup>Lord Liverpool observed at this time:

"Another mode which may prove successful in forcing the government, and criminal chiefs, to hearken to reason and accelerate an honourable and solid peace, may be by suspending the ill-judged profusion of money in exciting commotions and insurrections in the provinces, tending only to weaken the cause which is meant to be sustained - and by employing a portion of that expense, together with well founded assurances of security and support, to gain over to the cause of their country the principal generals - such as Pichegru, Moreau, Jourdan, Desaix, Lefebvre, Kleber, Keller-mann, and even Hoche\* as men who, although engaged in a bad cause, are nevertheless not devoid of sentiment and principle . . ."

Memoranda committed occasionally to writing concerning the pacification projected by a special mission from the Court of London to Paris at Berne, October 1796, BM, MSS 38354, Liverpool Papers, Vol. CLXIV, p.135.

<sup>100</sup>Minute of Grenville, The Royalist War in France, 30 March 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, p.305.

conclusion that the agency's search for armed support was in keeping with its long-term prospects of subverting the Directory by non-violent means . . .<sup>101</sup> but his assessment and Dutheil's explanation are directly contradicted by the actions of the Court.

The King himself and all his Ministers were entirely persuaded that the blow meditated at Paris would succeed and . . . in consequence of that opinion they had sent for their Royal Highnesses . . . that neither they nor the King might be found at the moment of the explosion in the hands of the Allies.<sup>102</sup>

Regardless of its purpose the plan was doomed to failure because it had been doubly betrayed. Ramel and Malo had from the start revealed all their negotiations with the conspirators to Cochon, the Minister of Police. The agents of Louis XVIII (Brottier, La Villeurnois, Poli, and Duverne) were all arrested on 11 Pluviôse V (30 January 1797). The indication from Brottier's interrogation is that he believed that he and LaVilleurnois had been betrayed by Duverne.<sup>103</sup> He was mistaken, however, as the second betrayal was not the work of Duverne at all, but that of the Prince de Carency, son of the Duc de La Vauguyon (who had only recently been a minister of Louis

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<sup>101</sup> Mitchell, op.cit., p.115.

<sup>102</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 8 March 1797, Wickham Correspondence, II, p.26. Fryer's (op.cit., p.183) estimation was that "they (the Court) pursued this vain and fatally dangerous plan quite regardless of their own recent interests in the influencing of the elctions . . ."

<sup>103</sup> Interrogation of Brottier - "Pieces relatives à la Conspiration découverte le 12 pluviôse" (published 1797), BN Le<sup>43</sup> 724; John Richard Hall, General Pichegru's Treason (London, 1915), p.184.

XVIII).<sup>104</sup>

Wickham's role in this affair is extremely curious. He was well informed from the outset of the progress of the conspirators. Both Brottier and Duverne were in contact with him ever since d'Antraigues had lost control of the Paris Agency.<sup>105</sup> While Louis XVIII was the theoretical head of its operations, Wickham, as the holder of the royalists' purse, had considerable influence over its affairs. After the exposure of the agency Wickham wrote to Harvé:

I have been most sincerely affected by the misfortune that has befallen your agents at Paris. I cannot say that I could ever bring myself to approve of any attempt of the kind of that which was projected, because I always thought that it must certainly be discovered as well as from the number of persons to whom the secret must be entrusted, as from the facility with which false brethren might introduce themselves into the fraternity. I was also most strongly against any attempts whatever being made before the epoch of the elections.<sup>106</sup>

The significance of this statement lies not in Wickham's disapproval of violent means before the election, but in

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<sup>104</sup>"At the very moment that Brottier was preparing to entrust him with an important mission, Carency was disclosing the agency's secrets to Barras." Mitchel, op. cit., p.111. Cf. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.57 and Ernest Daudet, Histoire de l'Emigration Pendant La Révolution Française (3 vols., Paris, 1904), II, pp.58-60. Hall's (op.cit., p.185) conclusion that this betrayal was "accidental" is incorrect.

<sup>105</sup>Cabinet du Roi to Wickham, 10 July 1796, AE Fonds Bourbon Vol.609, f.44. Cf. Mitchell, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>106</sup>Wickham to Harvé, Mulheim, 22 March 1797, AE Fonds Bourbon Vol.590 f.170.



his implicit acceptance of them after it had occurred, indicating that, like the émigrés, he had not completely abandoned his faith in the potentialities of a coup.<sup>107</sup>

The duality in Wickham's position is all the more puzzling because he did realize the effect an abortive royalist coup would have upon the legislative position of the royalists after the next election gave them a potential majority. As early as July 1796, he reported this view to Grenville:

I think that the period we have all to look to now is the renewal of the third portion of the legislature. The part that the Directory has to play is so extremely difficult that I cannot well foresee how it can possibly keep a majority in the two assemblies after the new election shall have taken place. It certainly cannot without having recourse to some violent measures. If the opposite party be prudent, quiet, temperate, and above all silent, it seems to me possible that they may succeed, but not otherwise.<sup>108</sup>

While Wickham's role in the plot of Duverne was primarily one of failure to act, it is important because it reveals his tolerance for mutually incompatible programmes of action - a trait which it is well to remember when the royalist

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<sup>107</sup> Grenville promised Duverne £60,000 for the first quarter of 1797 and a further £47,000 once a military force had been created on the condition that it should not be used until after the elections unless there was proof that the Directory planned to delay or suspend them. Mitchell, *op.cit.*, p.110. Cf. Minute of Grenville, 30 March 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, p.305.

<sup>108</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 4 July 1796, Dropmore Papers, III, p.216. Two weeks later Wickham wrote: "The season of partial insurrections is over. I am persuaded that they can no longer be attempted without certain destruction to their authors, and great mischief to the common cause." Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 19 July 1796, *op.cit.*, III, p.223.

election plans are discussed in the next chapter.

The full repercussions of this conspiracy were not immediately discernable. Despite the attempt by the Directory to use the fear of a royalist coup to influence the elections, the revelation and trial had little effect upon the outcome.<sup>109</sup> Duverne, however, made a complete confession before trial. This was kept secret by the Directory and published only after 18 Fructidor as evidence of the royalist conspiracy.<sup>110</sup>

Dumas was compromised by the conspiracy only in so far as he had been named Minister of War on one document and on another "comme ayant la confiance de Louis XVIII."<sup>111</sup> In neither case had he any knowledge of the reference nor did he have contact with the Conspirators.<sup>112</sup> It was Brottier's and LaVilledurnois' confessions and revelations

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<sup>109</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.58; Sydenham, op.cit., p.122; Godechot, op.cit., p.200.

<sup>110</sup>Godechot (op.cit., p.201) concluded: "Quant à Duverne de Presle, il fut simplement banni de France, ce qui donne une certaine vraisemblance à ses "aveux" . . .but as he also received the Cross of St. Louis in 1814 "de sorte qu'on se demande vraiment qui il a trahi . . ."

<sup>111</sup>Craignart, "Liste Officielle des Individus Prévenus et Arrêtés pour la Conspiration Tendante à Rétablir Louis XVIII sur le Trône," Paris, an V. Cf. Moniteur, no.139, 19 Pluviôse V.

<sup>112</sup>Dumas was not the only individual to be mentioned - Cochin himself was included as Minister of Police - an interesting choice. In his official report he excuses the reference: "J'ignore par où j'ai pu m'attirer cette marque de confiance de la part de ces messieurs". "Rapport officiel au Directoire Exécutif", p.7, BN Lb42 1244.

about Dumas which indicated that he had been considered:

Le citoyen LaVilleurnoy lut une liste de ministres à mettre en place. Le nom de Dumas était en tête comme ministre de la guerre. Ôtez, Ôtez, dit Malo, à voix basse, ce nom-là. Le citoyen LaVilleurnoy déchira ce nom, et le jeta au feu en disant: Êtes-vous content? <sup>113</sup>

However, Ramel's testimony of a conversation with

Poli indicated a different fate for Dumas:

Poly répond: une amnistie général; mais le parlement qui s'installe, prétend que le roi n'a pas le droit de faire grace, et en consequence il décrète de prise au corps Mm. LaFayette, Menou, Dumas, les Lameth, d'Aiguillon, et enfin tous les hommes qui, au commencement de la révolution, ont sacrifié leurs vies et les préjugés pour marcher sous les étandards de la liberté. J'observe que le premier qu'ils doivent immoler à Paris étoit le citoyen Dumas. <sup>114</sup>

Ramel's account was corroborated by Malo in a letter written to Cochon on 16 Pluviôse. <sup>115</sup> But there are grounds for suspecting the accuracy of these accounts.

Mallet's explanation for the divergence in the testimonies of Brottier and LaVilleurnois on the one hand and Ramel and Malo on the other was that the two officers had

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<sup>113</sup>Abbé André C. Brottier, "Exposé de la Conduite et des Principes d'A. C. Brottier - Séance du Conseil de Guerre permanent de la dix-septième division militaire 12 germinal an 5" (Published 1797) BN Lb 42 307.

<sup>114</sup>Ramel to Paris, 10 Pluviôse AN F7 6371. However, Poli denied making this statement during his trial. Interrogation de Frederic Poly, Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.202.

<sup>115</sup>"Théodore Dunan (sic Duverne) observa qu'il savait depuis longtemps que le Représentant Dumas avait bien du talent, mais qu'il était un traître et républicain; alors Berthelot de laVilleurnoy déchira lui-même le nom de Dumas, et le jeta au feu . . ."; Malo to Cochon, Paris, 16 Pluviôse V, AN F7 6371.

acted "pour soustraire Dumas au soupçon de complicité" because "Ramel est sa (Dumas') créature, et Malo celle de Carnot."<sup>116</sup> Indirect support for Mallet's assessment comes from the fact that Malo's statement was written on the same day that Dumas himself wrote to Cochon to protest his innocence,<sup>117</sup> implying a degree of collaboration.

The question remains, however, was Dumas involved? There is no certain answer but the indications are that he was not. He was, then included on the list unknowingly, as was Cochon,<sup>118</sup> perhaps because Duverne had known him before the Revolution.<sup>119</sup> Unlike Larivière, Lemerer and other members of the right who were in contact with the Paris Agency and who attempted to 'cover-up the plot',<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Mallet added "le noeud de ce commérage grossier est palpable; les jacobins l'ont bien vite aperçu et coupé, ils redoublent d'efforts pour aggraver l'opinion de la complicité de Dumas et ses amis." Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 15 February 1797, Mitchel, op.cit., II, p.231.

<sup>117</sup> Dumas to Cochon, Paris, 16 Pluviôse V, AN F<sup>7</sup> 6371.

<sup>118</sup> "Vous verrez aussi que les commissaires royaux m'avaient jugé digne de conserver ma place provisoirement jusqu'à l'arrivée de Louis XVIII . . ." Cochon, "Rapport officiel au Directoire Executif", Paris, V, p.7, BN Lb<sup>42</sup> 1244.

<sup>119</sup> "Ce Duverne Dupresle était un ancien officier de marine, qui faisait partie de l'état-major du comte de Bonneval, sur la frégate avec laquelle j'avais fait le voyage, dont j'ai parlé, dans l'Archipel du Levant: il me connaissait beaucoup; il s'était même fort attaché à moi, et cependant j'atteste que je ne l'ai pas revu une seule fois depuis, et qu'il n'a pas hasardé de venir me trouver, ni de me faire aucune communication." Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.152 n.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.206.

Dumas appeared to have been genuinely surprised and upset. His immediate reaction was to draw closer to the Directory and to break off his electoral alliance with the right.<sup>121</sup> D'André was able to prevent this break-up through a liberal application of funds and promises of royalist good behaviour,<sup>122</sup> but his success was only temporary, for the Feuillants' mistrust of the royalists was never truly assuaged. Hereafter, Dumas and his committee preferred to support their own candidates and policies.<sup>123</sup> As their conduct after the election would reveal, the Feuillants now were inclined to trust the Directory far more readily than they were the royalists.

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<sup>121</sup>"...among the other instances of the mischievous consequences of that event, he (d'André) informs me that the committee of Mr. Dumas had been on the point of again uniting itself with the Directory, but that he had taken timely means to prevent them". Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 8 March 1797, Wickham Correspondence, II, p.25.

<sup>122</sup>Albert Mathiez, "Les Élections de l'an V", AHRF (VI, 1929), p.432.

<sup>123</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 20 May 1797, PRO FO 74/20. Cf. Mitchell, op.cit., p.152.



## CHAPTER VI

### DUMAS AND THE DIRECTORY: II

Undeniably the elections of the year V constituted an overwhelming vote of no confidence in the Directory and its policies. Of the 216 departing deputies<sup>1</sup> only 11 were re-elected and of these 5 belonged to Clichy: Boissy d'Anglas, Sallèles, Gumery, Pénières-Delzors and Dabray.<sup>2</sup> Even departments which had voted for Thermidorians in the free sector of the elections in the year IV now were hostile to the government - the Haut-Rhin, for example, elected deputies "très républicains" in 1795 but in 1797 returned "trois royalistes déclarés dont un agent des princes et de l'étranger."<sup>3</sup> Not only were republicans rejected by the electors in places even moderate royalists and Feuillants failed to obtain support. Mallet du Pan concluded that in Paris the deputies were neither "sectateurs de l'ancien régime" nor those "connu . . . pour avoir

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<sup>1</sup>Although one-third of the seats in the Councils were at stake in the election, one-third of the deputies did not retire because the names of those deputies who had died or resigned were included in the lists. By this tactic only 145 instead of 167 deputies in the Five Hundred and 71 instead of 83 deputies in the Elders were retired. Mitchell, op.cit., p.147.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.158; Mathiez, op.cit., p.434; and Godechot, op.cit., p.309.

<sup>3</sup>J. Suratteau, "Les Élections de l'an V aux Conseils du Directoire", AHRF (XXX, 1958), p.49. The Jacobins obtained a majority in only 10 departments. Mathiez, op.cit., p.434.

pris une part trop essentielle à la première révolution" but men who desired to have the monarchy only "modifiée et non dénaturée."<sup>4</sup> In all, between 182 and 200 'Clichians' were elected, enough to give the right the majority it had sought.<sup>5</sup>

However the election results did not indicate that the French electorate, and still less the disenfranchised majority of the nation, would welcome a restoration of the monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII. Royalists had been elected because they represented the opposition to the Directory and its policies.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the royalists had fought their election campaign along the lines of opposition, assiduously avoiding any direct references to the future form of government.

One unfamiliar with the issues at stake would be able to discern very few clues of undisguised royalist propaganda, for though it spoke in Messianic terms of what the defeat of the Directory would mean for France, it was rarely articulate about the hard facts of political life in the event of success.<sup>7</sup>

The moderate royalists and Feuillants lost primarily because

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<sup>4</sup>Mallet adds that the results for all of France resemble those of Paris. Mallet to Vienna, Berne, 19 April 1797, Mitchel, op.cit., II, p.265.

<sup>5</sup>The figure 182 is given in Mitchell (op.cit., p.159) while 200 appears in Godechot (op.cit., p.309). In either case the majority now rested with the right.

<sup>6</sup>"Les élections de l'an V donnèrent des résultats conformes aux vœux et aux conseils du prétendant. Elles eurent un caractère 'anti-terroriste' aussi marqué que possible . . . On ne peut pas dire que la question monarchie ou république ait été posée dans ces élections." Aulard, op. cit., p.637.

<sup>7</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.143. Cf. Mathiez, op.cit., p.432.

they were tainted by their association with the Directory and not because they were moderates.

Louis XVIII convinced himself that the "Instituts" were behind the strong royalist vote while d'André and Wickham thought that success was due mainly to their electioneering and to d'André's coalition.<sup>8</sup> Because both parties saw the election results as the fulfilment of their own particular efforts, both overestimated the significance of their role and the royalist tone of the result, George Lefebvre has concluded that the role of the "Instituts" was slight as they had been completely organised in but a few departments.<sup>9</sup> Nor was d'André's coalition the sole decisive factor in the royalist gains. It was in Fryer's words "part of a larger and, as a whole, unplanned 'coalition' of elements which jostled in as an untidy rush to attack the outgoing tiers and the other friends of the Directory."<sup>10</sup> Therefore the royalist victory can be said to have been its own worst enemy in as much as it gave the appearance of a strength and unity which it did not possess.

At first Wickham, d'André and the émigrés were jubilant over the results; it appeared to them that the new deputies would be 'pure' royalists and that they owed their

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<sup>8</sup> Fryer, op.cit., pp.198-208; Mallet (op.cit.) is of the same basic opinion.

<sup>9</sup> Lefebvre, op.cit., p.57.

<sup>10</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.202.

election to the 'Great Design.'<sup>11</sup> But the opening of the new legislature (1 Prairial V - 20 May 1797) dampened much of this enthusiasm. Based upon d'André's calculations, Wickham reported that there were 200 "firm and decided royalists" but equally over 300 moderates, and that of the royalists there were scarcely 10 "attached to the person of the present King, and by far the greater number are either animated by strong prejudices against him, or entertain the most marked jealousy of his intentions and principles."<sup>12</sup> By July d'André's assessment had again been revised downward this time to less than 100 open royalists in the two Councils.<sup>13</sup>

The cause of this rapid decline in royalist strength is attributable directly to the defection of Dumas and his Feuillant group from the election alliance. On 6 May d'André reported that "ceux que je vous ai appellés le comité Directorial ont fait une alliance offensive et défensive avec le Directoire." He added that their reason for switching sides was that

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<sup>11</sup>D'André wrote "vous serez surpris de l'effet dans quelques mois, quand à moi j'espère tout." D'André to Wickham, n.d., cited in Fryer, op.cit., p.203n. Cf. Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 20 May 1797, PRO FO 74/20.

<sup>12</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 27 June 1797, cited in Fryer, op.cit., p.207.

<sup>13</sup>"Vous désirés sans doute connoître à fond l'esprit du corps législatif. On doit y compter environ 80 francs Royalistes des deux tiers aux cinq cents. Les Jacobins sont aussi nombreux, ainsi le reste est constitutionnel." D'André to Wickham, Paris, 17 July 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 67.

plusieurs de nos amis sont effraies et craignent qu'on ne se precipite trop vivement dans un changement. Sans doute que l'ambition personnelle est pour beaucoup dans tout cela. Chacun veut faire, et malheureusement veut faire seule.<sup>14</sup>

Wickham deduced from d'André's report that it was largely wounded pride and chagrin at their own failure on the part of Dumas and others which inspired this desertion,<sup>15</sup> but there is an even stronger indication that Dumas' decision was more a matter of policy than of pride.

Dumas and his committee were thoroughly alarmed by the results of the election. The Feuillants had not done badly in the Elders where "le choix des nouveaux députés . . . fut tel que nous pouvions le désirer. Nos nouveaux collègues suivirent pour la plupart la sage direction que nous avons pris."<sup>16</sup> It was the Council of Five Hundred, where there were a considerable number of "partisans et coopérateurs secrets du projet de la restauration de l'ancienne monarchie", which gave them cause for alarm.<sup>17</sup> The Feuillant's fears were twofold: that the royalists might attempt, or even succeed, to overthrow the government in favour of a restoration along absolutist lines, or,

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<sup>14</sup>D'André to Wickham, Paris, 6 May 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 67.

<sup>15</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 20 May 1797, PRO FO 74/20. Bayard reported that "toujours pratiqué" the Feuillants now wished "profiter de cet état des choses des Elections prochaines pour faire leur main avec le Directoire . . . ." Bayard to Wickham, Paris, 17 February 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 64.

<sup>16</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.83.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.



what was more probable, that the Directory to save itself and the Republic, would act against the royalists and in so doing reverse the progress the Feuillants and moderates had achieved so far.<sup>18</sup> The speed with which Dumas and his committee reversed their position - they acted even before the new deputies had taken their seats - revealed just how great were their fears of a coup from the left or right.<sup>19</sup>

The basic soundness of Dumas' move was attested to by the success which it met. As early as 8 May d'André was forced to concede that: "Il y a une réunion du Gouvernement avec le comité Dumas. Presque tous les bons membres des anciens se sont jetés dans cette réunion."<sup>20</sup> On 17 July he reported that "aux anciens les parleurs sont tous constitutionnels".<sup>21</sup>

Dumas and his fellow moderates had calculated wisely in shifting their support behind the Directory. Republicans in both the Directory and the Councils were thoroughly alarmed that the magnitude of the royalist victory would enable the right to accomplish the programme set forth in

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<sup>18</sup> D'André had been aware of this danger too, even before the polling. "Voulés-vous que je finisse par une prophétie?" he wrote to Wickham. "Le gouvernement militaire ou la Royauté, voilà ce que nous aurons dan un an." D'André to Wickham, Paris, 19 March 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 67.

<sup>19</sup> "...to Dumas and his colleagues it appeared that the government was being challenged and overthrown by the more extreme royalists." Mitchell, op.cit., p.174. Fryer (op.cit., p.204) is in basic agreement.

<sup>20</sup> D'André to Wickham, Paris, 8 May 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 67.

<sup>21</sup> D'André to Wickham, Paris, 17 July 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 67.

its election propaganda. Reubell proposed on 4 April that the entire election be annuled and that new elections be held under the strict supervision of the Directory. This was essentially a proposal for a coup d'état, but one conducted by parliamentary rather than military means because the republican majority of the old legislature would be used for sanction.<sup>22</sup> Barras agreed with Reubell, but Carnot steadfastly opposed the proposal and strengthened by Dumas' alliance he was able to win the support of Latourneur and LaReveillière.<sup>23</sup> Thus the prompt support offered by Dumas and the moderates won a temporary reprieve for themselves and for the royalists. Although Wickham came to realize that "the return of the new members . . . has been secured by this union" (of Dumas with the Directory)<sup>24</sup> royalists in general appeared to have profited little from this object lesson in moderation, as their conduct soon revealed.

Dumas' decision to switch his support to the government altered the policies and personnel of both his own and d'André's committees. For the Feuillants it marked a return to the programme of the previous summer, cooperation in exchange for concessions. The terms of his new agreement were, therefore, almost identical with those of the old one: repeal of the remaining revolutionary legislation;

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<sup>22</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.59.

<sup>23</sup>Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.227; Mathiez, op.cit., p.436.

<sup>24</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 20 May 1797, PRO FO 74/20.

dismissal of two of the following ministers: Truguet (Marine), Merlin de Douai (Justice) and Delacroix (Foreign Affaires) with their replacement by constitutionalists; and aid in obtaining the release of Lafayette and his fellow prisoners.<sup>25</sup> The composition of the committee which followed Dumas' lead is more elusive. Mathiez considered them to be essentially the same deputies who had rallied to the government after Babeuf's conspiracy: "C'est-à-dire Mathieu Dumas, Tronçon du Coudray, Dupont de Nemours, Vaublanc, Simeon, Emery, Portalis, Barbé-Marbois, Thibaudeau, et Rovère."<sup>26</sup> Mallet also described Thibaudeau and Emery as wishing to support the Constitution "dans toute sa pureté"<sup>27</sup> but d'André reported that Thibaudeau was a member of his committee and Wickham included Barbé-Marbois and Emery in a list of those deputies "who now form the committee with which he (d'André) concerts all the motions that are made by his party in either assembly."<sup>28</sup> Based upon their subsequent conduct it can be established that Gibert-Desmolières and Dumolard were definite defectors from Dumas' committee and that Thibaudeau was a new addition.

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid. Fryer (op.cit., p.214) and Mitchell (op.cit., p.275) accept them as valid. Aubin however, adds a fourth minister to the list - Ramel (Finance). Therese Aubin, "Le Rôle Politique de Carnot Depuis les Elections de Germinal an V jusqu'au Coup d'Etat du 18 Fructidor", AHRF (IX, 1932), p.47.

<sup>26</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., p.444

<sup>27</sup>Cited in Aulard, op.cit., p.639.

<sup>28</sup>Wickham to Grenville (Draft), Berne, 27 June 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M49 bundle 21.

After reviewing the defections from his coalition resulting from Dumas' new approach to the Directory, d'André evolved new tactics for the royalists. In place of open legislative attack he returned to a programme of resistance and opposition.<sup>29</sup> A 'Grand Coup' against the government would be attempted only if the Directors themselves appeared to be intent upon violating the Constitution, otherwise he was content to wait, convinced that the elections of the year VI would give the royalists even greater strength. Until then he would have to exercise restraint for:

Si on alloit directement au but, le Parti constitutionnel, qui est encore très nombreux, se réuniroit aux Jacobins; et nous retomberions dans la terreur.<sup>30</sup>

D'André's committee underwent a still more pronounced change in personnel than did Dumas'. At the beginning of the new legislature only two of his original 'friends' remained: Lemerer and Henry Larivière. Durand-Maillane, like d'André himself, was one of the few royalists who had failed to win a seat. Cadrol and Gibert-Desmolières were two new additions and Thibaudeau, despite his connection with Dumas, remained to complete d'André's inner

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<sup>29</sup> Wickham gave his consent for this modification although both he and d'André were aware of the danger that the Councils' pressure might equally produce a military dictatorship. For a detailed analysis of the modifications to the 'Great Design' see Fryer, op.cit., p.216.

<sup>30</sup> Cited in Fryer, op.cit., p.209.

group.<sup>31</sup> By the middle of June the committee had again changed and consisted of: Jourdan des Bouches du Rhône, Couchery, Tarbé, Barbé-Marbois, Desmolières, Quatremère, Emery, Henry Larivière, Lemerer, Gossuin, Meuaire, Cadroi, Jourdan de Lyons, André de la Lozère, Job Aimé, Polissard, Bonaventure and the two Imbert Colomès.<sup>32</sup>

Dumas' and d'André's committees were in close contact outside the Councils. Besides the meeting at Clichy, a group of approximately 80 deputies assembled at the home of Gibert-Desmolières. Among the 80 were Pichegru, Willot, Dumas, Villaret-Joyeuse, Marbois, Portalis, Pastoret, Vaublanc, Simeon, Boissy d'Anglas, Quatremère de Quincy, Tronçon du Coudray, Lafon-Ladebat, Lemèrer, Tronchet, Imbert-Colomès, Jourdan (des Bouches du Rhône et de la Nièvre), Couchery, Henry Larivière and d'André.<sup>33</sup> As Fryer points out the similarity between the size of this group and the 80 'franc Royalistes' d'André mentioned to Wickham is a strong indication that they were the same people.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>D'André to Wickham, Paris, 27 July 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 67. Thibaudeau (Antoine Claire Thibaudeau, Mémoires Sur La Convention et Le Directoire (2 vols., Paris, 1824), II, p.121) claimed never to have set foot inside of Clichy prompting Pontécoulant [Louis Gustave Le Doucét Pontécoulant, Souvenirs Historiques et Parlementaires (3 vols., Paris, 1861), II p.141] to reply that if Thibaudeau had never entered Clichy "ni moi non plus, on peut m'en croire."

<sup>32</sup>Wickham to Grenville, (Draft), Berne, 27 June 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 21.

<sup>33</sup>I. E. Delarue, Histoire du Dix-Huit Fructidor (2 vols., Paris, 1821), II, p.259.

<sup>34</sup>"It is natural to suppose that these eighty correspond pretty closely to the eighty deputies whom d'André finally characterized as 'francs Royalistes'." Fryer, *op.cit.*, p.234.



If this was the case then d'André's estimate has exaggerated the number of royalist deputies. Dumas' reasons for attending the meeting are not known, but in his Souvenirs he explained that he continued to attend Clichy in an effort to restrain the more adamant royalists and it is reasonable to suppose that he met with d'André for a similar purpose.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the disunity among the right, the moderates and extremists were able to agree upon the choice of deputies for presidents of the two Councils. In the Five Hundred General Pichegru was elected (with a total of 387 out of 444 votes cast) while Barbé-Marbois was elected in the Elders.<sup>36</sup> They also resolved to support Barthélemy in the election of a new Director, an unfortunate choice because of all the Directors, the right's only other advocate, Carnot was the least well disposed towards him.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup>"...mes amis et moi nous nous rendions assidûment à ces réunions, et nous nous appliquions à tempérer l'effervescence qui allait toujours croissant." Dumas, loc.cit..., III, p.87. Thibaudeau, (op.cit., II, p.182) who was not present, claimed that the purpose of these meetings was to coordinate royalist activity in each department through a committee of 40. However, there were only nine members who actually "avaient le secret du parti."

<sup>36</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.270. Aulard (op.cit., p.638) gives Pichegru's figures as 387 out of 404. The secretaries of the Five Hundred were also connected with Clichy-Siméon, Vaublanc, Henry Larivière and Parisot.

<sup>37</sup>In a conversation held after the coup d'état Carnot explained that he disliked Barthélemy because "he was a royalist." (Laurent Bornes, Carnot and the Revolution of 18 Fructidor, Switzerland, 8 March 1798, Dropmore Papers, IV, pp.144-146). Carnot's own preference was for Cochon, the Minister of Police, whom Wickham (Mitchell, op.cit., p.179) believed held royalist sympathies but who was described by the Paris Agency as a republican. Gillet to Bertaud, Paris, 8 September 1796, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 105. Cf. Jacques Godechot, "Carnot au 18 Fructidor", AHRF (XXII, 1950), pp.160-62.

The election of Barthélemy was the last issue upon which the right was united until July when news of Hoche's army's movement reached the Councils.

D'André's committee began its programme of wearing down the Directory immediately the new legislature met and no sooner had it begun that it appeared to get out of control. Undoubtedly a great deal of the irresponsible language and actions were produced by new and inexperienced deputies.<sup>38</sup> Their effect was most pronounced in the sessions of Clichy, where "forte de ces nouvelles recrues, cette réunion devint tumultueuse, comme le sont les assemblées nombreuses, imprudente comme l'inexpérience qui compte sur sa force, exclusive comme l'esprit de parti."<sup>39</sup> The files of the Directory contain several anonymous denunciations, the tenor of which are similar to the following:

La conjuration est dans les conseils; son foyer est à la société de Clichy; composée des élus de Vendémiaire (Véritables royalistes) . . . que reposent les espérances de l'Angleterre, de l'Autriche, de Louis 18 et de ses partisans.<sup>40</sup>

Yet even if the impassioned speeches of the new deputies

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<sup>38</sup>Sydenham (op.cit., p.134) considered that "extremists on the right acted independently and irresponsibly" . . . "despite d'André's counsel" and cited the election of Pichegru as president of the Five Hundred, in which case almost four hundred deputies fit his description.

<sup>39</sup>Pontécoulant, op.cit., II, p.138. Thibaudeau (op.cit., II, p.173) and Dumas (op.cit., II, p.38) confirm the altered nature of Clichy's meetings.

<sup>40</sup>Pièces Anonyme Adressé au Directoire, AN AF III 44 (158) pièce no.7..

are discounted, "the measures of the Right, especially when viewed together, spoke already with a loud enough voice, even if there had been no rash oratory to specify the real intentions of the party."<sup>41</sup>

In the area of legislation d'André does bear the brunt of the responsibility, for one of the most irresponsible and ultimately most damaging measures proposed by the royalists came from a deputy of his own legislative committee - Gibert-Desmolières.<sup>42</sup> "Le Corps Législatif," observed Carnot, "craignait, en accordant au Directoire trop de latitude, et surtout des moyens de finances, que celui-ci ne s'en servait pour prolonger la guerre plutôt que pour la terminer promptement."<sup>43</sup> Gibert wished to reverse this process and to force the war to end by making it impossible for the Directory to fund it. As the permanent chairman of the Five Hundred's Committee of Finance he proposed that a National Treasury, under the Council's control, be established to replace the then existing Treasury Committee.<sup>44</sup> His proposal passed in the Five Hundred, and had the Elders allowed it to become law, it

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<sup>41</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.245.

<sup>42</sup> Other members of d'André's group were also "indiscreet". Camille Jourdan demanded that the clergy be released from its oath to the Republic, Lemerer spoke of the 'religion of our fathers' and Tarbé attacked the Republic through its colonial policy. Fryer, op.cit., p.242.

<sup>43</sup> Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot, Mémoires Sur Carnot (2 vols., Paris, 1861), II, p.160.

<sup>44</sup> Albert Mathiez, "Le Coup d'État du 18 Fructidor An V", AHRF (VI, 1929), p.523.

would have struck at the very basis of the Directory's ability not only to make war but also to govern. Nor was this the end to the scheme of 'starving out' the Directory. As soon as the Elders had rejected this plan a new decree was proposed in the Five Hundred forbidding the sale of nationalized property in Belgium so as to deprive the government of one source of 'extraordinary' expenditure.<sup>45</sup>

D'André was aware even by June that the Directors were turning towards the army as a possible counter to the menace the Councils were becoming to their very existence.<sup>46</sup> Yet Dumolard was allowed to make an extremely impolitic attack upon the Republican armies. He addressed himself particularly to Bonaparte's conduct regarding Venice and Genoa and the general's failure to consult with the Councils on matters relating to foreign policy.<sup>47</sup> General Bonaparte was not the sort of person to let these attacks go unanswered, especially as they indicated to him that his position would not be very secure were the right to gain control of the conduct of public affairs. To the Minister of the Interior he wrote: "faites briser les presses du Thé;

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<sup>45</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.247n.; Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, pp. 282-84.

<sup>46</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.245. D'André was also concerned about "l'indiscrette ardeur" shown by some deputies on the right, but he did little to curb it.

<sup>47</sup> Fryer (ibid., p.286) has concluded that Dumolard's attack owed nothing to d'André and that he was not "in the number of his friends" but d'André did nothing to stop his attack or to control the royalist press which was subsidized by Wickham (Mitchell, op.cit., p.243). Cf. Bouchez and Roux; op.cit., XXXVII, p.280 for Dumolard's speech.

du Mémorial, de la Quotidienne; faites fermer le club de Clichy . . ."<sup>48</sup> As a counter to the royalist accusations he published a pamphlet entitled Comparaison Entre la Conduite du Club Royal de Clichy et Celle de l'Armée Républicaine d'Italie, which answered the royalist claim that the Army of Italy was meddling in diplomatic affairs with the prophetic warning: "L'Armée d'Italie ne se mêle que de se battre. Malheur au Club de Clichy si elle se mêle d'autre chose."<sup>49</sup>

D'André and his "friends" were practically without influence in the Elders.<sup>50</sup> There the Feuillants and moderate republicans were in a majority and throughout the legislative battles of the spring and summer they sought to moderate the 'ardour' of the Five Hundred as, indeed, the Constitution had intended them to do.<sup>51</sup> As Gilbert Desmolières began his campaign to gain control of the Directory's finances to force an end to the war, Dumas in his report "Relative à la fixation de la Solde des Troupes de la République",<sup>52</sup> gave his support to a plan

<sup>48</sup>Rapport du Ministre de l'Intérieur, An AF III 44, cited in Albert Olliver Le Dix-Huit Brumaire (Paris, 1959), p.68.

<sup>49</sup>Loc.cit. (Milan, 2 July 1797) point 3. BN Lb<sup>42</sup> 1442.

<sup>50</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.244.

<sup>51</sup>D'André to Wickham, Paris, 8 May 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 67.

<sup>52</sup>Loc.cit., 23 Floréal V, p.32, BN 80Le<sup>45</sup> 472. Dumas was named to the Committee to study the payment of the army on 14 Floréal V. (Procès-Verbal, 14 Floréal V, p. 153).



which would grant revenues to support the army. When Dumolard announced at Clichy that he intended to attack the conduct of the Army of Italy, Dumas tried to dissuade him and failing in this, attempted to palliate the effect by delivering a eulogy of the French army following the appearance of Dumolard's motion.<sup>53</sup>

However, although on the most crucial issues the Council of Elders did constitute an effective counter-balance to the Five Hundred, the system did not create stability. In part the problem rested with the composition of the Elders:

Ils étoient pour la plus part foibles par caractère, avancés en age dans le Conseil des Anciens; ils ne lui offrirent pas un parti sur lequel il put compter pour résister ou balancer l'action des Cinq-Cents, qu'il soupçonnoit décidés à saisir la première occasion de mouvement pour rétablir la royauté.<sup>54</sup>

But the constitutionally imposed delays between a decree's first presentation and the final vote also increased the tension as did the tendency of deputies to alter their position with each piece of legislation which left the government with no certain knowledge of what would and what would not become law.

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<sup>53</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.89; Dumas, "Discours sur la Résolution qui déclare que Les Armées d'Italie, de Sambre-et-Meuse, et de Rhin-et-moselle, ont Bien Mérité de la Patrie et de l'Humanité", 8 Floréal V, BN 80 Le<sup>45</sup> 340. Dumas' speech was also reported in the Moniteur (no.225, 15 Floréal V) which noted that he especially praised Bonaparte, Berthier, Massena and Augereau.

<sup>54</sup>Bornes, op.cit., Dropmore Papers, IV, p.145. Many moderates, such as Portalis, were poor orators and so seldom spoke against measures which they were eventually to oppose.

In response to this situation, Dumas sought to strengthen the ties of the Feuillant-Constitutionalist groups with the Directory further. As in the previous summer his method was to press for the appointment of Constitutionals to key ministries in order to rally the "honnêtes gens" to the government and produce a working majority in its favour.<sup>55</sup> Carnot and Barthélemy were in agreement with this plan but Reubell and La-Revellière were opposed leaving Barras as the key Director. Portalis and Siméon, later joined by Dumas himself, approached Barras, who at first "certainly seemed to respond with complacency to his suitors."<sup>56</sup> Yet Barras' "universally assumed" lack of principles, which made him appear approachable also made him an unreliable and dangerous ally.

It is impossible to say whether Barras was acting in good faith in early June when these discussions began, but by the end of the month he had resolved to use the Feuillant proposals for a change of ministers against them as part of a coup d'état against both the moderate and extreme right.<sup>57</sup> A major factor behind this decision

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<sup>55</sup>These were the proposals made by Dumas after the elections for a renewal of the alliance. See supra Chapter V for a discussion of their constitutional implications.

<sup>56</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.248. Portalis and Simeón, who were both from Provence as was Barras, had "beaucoup de rapports avec sa (Barras') famille." Dumas, op.cit., III, p.104.

<sup>57</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.249.

was the return of Fabré de l'Aude from his mission to solicit Bonaparte's support, with documents captured on d'Antraigues which revealed Pichegru's treasonous contact with Condé and Wickham.<sup>58</sup> Barras had been in secret contact with Pitt to whom he had offered the restoration of Louis XVIII in exchange for twelve million pounds.<sup>59</sup> Pitt's refusal and the certain knowledge that there were other royalist agents within the government convinced him that he would not be able to profit from a restoration.<sup>60</sup> At the same time Bonaparte's evidence now provided him with an excellent means of discrediting the royalists and, what was more important, of justifying any unconstitutional actions he undertook to preserve his own position and that of the Republic.

Barras formulated a plan of action. By revealing his information to Reubell and LaReveillière he secured their support for a 'purge' of the legislature, thus forming a

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<sup>58</sup> Bonaparte sent Barras a 16 page summary of the actual portfolio, certified as correct by d'Antraigues and Berthier. *Pieces trouvées dans le poste famille de d'Antraigues*, AN AF III 44 (158). On the implications of the substitution of a summary see R. de Gandsaignes, "L'Affaire Du Portefeuille d'Antraigues", *AHRF* (XXXIV, 1962), pp. 54-69.

<sup>59</sup> The offer was made via Sourdat and attested to by Vaublanc who is in turn supported by Mathiez (*op.cit.*, p. 532).

<sup>60</sup> The Prince of Caréncy revealed to Barras the purpose of the 'Institut', d'André's true role in Paris, and Wickham's connections with the Councils. Barras, *op.cit.*, II, p. 605.

Triumvirate of Directors.<sup>61</sup> Hoche was ordered to march a detachment of his Army of the Sambre-et-Meuse towards Paris under the guise of supplying troops for the invasion of Ireland.<sup>62</sup> While the soldiers were marching on Paris, the Feillant request for replacement of the ministers was used as a convenient pretext for removing those ministers favourable to Carnot or Dumas rather than those hostile to them. This was done at the session of the Directory held on 14 July, but not made public until 16 July.<sup>63</sup> Had Barras' timing been better the coup d'état would probably have taken place in July instead of in September, but by ordering Hoche to march before replacing Petiet, the pro-Feillant Minister of War, he needlessly jeopardized the secrecy of the preparations and thereby compromised the plan.

On the day following the announcement of the change of ministers, Petiet revealed to the Councils that Hoche had been moving towards Paris without the orders of the Ministry since 1 July and that he was then only 60 kilometers

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<sup>61</sup>Fryer, op.cit., p.249; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.66

<sup>62</sup>According to LaRevellière (op.cit., II, p.110) "Rewbell (sic. Reubell) et moi nous ne savions rien de cette marche, dont nous ne fûmes informés d'abord que par la voix publique . . ." the affair being "un tripotage de Barras . . ." The fact that Barras' signature was the only one appearing on the order supports LaRevellière's account.

<sup>63</sup>Carnot and Barthélemy were defeated by the Triumvirs on every vote. Two ministers Ramel and Merlin de Douai were retained and five replaced: Cochon, by Lenoir La Roche, Petiet by Hoche, Delacroix by Talleyrand and Truguet by Peley. Procès-Verbal, 28 Messidor V, AN 201 AP 1 (Reubell), pp.8-10.

from the city.<sup>64</sup> The coincidence of the two announcements indicated to all parties in the Councils that the Directory intended to use force or the threat of force. The fear of a coup caused a flurry of action amongst both constitutionalists and royalists. In the Councils Lacuée, Portalis and Tronçon Ducaudray urged the arrest of the Triumvirs and throughout the night of the 18th informal groups of deputies met to consider means of defence.<sup>65</sup>

At one such meeting held at Tronçon Ducaudray's house Portalis, Siméon, Pontécoulant, Thibaudeau, Willot, Pichegru, Villaret Joyeuse, Crassous and Dumas met to discuss a plan of action.<sup>66</sup> Portalis put forward his proposition for impeachment while Imbert Colomès advocated a call to arms in order to rally the army. On the question of the armed strength of the Councils, Dumas expounded that the grenadiers of the Councils' guard were well disposed and that they should "envoyer vingt-cinq grenadiers de la garde dans chacun des douze arrondissements pour faire un noyau, autour duquel se rallieraient les citoyens qui voudraient défendre le Corps Législatif, et pour former des têtes de colonnes".<sup>67</sup> This plan Pichegru

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<sup>64</sup>Fryer, *op.cit.*, p.250.

<sup>65</sup>Bouchez and Roux, *op.cit.*, XXXVII, p.296.

<sup>66</sup>Thibaudeau, *op.cit.*, II, p.215. Mitchell (*op.cit.*, p.192) adds that Imbert Colomès, Vaublanc and d'André also were present and is supported by Vaublanc (*op.cit.*, II, p.401).

<sup>67</sup>Thibaudeau, *op.cit.*, II, p.216.



rejected as diminishing what little organised force the Councils did have, and in its stead Portalis proposed that the National Guard should be reorganised as a more sure means of defence and with that the meeting broke up.<sup>68</sup>

The next day, 19 July, was the apogee of the crisis. Vaublanc proposed to impeach the Triumvirs and Carnot, president of the Directory at the time, had given his tentative approval.<sup>69</sup> In preparation for the move, Pichegru was named commandant of Paris - a very unfortunate choice, for at this moment Barras chose to reveal to Carnot the evidence he had accumulated against the general and the right. Thus persuaded that there was a threat to the Republic from the Councils and that members of the legislature were part of a vast royalist plot, Carnot agreed to counter-sign the following message of the Directory:

Le directoire ne croit pas que la malveillance ait eu la moindre part dans la direction donnée à cette marche. Il croit qu'elle est l'effet de l'erreur d'un commissaire des guerres . . .<sup>70</sup>

The crisis was past for neither the Triumvirs nor the Councils felt themselves to be in a position to act

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid., II, p.219. Dumas (op.cit., III, p.108) felt that Pichegru had no plan of his own: "Je pressai de nouveau de Pichegru de s'expliquer sur les moyens d'attaque ou de défense que ses amis pouvaient avoir préparés: il resta impassible et ne prit presque aucun part à nos dernières et inutiles délibérations."

<sup>69</sup>Olivier, op.cit., p.77; Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.309.

<sup>70</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.311; Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.233.

further - at least for the moment. The sole royalist response was to demand Hoche's removal as Minister of War on the grounds that he had not reached the required minimum age.<sup>71</sup> It was an empty victory, however, because Hoche's army remained where it was, suspended like a Sword of Damocles over the Councils.<sup>72</sup>

August was a month of relative quiet because all sides were preparing for further action. In the Councils both the moderates (Feuillants and moderate republicans) and the royalists sought to provide for the security of the Councils against any further attempts by the Triumvirs to use military force against them, but, as Thibaudeau observed, their approaches differed: "les clichyens proposaient des mesures violentes, les constitutionnels voulaient soutenir la dignité du Corps Législatif sans trop offenser le Directoire."<sup>73</sup> The moderates still hoped for some form of rapprochement with the Directory. Their principles, according to Thibaudeau, were traced in the following speech by Dumas:

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<sup>71</sup>Hoche was called to Paris to explain his conduct to the Directory and then replaced as Minister of War by Schérer. Mitchell, op.cit., p.196.

<sup>72</sup>Lord Malmesbury, then at Lille, negotiating for a peace, reported on the condition of Paris: "I hear it said that the moderate party is gaining strength, that it is becoming every day more numerous and more popular; but I am far from being confident that from these reasons we are to reckon that it will ultimately prevail - a few regular troops would keep great numbers in awe, and the return to the system of the terror for a very short time would completely overthrow the councils." Malmesbury to Grenville, Lille, 6 August 1797, PRO FO 27/50.

<sup>73</sup>Thibaudeau, op.cit., II, p.252.

que le Directoire s'unisse franchement au Corps-Législatif, qu'il puise sa force à sa véritable source. Elle est ici; qu'il se persuade qu'il y a cessation de gouvernement toutes les fois que les autorités sont divisées entre elles; que des ministres sans considération sont des ministres sans influence; qu'ils ne rencontrent que des obstacles là où d'autres auraient trouvé du secours; que la paix ne pourra s'obtenir que par l'union intime et constant des premières autorités; que la nation fatiguée de troubles et de désordres ne veut plus de révolution; que tout gouvernement qui n'aura d'appui que la force qui nécessite la terreur est impossible à réaliser; que cette force est dans les armées qui obéiront à leurs chefs pour défendre la liberté, mais qui n'obéiront jamais à un maître quel qu'il soit: que des généraux célèbres qui voient devant eux le plus glorieux avenir, la vie de Pompée et la vieillesse de Timoléon ne tiendront jamais dans des attaques catilinaires des noms aussi illustres; qu'il voie enfin que les hommes honnêtes et instruits n'attendent que le mouvement où on pourra avec gloire et dignité servir le gouvernement pour l'aider de leurs lumières et de leur talents.<sup>74</sup>

Dumas even met with the Triumvirs in the hope of reaching a new agreement but, as he wrote to Moreau,

le résultat de nos discours fut qu'ils manquèrent se battre au tapis de velours pour désavouer, et ne laisser aucune trace des réponses fort sages et fort dignes que nous avons fait (sic.) Carnot relativement à la situation de Paris et à la sûreté du Corps législatif que nous venions de remettre entre leurs mains très constitutionnellement et très loyalement.<sup>75</sup>

On the issue of the violation of article 69 of the Constitution by Hoche's army,<sup>76</sup> Dumas made a conciliatory report advancing the idea that the concern of the law was not for the actual movement of troops close to Paris but

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<sup>74</sup>Ibid., II, p.232.

<sup>75</sup>Dumas to Moreau, Paris, 27 Thermidor V, published in Victor Stanislas Pierre, 18 Fructidor: Documents Pour la Plupart Inédits (Paris, 1893), p.40.

<sup>76</sup>Article 69 forbade the approach of troops within "six myriamètres de la commune où le Corps Législatif tient ses séances." Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVI, p. 493.

for the command of them near the capital.<sup>77</sup> Thus movement of reinforcements and transfers of units through the limited area was not a serious violation. Yet the report was also concerned for the safety of the legislature. To control the dispatch of troops, Dumas proposed that "sur le territoire de la République, les généraux en chef, ainsi que les commandans en chef des divisions de l'intérieur, ne peuvent faire mouvoir de troupes hors de l'étendue de leur commandement sans y être légalement autorisées."<sup>78</sup> A complementary proposal was made that the orders for movement should be regularly reported in order to insure that the law was being respected.<sup>79</sup> Dumas spoke in favour of these measures, replying to critics that:

Si jamais le Conseil des Anciens s'est montré pouvoir modérateur, certes c'est dans les circonstances présentes, . . . Le Directoire n'a pu méconnoître l'irrégularité des démarches qu'on lui a fait faire: le préopinant lui-même a blâmé hautement l'impudeur avec laquelle l'opinion publique a été bravée . . . Il étoit donc indispensable de faire connoître à chaque citoyen de la force armée en activité, comme à tous les citoyens de la République, quel est à l'égard de chacun l'effet et l'application de la loi.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Dumas, "Rapport au Nom de la Commission Chargée de l'Examen de la Résolution sur Les Limites Prescrites Aux Troupes, 10 Thermidor V, BN 8° Le<sup>45</sup> 472, p.13

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Decree of 12 Thermidor V, approved by the Elders as an "acte d'urgence" (AN AF III 458 dossier 2749), in response to the Directory's legalizing the presence of Hoche's army with the arrêté of 3 Thermidor. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.88.

<sup>80</sup> Dumas, "Discours Pour Répliquer à l'Opinion Emise par le Citoyen Laussat", 11 Thermidor V, BN 8° Le<sup>45</sup> 2150, pp.3-10.

He also cooperated with Pichegru on two somewhat more substantial measures for the Council's defence. The first of these was a 'purge' of the guard of the Councils; the purpose of which was to ensure the reliability of the guard should it be called upon to oppose troops summoned by the Directory.

En sa qualité d'inspecteur de la salle, Mathieu Dumas renvoie à l'armée de Moreau les gardes qui sont notés comme jacobins et le général Moreau ou Desaix lui renvoient en place des soldats sur lesquels on peut compter c'est-à-dire animés d'un esprit modéré ou royaliste.<sup>81</sup>

As an additional defence, Pichegru had proposed the reorganisation of the National Guard. His plan was to re-establish the élite companies of grenadiers and chasseurs as well as the artillery, all of which had been disbanded after 13 Vendémiaire.<sup>82</sup> A fierce debate followed Pichegru's presentation; "un combat de tribune," Dumas wrote to Moreau, "dans lequel j'ai soutenu, pendant trois jours, l'organisation des gardes nationales présentée par le général Pichegru."<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>Mathiez, op.cit., p.540. Dumas admits as much: "je renvoyais à l'armée du Rhin tous les hommes qui avaient manqué trois fois à l'appel . . . le Général Moreau et Général Desaix . . . remplaçaient ces hommes par des <sup>sous</sup>officiers et soldats d'une conduite éprouvée." Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.102. Dumas also suggested that the guard be augmented, a suggestion taken up by Aubry. Mitchell, op.cit., p.201.

<sup>82</sup>Mitchell (ibid.) describes the plan to arm the officers first as "a transparent attempt to arm the wealthier ranks of society". But it was common military practice to arm the officer cadres before the men and in any event only when the entire guard had been armed and organised would it present a serious obstacle to the Directory.

<sup>83</sup>Dumas to Moreau, Paris, 27 Thermidor V, Pierre, op.cit., p.39.



Dumas' surviving letters to Moreau are all from this period between the attempted coup of July and successful coup of September. In Victor Pierre's words, they reveal "les scrupules constitutionnels de Dumas", and no trace of "une conspiration dans les conseils".<sup>84</sup> Indeed throughout Dumas' letters there runs an undercurrent of apprehension that the Triumvirs or the royalists or both will act unconstitutionally:

Vous avez bien raison de penser qu'il y a eu des fautes commises de part et d'autre, mais il n'y a, du côté du Corps législatif ou plutôt du Conseil des Cinq-Cents que des imprudences sans résultat, des présuppositions d'intention de l'humeur contre ce mépris insultant de la majorité de la représentation nationale . . .<sup>85</sup>

He deplored the growing violence in Paris - the war of the 'collet noirs' between destitute officers organised by the Directory and the forces raised by d'André.<sup>86</sup> When Bailleul made his declaration about the danger to the Republic from the 'collets noirs',<sup>87</sup> Dumas entered the debate and added that "il y avait à Paris une armée grise, recrutée et dirigée par des Clichyens dont il fallait se garer".<sup>88</sup> Wickham later admitted that Dumas had revealed

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<sup>84</sup>"Par la modération de Mathieu Dumas, on devine celle de Moreau, et je ne sais même si, pour se mieux faire venir de son correspondant. Dumas ne veillait pas avec plus de soin sur la légalité de ses actes et de ceux de ses amis." Pierre, op.cit., p.xi.

<sup>85</sup>Dumas to Moreau, Paris, 27 Thermidor V, ibid., p.39.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p.40.

<sup>87</sup>A stormy debate raged in both Councils over this declaration. Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVII, p.337.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p.339; Thibaudeau, op.cit., II, p.260.

to the Directory the identity of the bankers who were transmitting funds to parties inside France.<sup>89</sup>

As for the Directory, Dumas considered that "le doute seul que le Directoire employe ces forces contre le Corps législatif, au lieu de protéger sa tranquillité, est une injure, une sorte d'aggression morale"<sup>90</sup> This position was well captured in the same letter when he wrote: "Nous sommes au milieu d'un camp, absolument sous le canon du Directoire . . ."<sup>91</sup>

Royalist policy, in as much as it was directed by d'André, was neither as well defined nor as constant as that of the moderates. Fryer argues that "d'André changed his mind in the very midst of the crisis, and decided that, so far from running away from it, or even seeking with dignity and firmness to ward it off, the Conseils, having once in any sense faced the danger, should have gone the whole way, and should have tried to pluck both safety

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<sup>89</sup>"As to the proofs that the Directory can produce, I am afraid and I feel it is my duty to say at once, that they are of a nature as to give me very serious uneasiness . . . I will only observe that the declaration of Mr. Dumas is in no respect so fatal as in what regards this country, where he most unfortunately resided for some time, protected at my request by some of the first families of the state, and receiving pecuniary supplies for General Charette, through the hands of bankers whom he has inevitably denounced, and who will as inevitably come forward as the only means of saving themselves and their correspondents at Paris from proscription." Wickham to Grenville, Munzigen, 13 October 1797, Wickham Correspondence, II, pp.48-9.

<sup>90</sup>Dumas to Moreau, 12 Fructidor V, Pierre, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p.43.

and victory out of it".<sup>92</sup> But it rather appears that almost from the beginning of the crisis, d'André pursued two divergent and incompatible courses - one of passive resistance and the other of active offensive. After the Councils had made conciliatory gestures to the Directory he came to believe that a 'Grand Coup' might succeed.<sup>93</sup>

Fryer infers from this that "he was disgusted by the proposal which Pichegru had made to call off enquiries and had to be content with signposting the constitutional limits."<sup>94</sup> But at the same time d'André wrote to Wickham that "Ses (sic. Pichegru's) principes et sa conduite sont conformes aux miens; et c'est un grand bonheur pour nous d'avoir cette homme avec nous."<sup>95</sup> In his actions too, d'André wavered between audacity and restraint. On 2 August he reported: "Je forme ici des compagnies d'hommes surs et braves. Depuis deux jours je suis à cinq cents; je le porterai à deux mille et plus."<sup>96</sup> On the 18th he reported that all was going well with the 'Instituts' and that his distribution of arms was as a "measure de

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<sup>92</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.259.

<sup>93</sup> "Mr. Berger (sic. d'André) has indeed been uniformly of the same opinion, (i.e. to wait until the elections) excepting that moment when he was persuaded (in my mind upon solid grounds) that the blow would have succeeded". Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 18 August 1797, PRO FO 74/21.

<sup>94</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.258.

<sup>95</sup> D'André to Wickham, Paris, 22 August 1797, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 67.

<sup>96</sup> D'André to Wickham, Paris, 2 August 1797, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 67.

precaution" to safeguard the Councils.<sup>97</sup> Ten days later he refers to the street fighting between Augereau's soldiers and his armed "fops" as the war of the 'collets noirs' which he claims to have won,<sup>98</sup> actions which Dumas considered provocative towards the Directory. By Fructidor, d'André had also raised more recruits in the form of 350 dragoons and 14 non-commissioned officers of Malo's dragoon regiment, 50 chasseurs à cheval and 100 troops and one lieutenant of the 19th demi-brigade.<sup>99</sup> No matter which course of action d'André ultimately selected, either to attack the Directory or to defend the Councils, it would have been in his interest to preserve the temporary truce of August for as long as possible to allow for some form of cohesion to develop amongst his polyglot forces. Thus his war of the "collet noirs" indicates not only indecision as to the ultimate aim but also a poor sense of the tactical situation.

On the night of 30 August, d'André met with about 80 deputies at Imbert Colomès' house to discuss any further measures of resistance should the Directory decide to use force.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> D'André to Wickham Paris, 18 August 1797, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 67.

<sup>98</sup> D'André to Wickham Paris, 28 August 1797, HRO Wickham Papers, 38 M 49 bundle 67.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> D'André to Wickham Paris, 30 August 1797, HRO Wickham Papers 38 M 49 bundle 67.

By this time he had convinced Pichegru to work with la Trémouille and the Chouans.<sup>101</sup> Once again this was a tactical error, one for which Wickham was at least partially responsible, for the hundred or so Chouans which arrived would hardly have been a decisive factor if a struggle had developed, but their presence alienated the moderates and further strengthened the Directory's hand. The mistake was doubly serious because Wickham had already been warned that "the best agents and spies of the government are among the old chiefs of the chouans."<sup>102</sup>

The dualism of d'André's policies indicates very strongly that he did not believe that the Triumvirs would act against the Councils at least until after the next elections. The basis for this belief was, as Fryer indicates, the more or less general assumption that La Revellière and Reubell were unwilling to second Barras in a new coup, in other words while the Triumvirs were definitely preparing for a coup they lacked the resolution to see it through.<sup>103</sup> Under this assumption, the two courses of action open to him would have been to continue as before - gradually undermining the government or to

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<sup>101</sup> When la Trémouille arrived in Paris in July, Pichegru refused to have anything to do with him on the grounds that he was an émigré but after much bickering an agreement was reached and an additional hundred Chouans were brought in. Mitchell, op.cit., p.206; Fryer, op.cit., p.273.

<sup>102</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Munizen, 27 August 1797, PRO FO 74/21.

<sup>103</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.103.



build up sufficient forces to challenge the military power of the Directory and then, fortified by this strength, to bait the Triumvirs into attempting another coup.

D'André vacillated between the two policies in an opportunistic way as he did not consider there to be any real danger of provoking the Directors. There is some evidence to support this theory in Wickham's dispatches, as his assessments of the affairs in France are largely based upon either d'André's or Bayard's reports. On 18 August Wickham observed:

It is generally understood that it is not the present intention of the Directory to renew their attack upon the conseils, and that after providing for its own safety, influencing the votes of some particular members, and procuring evidence against others who are suspected of carrying on a correspondence with Blankenburgh, their efforts are now to be chiefly directed to the ensuing elections.<sup>104</sup>

And:

It seems probable as well from a letter of Mr. Berger (d'André) of the 26th instant (August) as from other information received in the course of this last week that all idea of acting offensively against the Directory before the new elections must be laid aside.

On the other hand it seems equally clear 1st that the National Guard will be forthwith armed and disciplined, 2nd that its composition will be in general excellent, 3rd that from the moment it shall be in a state to act the Directory will be incapable of striking a blow against the conseils.<sup>105</sup>

Whatever the cause, when the blow fell, the royalists were totally unprepared for it. On the day of the coup d'André could assemble only 13 of his agents, giving Malmesbury

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<sup>104</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 18 August 1797, PRO FO 74/21.

<sup>105</sup>Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 6 September 1797, PRO FO 74.21.

the impression that "the whole transaction passed over as if they had been taken by surprise and totally unprepared to meet it."<sup>106</sup>

As for the Triumvirs, they had never totally abandoned the resort to a coup after the July fiasco. Hoche's army had remained where it was and, General Bonaparte had obligingly sent Barras a new sword - Augereau - to replace Hoche.<sup>107</sup> On 20 August Cherin, Hoche's friend and chief of staff, was given command of the guard of the legislature. When Carnot's term as president of the Directory expired on the 23rd, the Triumvirs illegally elected LaRevellière in place of Barthélemy to succeed him.<sup>108</sup> LaRevellière then proceeded to deliver a violent tirade against the enemies of the Republic. By 18 Fructidor "the public were in hourly expectation of some terrible event, and . . . the councils were aware of their danger."<sup>109</sup>

On 15 Fructidor, Raffat, commander of the National Guard for the royalist section of Butte des Moulins, offered to lead 100 men and either to arrest or to kill

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<sup>106</sup>Malmesbury to Grenville, Lille, 9 September 1797, PRO FO 27/50.

<sup>107</sup>Meynier said of Augereau, "ce choix était excellent" because a Parisian, a popular general and politically docile. Albert Meynier, Les Coups d'État du Directoire (3 vols., Paris, 1927), I, p.122.

<sup>108</sup>Barthélemy was the only Director not to have been president so as the office went to "chaque membre à son tour" (art.141) it was legally his turn.

<sup>109</sup>Malmesbury to Grenville, Lille, 9 September 1797, PRO FO 27/50.

(should they resist) Barras and Reubell. This offer was made to Dumas and he refused it on the grounds that it risked causing civil war.<sup>110</sup> Raffat was arrested on the following day, an action which seemed to have excited Clichy to action.<sup>111</sup> That night (16-17 Fructidor) Vaublanc proposed to decree the arrest of Barras, LaRevellière and Reubell in the Five Hundred while Pichegru led the forces of the right - the Chouans, the jeunesse dorée, the guard of the legislature and the National Guard - to surround the Luxembourg. Because Vaublanc could not have his draft ready by the next day, the date for the attack was set for 19 Fructidor.<sup>112</sup> When Barras learned of this he ordered Augereau to march on 18 Fructidor.<sup>113</sup> No resistance was offered to the coup, Pichegru and Willot were arrested in their beds by Augereau, as was Barthélemy. Carnot was forewarned and managed to escape to Switzerland.<sup>114</sup>

Dumas had been at a meeting of the Inspectors of the Hall until 1:00 a. m. on the 18th. He passed the rest of that night at St. Fulcrand's house on Rue Neuve des Capucins until Villaret-Joyeuse brought him the news that

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<sup>110</sup> Dumas, Souvenirs, III, pp.111-12.

<sup>111</sup> Mathiez, op.cit., p.545.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.90; Hall, op.cit., p.229.

<sup>113</sup> Lefebvre, op.cit., p.91; Hall, op.cit., p.229.

<sup>114</sup> Bornes, op.cit., Dropmore Papers, IV, pp.144-46. Carnot may have been allowed to escape deliberately to avoid the embarrassment of arresting the 'organiser of victory.'

the army was occupying the Tuilleries.<sup>115</sup> He next went to the pavillion of the Assembly to determine if there was any possibility of resistance. Having ascertained that resistance was impossible, Dumas made his escape by the ruse of inspecting the very soldiers who were attempting to detain him thereby convincing them that he was himself on duty.<sup>116</sup> For the next eight days, Dumas remained in Paris, informed of the progress of events by Lebrun, "presque le seul des mes amis qui n'eût pas été porté sur la liste."<sup>117</sup> By that time M. deDreyer, the Danish Ambassador and a friend of Dumas', had provided him with a passport under the unlikely name of Elias Funck.<sup>118</sup> With it Dumas left France for a third time.

In all, the elections in 49 departments were annulled, depriving 140 deputies (including Dumas) of their seats.<sup>119</sup> Eleven members of the Elders were sentenced to deportation and 42 deputies of the Five Hundred shared a similar fate,

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<sup>115</sup>This occurred at approximately 6:00 a.m. on 18 Fructidor. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.116.

<sup>116</sup>The ruse was aided by Dumas dress: "Je me vêtis d'une capote bleue, pris un chapeau militaire, et un sabre sous le bras." Ibid., III, p.116.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., III, p.131.

<sup>118</sup>This passport was signed by Talleyrand "qui sachat bien qu'il m'était destiné". Ibid. Reubell also aided several deputies including Valentin Wilhelm and Dupont de Nemours. Homan, op.cit., p.126.

<sup>119</sup>Auguste Kuscinski, Les Députés Au Corps Législatif: Conseil des Cinq-Cents, Conseil des Anciens (Paris, 1905), p.189; Aulard, op.cit., p.659.

as did Carnot, Barthélemy, Cochon, Brottier, La Villeurnois, Duverne, Dossonville (policier), Ramel (colonel of the Legislative Guard) and generals Morgan and Miranda.<sup>120</sup> But many departments where royalism was strongest were not included in these decrees<sup>121</sup> and an analysis of the deported made by Polissard, an exiled deputy, indicated that there was a significant proportion of non-royalist deputies among them.<sup>122</sup> "The royalists have almost universally escaped," wrote Malmesbury, "and continue to form a considerable, though an inert and passive body in the Councils."<sup>123</sup> Therefore, it would appear that although the royalists provided the Triumvirs with the justification for the coup, they were not in themselves its sole target.

Indeed, the royalists were not even the coup's primary target because their position had already been compromised beyond redemption by the intransigence of Louis XVIII and their connection with the enemies of France:

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<sup>120</sup> Kuscinski, op.cit., p.191.

<sup>121</sup> E.g. Doubs, Jura, Isère, Drôme, Hautes-Alpes, Basses-Alpes, Gard, Lozère, Landes, Gers, Basses-Pyrénées, Hautes-Pyrénées, Pyrénées Orientales, Haute-Garonne, Charente-Inférieure, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Creuse, Haute-Vienne, Corrèze and Cantal. Mitchell, op.cit., p.212.

<sup>122</sup> Précy to Louis XVIII, 16 October 1797, AF Fonds Bourbon, no.592 cited in Mitchell, op.cit., p.212. Mitchell reaches the conclusion that two thirds of the deported deputies were royalists.

<sup>123</sup> Malmesbury to Grenville, Lille, 9 September 1797, PRO FO 27/50.



...si la trahison de Pichegru eût été connue trois mois plus tôt, beaucoup de républicains honnêtes qui ne pouvaient le soupçonner d'avoir déshonoré sa gloire, ni deviner l'existence d'un complot aussi formel, se fussent ouvertement prononcés contre ses auteurs et ses complices; la fatale journée du 18 Fructidor n'aurait peut-être pas au lieu et le Directoire, de concert avec la grande majorité, eut pu pouvoir, par des moyens moins funestes, qu'un coup d'état, au salut de la République.<sup>124</sup>

The Triumvirs' object in keeping this information from the Councils was to ensure that it was the executive and not the legislative branch that did the purging. By this means the Directory was able "to make itself independent of, and superior to, the Legislature."<sup>125</sup> By conducting the purge themselves, the Triumvirs were also able to be sure of the removal of moderates, such as Carnot who, while not royalists themselves, were opposed to the Triumvir's policies. The coup was in this sense no more than a political manoeuvre intended to redress the imbalance caused by the defeat of directorials in the elections of 1795 and 1797.

Barras, the chief architect of this approach, also had strong personal reasons for seeking the removal of Carnot and the moderates. As LaRevellière summarised: "Carnot était haï de Barras, comme membre de comité de Robespierre, Barras, comme thermidorien, l'était haï de Carnot."<sup>126</sup> This animosity went beyond personal dislike, for Carnot was the major proponent of making concessions

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<sup>124</sup>Thibaudeau, op.cit., II, p.286.

<sup>125</sup>Sydenham, op.cit., p.143.

<sup>126</sup>LaRevellière, op.cit., II, p.84.

in order to negotiate a speedy yet durable peace and on this point Carnot and Barras came to blows.<sup>127</sup> Barras' intention for the timing of the attempted coup of July was to remove the peace party in the Councils thereby compromising the negotiations at Lille and then to offer the British his support for a settlement in return for 15 million livres.<sup>128</sup> The urgency with which Barras acted and which compromised his plan, was due not to the royalists, but to the danger that an agreement might be reached at any time so weak was the British position because of her financial difficulties, the endemic rebellion in Ireland and the recent mutinies in the Channel fleets.<sup>129</sup>

Any discussion of the coup's necessity ultimately leads to an examination of the alternative policy - an alliance with Dumas and the Feuillants. Both Fryer and Mitchell are skeptical about the feasibility of this approach. Mitchell concludes that "in a negative sense

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<sup>127</sup> This occurred on the night of 14-15 August, when "ils faillirent se battre en duel." Reinhard, op.cit., II, p.238.

<sup>128</sup> Guyot, op.cit., p.446. Contact with the British was made on 18 August through an American named Melville. Malmesbury to Grenville, Lille, 22 August 1797, Dropmore Papers, III, p.356.

<sup>129</sup> "...the breakdown must be placed at the door of Barras and Talleyrand . . . It was the secret intrigues of French agents at Lille which stiffened the English resistance before Fructidor, and which after the coup d'état, were the cause of French intransigence." Albert Goodwin, "The French Executive Directory - A Revaluation", History (XXII, 1937), p.213.

they helped contribute to the political instability and made the coup d'état possible"<sup>130</sup> while Fryer criticised Carnot for his "dream" of "reconciling the bulk of conservatives to the Directory and to the established system, quite oblivious of the evidence that they were, in his sense of the word, already proved to be irreconcilable."<sup>131</sup> Two fundamental questions are raised by this criticism: were the Feuillants "irreconcilably" opposed to the Directory and was their policy vacillatory? Both are directly refuted by Dumas' conduct. His repeated attempts to form a durable alliance with the Directory are a clear indication of his willingness to support the government so long as it respected the Constitution and was itself willing to moderate the revolutionary settlement. The breaks in this alliance were not the result of an inconstant policy on the part of the Feuillants, but of a change in the attitude of the Directors.

It was the formation of the club of Salem under the protection of the government, and the refusal of the Directory to abide by the terms of the treaty entered into with the committee of M. Dumas, particularly in what respected the change of the ministers, that first induced this party to join the majority of the Five Hundred, and it was the indecent and insulting conduct, as much as the menaces of the Directory, that confirmed the union between the Conseils which a few civil speeches and the nomination of one single minister from among the friends of the club of Clichy would have effectively prevented . . .<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Mitchell, op.cit., p.216.

<sup>131</sup> Fryer, op.cit., p.248n.

<sup>132</sup> Wickham to Grenville, Berne, 18 August 1797,  
FO 74/21.

Apart from his uneasy election alliance, Dumas' conduct vis-à-vis the royalists was one of circumspection and even opposition. He did, however, make one fundamental political miscalculation concerning them. This was his decision to conceal the evidence of General Pichegru's treason, captured by Moreau in a baggage wagon belonging to the Austrian General Klinglin.<sup>133</sup> The revelation of such information he feared would compromise not only the royalists but also the moderates and the pro-peace faction in general.<sup>134</sup> Yet the result of the concealment did just that because it left Carnot unprepared to face Barras. By revealing Pichegru's treason, Barras was able to undermine Carnot's faith in the moderates of the Councils and to capitalize on the fact that despite his conservatism, Carnot remained a republican. Barras won in the end not because he was possessed of "greater capacities"<sup>135</sup> but because he possessed greater information.

While it has been argued that the indiscretions and mistakes in judgement made by the Feuillants did have the effect of undermining any confidence the Directory might

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<sup>133</sup>These papers were captured in April 1797 but not revealed to the Directory by Moreau until after the coup d'état. Cf. Jacques Godechot, "Moreau et les Papiers de Klinglin", AHRF (IX, 1932).

<sup>134</sup>The information was brought to him by Desaix, who "avait exigé ma parole d'honneur que j'en garderais le secret le plus absolu . . ." Dumas, op.cit., III, p.103.

<sup>135</sup>Mitchell, op.cit., p.196.

have placed in them,<sup>136</sup> this lack of confidence was not responsible for the failure of their programme or for the coup d'état. Rebuffed by the Triumvirs, who did not want their aid to save the Republic, and unwilling to give full support to the royalists who did seek their assistance, but only to overthrow the Republic, the hopelessness of their position forced Dumas and the moderates into passivity.<sup>137</sup>

Carnot's eleventh-hour reprieve of the Triumvirs during the crisis of July created suspicions amongst the moderates that he too had abandoned compromise and had joined with Barras, Reubell and LaReveillière - "Pendant que le parti exagéré méditait la proscription de Carnot, le parti modéré le soupçonnait d'intelligence avec les proscripteurs eux-mêmes . . ."<sup>138</sup> he observed in a note on his correspondence with Dumas. These suspicions of their most redoubtable ally in the Directory further deepened the paralysis of the centre. Isolated and faced in Carnot's words "de chaque

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<sup>136</sup>Ibid., p.216.

<sup>137</sup>On their state of mind, see Thibaudeau, op.cit., II, pp.263-268 and Fryer, op.cit., p.321.

<sup>138</sup>Carnot, Note sur cette Correspondance, Paris, nd, AN 108 AP 1 (Carnot). Dumas had written that ". . . on doute que vous vouliez affermir le gouvernement constitutionnel par la confiance; on croit que vous vous arrêtes sur cette ligne que vous avez parcourue avec courage . . ." Dumas to Carnot, Paris, 13 Messidor V, AN 108 AP 1.



côté qu'un horrible precipice, l'anarchie ou le despotisme . . . ,<sup>139</sup> the Feuillants and other moderates were unable to support either antagonist from fear that they would be aiding their own ruin.

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<sup>139</sup>Carnot, op.cit. In the draft of his reply to Dumas, Carnot wrote "Je ne puis vous peindre ma douleur . . . tout m'offre l'image de l'a dissolution; l'anarchie et la royalisme se disputent . . . " Carnot to Dumas (Draft), Paris, 14 Messidor V, AN 108 AP 1.

## CHAPTER VII

### EXILE AND RECONCILIATION

In 1797, as in 1792 and 1794, Mathieu Dumas sought asylum in a country which was neutral rather than hostile towards France. Once beyond the Republic's frontiers, he journeyed to Hamburg and there rejoined his old friends Alexandre and Charles Lameth and d'Aiguillon.<sup>1</sup> Hamburg was, at this time, a focal point for liberal exiles and a centre of dissemination for their ideas,<sup>2</sup> so it was not unexpected that Dumas encountered other exiles there, two of whom, Louis and Riccé, had founded a mercantile and banking house. It was in this house that Dumas invested his total resources, 40,000 francs, which his brother, St. Fulcrand, had given him as he was leaving Paris on the understanding that the interest earned by its investment would provide the funds necessary to see him through his

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<sup>1</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.136.

<sup>2</sup>"Si les officiers se groupent à Coblenz, banquiers et révolutionnaires modérés se retrouvent à Hambourg. Dumouriez, Talleyrand, Lafayette, l'abbé Louis, Portalis, Mathieu Dumas, Louis-Philippe d'Orléans, ont successivement séjourné à Hambourg, qui est devenu un centre de diffusion d'idées libérales . . ." Jacques Godechot, La Grande Nation: L'Expansion Révolutionnaire de la France dans le Monde de 1798 à 1799 (2 vols., Paris, 1956), I, p.114.

exile.<sup>3</sup> In Hamburg, too, Dumas met the eminent German philosopher Jacobi<sup>4</sup> - who became a close friend and, in Dumas' words, served as 'a guardian angel' through his efforts to find him a secure retreat. Through Jacobi, Dumas met the man who was to be his host for two years, Count Christian de Stolberg, one of the bailiffs of Holstein.<sup>5</sup>

Count Christian and his wife, Louise, resided throughout the year at their estate at Tremsbüttel in Holstein with their two adopted daughters. Dumas passed his entire exile at Tremsbüttel while his colleague, Portalis, was sheltered by Count Reventhlow, a relative of Louise, on his estate at Emkendorff.<sup>6</sup> The small society of litterati, which soon formed around Portalis and Jacobi, came to include, besides Dumas and Stolberg, himself a noted translator of Sophocles, Vanderbourg of the Institute of France,

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<sup>3</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, pp. 136-37. This sum, he asserts, comprised "avec le peu d'or que j'avais pu emporter, ma seule ressource pendant mon exil".

<sup>4</sup>Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) described by The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Paul Edwards, London, 1967, IV, p.235) as "a leading representative, with Hartmann, of the philosophy of feeling and a major critic of Kant". He was president of the Academy of Sciences in Munich (1804-1812) and in literary contact with most of the prominent thinkers of his time. He was deeply interested in the events of the French Revolution and quick to employ his critical powers to dispute Dumas' presentation of the Feuillant case.

<sup>5</sup>The Count and Countess de Stolberg were allied with many of the principal families of Denmark and Holstein, including Bernstorff, Schimmelmann, Baudessin, Rantzau and Reventhlow. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.138.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., III, p.159. Portalis' son married Ina, Reventhlow's adopted daughter, during their stay at Emkendorff.

and Klopstock, Niebuhr and Voss, all then professors at Kiel University.<sup>7</sup> Dumas' circle of friends was increased again after Lafayette, Latour-Maubourg and Bureaux de Pusy came to Holstein and settled with their families at Lemkuhl, following their release by the Austrians.<sup>8</sup>

As the coup d'état had denied Dumas of any further opportunity to participate actively in the political or military affairs of France, he turned instead to writing commentaries about them. His first composition, "Témoignage de Mathieu Dumas, Membre du Conseil des Anciens, sur la Révolution du 18 Fructidor an V", was an attempt to prove that the Directory's action had been unnecessary. He did admit in a summary of the composition of the legislature that there was a royalist party and that this party was not inactive, but he denied that it presented a serious threat to the Republic:

Les royalistes n'étaient sans doute pas inactifs; ils feignaient, au dedans comme au dehors, d'avoir une grande part aux événements; mais c'était un roman de contre-révolution, qui n'avait pour base que des conjectures, et dont la seule et triste réalité était de rendre au parti des jacobins un service tout semblable à celui qu'ils en avaient reçu, lorsque le despotisme de Robespierre pliait de nouveau les Français à la servitude, et faisait presque regretter le joug féodal . . . <sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., III, p.159.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., III, p.164. "I had but a small share in the Restoration of Gen. LaFayette and his Family to their Liberty, but however a sufficient one to grace with a soft Remembering the very last Exertions of mine in public station before the rash dissolving of the Legislative Body." Elias Funck (pseud. of Dumas) to Washington, Tremsbittel, 1798, LC, George Washington Papers, MS: 293-21.

<sup>9</sup> Dumas, op.cit., III, p.151.

No reference is made to Wickham or to d'André's programme; presumably this was part of the "roman de contre-révolution" as were Duverne's confessions, which he dismissed as "rêveries".<sup>10</sup>

The "Témoigne" was never published because of fear that it would provoke the Directory's retaliation.<sup>11</sup> This statement was made in his Souvenirs and would have had added conviction had his family not been protected by divorce. But it was possible for Dumas to have known of the Directory's disposition, for his wife, Julia, brought news of the government when she visited him in 1798. Julia had obtained this information from General Desaix, then in Paris awaiting further service under his new commander - Bonaparte.<sup>12</sup>

A more plausible explanation for abandoning the "Témoigne" was the arrival at Tremsbüttel of Colonel Ramel, the former commander of the Guard of the Legislature, who had escaped from Guiana. In Ramel's tales of the horror

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<sup>10</sup>Dumas did, however, include an oath of his own adherence to the Constitution. Ibid., III, p.153.

<sup>11</sup>"... mais la crainte d'aggraver la malheur de ceux qui gémissaient dans l'horrible exil de Sinnamary, et d'en compromettre plusieurs autres qui n'avaient pas atteints la verge des tyrans, me détournait de ce dessein..." Ibid., III, p.142.

<sup>12</sup>Dumas said of Desaix, "il vint trouver mon excellent bellemère, Madame Delarue, qui le chérissait comme un de ses fils; il passait chez elle la plus grande partie de ses instants de loisir; il confia à Madame Dumas le projet qu'on avait formé pour affranchir notre pays d'une si odieuse tyrannie; on crut un instant que le général en chef s'était déterminé à l'exécuter." Dumas, op.cit., III, p.157. N.B. These conversations had to have occurred prior to the departure of the Egyptian expedition as Desaix returned from Egypt only in time to participate in the campaign of 1800 - that is, after the Coup d'État of 18 Brumaire.



and suffering experienced by the deported deputies, Dumas saw a more powerful means of attacking the Directory's action, while at the same time avoiding awkward issues such as Pichegru's treason and Wickham's gold:

J'étais certain qu'une vive peinture des souffrances des déportés à Sinnamary réveillerait la sympathie nationale pour des malheurs si peu mérités, et ne pouvait qu'être ultérieurement très utile à notre cause.<sup>13</sup>

Because Ramel "n'était point en état de faire un tel écrit dans ce but",<sup>14</sup> Dumas ghost-wrote the account and published it as the Journal de l'Adjudant-Général Ramel, Commandant de la Garde du Corps Législatif de la République Française, L'un des Déportés à La Guiane après le 18 Fructidor an V.<sup>15</sup>

Ramel's Journal begins with an account of the coup d'état which leaves no doubt as to who was the aggressor,<sup>16</sup> and then, abandoning politics, recounts the horrible existence of the deputies in Guiana. The Journal was very successful in France because it catered to the taste for tales of exotic lands and foreign adventures. Two editions were published in the same year, the first in Hamburg by Dumas and the second in London by Ramel, indicating its vast public.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.166.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Loc.cit., (Hamburg, 1799). (Hereinafter referred to as Journal.)

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., (London, 1799), p.ii and p.5, BN Lb<sup>42</sup> 433.

<sup>17</sup>When Dumas revealed to Bonaparte that he had been the author and not Ramel, the First Consul's reply was that it had been only too successful in creating discord. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.192.

In the field of military history, Dumas produced a series of articles on the campaigns of 1799, which eventually developed into the Précis des Événemens Militaires, ou Essais Historiques Sur les Campagnes de 1799 à 1814.<sup>18</sup> These articles were begun with the intention of correcting often erroneous accounts of the campaigns' progress which were appearing in the local German journals. These papers were, in Dumas' words, full of "la confusion et la contradiction inévitable de tant d'avis journaliers".<sup>19</sup> In contrast, the Précis was to appear monthly presenting the true course and consequences of the events as could be determined only after some time had elapsed.<sup>20</sup> The Précis proved to be so popular that it was soon appearing as a six-part edition in English,<sup>21</sup> and by the end of 1799 as a complete book under the title Campagnes du Comte de Suwarow-Rymnisky, et du Prince Charles Pendant l'Année 1799.<sup>22</sup>

When the Précis is contrasted with Ramel's Journal, the

<sup>18</sup>Loc.cit., The original articles formed volumes I and II. (Hereinafter referred to as Précis.)

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., I, Prospectus, p.iv.

<sup>20</sup>"C'est pour éviter ces inconvénients, et pour se donner le temps de dégager la vérité de l'erreur, de présenter les conséquences des événemens passés, et des conjectures circonspectes, qu'on a préféré de ne résumer les faits qu'à des époques plus éloignées, et de réserver à la maturité de la réflexion ce qu'on refuse à l'avidité curieuse." Ibid., I, p.iv.

<sup>21</sup>Dumas, An Epitome of Military Events, or Historical Essay Upon the Present War (London, 1800). (Hereinafter referred to as An Epitome.)

<sup>22</sup>Loc.cit. (Hamburg, 1799). (Hereinafter referred to as Campagnes.)

dichotomy of Dumas' feelings becomes apparent. Although he considered himself to be a victim of Directorial tyranny, and even went so far as to add "condamné à la déportation le 19 Fructidor an V" after his name in the publication of Suvarov's Campagnes, it is only the Directory towards which he felt hostility. His description of the campaigns reveals great delight in the victories of French arms, while at various points in notes of explanation and general descriptions of events his sympathy for the ideals of the Revolution itself is shown to be unchanged. He regarded the French army as superior to the allied armies in the use of skirmishers - "génie de combat dans lesquels les Français lorsqu'ils sont soutenus, ou seulement lorsqu'ils croient l'être, ont par leur agilité et leur intelligence, un grand avantage sur l'infanterie la mieux exercée des autres nations".<sup>23</sup> Of a more political nature was his "Note sur la Formation des Gardes Nationales" in which he wrote that the true national guards are the militias of free countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Switzerland where these troops will not be used against the people themselves. He saw the National Guard as the protector of the civil order as well as the political one<sup>24</sup> and, in another note, "Sur la Composition des Armées",

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<sup>23</sup>Dumas, Précis, I, p.198. It is true, however, that Dumas gives generous praise to the enemy.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., I, p.440. That this note was part of the original work and not added in 1817 when the material was re-edited for the Précis can be demonstrated by its inclusion in the English translation of 1800. An Epitome, I, p.243.

he supported the conception that the National Guard should be open to all classes of citizens and all interests because it is the internal army of the nation.<sup>25</sup>

The profits from the sales of these works were very welcome "à cause du mauvais succès des affaires de la maison à laquelle je m'étais associé",<sup>26</sup> and to help defray the cost of living in expenses for his wife, Julia, who was expecting their third child.<sup>27</sup> This child had been conceived during Julia's visit to Tremsbüttel which began in the autumn of 1798. She had arrived with Cornelia, their eldest daughter, on the invitation of Count Christian and returned to France in April of 1799.<sup>28</sup> The child, a boy, born on 14 December 1799, was named Christian in honour of his father's generous host.<sup>29</sup> Although technically he was born out of wedlock, of an 'unknown father', St. Fulcrand signed the certificate as the 'oncle paternal'.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Dumas, Campagnes, p.274.

<sup>26</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.163

<sup>27</sup>Dumas sent Julia 50 louis from the proceeds of the Précis. "Telles avaient été nos pertes et la réduction de notre petite fortune, que cette ressource lui fut précieuse." Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Julia was able to obtain a passport to leave France under the pretext that she intended to take the waters at Pyrmont in order to restore her health. L'Administration du Département à l'Administration Municipale du 6<sup>eme</sup> Arrondissement, 14 Thermidor VI, AD (Seine) VD\* 6192.

<sup>29</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.161.

<sup>30</sup>Ville de Paris, Extrait du Registre des Actes de Naissance - 5<sup>eme</sup> Arrondissement, 23 Frimaire VIII, AAG 2<sup>eme</sup> série, GB 3103 (Christian Léon Dumas). Mathieu Dumas remarried Julia upon his return to France in 1800. Cf. Acte de Mariage: Dumas et Delarue, 30 Ventôse VIII (21 March 1800), AD (Seine) Reconstitution des Actes de l'Etat Civil.

The address given on his certificate as the home of the Delarues was 21 rue Neuve Nicolas, a street in faubourg St. Martin which even in 1808 was on the outer circumference of the city, supporting Dumas' statement that the family had lost most, if not all, of its wealth:

Les pertes considérables qu'avait éprouvées mon beau-père par la réduction des rentes, par le remboursement en assignats dépréciés, des finances de sa charge, tandis qu'il remboursait fidèlement en espèces les prêts qui lui avaient été faits par ses parents et ses amis, avaient beaucoup diminué l'aisance de la maison.<sup>31</sup>

By January 1800, it had become clear that the new government of Bonaparte had ended the proscriptions of the Directory and Dumas and Portalis, in company with Quatremère de Quincy, departed for Paris.<sup>32</sup> Dumas reached Paris on 14 February only to discover that he had been classified as "un royaliste remuant et dangereux" and would be required to reside outside the capital.<sup>33</sup> Through the intermediary of Lebrun he was soon able to persuade the First Consul of his good intentions. At first, Bonaparte considered Dumas solely as a military writer and administrator because he had not seen active service since the beginning of the Revolution. Accordingly, the offer of the prefecture of the Gironde was made but declined.<sup>34</sup> Bonaparte finally

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<sup>31</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.173.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., III, p.170. For the various devices by which Bonaparte made his position on émigrés clear, see Louis Madelin, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire (16 vols., Paris, 1938), III, pp.14-18 and Albert Vandal, L'Avènement de Bonaparte (2 vols., Paris, 1912), I, pp.422-430.

<sup>33</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.174.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.



consented to re-employ Dumas in a military capacity, but without restoring his full rank of lieutenant general, as this had been accorded by the Legislative Assembly at a time when Dumas was more politician than soldier. Instead he proposed that Dumas should earn this promotion upon the field of battle.<sup>35</sup>

Dumas' first assignment was to raise a corps of volunteers for employment with the Army of Reserve then forming at Dijon.<sup>36</sup> As this legion, as it came to be called, would never have been ready in time for Bonaparte's planned spring offensive no matter how diligently Dumas worked, its purely military usefulness was questionable.<sup>37</sup> The true importance of these volunteers lay in their social composition. Because each recruit was expected to furnish his own uniform and mount if he wished to join the cavalry, only the sons of the wealthier classes could afford to enlist;<sup>38</sup> thus the

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., III, pp.176-178 and Rapport: Le Général de Brigade Dumas était Envoyé à l'Armée de Réserve. 27 Ventôse VIII, AAG GD 395.

<sup>36</sup>État-Major 1<sup>re</sup> Division to Dumas, 27 Ventôse VIII, AAG GD 395.

<sup>37</sup>The initial call for volunteers appeared in the Moniteur (no. 182, 2 Germinal VIII, p.730) at the end of March. As Bonaparte left Paris at midnight of 5/6 May, Dumas had slightly over one month to arm, equip and turn into soldiers raw recruits, while collecting them from throughout France - clearly an impossible task. Cf. Mathieu Dumas, Organisation des Volontaires de l'Armée de Réserve (Paris, VIII), BN 40 Lf194 107, which was published in and reviewed by the Moniteur (no. 186, 6 Germinal VIII, p.747).

<sup>38</sup>The "Tableau du Prix des objets d'habillement, équipement, etc." gives the total cost for the Hussars as 557f.70c, not including the cost of a horse, and for the light cavalry, 114f.75c. Moniteur, no.191, 11 Germinal VIII, p.773.

legion, by its very existence, would demonstrate to France and to Europe that Bonaparte enjoyed their support - a matter of great importance when the instability of the new government is considered.<sup>39</sup> A former exile, having retained the manners of the Ancien Régime, and acquainted with many of the influential old families,<sup>40</sup> Dumas was himself an inducement for enlistment, as was the legion's constitution as a corps d'élite, which eliminated the social and military embarrassment of service with common soldiers. The success of this method can be assessed from the surnames of the recruits - Ségur, Choisy, Lameth and Clermont-Tonnerre.<sup>41</sup>

Once the initial stages of organisation had been completed, Dumas was transferred to the staff of the Army of Reserve.<sup>42</sup> In a letter of instruction from Carnot<sup>43</sup> he was

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<sup>39</sup>"Il est certain que, d'un Sieyès à un Benjamin Constant, peut-être même d'un Bernadotte à un Talleyrand - sans parler d'un Cadoual et d'un Hyde de Neuville - beaucoup eussent souscrit à la phrase que devait un jour écrire l'intempérante Germaine de Staël: 'le bien de la France exigeait qu'elle eut des revers.'" Madelin, *op.cit.*, III, p.217. Cf. Vandal, *op.cit.*, II, pp.366-395 and Georges Lefebvre, Napoléon (Paris, 1953), p.92.

<sup>40</sup>Louis Philippe de Ségur, *op.cit.*, II, p.26.

<sup>41</sup>Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.178. Two squadrons, each of 100 men, were raised. Dumas was also used by Bonaparte to approach Lafayette: "Le Général Mathieu Dumas me demanda une conférence, et convint qu'il avait été chargé par le premier consul de s'expliquer avec moi sur mon attitude improbatrice, si ce n'est hostile. . . ." Lafayette, Mémoires, Correspondance et Manuscrits du General Lafayette (Brussels, 1837), II, p.197.

<sup>42</sup>Dumas mentions that he had tried to obtain a post with the first line of the Army of Reserve, but Bonaparte had refused as his presence was needed at Dijon. Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.179.

<sup>43</sup>Carnot, who had returned to France after 18 Brumaire, was Minister of War during this campaign.

informed that he would exercise the functions of chief of staff for the second line of the Army of Reserve to be commanded by General Brune. The order concluded:

J'ai déjà donné les ordres nécessaires pour que les dépôts de l'Armée d'Orient, et ceux des demi-Brigades de l'Armée de Réserve reçoivent, avant le 10 Messidor prochain, les conscrits qui doivent les compléteres . . .<sup>44</sup>

The title "seconde ligne de l'Armée de Réserve" was, in fact, a euphemism for a polyglot collection of miscellaneous conscript and depot battalions which Carnot ordered Dumas to form into three divisions. As these same depots had already been drained to provide the necessary manpower for the first line of the Army of Reserve, Dumas' command can without exaggeration be said to have comprised the last dregs of the French army.<sup>45</sup>

Besides the organisation of this army, his special responsibilities included the command of the advance guard during the occupation of the Grisons.<sup>46</sup> While he was engaged in placing the advance guard in positions from which the passes of the Grisons could be secured, General Brune was

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<sup>44</sup>Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 9 Prairial VIII, AHG B<sup>12\*</sup> 42\*, Correspondance: Armée de Réserve.

<sup>45</sup>Because Bonaparte had never seriously intended to relieve the garrison of Egypt, his preparations for its relief were only a sham and the men assigned to the depots of l'Orient were of poor quality to begin with. Dumas described this army as "une reunion des cadres de divisions". (*Précis*, V, p.74).

<sup>46</sup>Dumas to Carnot, no.271, Geneva, 30 Thermidor VIII AAG B<sup>2\*</sup> (Etat-Major Général de l'Armée: Lettres et Ordres - Armée de Réserve devenue des Grisons).

transferred to the command of the Army of Italy.<sup>47</sup> Carnot's letter reporting this change ended with the exhortation "C'est pour vous une nouvelle occasion d'être utile à l'armée de Réserve . . ."<sup>48</sup> which was certainly an understatement, for until a replacement for Brune was found, Dumas was indispensable. He was now acting commander-in-chief and his own chief of staff, responsible for completing the organisation of an improvised army, occupying neutral Switzerland and negotiating a treaty of provisionment with the Swiss government.<sup>49</sup> Dumas' independence is best illustrated by the arrangements for the transmission of orders. When the Second Army of Reserve was created and a provisional staff appointed, Bonaparte directed that all correspondence should be addressed to the Minister of War (Carnot) in Paris, and not to himself as he was then in the midst of the Italian campaign.<sup>50</sup> Communications between Paris and Switzerland were so tenuous that the Moniteur, which often printed important government decrees, served as a major source of information for the Army of Reserve and interruption of its delivery became a matter

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<sup>47</sup> Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 26 Thermidor VIII, AHG B12\* 42\*. N.B. The armies of Italy and Reserve had been combined after Marengo into one formation at which time the 2nd line of the Reserve became the Army of Reserve.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Dumas to Carnot, Berne, 2 Fructidor VIII (21 August 1800) AHG B2\* 202\*.

<sup>50</sup> Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 9 Prairial VIII, AAG B12\* 42\*.

of great concern.<sup>51</sup>

Although the army never numbered more than 13,000-14,000 men, as many divisions were created as there were generals of division (Lt. generals), for in mountainous country such as the Grisons, which tended to split up large units, the only means the Austrians had of estimating the army's strength was by identifying headquarters.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, the impression these numerous small divisions gave to the Austrians was of an army of at least twice the actual size of that present.

The success and ability with which Dumas conducted the operations of the Army of Reserve during the armistice which followed Marengo is best attested to by Carnot himself in his replies to periodic reports made to him on the progress of the army. He wrote on 26 Thermidor:

Je m'empresse de vous témoigner combien je suis satisfait de l'active habileté que vous mettez à seconder le général en chef de l'armée de Réserve, en préparant et dirigeant avec autant d'intelligence que de précision les premiers mouvements de l'avant garde . . .<sup>53</sup>

and after the movements were completed:

Je me fait un plaisir de vous renouveler les témoignages de ma satisfaction pour le zèle et

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<sup>51</sup>Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 13 Fructidor, VIII (AAG GD 395) presents a discussion of the importance of the transmission of the Moniteur.

<sup>52</sup>Dumas, Précis, V, p.74. The idea was Bonaparte's, not Dumas'.

<sup>53</sup>Carnot to Dumas, Paris, 26 Thermidor VIII, AHG B12\* 42\*.



l'intelligence que vous avez mis à faire marcher  
et poster l'avant garde de l'armée . . . Jamais  
l'activité ne fut plus utile ni plus nécessaire . . .<sup>54</sup>

By September General Macdonald had become the new commander of the Army of the Grisons, as the Army of Reserve was now retitled. Because he was not familiar with either the country or the army entrusted to him, he relied heavily upon his chief of staff for advice<sup>55</sup> and even delegated to him the most important mission of representing the army in meetings held with the First Consul to prepare plans for a new campaign.<sup>56</sup>

Bonaparte and military historians after him have represented the campaigns of 1800 and 1801 as the products of war by committee - of compromise between the plans of the First Consul and the often conflicting ambitions of

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<sup>54</sup>Carnot to Dumas, Paris, Jour 2 Complimentaire VIII, AHG B12\* 42\*.

<sup>55</sup>In response to a request from Macdonald, Dumas prepared a report on the priorities for action should the armistice be denounced. These were: (1) modify the convention with Switzerland to allow for an increased number of divisions to be supported; (2) augment the outpost lines of Ney's corps to 12,000-15,000 men; (3) augment the advance guard; and (4) request the return of General Dampiere from the Army of Italy. Dumas to Macdonald, Feldkirch, 14 Fructidor VIII, AHG B2\* 202\*.

<sup>56</sup>Macdonald, accompanied by Dumas, did meet with Moreau at the headquarters of the Army of the Rhine, but only Dumas went on with Moreau to Paris. Etienne, Jacques Joseph Alexandre Macdonald, Souvenirs du Maréchal Macdonald (Paris, 1910), pp.115-116; Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.186.

his generals.<sup>57</sup> Dumas' reports to General Macdonald of those meetings and the general atmosphere of the military proceedings tend on the whole to confirm Bonaparte's claim.<sup>58</sup> On 3 Brumaire, for example, he wrote that Moreau was, "satisfait de ses premières conversations avec le Premier Consul sur la nécessité de résoudre la question diplomatique militairement . . ." <sup>59</sup> implying that Moreau's approval was vital. In another report, Dumas records that to obtain information about the resumption of hostilities he turned not to the government but to Moreau: "persuadé que j'obtiendrais auprès de lui des choses plus positives sur la vraisemblance de la rupture de l'armistice."<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> The best known example of this situation is to be found in the planning of the Marengo Campaign. Bonaparte originally wished to employ the Army of Reserve in Germany, the decisive theatre, rather than in Italy, but was forced to switch directions by Moreau's reluctance to accept his plan. Even in the amended plan, Moreau failed to co-operate fully, sending only 11,000 reinforcements to Bonaparte instead of the 25,000 provided for. Cf. Colin, Napoléon (Paris, 1914), p.46; Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et l'Empire (Paris, 1840), I, p.262. For a dissenting view that Bonaparte throughout intended Italy as his prime theatre of operation, see Sir John Adye, Napoleon of the Snows (London, 1931), p.38.

<sup>58</sup> As well as the official reports which are entered in the correspondence of the Army of Reserve, there is a private letter to Macdonald dated 4 Brumaire VIII dispatched via Romeuf (an aide) now preserved in the papers of Andréossy (AN 169 AP doss 6). This letter's comments are in a similar vein to those appearing below in the official reports.

<sup>59</sup> Dumas to Macdonald, Paris, 3 Brumaire VIII, AHG  
B12\* 42\*.

<sup>60</sup> Dumas to Macdonald, Paris, 13 Brumaire VIII, AHG  
B12\* 42\*.

The attitude of Moreau towards Bonaparte was more significant still. For him, as for Bernadotte and Massena, the First Consul was only the primus inter pares; moreover military jealousy added an element of invidiousness to all discussions. After the brief campaign of 1801, Dumas again met with Moreau and concluded:

Son mécontentement sa jalousie de l'ascendant qu'avait pris le premier consul, son opposition alors toute républicaine, perçurent dans tous ses discours . . . celui qu'il considérait comme son rival.<sup>61</sup>

While the contents of this conversation cannot be substantiated, a letter written in 1797 shows clearly that Moreau had long been sensitive to Bonaparte's glory:

J'ai vu hier dans l'Ami des Loix une grande impertinence à mon égard; il dit que j'ai suivi l'exemple de Bonaparte en chargeant à la tête de la cavalerie. Je reconnais bien la supériorité des talents de Bonaparte, et je prendrai de ses leçons avec bien du plaisir, mais en fait du courage, dans les six campagnes que je viens de faire, je n'ai eu besoin de l'exemple de personne pour faire mon devoir . . .<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.217. Dumas was if anything a favourable witness towards Moreau. In addition to their connection in 1796-97, Dumas' brother, St. Fulcrand, was a "munitionnaire général" with the army of the Rhine (*ibid.*, III, p.186) and Moreau had requested and obtained permission for St. Marcel to return to France (*ibid.*, III, p.187). Even his report of Moreau's conviction of treason in 1804 was sympathetic: "L'Armée verra avec étonnement, mais avec la plus vive indignation, que le Général Moreau, qui-lui-même proclama la trahison de Pichegru, ait souillé sa gloire . . ." Dumas to Durutte, Ordres du Jour, 30 Pluviôse XII, AHG K'1-49 (Archives Militaires du Maréchal Prince d'Eckmühl).

<sup>62</sup>Moreau to Dumas, Strasbourg, 16 Floréal V, Sotheby's collection. Dumas' reported conversation indicates that Moreau did consider himself equal to Bonaparte in some matters: "Pour la guerre méthodique sur un théâtre déterminé, pour la partie d'échecs, c'est autre chose; là je crois valoir mieux que lui". Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.218.

Turning to the results of the conferences, it was agreed that through a double envelopment of the flanks of the Tyrol, carried out by the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, the Austrians were to be forced to abandon that mountain fortress, thereby opening the road to Vienna.<sup>63</sup> The Army of the Grisons was destined to support the right of the Army of the Rhine by marching via the Splügen pass.

When hostilities recommenced on 22 November, Dumas personally conducted the crossing of the Splügen by the advance guard.<sup>64</sup> Because of the lateness of the season this was a transmontane march even more hazardous than Bonaparte's crossing of St. Bernard the previous spring. Dumas described the Splügen in winter:

. . . quand les neiges nouvelles ont effacé toutes les traces dans ces hautes régions où il n'y a plus de végétation d'arbres ni d'arbustes, quand les avalanches et la violence des vents ont enseveli ou emporté les balises qui jalonnaient le sentier, et changé même la configuration du terrain, on ne peut avancer que pas à pas: il faut s'assurer, la sonde à la main, comme à la mer au milieu des écueils, si l'on est sur le sentier ou sur l'abîme: les guides les plus exercés hésitant aux endroits où la direction doit changer, et ne trouvent qu'à l'horizon bonne par les cimes des glaciers (toute fois quand le temps est serein), quelques points de remarque.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Dumas, Précis, V, pp.152-54.

<sup>64</sup>The papers of Mathieu Dumas, donated to the Archives de la Guerre (AHG MR 471) in 1866 by his son Christian, contain sixteen items on the Army of the Grisons, including engineering reports, diagrams of sledges especially constructed to transport the artillery and baggage, and reconnaissances of the passes. Two histories of the Campaign are also included: Dumas, "Historire de la Campagne avec notes", and General of Engineers Morlaincourt, "Précis Historique de la Marche de l'Armée des Grisons."

<sup>65</sup>Dumas, Précis, V, pp.163-64.



Despite these dangers the army managed to cross the pass with relatively little loss of life; an avalanche, on 27 November during the first attempt at the crossing, did carry off thirty dragoons but that was the largest single loss of life.<sup>66</sup> Such relatively light casualties were primarily due to the unique and effective method devised by Dumas for constructing a safe passage:

Quatre boeufs des plus fortes du pays, conduits par les meilleurs guides, foulèrent les neiges où on les voyait s'enfoncer et presque disparaître; ils étaient suivis par quarante travailleurs paysans qui déblayaient et formaient le sentier. Une compagnie de sapeurs les soutenait et perfectionnait la tranchée; deux compagnies d'infanterie marchant par le flanc, les files bien serrées, achevaient d'aplanir et d'affermir la neige.<sup>67</sup>

By the time the Splügen had been crossed, Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden (3 December 1800) had broken the Austrian resistance; the war ended and with it the existence of the Army of the Grisons.<sup>68</sup> Dumas did not immediately return to Paris when the army's staff was dissolved, for he had been given the mission of examining and reporting on the state of Austrian fortification throughout the Tyrol.<sup>69</sup> By May, however, he was back in Paris and

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., V, p.168. This manoeuvre met with complete approval in Paris. Alexandre Berthier, the new Minister of War, wrote "je partage, de la manière distinguée dont vous le secondez et du zèle qu'à votre exemple les officiers de l'État-Major et autres ont mis à exécuter vos dispositions." Berthier to Dumas, Paris, 26 Frimaire IX, AHG B12\* 42\*.

<sup>67</sup>Dumas, op.cit., V, p.170.

<sup>68</sup>Berthier to Dumas, Paris, 17 Floreal IX, AHG B12\* 42\*.

<sup>69</sup>Berthier to Dumas, Paris, 11 Prairial IX, AHG B12\*



in June, on the recommendation of both Brune and Macdonald, he was appointed to the Council of State.<sup>70</sup>

Appointment to the Council of State throughout the entire period of Bonaparte's rule over France was never an empty honour,<sup>71</sup> and this was especially true under the Consulate, when it formed his true cabinet of genius.<sup>72</sup> It was organised into five sections: finances, civil and criminal legislation, marine (which included the overseas colonies), interior and war. While the Council discussed affairs as a whole, the sections also met individually for the preparation of material for their specific areas.<sup>73</sup> The war section originally consisted of Brune (president), Lacuée, Dejean, Marmont, and Pétiet, but with the end of the Austrian war, Dumas, St. Cyr and Andréossy were appointed to replace

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<sup>70</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.222. At first there had been some mutual hostility between the staunch republican Brune and Dumas when they had served together in the army of the Grisons, but an understanding had developed with the growth of their mutual respect - a fact borne out by Brune's recommendation of Dumas, which would certainly have been necessary as he was president of the war section of the Council of State.

<sup>71</sup>Councillors were given a distinctive blue uniform and a salary of 25,000 francs. Cf. Règlement du Conseil d'Etat, Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVIII, p.303. For the importance, see Charles Durand, Etudes Sur le Conseil d'Etat Napoléonien (Paris, 1949).

<sup>72</sup>The role of the Council changed under the Empire. Then Napoleon would present his ideas or requirements not so much for discussion as to have the technical problems which they raised resolved. Yet it still retained the greatest degree of freedom of expression of all the areas of government. Cf. Jean Bourdon, Napoléon Au Conseil d'Etat (Paris, 1963), p.280ff. and Baron Agathor Jean François Fain, Mémoires (Paris, 1909), p.147.

<sup>73</sup>Fain, op.cit., p.148.

all but Brune and Lacuée in service ordinaire.<sup>74</sup> In many respects this section and that of marine were the least important because their functions were limited by the existence of other bodies - the Conseil d'Administration de la Guerre (created in the year X) and the Conseil de la Marine (created in 1810).<sup>75</sup>

As the Council functioned at the time of Dumas' inclusion, individual responsibilities and missions were commonly assigned.<sup>76</sup> Dumas' first areas of particular involvement were concerned with the administration of the Invalides and military hospitals<sup>77</sup> - neither being vital concerns, especially as this was a period of relative peace. His third project, however, was anything but unimportant. This was the organisation of the Legion of Honour which Bonaparte himself described as one of the Consulate's "Masses de Granit", ranking it with the Peace of Amiens, the Concordate, the reorganisation of public education and the Code Napoléon.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVIII, p.305. Councillors in service ordinaire attended the regular sessions, which those in service extraordinaire (i.e. those on special missions) did not. The latter was in fact used as a form of disguised disgrace because, after the mission was completed, they need not be reinstated, thus allowing Bonaparte to be rid of them without public scandal as they kept their titles. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.80.

<sup>75</sup>It should be noted, however, that these Councils were composed exclusively of councillors of state. Durand, op.cit., p.242.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p.229. In 1800 Brune, Bernadotte, Gantheume and Marmont, although councillors, also held military commands.

<sup>77</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.222.

<sup>78</sup>Madelin, op.cit., IV, p.170.

To understand why so much importance and so much opposition was attached to a measure supposedly created for "les récompenses militaires, et pour récompenser aussi les services et les vertus civiles",<sup>79</sup> it is necessary to examine the details of its organisation and the purpose which this organisation was to serve. A distinction must be made between the Legion as it was envisaged in the years preceeding the establishment of the Empire and as it finally emerged after several important elements were rendered superfluous by the formation of an imperial nobility. Napoleon did not create the Empire "in vacuo" nor did he drift into it haphazardly; the work of Dumas clearly shows a continuity and development of thought, possibly running back as far as 1801. The Legion was intended to be for Bonaparte the Consul what the Empire was for Napoleon, the instrument for the creation of a new nobility, united through the ideal of service and loyalty to the state.<sup>80</sup>

None of the "Masses of Granit", not even the Concordat, was more strongly objected to than the Legion.<sup>81</sup> Despite

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<sup>79</sup>Aulard, op.cit., p.759.

<sup>80</sup>According to Remacle, a royalist agent, Bonaparte said, "J'ai rétabli la religion parce qu'elle existait. Je ne puis refaire une noblesse qui n'existe plus". Remacle to Condé, Relations, 26 September 1802, cited in Madelin, op.cit., IV, p.170 n.2. Madelin himself described it as "une sorte de noblesse démocratique". (ibid.)

<sup>81</sup>Madelin (op.cit., IV, p.171) has written: "Nous imaginons mal le 'tumulte' inouï que déclainera ce projet." Cf. Aulard, op.cit., p.760; Lefebvre, op.cit., p.135; and Bouchez and Roux, op.cit., XXXVIII, p.407.

its availability to all men of talent or courage, it was viewed, not without cause, as contrary to the principle of equality and "la France de Brumaire ne gardait guère d'attachement vif que pour celui de l'Égalité".<sup>82</sup> In the Council of State there was strong opposition to its formation, with a final majority of only four in favour of adoption.<sup>83</sup> Savoye-Rollin and Chauvelin denounced it as counter-revolutionary in the Tribunate; again, only a small majority for the measure was obtained.<sup>84</sup> Under these circumstances, Bonaparte paid tribute to Dumas' persuasive powers when he selected him, in company with Roederer and Marmont, to speak for the government in the Legislature.<sup>85</sup> Roederer and Marmont, in their speeches defending the measure, emphasised that the Legion did not violate equality.<sup>86</sup> Dumas' speech also contained an element of this argument, but his theme was different for he sought to show that:

l'organisation et la composition de la légion d'honneur, sagement combinées avec le caractère national, avec notre situation politique, ne dévient point des principes de notre gouvernement, et atteignent,

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<sup>82</sup>Madelin, op.cit., IV, p.171.

<sup>83</sup>The vote was fourteen to ten with such notables as Lacuée, Emmery, Berlier, Berenger, Thibaudeau, Jolivet, Defermon, Crétet and Réal in opposition. Pierre Louis Roederer, Journal du Comte P. L. Roederer (Paris, 1909), p.123n.

<sup>84</sup>This denunciation was made on 28 Floréal X. The vote was 56 to 38. Aulard, op.cit., p.760 and Dumas, op.cit., III, p.227.

<sup>85</sup>This was especially true as Dumas had been the first objector to the Legion on the grounds that it should be a strictly military body in order to stimulate martial feeling. Roederer, op.cit., p.122n and Durand, op.cit., p.642.

<sup>86</sup>Roederer, op.cit., p.128.

sans l'autre-passer, le but qu'il s'est proposé.<sup>87</sup>

His approach was more positive, seeking to demonstrate the purpose of the Legion through the mode of a classical allusion. Roederer's account of the session indicates that Dumas' tactics met with general success:

Le général Mathieu Dumas en fit . . . une pompe merveilleuse. Il avait trouvé dans le dictionnaire encyclopédique, au mot Honneur, que Marcellus, l'épée de Rome, avait érigé un temple à l'Honneur, où l'on n'arrivait qu'en passant par celui de la vertu; il fit un rapprochement oratoire entre Marcellus, l'épée de Rome, et Napoléon Bonaparte, l'épée de la France, se rencontrant dans la même idée. L'Enthousiasme s'empara de l'assemblée; on battit des mains pendant dix minutes. J'étais persuadé que la loi allait être votée à l'unanimité.<sup>88</sup>

Apparently there was more enthusiasm for the speech than for the law, for there was only a 56 vote majority.<sup>89</sup> Some opposition in republican and royalist circles continued after its adoption by the Legislature. Moreau, for example, parodied the Legion by bestowing "l'ordre de la casserole d'honneur" upon his chief cook, but, on the whole, the institution was quickly accepted.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>Dumas, "Discours Sur la Légion d'Honneur", Paris, 29 Floréal X, p.2, BN 8° Le50 133.

<sup>88</sup>Roederer, op.cit., p.128.

<sup>89</sup>Bouchez and Roux (op.cit., XXXVIII, p.410), Lefebvre (op.cit., p.144) and Dumas (Souvenirs, III, p.234) all agree that the vote was 166 to 110 while Aulard (op.cit., p.760) gives it as 170 to 110. In either case, the result was clearly only a narrow victory for the government.

<sup>90</sup>" . . . la Légion d'honneur ne tarda pas à être acceptée par l'opinion, et ses insignes furent si recherchés que ce fut là pour l'ambition personnelle de Bonaparte un puissant moyen." Aulard, op.cit., p.760. For Moreau's reaction, see Madelin, op.cit., IV, p.173.



Passage of the law proposing the creation of the Legion did not automatically bring it into being. The organisation, administration and finance remained to be considered and these details together with all other matters relating to the Legion were assigned to Dumas:

Il (Bonaparte) me chargea de tous les détails d'exécution; j'en fus occupé jusqu'à l'époque de la rupture du traité d'Amiens; je rédigeais les statuts de l'ordre, je préparais les listes pour les nominations, je composais, de concert avec le directeur général des domaines nationaux, les dotations des cohortes; . . .<sup>91</sup>

Dumas, who knew the system best, described it as almost feudal in nature: "sa formation des cohortes était, il faut en convenir, toute monarchique et presque féodale".<sup>92</sup> In fact, it was more military in its organisation and feudal in its finance. Following the pattern of Roman military nomenclature the basic unit of the Legion was the cohort, consisting initially of 7 grand officers, 20 commanders, 30 officers and 350 légionnaires.<sup>93</sup>

The territory of France was divided into sixteen

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<sup>91</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, pp.234-35. Dumas' claim to have been responsible for the organisation of the Legion is substantiated by the records of the Council of State (AN AF IV 1037). In the records for the Legion only one report from 1801 until 1804 bears a signature other than Dumas'. (Lamarque, "Propositions pour les places des Grandes officiers des seize cohortes de la Légion d'honneur"). However, initially there had been a commission of five (including Dumas) under Cambacérès, which had studied the basis of the Legion.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., III, p.227.

<sup>93</sup>Dumas to Bonaparte, 9 Fructidor XI, p.15, AN AF IV 1037.

cohorts<sup>94</sup> each of which was to have a headquarters or chef-lieu in which the records of that cohort were to be kept, the administration of the cohort was to be conducted, and a hospital for infirm légionnaires was to be established. The choice of location for the chef-lieu was left entirely to Dumas - with the proviso that wherever possible it should be located near a large city, preferably a prefecture or other administrative centre.<sup>95</sup> The choice of the chef-lieu along these guidelines appeared deceptively easy, but much consideration had to be given to each choice. In one report, three classes of location were identified: "1° ceux qui offroient évidemment la plupart des avantages désirables . . ." such as Fontainebleau and Chambord; "2° les chef-lieux relativement aux quels il était déjà parvenir des objections" such as the ecclesiastical sites at Arras and Toul, and "3° lieux dont on n'avait encore qu'une connaissance bien imparfait" such as at Narbonne and Nîmes.<sup>96</sup>

Choosing the chef-lieu for each cohort was difficult enough, but Dumas had an even more complex assignment to pursue simultaneously. Rather than pay the costs of the

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<sup>94</sup>As conceived there were 16 cohorts, not 15 as stated in Aulard (op.cit., p.759) and Lefebvre (op.cit., p.134) the difference in the figures probably resulting from the exclusion of a cohort based upon Turin. Dumas definitely reports "La division du territoire de la République entre les seize cohortes de la légion . . ." Dumas to Bonaparte, op.cit., p.1.

<sup>95</sup>Dumas, "Rapport sur quelques objets préparés pour l'organisation de la Légion d'Honneur", 2 Frimaire, XI, AN AF IV 1037.

<sup>96</sup>Dumas, "Rapport Sur le Choix des Chef-Lieux", nd, AN AF IV 1037.

Legion directly out of the national treasury, the First Consul had decided to attach "Biens Nationaux" to each cohort sufficient to provide revenue to meet all expenses that cohort incurred. The task of identifying available "Biens Nationaux" and then allocating a sufficient number of them to each cohort was also Dumas'. There were two classes of "Biens Nationaux" available: the confiscated property of the nobility, which were referred to as "biens" of the first origin and the confiscated property of the clergy which formed the second origin. Each class presented problems of identification, for many of the returned émigrés had reclaimed or were in the process of reclaiming their former possessions, while much of the ecclesiastical property had been sold or allocated to the support of various institutions.<sup>97</sup> Ultimately, through lands providing a net rent of 3,574,947 francs 24.5 centimes assembled in 16,342 articles, each cohort was provided with a revenue of between 100,000 and 500,000 francs.<sup>98</sup>

The parallel between the nobility of the Empire and the hierarchy of the Legion is now apparent. The Légion

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<sup>97</sup>Dumas, "Rapport Sur les Domaines Nationaux Réservés", 2 Thermidor X, AN AF IV 1037.

<sup>98</sup>Dumas, "Correspondance avec Napoléon Sur la Légion d'Honneur", n.d., and "Rapport Sur les Domaines Nationaux Réservés", n.d., AN AF IV 1037. The total rents revenue raised eventually rose to 4,679,257 francs.

of Honour represented a form of collective nobility, with each cohort representing a sort of noble family, exercising authority over a fixed area of the Republic and in return receiving revenues from the lands surrounding its *chef-lieu*. At the apex of the Legion stood future Grand Dignitaries of the Empire. For example, Marshal Berthier's imperial position as Prince of Neuchâtel with the administration and revenue of that principality, had its republican equivalent in his command of the First Cohort, with collective authority and revenues from the lands in the area of Paris.<sup>99</sup> While the other Princes of the Empire carried titles which did not convey territorial authority, each did receive the rents from various lands assigned to them in the manner of the Legion's system rather than grants from the French treasury.<sup>100</sup>

This system of financing had more than just a parallel in the creation of "Sénatoreries" in the year XII. At St. Cloud, Napoleon remarked on the completed table for the Legion's finances:

Ceci est trop beau et trop considérable pour la Légion d'Honneur. Je veux relever le sénat par la puissance des richesses, former des sénatoreries, et leur donner des grandes dotations territoriales.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.235.

<sup>100</sup>The Prince-Marshal's were often given titles reflecting their military glory, such as Davout's title of Prince of Eckmühl, Masséna's of Prince of Essling, and Ney's of Prince of the Moskowa. Eugene Bèuharnais, Talleyrand, Bernadotte, Murat and Joseph, Jerome and Louis Bonaparte were all granted territorial titles.

<sup>101</sup>Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.237.

According to Dumas, the great endowments of land granted to the leading Senators of France were derived directly from the lands which had been assembled for the Legion of Honour. This statement is substantiated by reports made in Floréal XII on projects for creating "Sénatoreries", which reveal that the same classes of land identified for the Legion of Honour were also utilized for the "Sénatoreries",<sup>102</sup> and by comparison of the sixteen "Sénatoreries" with the sixteen projected cohorts.<sup>103</sup>

Dumas also had a direct influence upon the extent of the administrative functions of each cohort. Besides the regulatory powers over its own members and the provisions for care of the infirm, he proposed two additional functions. The more important of these was for the Legion to establish and maintain five large stud farms and eleven depots of stallions - either one or the other in the territory of each cohort.<sup>104</sup> It is easy to underestimate the importance of

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<sup>102</sup>Dumas, "Rapport pour la Commission de Sénatoreries", Floréal XII, AN AF IV 1041. There were four classes in all: (1) émigré lands over 300 acres (arpents); (2) ecclesiastical property such as hospitals, churches and former buildings of religious orders; (3) lands reclaimed by the communes; and (4) the land surrounding fortifications. Only the first two classes were utilized for the Legion and for Sénatoreries.

<sup>103</sup>The cohorts were: Paris, Douay, Brussels, Cologne, Nancy, Dijon, Lyons, Aix, Nîmes, Bordeaux, Poitiers, Rennes, Chambord and Turin. The Sénatoreries were Aix, Amiens, Bordeaux, Brussels, Caen, Douay, Grenoble, Liège, Metz, Orleans, Poitiers, Toulouse, Treves and Turin. Cf. Tableau des Sénatoreries, 17 Pluviôse XII, AN AF IV 1041.

<sup>104</sup>Dumas, "Rapport et Projet d'Arrêté Sur l'Établissement, le Service, l'Administration et l'Inspection Générale des Haras par la Légion d'Honneur", 18 Frimaire XI, AN AF IV 1037. In all, Dumas prepared four separate reports on the subject of stud farms.



this function of the Legion - even if the ubiquitous nature of the horse in warfare is remembered - unless it is remembered that throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars the French army never had sufficient mounts for its cavalry, artillery and train.<sup>105</sup> Therefore, despite several strong objections, this measure was incorporated,<sup>106</sup> as was the second, less important, proposal that the fourth and sixteenth cohorts be made responsible for the camps of veterans located within their territory.<sup>107</sup>


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<sup>105</sup>The question of the limitations imposed upon the French army by its shortage of horses has never been fully examined. An indication of the extent of the problem can be obtained by studying Bonaparte's reorganisation of the Republic's cavalry forces in 1802. Prior to this date, there were 25 heavy cavalry regiments and 20 dragoon regiments but there was no real difference in either the size or the armament of these units. Bonaparte concentrated the heaviest men and horses into 14 truly heavy regiments (12 of cuirassiers to whom he restored the steel cuirass and 2 of carabiniers) which became the reserve cavalry. The remainder became the light and the line cavalry. In the following 15 years of warfare only two new regiments of heavy horse were raised because the heavy horses necessary were bred only in Normandy or in Germany. In 1803, 20 regiments of line horse were without mounts and the cavalry arm received its full allotment of horses only when those captured from the Austrians at Ulm were distributed to the various units. Cf. Sir Charles Oman, Studies in the Napoleonic Wars (London, 1929), pp.232-244.

<sup>106</sup>In a letter to the First Consul dated 21 Frimaire XI (AN AF IV 1037) Dumas mentions that there were "plusieurs objections solides et quelques unes très spécieuses" but does not identify what they were. However, administrative difficulties and physical danger to inspectors in Brittany are referred to in "Notes Pour Servir à La Discussion Sur les Harras de la Légion d'Honneur", nd, AN AF IV 1037.

<sup>107</sup>Dumas to Bonaparte, 9 Germinal an 7 and Dumas, "Articles à Insérer dans le Projet d'Arrêté Relatif à l'Organisation des Camps de Vétérans", nd, AN AF IV 1037.

When it was decided that the members of the Legion of Honour were to be accorded marks of distinction (originally the Legion had been conceived of strictly as an assemblage of citizens and not as an award so that no insignia was proposed)<sup>108</sup> Dumas was given this assignment as well. In this instance, however, his suggestions were rejected outright by the First Consul,<sup>109</sup> perhaps fortuitously, because he had produced the two rather unimpressive designs, "en argent avec le soleil en or frappé et sur les deux façons,"<sup>110</sup> reproduced below:



<sup>108</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.134.

<sup>109</sup>Dumas, "Note des objets dont le 1<sup>er</sup> Consul m'a ordonné de m'occuper à la suite de son travail du 19 fructidor", nd, AN AF IV 1037.

<sup>110</sup>Dumas, "Projet Marques Distinctives pour les divers grades de la Légion d'honneur", nd, AN AF IV 1037.



Dumas mentions in his Souvenirs that he had had hopes of becoming the first Grand Chancellor of the Legion.<sup>111</sup> He had a strong claim inasmuch as no other member of the government, civilian or military, had been so intimately involved with its creation. But, according to him, the First Consul had resolved upon granting that honour to a civilian and so appointed senator Lacépède Grand Chancellor and Dejean Grand Treasurer.<sup>112</sup> With the exception of the portfolio of "Biens Nationaux", which went to senator Barthélemy, who was president of the commission on "Sénatoreries",<sup>113</sup> all Dumas' reports and papers concerning the state of the Legion were surrendered to these two men in 1803. As a reward for his services in creating the Legion, Dumas was offered the post of Minister of War to Tuscany, then known as the Kingdom of Etruria, but, wishing instead to rejoin the army which was then preparing for the invasion of England, Dumas refused the honour. On 11 Fructidor XI (29 August 1803) he was appointed chief of staff to the camp at Bruges.<sup>114</sup> Appointment to this camp brought him

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<sup>111</sup>Loc.cit., III, p.236.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., III, p.237.

<sup>113</sup>In addition to surrendering his papers, Dumas also prepared a "Mémoire Pour le Grand Conseil d'Administration de la Légion d'Honneur" (contained in Dumas to Bonaparte, 9 Fructidor XI, AN AF IV 1037) which presented a detailed summary of the organisation and responsibilities of the Legion.

<sup>114</sup>Ministre de la Guerre: Général Mathieu Dumas nommé chef d'état-major du camp de Bruges, 11 Fructidor XI. AHG C<sup>2</sup>\* 213\* (Correspondance Militaire du Camp de Bruges 1803-1805). His stated desire to rejoin the army was genuine, as he had yet to be restored to his full former rank, but his family was also an inducement - "Ma famille, et particulièrement Madame Dumas, ressentit plus que moi cette espèce de désappointement", Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.236.

under the command of Marshal Davout, one of the most intelligent and successful of all the Empire's generals<sup>115</sup> and it provided considerable opportunity for personal initiative because of the extended territory encompassed by Davout's command.<sup>116</sup>

As these camps (there were four in all) or corps d'armée were in effect miniature armies themselves, capable of prolonged independent action, they were organised along a pattern similar to that of the entire French army. Dumas' position as chief of staff, therefore, corresponded directly with the position of Marshal Berthier in the Grande Armée. Thus, although Dumas was only a brigadier general and so two ranks beneath his old comrade, in function he was but one grade lower.<sup>117</sup> In many ways, Dumas held the more challenging position, for Bonaparte often acted as his own

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<sup>115</sup>Louis Nicolas Davout, born 10 May 1770, entered military service as a cadet at l'Ecole Militaire on 29 September 1785. His most outstanding military success came at Auerstadt in 1806 when, with only 26,000 men, he defeated 70,000 Prussians led by the Duke of Brunswick and the King in person. General Fuller considered that he was "probably the ablest of Napoleon's generals". General J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World (3 vols., London, 1965), II, p.437.

<sup>116</sup>Third corps, as Davout's camp was renamed, was to embark in a Dutch flotilla under the command of Admiral Verhuel. As these boats had to sail from Flushing along the coast to the ports of embarkation (Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Vemereux and Saint Valery) the corps and Dumas in particular had the added responsibility of directing their movements.

<sup>117</sup>The staff was organised according to Capt. Hall "on the same lines as Napoleon's own, being very similar in composition to the staff of an army corps today", Ronald Alcott Hall, Studies in Napoleonic Strategy (London, 1918) p.71.

chief of staff,<sup>118</sup> reducing Berthier's role to that of chief clerk, while Davout and the other corps commanders did not usurp the responsibilities of their staff officers.

Comparison between Dumas and Berthier, in the exercise of generalship, is also revealing. During the campaign of 1800 each was chief of staff to an Army of Reserve,<sup>119</sup> each was responsible for its organisation and then each participated in a crossing of the Alps. In marked contrast to Dumas' initiative and resourcefulness, Berthier's performance was lamentable. He began by entirely misunderstanding the nature of the campaign and thereby misdirecting the march of the advance guard. Later, as the army advanced over Great St. Bernard Pass, to quote Sir John Adye, he "in particular, appears to have had little foresight or initiative and to be prone to despairing generalities".<sup>120</sup> Berthier's greater reward after the campaign is attributable to two factors: his closer and more lengthy service with Bonaparte<sup>121</sup> and the First Consul's continued distrust of Dumas' political loyalty.<sup>122</sup> In this latter respect, the

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<sup>118</sup>Hall, op.cit., p.72; Merlier, op.cit., p.209.

<sup>119</sup>Berthier's title was commander-in-chief, however, because Bonaparte, the actual commander, was constitutionally unable to command an army.

<sup>120</sup>Adye, op.cit., p.117.

<sup>121</sup>On the former point, Fain (op.cit., pp.296-97) observed that "Il était attaché à ses vieux serviteurs, à ses vieux compagnons, comme à ses vieux habits" . . . "Il avait horreur du changement, craignait les nouvelles figures et tenait singulièrement à conserver tous les hommes qui s'étaient formés sous son ombre."

<sup>122</sup>See infra, Chapter VIII.



death of General Dessaix at Marengo may well have damaged Dumas' career, for Dessaix was both known and trusted by Dumas and Bonaparte. Dessaix knew, if anyone did, the extent of Dumas' involvement with the royalists. Had he lived he certainly would have been made a Marshal and might well have carried Dumas' fortunes forward with his own. Yet such was Dumas' capacity that even without the unreserved trust of Napoleon, he was to play a prominent role in the fortunes of the Empire.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE EMPIRE

By the Constitution of 28 Floréal XII (18 May 1804), the government of the Republic was entrusted to an hereditary emperor - Napoleon I. In his capacity as a member of the Council of State, Dumas was present at Notre Dame on 2 December 1804 for the coronation. He had been in Paris, on leave, since November in order to attend the wedding of Cornelia to M. de Saint-Didier.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor showed his appreciation for Dumas' services by appointing his new son-in-law Préfet du Palais, a post which he was to retain throughout the course of the Empire.<sup>2</sup>

Joseph Bonaparte, as head of the family, was offered the iron crown of Lombardy because Napoleon considered that it was inconsistent to be at once Emperor of the French and President of the Italian Republic.<sup>3</sup> However, Joseph

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<sup>1</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.244. Alexandre Charles Nicolas de Saint-Didier was in Dumas' words: "l'aîné de deux frères d'une ancienne et très-honorable famille de Provence. Madame Dumas m'avait proposé cette union, qu'elle souhaitait fort, et que j'approuvai avec empressement".

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. He was made a Baron of the Empire on 12 November 1809.

<sup>3</sup>A major reason for offering the crown first to Joseph and then to Louis' (Bonaparte) son was the desire not to offend Austrian sensibilities and fears that Italy would be absorbed into France. Thus after his brother's refusal, Napoleon sent to Vienna (1 January 1805) an assurance that the new kingdom would be kept forever distinct from the French Empire. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.192.

adamantly refused this honour as its acceptance would have entailed his forfeiture to any claims on the imperial throne - a sacrifice he was not prepared to make while Napoleon remained childless.<sup>4</sup> But had Joseph accepted, he would have appointed Mathieu Dumas to be one of his chamberlains, as indeed he did the following year when he accepted the throne of Naples.<sup>5</sup> Joseph first worked with Dumas on the presentation of the Legion of Honour to the Legislature and it appears that he was particularly impressed with his capabilities in the areas of organisation and administration - areas where his own interest and ability lay. In May of 1805, he selected Dumas to accompany his tour of Belgium and the northeastern ports of France to inspect the preparations for the invasion of England.<sup>6</sup> Later that same year, as the Grand Army sped eastwards towards the Austrians, Joseph became the acting ruler of France in his brother's absence. In this role it was absolutely vital that he should have accurate and detailed information on the progress of the campaign. Much of this Napoleon himself supplied in his instructions to Joseph, but as these were not sufficiently comprehensive, Dumas was authorised by Joseph to provide him with a

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.247; Fain, op.cit., p.198. The chamberlains of the princes and princesses all had the rank of chamberlain of the Imperial Court.

<sup>6</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.244. Joseph was colonel of the 4th regiment of infantry.

detailed summary of the campaigns.<sup>7</sup>

Napoleon too was disposed to make personal use of Dumas' abilities in 1805. He initially wished him to return to the Council of State, but yielded to Dumas' request that he be allowed to resume his duties with III corps.<sup>8</sup> On the recommendation of Marshal Davout, Dumas was restored to his full rank of lieutenant general on 1 February 1805.<sup>9</sup> He continued to serve under Davout until the opening of the land campaign when, together with General Andréossy, he was appointed to the functions of aide-major général of the army under the immediate orders of Marshal Berthier.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Lettres du Général Mathieu Dumas à Son Altesse Impériale le Prince Joseph - Pendant la Campagne de la Grande Armée en 1805, AHG C<sup>2</sup>\* 233. In all, there are three complete letters and the notes for a fourth comprising a narrative of over sixty pages. None of Joseph's replies have been preserved, but the third letter makes specific reference to "la lettre dont V.A. a daigné m'honorer en date de 12 de cette mois" (p.13) so the correspondence was clearly not all one way. Joseph may also have been influenced in this choice of Dumas by the reputation the first volumes of the Précis enjoyed. Napoleon himself, Dumas reports, was favourably impressed and offered to put the army records at his disposal. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.225.

<sup>8</sup>"Le Général Dumas auquel l'Empereur a dit de travailler à la section de la guerre, demande s'il doit se rendre au camp de Bruge." Extrait des Demandes fait à l'Empereur, 25 Nivôse XIII, AAG 395 (approved on 27 Nivôse).

<sup>9</sup>Pension Militaire, op.cit. N.B. Under the Empire only Marshal Berthier (Soult in 1815) as chief of staff held the rank of major general. All other general officers, even those in command of corps d'armée, were lieutenant generals (generals of division).

<sup>10</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.252.

The G.Q.G. (Grand-Quartier-Général) of the Grand Army was by this time divided into three distinct parts.<sup>11</sup> The first and most important section was the Maison of the Emperor - Napoleon and his immediate entourage, including Berthier. Berthier and four secretaries comprised the second, known as the *État-Major particulier du major-général*. Finally, there was the *État-Major Général* proper, further sub-divided into two (later three) sections, headed respectively by Dumas and Andréossy. While the Maison and the *État-Major particulier* functioned largely as instruments for issuing the Emperor's orders, the third division performed the majority of the true staff work:

Deux aides-majors-généraux furent principalement employés sous les ordres du major-général: l'un, avec le titre de chef de l'état-major-général, était chargé de centraliser tous les rapports, de diriger et de surveiller, par l'intermédiaire des chefs d'état-major des corps d'armée, tous les détails du service; l'autre, avec le titre de maréchal-général-des-logis, fut chargé des reconnaissances, de l'ouverture des marches, et de tout ce qui était relatif aux mouvements. Le premier de ces emplois fut confié au général Andréossy; le second au général Mathieu Dumas.<sup>12</sup>

During the course of the campaigns, Dumas performed several missions of note. At Ulm, he was responsible for

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<sup>11</sup>The organisation of the imperial general staff is discussed in detail in Chandler, *op.cit.*, pp.367-374 and Georges Merlier, "L'Etat-Major de la Grande Armée", *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, édition Française, (no. 30, 1970), pp.195-213. For the functions of the staff considered by a contemporary, see Marshal Laurent Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, *Considérations Sur l'Organisation des États-Majors de l'Armée* (Paris, 1820).

<sup>12</sup>Dumas, *Précis*, XII, p.138.



the arrangements of the Austrian surrender, including the removal of prisoners and disposal of captured arms and equipment.<sup>13</sup> Prior to the battle of Austerlitz, he was sent with a squadron of dragoons to make absolutely sure that the Austro-Russian army was not intending to march off towards Vienna in an effort to unite with the army of Archduke Charles, then moving up from Italy.<sup>14</sup> In preparation for a third campaign, should Austria have wished to continue the struggle from Hungary, Dumas was instructed to draw up the marches of the army in pursuit.<sup>15</sup>

The surrender of Austria brought Dumas no respite. By the terms of the treaty of Pressbourg (26 December 1805), as part of the settlement in Italy, Dalmatia and Istria became part of the French Empire. On 9 January 1806, Dumas received the order:

de se rendre en Italie, et aussitôt que les Français seront en possession de l'Istrie et de la Dalmatie, de se transporter dans cette dernière province, pour en faire la reconnaissance sous les rapports militaires et administratifs; il fera un mémoire sur la situation actuelle de cette province, et sur les projets d'amélioration dont elle est susceptible.<sup>16</sup>

By 17 January he had reached Venice and after assisting

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<sup>13</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.254.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., III, p.264.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., III, p.271. Immediately the battle finished, he had been instructed to collect those troops which had become separated from their units and to reorganise them. Napoleon to Dumas, 13 Frimaire XIII, Dumas, Précis, XIV, p.294.

<sup>16</sup>Napoleon to Dumas, Schoenbrunn, 9 January 1806, Dumas, Précis, XV, p.363.

General Lauriston prepare for Eugene's state entry, he departed by sea for Zara, the capital of Dalmatia.<sup>17</sup>

Dumas' mission to Dalmatia was destined to be brief.

Having just signed a carefully prepared convention with the Marquis Ghisiliéry, the Austrian minister, for the transfer of the provinces to France, he was forced to witness, impotently, the seizure of a principal fortress, Bocche di Cattaro, by a Russian army with the aid of its Austrian garrison.<sup>18</sup> No sooner had he begun a preliminary reconnaissance than orders from the Emperor arrived, directing him to proceed without delay to Italy.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Dumas to Prince Eugene, Vice-Roi of Italy, Venice, 17 January 1806, PU State Papers of Eugene Beauharnais (hereinafter referred to as Beauharnais MSS). Cf. Dumas, *Souvenirs*, III, p.280.

<sup>18</sup>" . . . je me bornerai à mettre sous ses yeux la motte officielle que je viens de recevoir de M<sup>r</sup>. le M<sup>is</sup> de Ghisiliéry: j'espère que son intervention suffira pour faire cesser cette violation de territoire si injurieuse à la cour de Vienne . . ." The text of the convention, signed on 9 February 1806, is included in this letter. Dumas to Prince Eugene, Zara, 18 February 1806, PU Beauharnais MSS. Cf. Dumas, *Souvenirs*, III, p.281.

<sup>19</sup>Despite the premature and precipitous conclusion of this mission, Dumas was able to prepare two reports containing his observations on the country and proposals for its administration totaling over forty pages: "Reconnaissance de la Dalmatie" and "Notes Historiques et Politiques sur le Montenegro" (both filed AHG MR 1617). In the former report (p.5) he mentions that: "J'ai reçu en passant à Capo d'Istria les nouveaux ordres de son altesse Imp. Monseig<sup>r</sup> le prince Eugene qui me transmet ceux de votre Majesté pour que je me rende, sans délai, auprès des S.A.I.M. le Prince Joseph . . ." According to Dumas' letter to Prince Eugene of 18 February 1806 (PU Beauharnais MSS) these orders reached him at Fiume but he delayed his compliance ostensibly because of the difficulties arising over the Russian seizure of Cattaro.

The treaty of Pressbourg had also sanctioned the expulsion of the Bourbons from the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and it recognized Joseph Bonaparte as the King of Naples.<sup>20</sup> Naples in 1806 was the most important and prestigious territory at Napoleon's disposal and it was for this reason that it had been offered to Joseph. Its value was chiefly derived from its being an old and established kingdom and from its location, which made it a vital element in Napoleon's Mediterranean strategy.<sup>21</sup> Naples was, however, one of the poorest states of Europe and one of the most backward. Of a population estimated at five million, nearly three and a half million were still under feudal jurisdiction and two million of these were controlled by only 60 of the 600 titled families.<sup>22</sup> Participation in the revolutionary wars after 1793 created a grave financial crisis, culminating in the failure of the bank of Naples in 1799, from which the country had not recovered. To some extent this crisis was beneficial to the French because it prepared the way for the destruction of the feudal order and made reforms both necessary and welcome.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Joseph accepted the crown of Naples only because Napoleon had guaranteed his right of succession to the imperial throne. Owen Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms (New York, 1965), p.61.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p.68.

<sup>22</sup>Pasquale Villani, "Le Royaume de Naples, Pendant la Dominion Française", AHRF (XLIV, 1972), p.67.

<sup>23</sup>"Le terrain était déblayé, préparé, dirai-je, pour recevoir les nouvelles fondations; il restait à commencer la construction du nouvel édifice." *Ibid.*, p.70.

A dedicated liberal, Joseph was intelligent and desirous of Naples' best interests. Although he may have lacked the ruthlessness, training and endurance of a great ruler, he devoted as much as four or five hours a day to state business and presided over his Council of State personally and such was the state of affairs that his effect upon the country was immediate and salutary.<sup>24</sup> Government was reorganised along French lines for greater efficiency. The numerous taxes of the ancien régime were replaced by a single tax on land and one on industry, with the result that the public debt was reduced from over 100 million ducats to 59 million by 1808.<sup>25</sup> Feudalism was abolished and agriculture reformed, but Joseph did not promulgate the Code Napoléon despite his brother's pressure to do so, because he felt that such sweeping changes should come gradually and only when the people were prepared for them.<sup>26</sup> With the army, Joseph had less success, but this was due more to the stress of war and the policies of Napoleon than to any shortcomings of either the

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<sup>24</sup>Dumas was very favourably impressed by Joseph's reign. He considered him to be a good and capable ruler: ". . . ce prince travailla avec ardeur à féconder tous les germes de prospérité que la nature verse à pleines mains sur ce beau pays; son goût pour les plaisirs, qu'on s'est plu à exagérer, ne l'éloigna jamais de ses devoirs et du soin des affaires; . . ." Dumas, Précis, XV, p.180.

<sup>25</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., pp.442-443; Villani, op.cit., p.72. Cf. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.294 and "Note sur l'introduction des institutions françaises et l'administration du royaume de Naples, par le roi Joseph Napoléon", Précis, XV, pp.361-371.

<sup>26</sup>Connolly, op.cit., p.69; Lefebvre, p.443.

King or his Ministers of War.

Despite his brother's invention of a military record of which he later grew to be very proud, Joseph Napoleon, as he was soon to style himself (at his brother's request), came to the throne with virtually no military experience.<sup>27</sup> The selection of his advisors was for this reason a matter of great importance. As early as January 1806, Joseph had written to Napoleon requesting "que votre majesté m'envoyât le Général Dumas et le Colonel du 10<sup>e</sup>, Cavaignac, et le colonel Blagnac, les trois seuls officiers militaires que votre majesté m'ait donnés."<sup>28</sup> Napoleon replied that Dumas had already been assigned to Dalmatia, and that he doubted if he would be as useful as Joseph thought because "il n'a pas l'expérience de la guerre".<sup>29</sup> Finally, however, Napoleon granted Joseph's request,<sup>30</sup> but the King of Naples continued to refer to Dumas' absence in his reports:

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<sup>27</sup>"To justify Joseph's nomination to the senate, Napoleon recorded that he had been a battalion commander at Toulon (1793), had served as a staff officer in Italy (1796-1797) and had a wound. Actually, Joseph had no military experience." Connelly, op.cit., p.58.

<sup>28</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, January 1806, cited in Joseph Bonaparte, Mémoires et Correspondance Politique et Militaire du Roi Joseph, ed. by A. du Casse (3 vols., Paris, 1855), I, p.361. (Hereinafter referred to as du Casse).

<sup>29</sup>Napoleon to Joseph, Paris, 7 February 1806, *ibid.*, II, p.56. Although it is undoubtedly true that Dumas had not much combat experience he did enjoy an immense reputation as an organiser: "il vint de là à Naples, précédé d'une réputation immense: son oeuvre ministérielle n'en fut pas indigne", Jacques Rambaud, Naples Sous Joseph Bonaparte, 1806-1808 (Paris, 1911), p.236.

<sup>30</sup>Napoleon to Joseph, Paris, 2 March 1806, du Casse, op.cit., II, p.87.



J'ai beaucoup de peine à maintenir l'ordre; quelques personnes voudraient faire vite leur fortune aux dépens du pays, de l'armée et des entrepreneurs. Je regrette beaucoup Dumas, Saligny et Mathieu; leur attachement pour moi me répondait de leur honnêteté autant que leur caractère personnel.<sup>31</sup>

In his final letter to Napoleon before Dumas' arrival, Joseph expressed the intention that "c'est lui (sic. Dumas) ou Reynier qu'il me faudrait pour chef d'état-major".<sup>32</sup> This was potentially the most important military office in the kingdom because it was the sole link between the French army of occupation in Naples and the Neapolitan Army proper.<sup>33</sup> Unfortunately for the coordination of the two, Joseph, on imperial orders, appointed neither Dumas nor Reynier but Caesar Berthier,<sup>34</sup> under whom the post became no more than a "chef de bureau", and whose relations with Joseph were often strained.

le chef d'état-major se plaint de connaître ce qui se passe dans les différents corps et services qu'indirectement ou pas du tout, effet de "liberté que votre majesté a accordée aux généraux, aux

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<sup>31</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 7 March 1806, *ibid.*, II, p.93. See also Joseph to Napoleon, San Germano, 11 February, *ibid.*, II, p.64.

<sup>32</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 14 March 1806, *ibid.*, II, p.109.

<sup>33</sup>The commanders of the French army (which, with 40,000 men, was far larger than the Neapolitan), especially Marshal Massena, although nominally under Joseph's command, were reluctant to accept orders from a civilian. Connolly, *op.cit.*, p.72. Cf. James Marshal-Cornwall, Marshal Massena (Oxford, 1965).

<sup>34</sup>Caesar was the brother of Napoleon's chief of staff but did not share his brother's capabilities. Rambeau (*op.cit.*, p.248) described him as "dépensier, léger et fat, trop souvent occupé de ses galanteries et de ses dettes".

colonels et aux administrateurs, de s'adresse directement à elle sans s'être adressés au chef de l'état-major général".<sup>35</sup>

Instead of becoming chief of staff, Reynier was given the command of a corps d'armée, and as soon as Dumas arrived he was appointed Minister of War, replacing Miot who, in turn, became Minister of the Interior.<sup>36</sup>

As minister, Dumas was responsible for the Neapolitan army alone, altogether a large enough task in itself.<sup>37</sup> Despite a superabundance of officers,<sup>38</sup> Dumas' major problem was a shortage of manpower caused primarily by a high desertion rate (e.g. of 4,365 drafts taken in 1807, only 2,800 were still in the ranks a year later) and aggravated by Joseph's reduction in the numbers of men conscripted from eight men per thousand per year under the Bourbons to only one per thousand per year.<sup>39</sup> This was a problem Dumas was able to only partially overcome by sending the conscripts north to Mantua or Verona in the Kingdom of Italy under an armed escort, thereby making desertion more difficult at the time when it was most likely

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.248, citing C. Berthier to Joseph, 25 June 1806, AN F<sup>40</sup>88310.

<sup>36</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 30 March 1806, du Casse, op.cit., II, p.119.

<sup>37</sup>The archives of Naples were destroyed during the Second World War. However, a considerable amount of material, stored in France, has survived, including Joseph's correspondence (AHG C<sup>51</sup>) and the papers of the Etat-Major of the French army of occupation (AN AF \* IV 1436 to 1438, January 1806 - June 1807).

<sup>38</sup>"Il était de toute impossibilité de fournir des emplois à tous les Napolitains: au 1<sup>er</sup> Janvier 1807 il y avait encore en non-activité douze cents officiers." Rambaud, op.cit., p.227.

<sup>39</sup>Connelly, op.cit., p.88.

to occur. He claims in his Souvenirs<sup>40</sup> to have formed four new regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, but this is deceptive for by the end of Joseph's reign there were in existence only one infantry regiment of native troops plus four additional battalions serving in Spain, while the remainder of the Neapolitan army consisted of foreign regiments.<sup>41</sup>

As for operations, the French army, assisted by the few regular Neapolitan troops, pursued guerilla bands<sup>42</sup> and conducted the regular operations, such as the siege of Gaëte, but "les provinces rapidement parcourues étaient mal soumises".<sup>43</sup> In order to provide for the effective enforcement of the government's will, Dumas organised a Provincial Guard modelled on the National Guard. One regiment was formed in each province with command given to the sons of the local nobility in an effort to obtain their

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<sup>40</sup>Dumas, loc.cit., III, p.294.

<sup>41</sup>Connelly, op.cit., p.87. Rambaud (op.cit., p.265) adds that this was true too of the French army of occupation at the time: "Dans l'armée d'invasion (sic. of Sicily) il y avait sept régiments Italiens, deux régiments Polonais, un bataillon Suisse, des nègres, deux régiments étrangers, formés de gens de toute nation . . .".

<sup>42</sup>These guerilla bands were supposedly royalist and anti-French but they were really little more than bandits, as often as not attacking, robbing and murdering their own people. For this reason the general population remained apathetic and the guerillas few in number. Connelly, op.cit., p.63. Cf. Dumas, Précis, XV, pp.25f.

<sup>43</sup>Dumas, op.cit., XV, p.137.

support.<sup>44</sup> Later, Coast Guards and Coastal Gunners were also formed to aid in the patrolling and the defence of the kingdom's extensive coastline.<sup>45</sup>

Extensive changes were made by Dumas in the administration of the army. The École Militaire was re-established, arsenals and gun foundries re-opened and throughout the system French regulations were introduced. He made one notable innovation for greater efficiency by combining the functions of the commissaries of war, who were responsible for the supply of the army, and the inspectors of reviews, who were responsible for its administration, under the denomination of military intendants - an arrangement later copied in France.<sup>46</sup> The supply system, too, was overhauled. To end the necessity for foraging and to remedy the chronic shortages of food and fodder, Reynier was made "Administrateur Général des Subsistances".<sup>47</sup> From an administrative standpoint, Dumas' ministry marked the

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<sup>44</sup>In his instructions to General Bron de Bailly, one of the Military Commandants, Dumas mentions that the Provincial Guard will be placed at his disposal "comme force publique employée à maintenir la tranquillité intérieure". Dumas to Bron de Bailly, Naples, 2 April 1806, AN 178 AP 3 (André François Bron de Bailly). Cf. letters of 31 May, 18 June and 30 June 1806.

<sup>45</sup>Dumas to Bron de Bailly, Naples, 11 July 1806, AN 178 AP 3.

<sup>46</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.296.

<sup>47</sup>This appointment was made on 6 June 1806. Cf. Dumas to Reynier, Naples, 6 June 1806 and 18 August 1806, and Dumas, Instructions Pour Monsieur le Commissaire Civil, Naples, nd, AN 211 AP 1 (Jean Louis Antoine Reynier).

high point of Joseph's reign and established a firm base for the army's future expansion. Jacques Rambaud summarized:

. . . à peu près limité au rôle d'administrateur, où il excellait: c'est lui, bien que son ministère corresponde à la période des plus grandes opérations, qui mettra sur pied le gros des forces napolitaines, donnera l'impulsion aux gardes provinciales; il cherchera à faire vivre l'armée régulièrement, tentera de substituer aux entreprises la régie.<sup>48</sup>

Joseph, as witnessed by his correspondence with Napoleon, fully supported the actions of his Minister of War:

Je prends pour cela le parti de tout centraliser sous la surveillance du ministre de la guerre, les manufactures d'armes, fabrication de poudre, habillement, solde, etc., sans quoi tout ici était désordre. Je suis content du général Dumas, c'est un homme honnête, et c'est bien précieux.<sup>49</sup>

The two men also appear to have become friends on a personal level. Both shared an interest in antiquity and in archaeology. When Joseph made his tour of Calabria, Dumas accompanied him and the two spent as much time examining the excavations of Pompeii as they did the fortifications of Castellammare.<sup>50</sup>

However, on 15 April 1807 it was announced that Christophe Saliceti, the Minister of Police, was to be the new Minister

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<sup>48</sup>Rambaud, op.cit., p.248.

<sup>49</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 16 May 1806, du Casse, op.cit., II, p.238. In 1807, when Caesar Berthier was called to the Grande Armée, Joseph again proposed that Dumas be made chief of staff with his ministry going to Marshal Jourdan. Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 24 January 1807, ibid., III, p.296.

<sup>50</sup>Connelly, op.cit., p.71. Dumas describes this journey in his Souvenirs, III, p.299. While in Dalmatia, Dumas had visited the Palace of Dioclesian and remarked upon discovering a milestone of the 9th Legion (Souvenirs, III, p.283).



of War.<sup>51</sup> Saliceti replaced General Jacques Philippe d'Arcambal, an interim minister, appointed in March when Dumas departed for Paris on official leave in order to attend the death bed of his wife.<sup>52</sup> Dumas attributed his replacement to Saliceti's desire to be rid of police matters and to increase his influence.<sup>53</sup> But Dumas' explanation is far from complete for, to begin with, Saliceti did not cease his role as Minister of Police; he was far too valuable and too proficient to lose.<sup>54</sup> Instead, the two ministries were combined in his person, and in most technical matters regarding the Ministry of War he relied heavily upon the advice of either Dumas or Marshal Jourdan. Nor does Dumas explain Joseph's motives for agreeing to Saliceti's overtures. If Joseph were pleased with Dumas'

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<sup>51</sup>André Francois Miot, Count de Mélito, *Mémoires du Comte Miot de Mélito* (3 vols., Paris, 1858), II, p.339.

<sup>52</sup>Dumas had not seen his wife since departing for the campaign of 1805. He had wished her to join him in Naples, but she refused to leave her eldest daughter, Cornelia. When Julia died, on 26 March 1807, Dumas returned to Naples with Octavia, now eighteen, leaving his son, Christian (age seven) in Cornelia's care. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.304.

<sup>53</sup>"... je ne fus point étonné que Saliceti, pour se débarrasser des détails dégoûtants de la police, et pour accroître son influence dans les affaires, eût profité de mon absence pour convaincre le roi qu'en mettant entre ses mains la disposition de la force armée et du principal emploi des fonds de l'État . . ." Ibid., III, p.307.

<sup>54</sup>Saliceti was an excellent, if brutal, chief of police. He had what amounted to a "veritable army of spies and informers" among whom was the trusted mistress of Colonel Hudson Lowe, who directed British espionage from Capri. Connelly, op.cit., p.73.

accomplishments, as his letters to Napoleon indicate, why would he wish to replace him?

One possible answer lies in the past connections between Saliceti and the Bonapartes. A Corsican member of the Convention in 1793, Saliceti had befriended the family when they were expelled from Corsica by Paoli. It was through his influence that Joseph became a commissary and Napoleon gained command of the artillery before Toulon.<sup>55</sup> Joseph had saved Saliceti from deportation in 1799 when he had opposed the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire and may have continued to feel a debt of gratitude towards the man who had done so much to aid the family. The practical considerations of economy and efficiency could also have been important, for a reunion of the two ministries would centralise the kingdom's agencies for counter-insurgency. Neither of these theories, however, explains why Joseph repented of his decision several days after making it and expressed to Miot his desire to dismiss Saliceti,<sup>56</sup> an indication that at least some of the causes of Dumas' replacement lie deeper still in the situation at Naples. They are, too, a manifestation of problems inherent to a greater or lesser degree in all the satellite kingdoms.

Napoleon never really regarded Naples, or any of the other kingdoms for that matter, as anything but a conquered

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.60.

<sup>56</sup>Miot, op.cit., II, p.340. Miot counselled against dismissal because, following so closely upon the appointment, it would have appeared to be an act of caprice on Joseph's part.

land to be disposed of for the benefit of the Empire. Joseph, although King of Naples, was first and foremost an imperial prince with a higher loyalty to his imperial brother than to his own subjects. Even Naples' sovereignty was limited, for Napoleon freely created six imperial duchies and two principalities from her lands. Joseph, on the other hand, appears to have evidenced genuine concern for the Neapolitans. Much to his brother's annoyance, he often put their needs above those of the Empire, as, for example, when he reduced taxation to below the levels of France herself - an act which ultimately drained the Imperial Treasury of 7,500,000 francs to keep the throne solvent.<sup>57</sup>

The adherents of these two divergent viewpoints formed two distinct parties in Naples: the imperial faction or radicals, largely composed of the command of French Army of occupation and including C. Berthier, Massena and Saliceti, all of whom favoured the exploitation of the country for the benefit of France and of themselves, and who advocated the savage repression of all resistance to royal (French) authority; and opposed to them were the King's faction or moderates - men of the government such as Roederer, Miot de Mérito, Girardin and Dumas - who supported Joseph's efforts on behalf of the welfare of the Neapolitans, moderation in dealing with opposition, and the gradual introduction of reform. Jacques Rambaud

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<sup>57</sup> Connolly, op.cit., p.70.

has defined these differences by saying that: "On pourrait, suivant la formule, oppose les hommes de 1789 à ceux de 1793" but it would be more accurate to say that the contrast was largely between the military and the civilian view point.<sup>58</sup>

Within the context of military affairs the major differences between the two ideologies centered upon the constitution of the Neapolitan army. The population of Naples was, for Napoleon, too corrupt to ever be capable of forming a national army. In its place he wished to see a Neapolitan Legion formed of various foreign elements and mercenaries.<sup>59</sup> Joseph, in defiance of Napoleon's wishes, sought to create a national army. Initially, at least, Napoleon made no protest over the affairs in Naples. With relative peace on the continent, he could afford the officers necessary to command and train a Neapolitan army. But by 1807, after Jena and Auerstadt failed to produce a speedy conclusion to the new continental war and as his armies were drawn further and further eastward, the ever growing need for more soldiers forced him to take a stonger

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<sup>58</sup>Ram baud, op.cit., p.229. Miot (op.cit., II, p.310) asserted that "L'empereur voulait une dépendance complète et une obéissance aveugle. Le prince . . . cherchait à se rendre indépendant . . . comme une garantie de protection et le commencement d'une nouvelle existence politique pour le royaume".

<sup>59</sup>"Dans toutes ses lettres, l'empereur recommandait au prince de désarmer les Neapolitains, de se méfier d'eux et de se tenir constamment sur ses gardes." Miot, op.cit., II, p.305. Cf. Napoleon to Joseph, 1 March 1806, du Casse, op.cit., II, p.306.

line with Joseph. "La guerre avec la Prusse", wrote Rambaud,<sup>60</sup> "puis avec la Russie, lui fait rappeler beaucoup de monde, presque toute la cavalerie, les Polonais, et dès lors il se plaint constamment qu'on gaspille ses troupes". As Minister of War, Dumas was inevitably the centre of Napoleon's displeasure. He chided Joseph that:

Ce que fait Dumas n'a pas de sens. Il se donne beaucoup de peine pour former de mauvaises corps napolitains, qui seront les premiers à tirer sur vous si un malheur arrivait; et surtout on désorganise mon armée pour un tas d'établissements.<sup>61</sup>

Dumas' removal, therefore, represented a victory for the imperialist viewpoint on matters of police and war, although the moderates dominated the conduct of domestic affairs.

Napoleon had other reasons for displeasure with Dumas, although these applied also to many of the other members of Joseph's entourage. The administrators of Naples, Roederer, Miot, Dumas, Cavaignac, Girardin and Saliceti, have been justly described as "une véritable élite"<sup>62</sup> but Napoleon had had other motives for choosing these men than just providing Joseph with talent. They were all, for one reason or another, men Napoleon preferred to see outside of France and so away from the centre of

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<sup>60</sup>Rambaud, op.cit., p.247.

<sup>61</sup>Napoleon to Joseph, Osterode, 20 March 1807, du Casse, op.cit., III, p.318.

<sup>62</sup>Rambaud, op.cit., p.373. Cf. Lefebvre, op.cit., p.442.



power.<sup>63</sup>

In the case of Dumas and Roederer, Napoleon openly expressed his feelings to Joseph:

J'en pourrais dire autant de Dumas. Ce sont des hommes (sic. Dumas and Roederer) qui n'ont pas eu et qui n'auront jamais la prudence de marcher avec le temps, qui feront aujourd'hui ce qui ne doit être fait qu'après-demain, et qui ne sauront pas vous tirer de la situation où vous vous trouvez.<sup>64</sup>

Napoleon specifically objected to Dumas' introduction of men "d'un esprit réacteur" into the army's administration, yet he himself despatched one hundred former gardes-du-corps of Louis XVI to serve as a nucleus of Joseph's royal guard.<sup>65</sup> Undoubtedly, the basis for Napoleon's distrust lay in the events which led up to the coup d'état of 18 Fructidor. During the Consulate, Dumas had written to d'Antraigues, then in Dresden, as had Cambacérès, the Bishop of Troyes and General Suchet, but there is no evidence to suggest that Napoleon was aware of these

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<sup>63</sup>Ramnaud, op.cit., p.228. "Ce n'est, en tout cas, pas le hasard que réunit à Naples tant d'hommes à l'égard desquels Napoléon, pour une raison ou pour une autre, éprouvait de la défiance ou du mécontentement . . ."

<sup>64</sup>Napoleon to Joseph, Osterode, 1 March 1807, du Casse, op.cit., III, p.311. Roederer (op.cit., p.232) mentions that Napoleon did not wish him to become Minister of Finances and that an argument over his employment ensued along much the same lines as the one over Dumas'.

<sup>65</sup>Ramnaud, op.cit., p.229. Dumas brought to Naples his administrative team, consisting of St. Fulcrand, Combes and Alexandre Romeuf. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.295.

transactions.<sup>66</sup> Nor was Dumas in any way involved with the royalist conspiracies conducted under the Consulate or the Empire.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the opinions of his brother, Joseph continued to hold Dumas in high esteem. On the same day that the combination of the two ministries was announced, Joseph appointed Dumas Grand Marshal of the Palace, the highest position in his Court.<sup>68</sup> Octavia, after the death of her first fiancé, M. Pomard, married Joseph's first aide-de-camp, General Franceschi-Delonne, a very pleasing match for, according to the testimony of Marshal

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<sup>66</sup>Godechot, *La Contre-Révolution*, p.394; Pingaud, *op. cit.*, p.226. Cambacérés and Dumas had both known d'Antraigues from their youth as all were natives of Montpellier. The Bishop of Troyes, de Barrel, was d'Antraigues' uncle. At this time, the Count was forwarding reports to the Court of Saint Petersburg via Prince Czartoriski. D'Antraigues' information about French plans, such as those for the naval campaign of 1805 and the strength of the Grand Army were provided by two anonymous sources, the "Ami de Paris" and the "fils de l'Ami". Until the reports of d'Antraigues, now in Moscow and Leningrad, become known, it is unlikely that these two persons can be identified, but, significantly, neither Pingaud, who did see these documents, nor Godechot, who did not, has suggested that Dumas was either the "ami" or the "fils". There is no record of Dumas' ever having had contact with the royalists in any of Fouché's police bulletins. Cf. Ernest d'Hauterive, *La Police Secrète du Premier Empire: Bulletins Quotidiens Adressés par Fouché à L'Empereur* (5 vols., Paris, 1908). Nor does the correspondence of d'Antraigues contain any letter to or from Dumas. Cf. AE Fonds Bourbon: 628 (Papiers du Comte d'Antraigues) f.1 (Table général) and ff.628-644.

<sup>67</sup>Cf. Léonce Pingaud, *Correspondence Intime du Comte Vaudreuil et du Comte d'Artois Pendant l'Emigration* (2 vols., Paris, 1889); Ernest d'Hauterive, *La Contre Police Royaliste en 1800* (Paris, 1931); Edouard Guillon, *Les Complots Militaires Sous le Consulate et l'Empire* (Paris, 1894); and *Conseil des Conjures, History of the Secret Societies of the Army and of the Military Conspiracies* (London, 1815).

<sup>68</sup>Joseph to Napoleon, Naples, 15 April 1807, du Casse, *op.cit.*, III, p.338.

Soult, he was one of the best generals of his time.<sup>69</sup> When Joseph exchanged the throne of Naples for that of Spain in May 1808, he brought his most trusted officers with him - Generals Franceschi, Maurice Mathieu, Dumas, Salligny, Merlon and Girardin - together with most of the contents of the treasury.

After the trouble in Naples and after being the unfortunate emissary chosen to bring word of Joseph's retreat to the Ebro following the capitulation at Baylen, it would not have been surprising to find Dumas shunted aside by the Emperor. But instead he was immediately allowed to re-enter the Grand Army, being re-instated to the same duties he had performed in 1805<sup>70</sup> and was soon to rise to higher positions of authority than he had ever before held in the French army. The reason for Napoleon's seeming reversal of attitude towards Dumas lay in the strains imposed upon the French war machine by the necessity of raising ever greater numbers of recruits to fight a war on two fronts. Dumas' administrative ability was under these circumstances too great to be ignored and significantly, from this date onwards, he was almost exclusively involved with either organisational or logistical matters.

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<sup>69</sup>Jean Baptiste Maire Franceschi Delonne, Baron de l'Empire, 23 June 1810. Dumas wrote to the Minister of War on several occasions requesting the rank of general of division for Franceschi. Cf. Dumas to Clarke, Naples, 29 November 1807, AAG GD 395; Dumas to Count d'Hunebourg, Paris, 20 March 1809, AAG 2<sup>e</sup> Serie GB 1037 (Franceschi).

<sup>70</sup>Count d'Hunebourg to Napoleon, Paris, 24 October 1808, AAG GD 395.

The Army of Spain, under the Emperor's personal command, was soon pouring into Spain over 200,000 men strong. As it advanced towards Madrid, smashing and scattering the Spanish armies in the process, Dumas was stationed at Burgos to direct the flow of reinforcements. In reply to his protests about being left in the rear, Napoleon had told him: "Monsieur le Général, sur un tel théâtre de guerre il n'y a ni derrière ni devant"<sup>71</sup> - a statement Sir John Moore soon did everything in his power to prove correct as he advanced towards Léon, as much in ignorance of the French strength and position as were the French of his.<sup>72</sup> His intention was (to) first defeat Marshal Soult's II corps - a force of only 17,000 men (two infantry and one cavalry divisions) intended only to restore order and to round up the survivors of Blake's shattered Spanish army - and then to assault Burgos, garrisoned by 500 men, thereby severing Napoleon's line of

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<sup>71</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.327. Dumas' main task at Burgos was to make up reinforcement convoys of men and material of sufficient strength to be able to withstand attacks by Spanish guerrillas. Cf. Dumas to Marshal Ney, Burgos, 2, 3 and 5 December 1808, AN 137 AP 11 f.476, 477, 478 (Marshal Michel Ney).

<sup>72</sup>Operating in a friendly country there seems little excuse for the misassumptions under which Moore undertook this manoeuvre: i.e. that Madrid was still in Spanish hands when it had fallen 36 hours before, and that Napoleon had only 80,000 men instead of 250,000. As the British army numbered only 25,000 and the hostility of the countryside made reconnaissance impossible, it is easier to understand how Napoleon could have remained ignorant of Moore's position for so long. Cf. Chandler, *op.cit.*, p.646, William Frances Patrick Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of France (London, 1835, 3rd edition), I, Chapter IV.



communications and inciting Northern Spain to renewed resistance.<sup>73</sup> Dumas first learned of Moore's position when he attacked and defeated the French cavalry screen under Franceschi. He immediately realized that the only troops who were within supporting distance of Soult were elements of Junot's Army of Portugal then under the Emperor's orders to march to Segovia.

The subsequent events are discussed in detail by Dumas in a letter written in 1814, which commented upon the discrepancies between what had actually occurred and the official account:

Je me bornai d'abord à faire connaître aux généraux commandant ces mêmes divisions les situation ou se trouvait M<sup>r</sup>. le Duc de Dalmatie, la marche et les projets de l'ennemi qui n'avaient pu être connus de l'Empereur, et la fausseté d'une manœuvre qui ôtais tous moyens d'arrêter les progrès du g<sup>al</sup> Moore jusqu'au moment où l'Empereur serait informé. Ces généraux n'ayant point d'autre instructions que de se conformer aux ordres que je leur transmettrais, refusèrent de ne rien prendre du sérieux; en conséquence je me décidai à faire au nom du major-général les dispositions suivantes . . ." (dispositions follow)<sup>74</sup>

Once Dumas had assumed the responsibility, generals Lorge, Fournier, Foy and Laborde soon realized the wisdom of his

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<sup>73</sup>Chandler, op.cit., p.648; Napier, op.cit., I, p.459.

<sup>74</sup>Dumas to Bory, Paris, 12 December 1814, AHG MR 919, pp.3-4. Dumas mentions these same events in his Souvenirs (op.cit., III, pp.330-334) and in Notes to his edition of John Brigland, Histoire d'Espagne (Paris, 1828, III, p.58) and his translation of Napier, Histoire de la Guerre dans la Péninsule et dans le Mide de la France (13 vols., Paris, 1828-1844, IV, p.97). Napier himself makes no reference to Dumas but Chandler (op.cit., p.649) devotes an entire page to the events at Burgos.



actions and were speeding on their way towards Palencia to reinforce Soult. Dumas next dispatched one of his aides to bring word of Moore's advance and his counter-measures to Madrid. It was this message that prompted Napoleon to set off in his pursuit of Moore which led to the latter's embarkation at Corunna.<sup>75</sup> Even though Dumas was an aide-major général, for such a relatively junior officer to have directly countermanded the Emperor's orders was a bold move and required not only quick decision but moral courage.<sup>76</sup> It was a fitting conclusion, however, that when Dumas arrived in Madrid, in compliance with orders issued before this episode was known, he was told by Marshal Berthier of the Emperor's approval and pleasure in his action.

Restoration of the French presence in Spain had been achieved only at the expense of the Army of Germany, which, by October 1808, had been reduced to the strength of little more than a single corps.<sup>77</sup> The Austrians, meanwhile, had been preparing for a war of revenge ever since 1806, and there were clear indications that they intended to march sometime in the spring of 1809. Prodigious efforts were

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<sup>75</sup>Dumas to Bory, op.cit., p.5 and Chandler, op.cit., p.650.

<sup>76</sup>This was Chandler's (op.cit., p.649) conclusion as well.

<sup>77</sup>"On paper, the Army of the Rhine consisted of 120,000 men but when various distant detachments are deducted . . . it will be seen that Davout was in effectual command of rather less than 80,000 troops . . ."  
Chandler, op.cit., p.669.

therefore necessary on the part of the French staff if they were to be able to match the Austrian army in Germany without seriously reducing the 200,000 men committed to Spain. The procurement of recruits was not a major problem as the classes of 1806 and 1809 called up in September provided 80,000 conscripts and those of 1810 called up in December an additional 80,000. All but rudimentary training, as in 1800, was dispensed with and to equip them in the brief time available administrative short cuts were devised. The most important of these short cuts was entrusted to Mathieu Dumas when Napoleon appointed him to inspect the depots of the various corps d'armée under formation for Germany. Dumas' task was to see that each depot armed and equipped as many soldiers as possible in the shortest possible time by dispensing their stores to the recruits as they came regardless of which units the materials were originally destined for. It was an enormous task and occupied him well into the opening of the campaign.<sup>78</sup>

Not until 18 May was Dumas able to rejoin the army, which by then was camped at Vienna. During the battle of Aspern-Essling (21-22 May), he distinguished himself when posted to maintain the pontoon bridge from the island of Lobau to the north bank - the armies' sole line of retreat. Together with Marshal Massena and the Old Guard, he kept the bridge in operation until the entire army had made good its withdrawal, leaving on Marshal Massena's orders, not

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<sup>78</sup>Dumas, *Souvenirs*, III, p.340; Dumas to Minister of War, Paris, 20 March 1809, AAG GD 395.

"un seul cheval blessé ni une cuirasse" fall into the hands of the enemy.<sup>79</sup> Following the battle, Dumas was appointed sous-chef-d'état-major "sous ordres immédiats du Prince du Neufchatel".<sup>80</sup> In this capacity he served in functions which were again similar to those he had exercised in 1805 and 1808. These included a reconnaissance of the course of the Danube, reports on the state of the artillery and service regulations for the cavalry, verification of the dead and wounded, evacuation of wounded from Labau Island, control of the Austrian prisoners and service with the Emperor's staff at Wagram.<sup>81</sup> He was responsible for enforcement of the terms of the armistice concluded after the battle and also sat on a court of inquiry held to investigate the allegations of Marshal Lefebvre against Baron von Stengel of the Bavarian army.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.355; Edouard Guillon, Nos Écrivains Militaires (2 vols., Paris, 1899), II, p.88.

<sup>80</sup>Dumas to Minister of War, Schonbrunn, 29 June 1809, AAG GD 395. Dumas refers to himself as exercising the functions of chef d'état-major général but in a later dispatch Berthier defines his title as sous-chef. Berthier to Minister of War, Schoenbrunn, 15 September 1809.

<sup>81</sup>Dumas, "Reconnaissance Sur le Cours du Danube", 13 July 1809, 5 pieces, AHG MR 1611; Dumas to General Dzonet, Penzing, 25 July 1809, AN 51 AP 2 (Autograph collection Gabriel Deville); Dumas, Chargé du service du Parc général d'artillerie, to Daru, Vienna, 10 September 1809, AN 138 AP 107 f.105 (Daru); Dumas, "Rapport sur le Règlement pour le Service des Troupes à Cheval en Campagne", Schonbrunn, 1 November 1809, AN 138 AP 92 (reg. 1 f.272); Dumas, "Rapport sur une Indemnité", Penzing, 3 November 1809, AN 138 AP 92 (reg. 1 f.273); Dumas, "Rapport Sur les Frais de Poste dus à M. Gouy", Birigen, 4 November 1809, AN 138 AP 92 (reg. 1 f.267).

<sup>82</sup>The Imperial Court of Inquiry consisted of generals Andréossy, Verger, Montmarie and Dumas; it sat in Vienna on 27 October and took but 45 minutes to exonerate Stengel. Rice and Brown, op.cit., I, p.110n.

Napoleon rewarded Dumas well for his services in 1808 and 1809. He was created a Count of the Empire, made a commander of the Legion of Honour and accorded a pension of 13,000 francs, derived from rents on convents and estates suppressed in Parma.<sup>83</sup> A further mark of favour was the Emperor's permission to accept and wear the Grand Cross of the Order of Military Merit of Bavaria.

Dumas asserts that in the years 1810 and 1811 he wrote over 70,000 letters in the course of his official duties,<sup>84</sup> a claim which appears to be quite reasonable when his duties are examined. He had already been reinstated into the Council of State when Napoleon selected him to replace Lacuée as the Director General of Conscription and Reviews.<sup>85</sup> The two positions combined in this manner made Dumas the head of the army's department for these affairs as well as the Councillor of State responsible for them. He had in effect to enforce measures which he proposed.

The responsibilities of the Director General of Conscription and Reviews as the title implies comprised

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<sup>83</sup>Napoleon I, lettre Patent Enregistrée, (1808-1814), AN CC 245 151 (14 February 1810). This pension was in addition to a similar one of almost equal amount drawn on Hanover, which Dumas already enjoyed. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.393. Cf. Louis de la Roque, Armorial de la Noblesse de Languedoc (Montpellier, 1860) for his coat of arms.

<sup>84</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.396.

<sup>85</sup>Napoleon I, Decret, Paris, 2 February 1810, AAG GD 395. Dumas had lost his position when he became a permanent minister of another state, but was reinstated in September 1809. Durand, op.cit., p.383.

the supervision of two separate bureaux. The first of these, that of Conscription, was well handled by A. A. Hargenvilliers throughout the course of the Empire.<sup>86</sup> Reflecting the growth and proficiency of this bureau, the statistics for conscripts actually delivered to the combat units had risen from 66% under the Directory to 93% by 1809.<sup>87</sup> Even so, the enormous increase in the demand for manpower arising from the necessity to maintain large armies at the opposite ends of the Empire strained the system to the utmost.<sup>88</sup>

Dumas' own contributions to the functioning of conscription were modest. His major contribution was the conception and supervision of a compilation made by Hargenvilliers and the other clerks of all the various laws and regulations concerning the process of conscription.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>Antoine Audet Hargenvilliers, born 5 February 1768, entered the bureau of war on 6 December 1793 and became bureau chief of conscription in 1806. Cf. Gustave Vallée, Comte Général de la Conscription de A. A. Hargenvilliers (Paris, 1937).

<sup>87</sup>"La différence s'explique par le perfectionnement graduel de la machine à recruter les hommes beaucoup plus que par une sorte d'accoutumance de la nation au sacrifice annuel de sa jeunesse." Gustave Vallée, La Conscription dans le Département de la Charente (Paris, 1937), p.657.

<sup>88</sup>For example, by 1812 infantry regiments contained four to five field battalions each instead of two to three as before, thereby making them the equivalent of a brigade. As a further strain, between 1809 and 1812, twelve new regiments of the Young Guard were created from the best conscripts in each year's class.

<sup>89</sup>Dumas, "Instruction Général Sur la Conscription" (Paris, 1 November 1811) BN F 4619-4622. This work was the product of six months' labour and was immediately adopted throughout the Empire. Cf. Dumas to Eugene, Paris, December 1811, PU Beauharnais MSS.



But all aspects of this work were not beneficial. Dumas reiterated and defended the principle of substitution despite the suggestion by one Préfet that it should be curtailed if not eliminated altogether. In his reply, Dumas wrote:

Ce ne sont pas toujours de jeunes gens riches et aisés qui cherchent à se faire remplacer; souvent une famille peu fortunée fait un sacrifice pour conserver son unique soutien, . . . soit par la culture, soit par le commerce, soit par toute autre vie également utile à l'état.<sup>90</sup>

In fact, replacement retained its character as a social privilege or profit for the wealthy.<sup>91</sup>

The majority of Dumas' efforts in dealing with conscription were directed towards finding additional sources of manpower. One solution was the anticipation of classes - 32,000 sailors were raised in this manner in 1810 from the classes of 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1816.<sup>92</sup> It was found unnecessary to "mortgage" the future for ordinary soldiers because the increase in the territory of the Empire allowed for larger annual classes - 120,000 conscripts in 1811 compared with 80,000 in 1808.<sup>93</sup> In all these activities Dumas supervised the Préfets directly and

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<sup>90</sup>Dumas to Préfet de la Loire, Paris, 15 August 1811, AN 140 AP 1 (Jube de la Perelle).

<sup>91</sup>Vallée, op.cit., p.600.

<sup>92</sup>Dumas, "Observations Sur le Projet de décret", Paris, 22 September 1810.

<sup>93</sup>Dumas, "Rapport Sur la Conscription", Paris, 14 January 1811; Dumas, "Rapport Sur la Levée de 1811", Paris, 14 January 1811; and Dumas, "Projets de Décrets Relatif à la Conscription de 1811", Paris, 21 January 1811.

reported to Napoleon who gave him the dispositions for each class.

Unlike the bureau of Conscription, the bureau of Reviews was in a chaotic state. By the decree of 9 Pluviôse VIII, Inspectors of Reviews were responsible for: "l'organisation, embrigadement, incorporation, levée, licenciement, solde et comptabilité des corps".<sup>94</sup> The formation of new units, the amalgamation and mutation of existing ones, the indiscriminate issue of equipment in 1809 and the movement of armies over vast distances had created what Dumas described as a labyrinth of ordinances, decrees, regulations, etc. In this area, Dumas did not report directly to Napoleon but to the Minister of War and he consulted Daru (Secretary of State) and Lacuée (Director of the Administration of War) over financial allocations.<sup>95</sup> After sorting out the previous decrees, Dumas restored order to the finances of the army through a major reorganisation of accounting procedure. Company funds were abolished as was the post of quarter-master, and in their place the regiments' finances were to be handled by Military Treasurers who were agents of the treasury, not the army. Accounts were made the responsibility of the Council of Administration, consisting of the colonel

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<sup>94</sup>Jean Bourdon, "L'Administration Militaire Sous Napoléon 1<sup>er</sup>; et ses Rapports avec l'Administration Générale", Revue des Études Napoléoniennes, XI, (January - June, 1917), p.20.

<sup>95</sup>Dumas to Daru, Paris, 12 December 1810, AN 138 AP 22; Dumas to Lacuée, 24 July 1810, AN 138 AP 167.

and the four senior officers present.<sup>96</sup>

As a member of the Council of War, Dumas had numerous other responsibilities, outside of those as Director General, of which only examples can be given. In the area of military justice, he was concerned with the creation of procedures to cover special cases such as desertion in a foreign regiment in the service of France or desertion from a National Guard regiment on foreign service.<sup>97</sup> He was involved with the creation of two regiments of Flankers for the Guard,<sup>98</sup> and with the reorganisation of the National Guard in 1812 as part of preparations for the Russian campaign.<sup>99</sup>

The only personal references appearing in the Souvenirs for this period are to the deaths of first his son-in-law Franceschi, and then his daughter, Octavia. Franceschi was captured by the Spaniards in 1810 and taken to a prison in Cathage. The Spaniards wished to exchange him for

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<sup>96</sup>Cf. Dumas, "Rapport et Projet de Décret Relatives à la Suppression de la Masse de Compagnie", 30 April 1811; Dumas, "Projet de Décret Relatif à l'institution des Trésoreries Militaires", 18 April, 2 May and 3 May 1811; Dumas, "Projet de Décret Relatif à l'Administration et à la Comptabilité des Corps", 10 May 1811; Dumas, "Instructions Sur la Tenure et les Arrêtés de la Comptabilité des Corps", 28 December 1811. Cf. Bourdon, op.cit., p.20.

<sup>97</sup>Cf. Dumas, "Projet de Décret", 19 March 1811. An example of the legal complexities of this system can be found in a letter from Dumas to the Minister of Justice (Paris, 12 February 1810, AN AA 51 f.1454) on behalf of the Préfet of Meuse-Inferieure who desired the extradition of a conscript sentenced by a Dutch Tribunal.

<sup>98</sup>Dumas, "Sur le Régiment des Flanqueurs de la Garde", AN AB XIX 3374.

<sup>99</sup>Cf. Bourdon, Napoléon au Conseil d'État, pp.280-84.

General Palafox, but Napoleon refused and, as no other general was acceptable to them, Franceschi remained in prison until he died from yellow fever on 23 October 1810. "Je perds un fils digne de toute mon estime et que j'aurais comme mes propres enfants," Dumas wrote at the time. The same letter adds "ma fille frappée de ce coup terrible au moment <sup>elle</sup> où se livrait à des vaines espérances est accablée de douleur . . ."<sup>100</sup> Octavia, Mme. Franceschi, was inconsolable. She was never to recover from this grief - from 1810 her health declined steadily until her death on 13 February 1812.<sup>101</sup>

By the time of Octavia's death, the organisation of the new Grand Army was complete. Napoleon then began specific preparations for the Russian Campaign. His previous experiences in Poland had taught him how vital it was to organise thoroughly the provisionment of the army once the areas of Europe were entered where foraging was no longer capable of supporting it.<sup>102</sup> He therefore determined to organise the procurement of supplies in a military manner. To supply an army of 675,477 (gross strength) was no easy task. Twenty-six transport battalions, with a total

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<sup>100</sup> Dumas to the Duke de Feltre, Paris, 11 December 1810, AAG 2<sup>e</sup> série GB 1037.

<sup>101</sup> Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.404. From the tenor of a letter from Dumas to Roederer [Paris, 2 January 1812, AN 29 AP 10 (Roederer)] her death was expected.

<sup>102</sup> Napoleon wrote to Davout on 26 May 1812: "We can hope for nothing from the countryside and accordingly must take everything with us". Chandler, *op.cit.*, p.757.

carrying capacity of 2,640,000 kilos were created. Fresh meat was provided by herds of cattle and oxen. The supply services even contained two naval squadrons of 100 boats each intended to utilize the rivers of western Russia for conveying stores from Tilsit to Kovno.<sup>103</sup> The onerous responsibility for these arrangements lay with the Intendant General, the final position held by Dumas during his active military career.<sup>104</sup>

In the course of the French advance he usually followed the Imperial Headquarters at a day's march to the rear, but after Smolensk had been passed Dumas kept with the Imperial Headquarters, often camping with his friend Daru.<sup>105</sup> He was, therefore, present at Borodino, from which, as part of his normal responsibilities, he was in charge of the transportation of the wounded. Together with Daru, he was sent into Moscow to appraise the situation there and was one of the first French officers to enter the city.<sup>106</sup> Few papers from this campaign survive, but those which do indicate that in addition to administering the hospitals, Dumas was responsible for procuring grain from local merchants, largely an impossible task, making an inventory of the treasures to be found in the churches of Moscow, as possible loot for the Louvre, and maintaining

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid., pp.756-58.

<sup>104</sup>Napoleon I, Decret, Paris, 25 February 1812, AAG GD 395. Dumas had charge of 56 commissaires 'ordonnateurs' and 444 commissaires. Cf. Bourdon, "L'Administration Militaire", p.25.

<sup>105</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.435.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., III, p.443.



the post stages through Russia and Poland, by which the Emperor retained contact with Paris.<sup>107</sup> Weakened by overwork, he contracted an illness diagnosed by Baron Desgenettes as "fluxion de poitrine" (inflammation of the lungs). Daru assumed Dumas' duties for the remainder of the campaign and Napoleon offered to allow him to remain in Moscow to return the city to the Russians, an 'honour' which Dumas steadfastly refused. Instead, he chose to remain with the army and he made the retreat by carriage, convalescing. He was accompanied by Saint-Didier and Combes, then part of his staff.<sup>108</sup>

The verdict of military historians on the debacle of 1812 is aptly summarised by David Chandler when he wrote that it stemmed "as much from administrative weakness as from any other single factor". Certainly, ill-health in the form of disease (diphtheria, dysentery and typhus) and malnutrition took a heavy toll with some corps losing as much as half their effective strength before even making contact with the enemy.<sup>109</sup> But this failure of supply

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<sup>107</sup>"Je n'ai rien trouvé, absolument rien de la campagne de 1812, mes dernières caisses ayant été brûlées d'après un ordre exprès de l'Empereur la veille du passage de la Bérézina . . ." Dumas to Daru, Villepinte, 3 August 1817, AN 138 AP 99. Other papers have survived indicating Dumas' role: Cf. Dumas to d'Arriule (Relative aux Trésors des Églises de Moscou), 20 September 1812, AN 221 AP 2 (Jean-Luc d'Arriule); Dumas, "Rapport Sur le Marche de Michelet pour l'Achat de Sel en Russie", Moscow, 7 October 1812, AN 138 AP 25 (reg. 2); Dumas to Caulaincourt (Postal System), Moscow, 8 October 1812, AN 95 AP 12 doss. 59 (Caulaincourt).

<sup>108</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.459.

<sup>109</sup>Chandler, op.cit., p.759.

should not be regarded as the fault of the administrative services; rather it was the natural result of the interplay of the nature of the campaign and the limits of eighteenth century technology. Originally, Napoleon planned to fight the entire campaign west of Smolensk. Therefore his march on Moscow had largely to be extemporised and it added immensely to requirements for supply vehicles. The effect of the increased distances was multiplied by the loss of carrying capacity of supply services through the death of over 20,000 horses by the time Vilna was reached. This was the ultimate source of most of the service's shortcomings.<sup>110</sup>

Yet despite these difficulties, the supply service was by no means a complete failure. Napoleon evidenced displeasure with Dumas' performance on only one occasion, over the transport of the wounded from Moscow to Smolensk.<sup>111</sup> So far as provisioning was concerned, even during the

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<sup>110</sup>To some extent the Russians' ability to escape Napoleon's first manoeuvres and the delay at Vilna were caused by the breakdown of the supply columns. It appears that the carts were both too heavy and too numerous for the Russian roads to withstand. On the campaign, see Chandler, *op.cit.*, p.763; Fuller, II, p.447.

<sup>111</sup>At the beginning of October, Napoleon asked Dumas how long it would take to evacuate the wounded to which Dumas replied forty-five days, a figure which annoyed Napoleon. On 14 October, the order to evacuate 12,000 wounded was given, but when Napoleon asked if they were entirely gone on the 16th Dumas reported that there remained 4,000. Napoleon was again displeased, but said nothing. This was the full extent of the incident. Cf. Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.456; Baron A. J. F. Fain, *Manuscrit de Mil Huit Cent Douze* (2 vols., Paris, 1887), II, p.147, and Arnaud Auguste Louis de Caulaincourt, *Mémoires*, ed. by Jean Hanoteau (2 vols., London, 1950), I, p.310.

retreat there were sufficient stockpiles to feed the army.

Paradoxically, as the Grande Armée retreated it repeatedly came upon well-stocked rear depots (at Smolensk and Vilna, for instance), but the troops wrought havoc with these much needed supplies, wasting and destroying what they could not gorge on the spot. Thus the problems of distribution and control rather than of actual provision were the aspects of logistics that proved insoluble.<sup>112</sup>

Following the crossing of the Berezina and the onset of winter, the ragged elements of the Grand Army found a temporary respite - all save for the administrative services, which were pressed to the limit to create a new army for that summer's campaign. Although not completely recovered, Dumas resumed his post as Intendant General.<sup>113</sup> His task was two-fold for he needed to re-equip the supply battalions necessary to support the army while at the same time procuring the supplies themselves. These supply battalions, known as the Train des Equipages, by the 1807 standards were supposed to consist of four companies and a headquarters with each company containing 93 men and 152 work horses, but in January 1813 the 19 battalions attached to the Grand Army had between them a total of only 75 horses.<sup>114</sup> Prince Eugene, left to reorganise the army after Murat's desertion, had wished to reconstitute two of these battalions

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<sup>112</sup>Chandler, op.cit., p.367. Cf. ibid., p.827.

<sup>113</sup>This was in response to the request of Daru. Dumas, op.cit., III, p.490. His first correspondence is dated 31 December 1812. Dumas to Eugene, Konisburg, PU Beauharnais MSS.

<sup>114</sup>Dumas to Eugene, Posen, 18 January 1813, PU Beauharnais MSS.

at Berlin and two at Danzig with the remainder at Magdebourg and Posen, but Dumas was of another opinion. "Il me semble," he wrote to Eugene, "que Magdebourg est la point qui offre à la fois la surété nécessaire pour un pareil dépôt et les ressources nécessaires . . ." In the same letter he also advised that, as the supply battalions were "trop incomplète", it was preferable to reorganize only four battalions thereby utilizing the survivors and replacements in the most efficient manner.<sup>115</sup> Had Dumas not intervened, the depots at Berlin and Danzig would have been overrun by the Russians, who had reached Posen by February.

Affairs were no less critical in the matter of actually obtaining supplies. The principal difficulty seems to have been a loss of confidence in the French on the part of the suppliers. No longer certain that France would be in a position to make good her obligations, the contractors demanded a considerable proportion of their payment in advance.<sup>116</sup> Without entering into undue detail, it appears that Dumas had achieved some success with provisioning but these efforts fell below what was necessary to support an army which consisted largely of conscripts

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<sup>115</sup>Ibid. ". . . j'avais donné le 12 de ce mois l'ordre d'en faire sortir (sic. from Danzig) les voitures et harnais disponibles. Si cette disposition a pu être exécutée, nous profiterons de ce material."

<sup>116</sup>Although a rise in prices was certainly significant Dumas makes it clear that "la principale difficulté . . . a été la demande d'avances considérables". Dumas to Eugene, Berlin, 8 February 1813, PU Beauharnais MSS. A report to Napoleon on the same subject indicated that these advances had exhausted the credit of the army. Dumas to Napoleon, Berlin, 7 February 1813, copy, PU Beauharnais MSS.

who were unversed in the arts of foraging and hence almost totally dependent upon magazines.<sup>117</sup>

Perhaps the most striking feature of Dumas' career under the Empire was not his failure to reach the pinnacles of the military hierarchy, either as Minister of War or chief of staff, but his ability to rise as far as he did. Napoleon, understandably, never bore any real affection for him. Dumas was, after all, more a writer of military history than a creator of it - a man of thought and reflection rather than of action. In short, he was a man who came close to personifying the quintessence of all that Napoleon disliked in his officers - a military ideologue.<sup>118</sup> Even in his duties as a staff officer, Dumas offended Napoleon with his independence and frankness. Napoleon's own conception of the role of staff officer was that of chief clerk, as he told Dumas:

Les chefs d'état-major ne doivent être que des instruments; je n'ai qu'à faire entrer le jeune

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<sup>117</sup>The critical situation in the army is well illustrated by Oudinot's letter of 7 June 1813: "Mon général, j'arrive à Herzberg . . . pour y profiter de votre secours, hâtez-vous je vous prie de nous l'accorder, car nous n'avons jusqu'alors reçu que de privations; envoyez-vous forcée Riz, Biscuits et eau de vie, si vous ne voulez que je repasse l'Elbe . . ." Oudinot to Dumas, Vibgau, 7 June 1813, AN 206 AP (Oudinot). Cf. Dumas, Correspondance de la Intendant Général, 1 October, 12 November 1813, AHG C2 414.

<sup>118</sup>Camille Rousset, Un Ministre de la Restauration: Le Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre (Paris, 1885), p. 34. Napoleon's distrust of ideologues has been well established. One incident occurred in 1804 at the Coronation. The Savant Monge introduced one of his former pupils, Clermont-Tonnerre, to Napoleon as "un officier distingué" because he had done well at the Polytechnique. This drew the reply, "Vous n'avez pas fait la guerre? Non, sire - eh bien! je ne connais d'officier distingué que sur le champ de bataille."



Marboeuf, officier d'ordonnance, qui est là dans le salon de service, et j'en ferai mon major général.<sup>119</sup>

In contrast, Dumas insisted, often tactlessly, upon presenting unpleasant facts, as in Moscow or in questioning the master's decisions at Dresden in 1813.<sup>120</sup> Acting upon his own initiative had saved a disaster in 1808 but equally his insistence upon "impartially" enforcing the terms of the armistice after Wagram would have placed the French army at a disadvantage should the campaign have been resumed.<sup>121</sup> Frankness may have been the best way to serve Napoleon as his friends Daru and Berthier consoled, but it was not the way to gain his endearment.<sup>122</sup> Ultimately, it proved more to the detriment of Napoleon than of Dumas. The Empire's need for capable administrators was great enough to ensure Dumas of constant and important employment. But Napoleon, granted by 1813 his wish for a staff of Marboeufs, found himself in a situation in which nothing was foreseen or executed except when commanded by him.

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<sup>119</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.387.

<sup>120</sup>At Dresden, Dumas had questioned whether the city was suited for a centre of operations. Berthier's comment was: "Tu fais toujours la même faute; tu veux toujours répondre à l'Empereur". Ibid., III, p.503.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., III, p.386. The Austrians had been slipping militia into Hungary when Poniatowsky moved his corps across the armistice line to prevent this movement. Dumas, as commissioner of the armistice, ordered him back.

<sup>122</sup>According to Caulaincourt, as the Russian campaign progressed Napoleon took a dislike to anyone who tried to discuss the state of the army or of France. "Things had come to the point of the Emperor taking a dislike even to the persons forming the Prince's staff . . . Count Dumas, the zealous and active chief of the administration, and M. Joinville, were constant objects of His Majesty's prejudice; they had become objects of his dislike." Caulaincourt, op.cit., I, p.199.

## CHAPTER IX

### EPILOGUE

The fate of the French garrison at Dresden, as of the entire Empire beyond the Rhine, was decided during 16 to 19 October 1813 in what has become known as the battle of Leipzig. St. Cyr, the commander of Dresden, managed to resist until 11 November, but with no hope of relief and supplies nearly exhausted he had little alternative except to capitulate. Mathieu Dumas was delegated the onerous task of conducting the negotiations, largely because he had dealt with the Austrians in reversed circumstances after Ulm and Wagram, when his humanity and fairness had won him many friends among their commanders.<sup>1</sup> Dumas proved an excellent negotiator, obtaining the same terms as those granted by the French to Marshal Wurmser at Mantua (2 February 1797). Notable amongst these conditions was the right of the French garrison to march, without arms, to France, whereupon they would be able to rejoin the Grand Army, providing Napoleon with desperately needed

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<sup>1</sup>Dumas' enforcement of the Armistice after Wagram has already been mentioned (see *supra*, Chapter VIII). Following the conclusion of the peace treaty, he was appointed to conduct the evacuation of provinces still held by French troops. In discharging this task his consideration for Austrian feelings won the gratitude of Count Wrba, High Chamberlain to the Emperor, and of Francis himself, who presented Dumas with a snuff box containing his portrait set in diamonds. Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.389-392.

veterans.<sup>2</sup> But the Allies, once having obtained the capitulation of the city had no intention of facing its garrison in battle again and so denounced the convention on the grounds that their sovereigns had not consented to it. St. Cyr was left with no alternative except unconditional surrender and his army was counter-marched off into the interior of Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

The major portion of Dumas' captivity was passed in the small Hungarian town of Tyrnau, near Presbourg. Despite the hospitality of Ernest de Schwartzenburg, the town's prince-bishop and the brother of the Austrian commander-in-chief, Dumas found himself in a ruinous situation. Although he had ceased to function as Intendant General, he was still in possession of all the intendancy's papers, which he felt obliged to maintain throughout his peregrinations because they contained, amongst other things, the entire pay records for the army. He supported, at his own expense, his "personal staff" of civilians, including Combes, Saint-Didier and several secretaries. In a letter reclaiming these expenses, Dumas summarised his position:

1° Après le départ des 6 colonnes dirigées sur Strasbourg, je dus me rendre en poste avec mes aides de camp et mes principaux collaborateurs . . .

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<sup>2</sup>By terms of the Convention the French surrendered their arms, but not their colours and eagles, and were permitted to march to France under their own officers in six columns. To preserve order, each was to be preceded by one hundred armed men and three cannon. Ibid., III, p.538.

<sup>3</sup>This was not in fact an oversight on the part of the Allies but a "disreputable trick" also employed against the garrisons of Danzig and Torgau. Chandler, op.cit., p.939.

Arreté devant Kehl et forcé de rétrograder avec toutes les personnes qui m'accompagnèrent jusqu'à en Saxe, et de là en Bohême et en Moravie, où je n'arrivai que vers la fin de Décembre, les frais de ce voyage de plus de 600 lieues avec 4 voitures sont restés à ma charge.

2° J'ai perdu, vendu à bas prix la totalité de mon equipage, . . .

3° Pendant tous les temps de ma captivité tous les individus qui m'étais attachés et qui n'avaient pas de rang ou d'emploi dans l'armée, tous mes domestiques sont restés à ma charge sans qu'on leur ait accordé, ni indemnités, ni rations et j'ai dû pouvoir aux frais de leur retour.

4° J'ai dû faire transporter à mes frais de Tópletz à Paris les papiers de l'intendance général.<sup>4</sup>

Napoleon abdicated on 7 April 1814 and on the same day the Senate adopted a new Constitution stating that the King's brother was "freely" called to the throne and that he might reign only after swearing allegiance to this Constitution. Reaction in the army was mixed: among the soldiers there were 180,000 desertions with the advent of Louis XVIII and "dans vingt villes fortes, la garrison se souleva au cri de: 'Vive l'Empereur!'"<sup>5</sup> but the majority of its leaders were quick to submit to the new government. That staunch republican, Carnot, submitted on 14 April, ten days before Louis XVIII had even arrived in France.<sup>6</sup> Although Dumas had followed Napoleon's final campaign and learned of his abdication, he did not compose his submission

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<sup>4</sup>Dumas to Minister of War, Paris, 27 June 1814, AAG GD 395. Cf. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.544.

<sup>5</sup>Henry Houssaye, 1815 - La Première Restauration: Le Retour de l'Isle d'Elbe; les Cent Jours (Paris, 1899) p.3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p.7. "Les plus glorieux représentants de l'empire, comme Ney, les plus grandes patriotes, comme Carnot, avaient accepté franchement la royauté".

until 11 May 1814,<sup>7</sup> by which time Louis had taken up residence in Paris.

Dumas' most pressing problems upon his return were financial. He somehow had to recoup his expenses and losses during the campaigns of 1812-1813 and his captivity and also to find alternative sources of income to replace the revenues from Parma and Hanover lost with the Empire. The obvious solution was to turn to the new government for both compensation and employment and Dumas was not reluctant to adopt this method:

Le nouvel ordre de choses imposait de nouveaux devoirs; je m'y rangeai comme les autres, et d'autant plus facilement que le commencement et une grande partie de ma carrière militaire s'étaient écoulés sous le gouvernement des Bourbons.<sup>8</sup>

Nor was it difficult for him to support the new government on ideological grounds, for the Constitutional Charter gave cause for hope that a compromise had at last been reached between the principle of absolutism and the political and social gains of the Revolution - principatum et libertatem, as Dumas expressed them - which "Je me trouvais dans la ligne de l'opinion que j'avais toujours professée".<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Dumas to Minister of War, Vienna, 11 May 1814, AAG GD 395.

<sup>8</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.549.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., III, p.550. This opinion of the Constitutional Charter (proclaimed on 4 June 1814) is shared by modern historians as well. G. de Bertier de Sauvigny ("French Politics, 1814-47", NCMH, IX, p.338) describes it as a work of compromise, while Alfred Cobban [A History of Modern France (3 vols., London, 1961) II, p.65] adds that it was a compromise "rather to the advantage of the latter (sic. the Revolution)".



In contrast to the majority of imperial officers, Dumas was relatively well favoured by the new government. The Minister of War, Dupont, was not hostile towards him and his old comrade from the days of Hanover and Naples, Louis, was Minister of Finance. But even if Dumas' relations with the government are not typical of those of most imperial officers, they do reflect the same problems on a lesser scale.

He wrote to the Minister of War on 6 June requesting payment for his "frais de bureau d'October 1813" and his "traitement comme officier général employé, et comme intendant général, pendant ma captivité en Autriche" (sic. 1 December 1813 - 1 June 1814).<sup>10</sup> The calculations of the ministry showed that Dumas was owed a sum of 24,000 francs "qui lui est du pour ses frais de bureau de mois de 8bre et 9bre 1813 et dont il a les ordonnances", but a second hand added that the Minister had decided that he was to receive only a quarter of his expenses for the period of his captivity - 3,000 francs per month making a total of only 18,000 francs instead of the 72,000 he would normally have received.<sup>11</sup>

Unlike the other officers, however, Dumas was accepted into the new regime almost immediately. He had requested

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<sup>10</sup>Dumas to the Minister of War, Paris, 27 June 1814, AAG GD 395. In addition to his salary as a lieutenant general, Dumas received 3,000 francs per month as Intendant General and 12,000 for expenses.

<sup>11</sup>Ministère de la Guerre, Rapport, np, 18 July 1814, AAG GD 395.

that Dupont recommend him for the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, an award which was withheld at first but later accorded to him, as was the rank of commander in the order of Saint Louis.<sup>12</sup> He was also made a "Conseiller d'État d'épée", an office he described as a "vain titre honorifique sans aucune fonction déterminée" but which was a mark of approval.<sup>13</sup> A position of more importance was his place on the commission of six officers (three royalist and three imperial) which met under the presidency of Vioménil to examine the claims of the émigrés who had fought with Condé or the Allies and now wished reintegration into the French army.<sup>14</sup>

On the recommendation of Baron Louis, he was nominated Director General of the liquidation of the army's arrears, a post he accepted "avec plaisir" because it enabled him to be of service to his old comrades.<sup>15</sup> He was not employed by the army but rather by the Treasury for this office and his salary, accordingly, was only 8,960 francs - that of a lieutenant general in "non activité", even though he performed "la même fonction et avec la même titre" as under

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<sup>12</sup>Dumas to Dupont, Paris, 25 July 1814 and 1 August 1814, AAG GD 395. These requests were, no doubt, motivated by the pension which accompanied the honour.

<sup>13</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.551.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. Dumas' own opinion was that, had Marshal MacDonald's proposal for compensation to the émigrés been accepted, it would have provided an alternative to the court's method of compensation through military commissions.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p.552. Louis XVIII, Décisions Tendue dans la Séance du 1 juillet 1814, AN AF V 2 doss. 3.

the Empire.<sup>16</sup> In September he was awarded an additional sum of 20,000 francs by the Minister of War as compensation for the sum he normally would have received from the expenses allotted the office but withheld for the period of his captivity.<sup>17</sup>

The work of liquidation of arrears at first went smoothly. Employing a director for each principal corps d'armée, over 30,000 dossiers were examined and thirty million francs were distributed "principalement pour des arriérés de gratifications de campagne et de pertes devant l'ennemi . . .".<sup>18</sup> Marshal Soult, who succeeded Dupont as Minister of War, decided to centralise the liquidation of arrears with the payment for current service, and offered Dumas the Direction of the Invalides in its place.<sup>19</sup>

Many of the problems facing the Bourbons upon their restoration were not of their own making: the circumstances of their return, which were regarded by all but devout royalists as a national humiliation; the state of the Treasury, which required austere and therefore unpopular measures, such as the cessation of many public works, the

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<sup>16</sup>Dumas to Minister of War, Paris, 1 October 1814, and Ministère de la Guerre, Rapport Au Roi, Paris, 16 September 1814, AAG GD 395.

<sup>17</sup>Dumas to Minister of War, Paris, 26 September 1814, AAG GD 395.

<sup>18</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.553. Cf. AN AJ 14 Direction Générale de la Liquidation (papiers militaires de la Révolution).

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p.559. Dumas also mentions that Soult believed that the liquidation would take no more than two years when, in fact, because of royalist obstruction, "dix années ont à peine suffi pour le terminer".

dismissal of civil servants and the retention of excise duties; and the uncertainty felt by holders of former noble lands, which was caused by the émigrés' demands for compensation.<sup>20</sup>

These problems the Bourbons compounded by a variety of impolitic acts, which are most evident in their treatment of the French army. Dupont, a symbol of national humiliation because of his surrender to the Spaniards at Baylen, was made Minister of War. Napoleonic officers were pensioned off or put at half pay, while the cadres were filled with émigrés and chouans, many of whom had never held a military command.<sup>21</sup> Many regiments were disbanded for reasons of economy and yet the Maison du Roi was re-established at a strength of 6,000 men and an annual cost of twenty million francs.<sup>22</sup> Even the imperial numbers of the regiments were changed to destroy their associations with past glories.<sup>23</sup> But most humiliating and annoying of

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<sup>20</sup>Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.340. Baron Louis' stringent financial measures have often been regarded as one of the best features of the Restoration, but Bertier de Sauvigny [La Restauration (Paris, 1955) p.83] concludes that they were ultimately responsible for creating much of the disaffection in the government and the army.

<sup>21</sup>Between 10,000 and 11,000 officers were placed on "demi-solde", ranging from 75 francs per month for a captain to 44 francs per month for a lieutenant. "En moins d'un an, la Restauration fit donc 387 officiers-généraux, dont beaucoup n'avaient jamais commandé à deux hommes." Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, p.78.

<sup>22</sup>Cobban, op.cit., II, p.66; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.78.

<sup>23</sup>Thus when the thirty regiments of dragoons were reduced to fifteen the first was abolished, the second became the first, the fourth became the second, the fifth the third, etc. In all, the 1,3,8,9,10 and 20 to 30 regiments were disbanded. Cf. AHG C15\* 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

all was the substitution of the Bourbon flag for the tri-colour: "They imposed on us," wrote Ségur, "the flag under which they had fought us".<sup>24</sup> The entire programme was counter productive, for instead of royalising the army it only demoralized it.<sup>25</sup>

Even before Napoleon embarked from Elba there were ominous signs that the Restoration was breaking down. The resignation with which the majority of Frenchmen had received the Bourbons was giving way to anger as the fear that the abuses of the ancien régime were once again going to emerge.<sup>26</sup> Due to the "reforms" of Dupont, the army's mood, upon which the fate of the government hung, ranged from sullen resentment to open defiance. Its hostility found many forms of expression; for instance, sentries continued the old practice of presenting arms to veterans wearing the cross of the Legion of Honour, despite all the ordinances forbidding it. Fouché, on a more serious level, planned a military coup in conjunction with Drouet d'Erlon, commander of the 16th military division (Lille), which

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<sup>24</sup>Cobban, op.cit., II, p.66. Besides the change in the flag, the tri-colour cockade was replaced by the white and the regiment's eagles were abolished. Cf. Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.50.

<sup>25</sup>Dupont, "contresigné de scandaleuses nominations dans la Légion d'Honneur; il avait souffert la création des compagnies rouges . . . la réorganisation aristocratique de l'École militaire, le licenciement des invalides, la suppression des maisons de la Légion d'Honneur; enfin il n'avait pas su obtenir l'exécution d'ordonnance royale du 1<sup>er</sup> juillet relative au paiement des sommes dues aux officiers . . ." Houssaye, op.cit., p.78.

<sup>26</sup>Lefebvre, op.cit., p.564.



aimed to replace Louis XVIII with either Napoleon II or the Duke d'Orleans.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the deep discord in France, Napoleon's return from Elba found the population inclined to await the outcome of events rather than openly declare for one side.<sup>28</sup> Even in the army, this was evident - largely because of a conflict of loyalties between the oath to the King and the memories of the great man. Unlike the majority of military men, however, Dumas decidedly supported the Bourbons until the very last. As Napoleon drew ever closer to Paris, the Court committed one folly after another until the ultimate mistake was made when the Old Guard was ordered to march from Metz, where it had languished in virtual exile, with orders to intercept and arrest Napoleon.<sup>29</sup> Dumas immediately perceived what he considered to be the error in this manoeuvre and, convincing the Court that should the Guard reach Napoleon all was lost, he rode with orders to reverse its march.<sup>30</sup> He arrived at Chaumont only to discover that

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<sup>27</sup>Bertier de Sauvigny, *op.cit.*, p.85; Chandler, *op.cit.*, p.1010. Although this rebellion began on 8 March 1815, Napoleon had not been responsible for it.

<sup>28</sup>Bertier de Sauvigny, *op.cit.*, p.341; Cobban, *op.cit.*, II, p.67.

<sup>29</sup>"In the capital complacency was rapidly being succeeded by frantic and futile orders and counter-orders and something approaching a panic." Cobban, *op.cit.*, II, p.67

<sup>30</sup>When Napoleon landed the conclusion reached by Dumas, and the majority of Frenchmen, was that if he acquired sufficient numbers civil war would erupt. As for the actual course of events, Dumas admitted: "Non, je ne pouvais croire que son nom seul, et une poignée de braves, qui représentaient la vieille grande armée, suffiraient pour réveiller tous les souvenirs, frapper toute la nation comme par un coup électrique, et faire voler de clocher en clocher le drapeau tricolore jusqu'au des Tuileries." Dumas, *op.cit.*, III, p.562.

it was already too late, for its commander, Marshal Oudinot, admitted "Ils me respectent, mais ils me gardent à vue et ne m'obéissent pas".<sup>31</sup> His mission a failure, Dumas returned to Paris in time to witness the departure of the King.

What occurred next is a matter of some uncertainty because Dumas' own account often conflicts with what few facts can be established. According to his Souvenirs, he was persuaded by his family and friends to attend a levée held by Napoleon and following this audience he retired to his country home, Villepinte. Several days later he read in the Moniteur that he had been appointed Director General of the Organisation of the National Guard. But he adds that he was not recalled to the Council of State: "J'étais seul excepté des membres de la section de la guerre", nor was he made intendant general when the army's staff was formed. "J'ai su qu'il ne comptait nullement sur mon dévouement, mais bien sur ma probité et mon exactitude à remplir les fonctions que j'aurais acceptées."<sup>32</sup>

However, Dumas' account distorts his relationship with Napoleon in several significant ways. The records of the Secretary of State clearly indicate that official notice of his appointment as Director General was sent to him on 12

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., III, p.566.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., III, p.570.

April,<sup>33</sup> five days after his nomination had been discussed,<sup>34</sup> but still three days before the announcement appeared in the Moniteur.<sup>35</sup> While it is true that he was not included in the Council of State organised by Napoleon, he was given the title of Councillor of State in service "extraordinaire", which was the same title he had held ever since 1812.<sup>36</sup> In the area of his employment, Dumas again misrepresents the situation, for Daru had exercised the functions of Intendant General in 1814 and he was selected by Napoleon to retain the post in 1815. Because Napoleon expected to fight a brief campaign with a small veteran army close to the borders of France, the role of the Intendant General, arguably, can be said to have been of less importance than that of the Director General. Thus, Dumas' position during the Hundred Days was one of greater, not lesser, trust.

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<sup>33</sup>Extrait des Minutes de la Secreteriairie d'état, Tuileries, 12 April 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360. Dumas' actions were not those of one who felt himself in disgrace and excluded from authority. On 7 April he wrote to Baron Berthezene requesting confirmation by the Commission de l'Etat de Service of St. Marcel's honorary rank of Lt. General, granted by the Bourbons on 28 January 1815. It may have been coincidental that the date of this letter was the same as that of his nomination, but as the letter was written from Paris, Dumas may have already been apprised that he would be offered the post and so knowing he was again in service, he would have felt confident enough to have made this request. Cf. Dumas to Berthezene, Paris, 7 April 1815, AAG GD 395.

<sup>34</sup>Extrait des Minutes de la Secreteriairie d'état, Tuileries, 7 April 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360.

<sup>35</sup>Moniteur no. 105, 15 April 1815, p.427. "Par décret imperial du 7 de ce mois, M. le general comte Dumas est nommé directeur-général de l'organisation des gardes nationales sous les ordres du ministre de l'intérieur."

<sup>36</sup>Durand, op.cit., pp.765 and 771.

In 1826, at the time the Souvenirs were written, Napoleon was dead and so no longer an issue. However, the attitude of the restored Bourbon government had made an issue of service during the Hundred Days. Dumas' account was written with this discrimination against himself and his fellow officers in mind. Through his intentional misrepresentation of his relationship with Napoleon, Dumas sought to place emphasis upon his service to France in her defence, rather than upon his support or acceptance of Napoleon. Once the Bourbons had fled to Belgium and identified themselves and their cause with the foreign powers who were preparing to invade France, the question of the monarch ceased to matter. In a situation reminiscent of the summer of 1792, the choice had become whether to support France or her enemies and, as in 1792, Dumas chose France:

Je m'y livrai sans réserve; je remplis avec zèle le devoir de concourir à la défense du territoire, évidemment menacé d'une seconde invasion, et dans ma conscience je ne m'accusais point d'un manque de foi.<sup>37</sup>

Ever since Waterloo, military historians have found reason to criticise the choice of personnel Napoleon made during the Hundred Days. He employed Ney, Grouchy and Soult in positions for which they were not best suited or which were beyond their capabilities, while he left Davout, the ablest of his marshals, in Paris and chose not to

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<sup>37</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.570. Similarly, the threat of invasion in 1814 brought offers of support from many of Napoleon's critics, such as Carnot, who had withdrawn from service in opposition to the life Consulate. Cf. Carnot to Napoleon, Paris, 29 January 1814, AN 108 AP 1.

employ at all the finest leader of cavalry in Europe, Murat.<sup>38</sup> But at least in the choice of Director General for the organisation of the National Guard he had found the best combination of experience, ability and zeal necessary for what was potentially one of the most important posts in the government.

The greatest shortage facing Napoleon at the onset of the campaign was manpower. The army he had inherited from the Bourbons numbered only 200,000 men and would have to face at least five times that number of allied troops. Seventy-five thousand veterans were recalled and fifteen thousand volunteers appeared but these measures taken together with the conscripts of the class of 1815 (120,000 men) were still woefully inadequate. Furthermore, even these few resources could not immediately be assembled into a field army because they were barely sufficient to garrison the entire length of France's frontiers.<sup>39</sup> If France were not to be borne under by sheer weight of numbers, the leading allied armies had to be quickly defeated, thereby either ending the war or at least gaining sufficient time

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<sup>38</sup>General Fuller (op.cit., II, pp.494-95) sums up this criticism aptly when he writes "For the effective execution of his grand tactics, he needed at least four men who thoroughly understood his bataillon carre system. These four appointments were the most fatal of all the errors Napoleon committed during the Hundred Days." Cf. Chandler, op.cit., pp.1021-23 and Archibald Frank Beck, Napoleon and Waterloo (London, 1936) p.36.

<sup>39</sup>Arthur Chuquet, "La Défense Nationale en 1815", Annales Révolutionnaires (I, 1908), p.80; General Gourgaud, The Campaign of 1815 (London, 1815), pp.5-8 et passim; and Chandler, op.cit., p.1014.



to meet the remainder on more equal terms. To free his army for an offensive in the north, Napoleon resorted to a massive employment of the National Guard. They were to relieve the garrisons of all the fortresses in the country, so releasing them for field service, and on secondary fronts the youngest and ablest guardsmen, formed into full divisions, were to supplement the field armies.<sup>40</sup>

The Bourbons had themselves ordered the mobilization of the National Guard on 9 March 1815 in an effort to stop Napoleon, but those guardsmen who responded were ordered to return to their homes.<sup>41</sup> Reports returned by the *prefets* on the state of the Guard following this decree give a clear impression of how little a base Dumas had to begin from. Rouen (*Seine inférieure*) reported on 28 March 1815, "L'organisation de corps de volontaires s'effectuait dans mon département avec beaucoup de lenteur et très peu de zèle, quelque foibles détachemens de gardes nationales seulements avoient été dirigés de points du département . . ."; Limoges (*Haute Vienne*) reported on 27 March: "Il n'y avais eu jusqu'à presents, monseigneur, qu'une seule compagnie de gardes nationales mobilisée . . ."; Le Mans (*Sarthe*) 27

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<sup>40</sup> Chuquet, *op.cit.*, pp.84-85. Gourgaud suggests in his account (*op.cit.*, p.24) that an invasion of Belgium in May, when there were only 100,000 Allies assembled, had to be abandoned by Napoleon because, among other considerations, the National Guard was not then sufficiently organised to occupy the fortresses and render disposable the necessary troops of the line to form the army.

<sup>41</sup> Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'état, Paris, 21 March 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360.

March: "Les ordres du Duc de Bourbon pour la levée de 1000 gardes nationaux, n'ont recue d'exécution . . ."; Chateauroux (Indre) 27 March: "Il n'a point non plus été formé de corps de volontaires . . ." In all fourteen replies received, none of the prefets reported any progress in organisation.<sup>42</sup>

The first positive measure towards raising the estimated 200 battalions which were required was taken on 23 March 1815, but this only placed responsibility for the guard's organisation under the Minister of the Interior (Carnot).<sup>43</sup> It was not until 11 April that the decree providing the necessary regulations was signed. In conformity with the decree of 5 April 1813, it specified that all Frenchmen between 20 and 60 were eligible for service unless excepted (art. I) and that the formation of guard units was the responsibility of committees which were to be set up on the administrative level of the arrondissement and the department.<sup>44</sup> Dumas controlled and co-ordinated this vast operation through the employment of special commissioners who were assigned to each of the 23 military

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<sup>42</sup>These replies were in response to a circular from Carnot requesting an account of all activities taken to arm the National Guard. Carnot, "À M. le Préfet du Département d \_\_\_\_\_", Paris, 22 March 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360 doss. 1.

<sup>43</sup>Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'état, Paris, 23 March 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360.

<sup>44</sup>Napoleon I, Décret Sur les Gardes Nationales, 10 April 1815, published in the Moniteur of 11 April 1815.

divisions into which France was divided.<sup>45</sup> They were granted almost dictatorial powers over matters affecting the affairs of the Guard, reflecting the importance of their mission, as the following circular illustrates:

Vous vous rendrez à \_\_\_\_\_ : votre arrondissement comprendra la \_\_\_\_\_ Division Militaire. Le but principal de cette mission est l'organisation des gardes nationales et de la mettre à Lyon, à la disposition de M. le Maréchal duc d'Albuferon. Vous êtes investis de tous le pouvoirs nécessaires au succes de votre mission: vous pourrez faire de proclamation, changer provisoirement les autorités civiles, ainsi que les officiers des gardes nationales, vous êtes autorisé à vous faire delivrer - par les autorités locales les sommes qui vous seront nécessaires . . .<sup>46</sup>

The commissioners in the departments were supported by an extensive bureau in Paris, assembled under Dumas' direction. It was divided into a Cabinet, under Saint-Didier's direction, which controlled the central accounting, a subsection for the situation reports and bulletins and the Paris firebrigade, and three bureaux, two for personnel and the third for arms, equipment, pay and accounting.<sup>47</sup> In accordance with the decree of 10 April, officers were selected from Paris and were drawn mainly from the regular

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<sup>45</sup>Napoleon I, Decret: Commissionnaires Extraordinaire, Paris, 21 April 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360 doss. 3. Prominent public figures were employed in this capacity, including: Dumolard (6<sup>e</sup> division militaire), Pontécoulant (10<sup>e</sup>), Boissy d'Anglas (11<sup>e</sup>), Miot (12<sup>e</sup>), Maret (19<sup>e</sup>), Marchant (20<sup>e</sup>) and after 7 May Roederer (7<sup>e</sup> and 8<sup>e</sup>). Cf. Chef de la 1<sup>ere</sup> Division du Ministère de l'Intérieur to Dumas, Paris, 7 May 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360 doss. 3. Their role was to preserve order and to establish a civil administration as well as to organise the National Guard.

<sup>46</sup>Ministère de l'interieur, Circulaire, Paris, 4 April 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360.

<sup>47</sup>Dumas, Repartition du Travail et du Personnel de la Direction Général de l'Organisation des Gardes Nationales, Paris, 6 May 1815, AN F<sup>9</sup> 360 doss. 17.

army or from those on half pay.<sup>48</sup> As an aid to the commissioners and the committees, Dumas prepared a fifty page table of organisation.<sup>49</sup> Once the preliminary stages of organisation were completed, the élite companies (Grenadiers and Chasseurs) of each battalion were drawn off and under the supervision of the Ministry of War were formed into élite battalions. These battalions were either united into field divisions or were sent to garrison the fortresses.<sup>50</sup> The magnitude of Dumas' achievement rivalled Napoleon's own measures with the army. In the short span of six weeks over 100,000 élite National Guards were made available for service. The following table, prepared at the end of May, best represents its scope:

Récapitulation: Nombre des Bataillons<sup>51</sup>

Armée	Requir	À Employer dans les Places	À Employer aux Corps de Réserve
du Nord	115	105	10 (1 division)
de la Moselle	42	32	10 (1 division)
du Rhin	35	29	6 (1 division)
du Jura	46	23	23 (2 divisions)
des Alpes	56	14	42 (3 divisions)
de la Manche	30	30	0
Totaux	324	233	91

<sup>48</sup>Letter to Dumas, Paris, 23 April 1815, AHG X<sup>m</sup> 29.  
Cf. Gardes Nationales, Documents Généraux et Correspondance, AHG X<sup>m</sup> 1 to 30.

<sup>49</sup>Dumas, "Instructions Sur l'Organisation, le Traitement et la Compatabilité des Gardes Nationales", Paris, 10 May 1815, AN F<sup>7</sup> 360 doss. 10 (carries proof marks by Dumas).

<sup>50</sup>Chuquet, op.cit., p.85. Twenty battalions of veterans (retired officers and soldiers) were also raised and used to provide instruction to these Guard formations.

<sup>51</sup>Gardes Nationales Par Place Et Par Armées, Paris, 31 May 1815, AHG X<sup>m</sup> 29. See Appendix III for details.

Outside the Army of the North, the bulk of France's defenders wore the uniforms of the National Guard - its divisions constituted one-fourth of the Armies of the Moselle and Rhine (not including the garrisons), three-fifths of the Army of the Alps, two-thirds of the corps of the Jura and of the Pyrenees. Furthermore, these proportions rose by the end of June as additional reinforcements became available: 50,000 regulars and 100,000 National Guardsmen each for the armies of the North, Rhine and Alps.<sup>52</sup>

Dumas' responsibilities as Director General left him little time for other work during the Hundred Days. He did assist the Grand Master of Ceremonies prepare for the ceremony on the Champs du Mars and also appeared at dinners and functions organised by Joseph in support of the new government.<sup>53</sup>

Following the disaster at Waterloo and Napoleon's second abdication, he attached himself to the staff of Marshal Davout, commander of the French forces around Paris (29 June). Had it not been for Fouché, the war would certainly have continued with every possibility of the Allies suffering an even great defeat than that which

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<sup>52</sup>William Siborne, History of the War in France, (2 vols., London, 1844) I, p.14.

<sup>53</sup>Dumas to Durosnel, Paris, 29 May 1815, AN AB XIX 3375. Lafayette, Mémoires, II, p.275.



they had inflicted on the French at Waterloo.<sup>54</sup> But Davout distrusted Fouché, the head of the provisional government, and was inclined to believe further resistance might provoke civil war between the royalists and the republicans.<sup>55</sup> The Chambers had openly declared against the Bourbons and sent a deputation headed by Lafayette to negotiate with the Allies, the general inclination being to substitute Orleans. Wellington, however, was resolved upon the restoration of the King and he and Louis were in secret contact with Fouché. The outcome of these

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<sup>54</sup>Waterloo has often been regarded as a decisive victory but it was nothing of the kind. Rather, it was a battle in which the victorious Allies failed to follow up their tactical victory by launching an all out pursuit. This failure allowed Marshal Grouchy's wing to escape practically unmolested and for the remainder of the French army to rally off the field. Thus when Wellington and Blucher began their advance, without awaiting the Austrian and Russian armies, they faced 117,000 French regulars and 170,000 conscripts, backed by 400 field and 300 heavy guns around Paris with only 118,000 of their own combined armies. Had not Fouché been able to undermine first Napoleon's and then the Chambers' will to resist, the dangerously over-extended Allies would have stood little chance. Thus in the strategic sense Fouché more than any other individual, civilian or military, deserves the credit for making Waterloo the decisive battle. Cf. Chandler, op.cit., pp.1090-1905; Gourgaud, op.cit., p.163 et passim; and Siborne, op.cit., II, pp.298-344. On Fouché's role, see Louis Madelin, Fouché (2 vols., Paris, 1923), II, pp.389-447 et passim; Joseph Fouché, Lettres du M. Fouché, Duc d'Otrante Au Duc de Wellington (Paris, nd) BN 80 Lb 40 2744; and Eugene Forgues, Le Dossier Secret de Fouché (Juillet-Septembre 1815) (Paris, 1908).

<sup>55</sup>"Je le répète il faut proclamer Louis XVIII, lui demander de faire son entrée sans les troupes étrangères, qui ne devront jamais entrer dans Paris; Louis XVIII doit régner avec la nation . . . J'ai surmonté mes préjugés, mes idées; je n'ai été mu que par la plus impérieuse des nécessités et parce qu'il m'est prouvé qu'il n'y a que ce moyen qui puisse sauver notre malheureuse patrie." Davout to Fouché, Paris, 28 June 1815, cited in Madelin, op.cit., II, p.416. Dumas was of the same opinion. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.576.

manoeuvres was the military convention of 3 July by which Paris was evacuated and, following this, Fouché's brazen proclamation to the provisional government that their role was over and that all was in order for the King's return.<sup>56</sup>

The second Restoration did not have an auspicious beginning. The civil war, which Davout had sought to avoid through capitulation, flared up anyway in the guise of the 'White Terror'. The King's Cambrai declaration of amnesty was forgotten and reprisals began against those who had supported Napoleon. The army, which had played such a crucial role, bore the brunt of these proscriptions.<sup>57</sup> Marshal Ney, executed after trial by the Peers, was the most notable victim of this 'Legal Terror', but it was not only the superior officers who suffered. A Special Commission "chargée d'examiner la conduite des officiers qui ont servi pendant l'usurpation" was created to grade all officers

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<sup>56</sup>After making this statement, Fouché prevented the Legislature from meeting by blocking the entrance to its assembly with a squad of soldiers - there was no resistance. Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.342; Lefebvre, op.cit., pp.571-72; and Madelin, op.cit., II, pp.446-47.

<sup>57</sup>"Les émigrés de Gand négligèrent de penser que cette victoire (sic. Waterloo), leur victoire; était remportée sur des Français, que Prussiens et Anglais ne cessaient pas d'être les ennemis de la France pour être les alliés du roi . . ." Charles H. Pouthas, Guizot Pendant la Restauration; Préparation de l'Homme d'Etat (Paris, 1923), p.95. Brune and Ramel were massacred by the civilian population in Avignon and Toulouse respectively. Resnick's [Daniel P. Resnick, The White Terror and The Political Reaction After Waterloo (Harvard, 1966), p.113] studies indicated that "Almost every department in France was affected to some degree by the legal reaction that began in the late fall of 1815 and lasted through the following year".

according to their political conduct.<sup>58</sup>

Dumas' own ruin was encompassed in this reaction. Following the capitulation of 3 July, he had left the army and returned to Villepinte to find that his house had been partially pillaged by the Brunswick Corps.<sup>59</sup> He was retired from the army on 4 September 1815. His brothers, too, lost their employment. St. Marcel was retired from the customs service and St. Fulcrand had already lost his posts in Naples as intendant of Bori and Master of Requests when Murat was dethroned.<sup>60</sup>

The only resources left to Dumas were his retirement pay and an undisclosed sum of money owed to him from his period of service in Naples, supplemented by royalties derived from the Précis, two volumes of which appeared almost every year until failing eyesight brought his work

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<sup>58</sup>Richard Holroyd, "The Bourbon Army: 1815-1830", The Historical Journal, XIV (no.3, 1971) p.529. There was no need to sort out the common soldiers; this they did themselves as over 70,000 men, one-half of Davout's command, preferred desertion to the white cockade.

<sup>59</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.585. The house was only preserved from further damage by a Prussian officer who remembered Dumas from 1812. According to the "Monographie Communale", Villepinte was occupied by the Russians in 1814, the Prussians (I and II Corps) in June 1815, and Wellington's army after 1 July. Instituteurs Publics, "Monographies Communales, XXIV, Canton de Gonesse", (Villepinte, 29 August 1899), p.10.

<sup>60</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.584. Pension Militaire, op. cit.; Dumas to the Minister of War, 2 September 1815; l'Inspecteur Général aux Revues, Livret de Solde - Mathieu Dumas, 1 January 1816, AAG GD 395. Miot de Melito mentions in his Memoirs (André François Miot de Mérito, Memoirs of Count Miot de Mérito, ed. General Fleischmann, trans. by Cashel Hoey and John Lillie (2 vols., London, 1881), II, p.753n) that his pension as a former Councillor of State was withdrawn in 1815 and not restored until 1818. Presumably Dumas also lost this revenue, although he makes no specific reference to it.

to a halt in 1826.<sup>61</sup> He remained out of public life until 1818.<sup>62</sup>

Like other imperial officers, Dumas' return to service was made possible largely because the period following the dissolution of the 'Chambre Introuvable' proved to be one of attempted constitutional government, and the calmest of the Restoration.<sup>63</sup> Two of the three political groups which appeared at this time were in favour of liberal reforms: the Constitutional Party which was "born" out of opposition to the excesses of the Royalists or 'Ultras' and the 'White Terror' and the Independents who represented the Republicans, Bonapartists and Orleanists. (Formed in 1817, they were really a splinter group of the Constitutional

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<sup>61</sup>"Je me livrai tout entier à ce travail . . . J'ai continué cet ouvrage, dont j'ai publié à peu près deux volumes chaque année, jusque vers le milieu de l'an 1826, époque à laquelle la faiblesse de ma vue m'a forcé de l'interrompre". Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.588.

<sup>62</sup>"Je reconnus bientôt l'insuffisance de mon revenu et le poids des engagements que j'avais contractés. Voyant l'esprit de parti un peu amorti, et le gouvernement ramené à la modération, je cherchai à m'en rapprocher, et à me faire employer." Ibid., III, p.589. He also claimed payment of 947 francs 10 centimes for expenses incurred in the liquidation of the army in 1814. Dumas to Gouvion St. Cyr, Paris, 5 June 1818, AAG GD 395.

<sup>63</sup>The 'Chambre Introuvable' had been elected in August 1815 at the height of the 'White Terror'. Under the Duke de Richelieu, who succeeded Talleyrand as chief minister, a more reactionary government was installed and the 'Legal Terror' instituted. Louis XVIII dissolved this Chamber on 5 September 1815 on the advice of Decazes, his Minister of Police, and the Allied governments who feared that it was too reactionary. Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., pp.124-138; Frederick B. Artz, France Under the Bourbon Restoration, 1814-1830 (New York, 1863), p.19; Jacques Droz, Europe Between Revolutions, 1815-1848 (London, 1967), pp.98-100.



party.)<sup>64</sup> The politics of this period do not relate directly to Dumas except in regard to the constitution of the army. The Constitutionalist and Independents were able to pass a law reorganising the army on a basis more favourable to the former Napoleonic officers, thus redressing to some extent the imbalance caused by the purges of 1815. Although the 'Ultras' and even the other European powers were concerned over the return of these officers, reforms of this nature were necessary for practical reasons and in France fear of the army's weakness overcame the right's fears of its strength.<sup>65</sup>

Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, who replaced Clarke (12 September 1817), became the first Minister of War of the Restoration to attempt any serious reforms. Through the reintroduction of conscription (40,000 per year maximum) the army's strength was raised to 240,000 from its previous level of 150,000. Many old soldiers were persuaded to return to the colours, serving as a reserve on half-pay. Divisions, however, still persisted in the officer class between those who had fought for or against Napoleon, and

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<sup>64</sup> Charles Pouthas (op.cit., p.127) states that: "les violences contre-révolutionnaires de la chambre avaient créé un parti constitutionnel". For the composition of these parties, see Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., pp.140-44.

<sup>65</sup> In 1823, at the outset of the Spanish campaign, the total strength of the army was 160,000 men. Before St. Cyr's reforms, (according to Richard Holroyd, op.cit., p.530) "The Guard was almost the only section of the army that constituted an effective military force, although the state of other regiments varied." For the Royalists' fears, see E. Bonnal de Granges, Les Royalistes Contre L'Armée: 1815-1820 (2 vols., Paris, 1906).



these were aggravated by the incompetence of many royalist colonels and general officers.<sup>66</sup>

Dumas maintained that his appointment as a Councillor of State in service "extraordinaire" came as a result of St. Cyr, Louis (Finance) and Dessolles (Foreign Affairs). It was, however, a general policy of St. Cyr's to re-employ officers who had been compromised by the Hundred Days as part of the government's measures to satisfy the left, the return to service of these officers being the military equivalent of the sixteen préfets and forty sous-préfets replaced by Decazes.<sup>67</sup> He was transferred to ordinary service with appointment to a commission selected by St. Cyr to study the defence of France and to prepare general plans for each frontier.<sup>68</sup> Dumas and St. Cyr Mugues were assigned the Pyrenees, the least critical frontier, as their specific area of responsibility.<sup>69</sup> Concurrently with this project, Dumas served as a representative of the government in the presentation of a law regulating the commerce and

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<sup>66</sup>Holroyd, op.cit., p.533; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.145.

<sup>67</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.590; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.158.

<sup>68</sup>This commission consisted of: Marescot (president), Andréossy, Dumas, Ruty, Valée, Guillemainot, Chambarlhac, Pelet (secretary) and St. Cyr Mugues. Note Par Le Bureau de l'Etat Major, Paris, 12 August 1819, AAG GD 395.

<sup>69</sup>Dumas to St. Cyr, Paris, 31 May 1818, AAG GD 395. The report itself was largely Dumas' work; St. Cyr Mugues' name did not even appear on one of the copies. Cf. Dumas et St. Cyr Mugues, "Mémoire Sur le Defense de la Frontière des Pyrénées", np, May 1819, AHG MR 1221.

production of saltpetre to the two Chambers.<sup>70</sup>

Christian Dumas also benefited from the government's change in attitude. He entered the army in March 1818 as a lieutenant in the Chasseurs des Alpes. By January of the following year he had been admitted to the corps of the General Staff and became aide-de-camp to General DeFrance, commander of the First Military Division.<sup>71</sup>

The end of the attempt at constitutional government, of the Constitutional party itself and of Dumas' renewed political career began with the elections of 1819. The party of the left, or Independents, won such a great success that they seemed to challenge the political balance. Decazes' reaction was to move towards the right, one of his first actions being the dismissal of Gouvion St. Cyr, ending the army reforms.<sup>72</sup> The murder of the Duke de Berry (13-14 February 1820), nephew of Louis XVIII and the only member of the senior branch of the family capable of producing an heir, drove the government further towards the Ultras, and Decazes was replaced by the Duke de Richelieu and then by Villèle. Dumas himself was included in the fall from power of his patrons - St. Cyr, Louis and, to a

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<sup>70</sup>Dumas et Allent, "Projet de la loi sur la Commerce et la Fabrication des Salpêtre", Chambre des Députés, 9 January 1819, Chambre des Piers, 23 February 1819, AM CC 992.

<sup>71</sup>Cr. Lasseray, op.cit., under Comte Christian Léon Dumas, and AAG 2<sup>e</sup>-Série GB 3103.

<sup>72</sup>Bertier de Sauvigny, "French Politics", p.347. The Ministry was split over this movement to the right with Serre and Portal supporting and St. Cyr, Louis and Dessolles opposed. Duke de Broglie, Souvenirs (4 vols., Paris, 1886), II, p.66.

lesser extent, Decazes himself.<sup>73</sup> Under the new government headed by Villèle (1822) Dumas was struck from the list of Councillors of State. His position was further reduced after the ascension of Charles X when Villèle published an ordinance which automatically retired all officers who had reached retirement age and had not been actively employed since 1823. Thus Dumas and "presque tous des anciens officiers de l'Empire" were again retired.<sup>74</sup>

The period between his relegation and his election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1828 was one of the hardest in Dumas' life. St. Marcel died at Versailles on 1 May 1826, and Mathieu's own health declined. His eyesight began to fail, forcing him to abandon work on the Précis by 1826, although it was no more than half completed, because he could no longer study the maps and plans of the campaigns.<sup>75</sup> By 1827, with this income lost, Dumas was forced to write to his former aide-de-camp, Clermont-Tonnerre, now Minister of War, requesting him to ask the King for a 'dotation', citing not only his forty-five years of service but also his pressing financial need:

La modicité de ma fortune . . . enfin le devoir de

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<sup>73</sup>Decazes had supported Dumas for the peerage, but he was not accepted as a result of du Berry's assassination. Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.593.

<sup>74</sup>Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.369. The ordinance encompassed approximately 250 officers. Its reception was not aided by the fact that it appeared on 2 December 1823 - the anniversary of Austerlitz.

<sup>75</sup>Dumas, op.cit., III, p.598.

soutenir une nombreuse famille m'imposent celui de recourir aux bontés des recevoir par l'entremise de votre excellence un honorable témoignage, répandant sur mes derniers jours la plus précieuse et la plus honorable consolation.<sup>76</sup>

and in a second letter dated the same day he added:

J'ai beaucoup de peine, en maintenant dans ma retraite une convenable et décente économie à conserver mon patrimoine intact à mes enfants.<sup>77</sup>

Clermont acted immediately and a dotation pension of 1,500 francs was awarded to Dumas on 1 September 1827.<sup>78</sup>

Some consolation was provided by the loyalty of his old friends. Roederer had preserved fragments of Dumas' correspondence, including an invitation to dinner "réunir avec le comte Miot, Ferri, Pisani Fréville, à un petit cercle devenu trop peu nombreux, de ce qu'il reste d'anciens compagnons qui se sont trouvés avec moi soit à Naples, soit en Espagne".<sup>79</sup> Replies to other letters, revealing Dumas' "extrême plaisir" at reading Roederer's "dernières comédies historiques" which Roederer had sent Dumas, indicate a

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<sup>76</sup>Dumas to Clermont, Villepinte, 29 August 1827, AAG GD 395.

<sup>77</sup>Dumas to Clermont (Elle Seule), Villepinte, 29 August 1827, AAG GD 395. Dumas concluded, however, in a less humble tone: "Je n'ai pas moins à coeur d'obtenir à mon tour un témoignage éclatant des bonnes grâces du Roi, parce que, devant Dieu et dans ma conscience, je ne cède à personne l'avantage et l'honneur des les avoir mieux mériter."

<sup>78</sup>Ministère de la Guerre, Note Pour la Section de la Donation de l'Ordre de St. Louis, np, 1 September 1827, AAG GD 395. Clermont had also acted with urgency upon Dumas' request for the Grand Cross of St. Louis (Dumas to Clermont, Paris, 4 May 1825, AAG GD 395).

<sup>79</sup>Dumas to Roederer, Paris, 17 January 18--?, AN 29 AP 10 (Roederer).

continued and longstanding relationship.<sup>80</sup> Christian Dumas, following service during the Spanish campaign, returned to Paris to care for his father and to aid him in the preparation of the Précis and then upon the Souvenirs.<sup>81</sup> In 1824, Christian married Julia Caroline Bérard, daughter of a receiver of finances, a marriage which undoubtedly brought financial benefit but not an advance in social standing.<sup>82</sup>

Written during this period of dejection and difficulty, the Souvenirs were clearly intended as a defence of his career.<sup>83</sup> There is no better illustration of the dominance of Dumas' constitutional scruples than in the conception of his defence. He felt compelled to demonstrate the

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<sup>80</sup>Dumas to Roederer, Ferraux près Nogent, 19 October 1825 and idem. Villepinte, 3 October 1827, AN 29 AP 10. Earlier Roederer had loaned Dumas a considerable number of books concerning the campaigns of the French army from 1793 to 1807. Dumas, Note, Villepinte, 21 September 1815, (attached to Dumas to Roederer, Paris, 22 May 1821, AN 29 AP 10).

<sup>81</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.603.

<sup>82</sup>The records of Christian's marriage were destroyed in 1870. Details of his marriage have been taken from "Liquidation du Pension: Christian Dumas" prepared by the Ministry of War in 1873. (AAG 2<sup>e</sup> Série GB 3103) Julia was the daughter of Auguste Simon Louis Bérard and married on 22 April 1824.

<sup>83</sup>Although they did not appear until 1839, there is a strong indication that Dumas had originally intended them to appear in 1827-28. The narrative ends in 1826 and the ensuing ten years of his life receive a scant three pages. A letter from Louis Philippe Ségur, written at this time, (Segur to Dumas, Paris, 22 May 1827 in the possession of a private dealer - Charavay - AN Ch. 715, 6-64, 29935, reproduced in the Souvenirs, I, p.3) makes specific reference to Dumas' Souvenirs, indicating that publication was a distinct possibility - "Je voudrais bien aussi vous voir publier vos mémoires . . ."



loyalty of Louis XVI to the Constitution of 1791 in order to justify his own conduct. Accordingly, the period of the Legislative Assembly was, in his eyes, the most important phase of his career and a full third of his Souvenirs are dedicated to the events from October 1791 to September 1792.<sup>84</sup> Of Louis XVI he wrote:

Je déclare que je ne crois point que jamais Louis XVI, depuis son acceptation de la constitution, ait jamais connivé avec les puissances étrangères ni concerté aucun plan avec elles, bien moins encore avec les princes ses frères, et les émigrés, pour opérer par les armes une contre-révolution; pendant les trente-huit années écoulées depuis cette époque jusqu'au moment où j'écris, je n'ai rien vu, rien lu, rien appris qui ait pu me faire changer d'opinion sur ce point.<sup>85</sup>

Louis had to be shown to be innocent of the royalists' plot if the accusation of hypocrisy or of yielding under duress to the Constitutionals was to be avoided.

Je déclare ici que d'après tout ce que j'ai observé par moi-même et d'après les rapports qui m'ont été faits par des personnes bien informées, il est résulté pour moi la conviction que ni Louis XVI ni la reine ne conçurent jamais le criminel dessein et la folle espérance de rétablir l'autorité royale par les mains de l'étranger.<sup>86</sup>

The attempted flight from Paris to Rouen, in which Dumas participated, was defended on the grounds that the King was not intending to abandon the Revolution but only to escape from the anarchy of Paris and the dictation of the

<sup>84</sup>I.e. Vol. I, 1770-1791; Vol. II, 1791-1792; Vol. III, 1792-1836.

<sup>85</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, II, pp.16-17.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., II, p.196.

factions.<sup>87</sup> In a similar manner, Louis' flight of 1791 towards Metz was defended. Here Dumas claims to have seen Bouillé's maps showing two positions for the royal camp, one inside France and the other across the border. Rather than ascribe them to military necessity, Dumas asserted that:

On ne peut douter que le dessein de faire sortir du royaume toute la famille royale n'appartint tout entier aux instigateurs de l'intrigue, mais que celui de rester isolé et libre de ses mouvements, dans une place de l'extrême frontière, sans la dépasser, enfin de ne point abandonner la France, n'appartint au roi seul.<sup>88</sup>

Through this, the loyal interpretation of Louis' acts, Dumas was able to claim ultimately that "On a calomnié la mémoire de Louis XVI, en supposant que ce prince infortuné comptait sur le secours des étrangers, et qu'il attendait sa délivrance du succès probable d'une invasion: c'est une absurdité . . ."<sup>89</sup>

A contemporary political purpose was also served by the Souvenirs. In a manner similar to that of Ramel's Journal, Dumas intended that the tale of his own sufferings would evoke sympathy and in a moral sense undermine the philosophy of the Restoration. Louis XVI's position was as crucial to this objective as it was to his own defence.

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<sup>87</sup>Louis XVI avait tout le temps, et l'heure était venue d'abandonner la capitale envahie par une faction qui venait de démasquer ses projets sinistres, et de sortir de ce palais où déjà la majesté royale avait été impunément profanée . . ." Ibid., II, p.359.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., I, p.518.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., II, p.361.

For if, by his mixture of suffering and reason, he were able to convince people that Louis XVI actually did freely accept the Constitution, then it was the émigrés who had rebelled against the throne and contributed to its overthrow. With Louis' free consent, the ancien régime was extended to 1792 and, therefore, the Constitution of 1791 became the true foundation for the restored monarchy rather than the pre-1789 situation.

Sometime between 1824 and 1826, Dumas became affiliated with the Société de la Morale Chrétienne and with the related Société Philanthropique en faveur des Grecs. The Philhellenic movement was a European phenomenon by 1826, stimulated by the writings of Lamartine, Chateaubriand and Hugo as well as by Byron's death at Missolonghi. In France Chateaubriand, an Ultra, was at the head of the movement, but he was seconded by Broglie and other members of the liberals and independents.<sup>90</sup>

Both these organisations were concerned with raising money to aid the cause of Greek independence. In a joint letter to Baron Broughton, signed by Alexandre Lameth, Dumas, Cottier and Villenau, the purpose of these funds was described as to provide the Greeks "en arm<sup>es</sup>, en munitions, en habillement, chemises, souliers et soit pour l'organisation de troupes régulières soit pour être distribués aux

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<sup>90</sup>"Le mouvement philhellène, d'abord confiné aux milieux libéraux, avait gagné, à partir de 1824, l'adhésion des royalistes de droite." Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.400.

irrégulières."<sup>91</sup> By contrast, the Société de la Morale Chrétienne was not concerned solely with the Greek question. Under its Council of Administration, presided over by the Duke de Broglie, were committees for "l'abolition de la traité des Noirs, des Prisons, l'abolition des Jeux et Loteries, l'institution pour le placement des jeunes Orphelins, charité et de bienfaisance, sur la question de l'abolition de la peine de morte".<sup>92</sup> The Greek Committee,<sup>93</sup> according to the annual report of 1823-24, had been founded only the previous year (sic. 1822). Its purpose, in the words of the rapporteur, was "de revoyer dans leur patrie ceux de Grecs qui, dans les premiers temps de l'insurrection, échappèrent par la fuite aux fureurs de Musulmans."<sup>94</sup> An estimated ten million francs were raised by this committee by 1828. The purpose of the committee had been expanded by then to resemble more nearly that of

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<sup>91</sup>Lameth, Dumas, Cottier and Villenau (Société Philanthropique en faveur des Grecs) to Baron Broughton (John Cob Hobhouse), Paris, 4 November 1826, BM Broughton Papers, Add MSS 36463.

<sup>92</sup>Louis Guizard, "Rapport Sur les Travaux de la Société de la Morale Chrétienne", Assemblée Générale Annuelle de la Société de la Morale Chrétienne, Séance du 10 Mai 1824, p.26, BM 80R piece 7319.

<sup>93</sup>BM Broughton Papers, Add MSS 36463. The membership of the Comité de la Souscription en faveur des Grecs réfugiés en France given in the Society's report for 1823-24 was: La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt (pres.), de Broglie, Delessert, Alexandre de Laborde, de Lasteyrie, Charles de Remusat, A. Mahul, Dominique André, Mark Wilks, Charles Coquerel, Edouard Odrer, Jules Alisse, Casimir Rosta, and Greeks: Schinas, Vogoridi, Coutzofski and Photilas. Dumas does not figure among either this committee or the general society's members. Ibid., p.30.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p.15.

the Société Philanthropique, and change of membership was noted by the police, who reported its principal members as Chateaubriand, Choiseul, d'Alberg, Dumas and Sebastiani.<sup>95</sup>

Dumas re-entered politics in 1828, by standing in a by-election (21 April) for the First Arrondissement of Paris, held to replace Dupont de l'Eure, who had resigned his seat.<sup>96</sup> Apart from his age and health, he was in many ways an ideal candidate to reassure the wealthy but liberal electorate that the opposition could be trusted to end aristocratic abuse without resorting to social revolution. His entire career was testimony to this. He also had the considerable prestige of his long career in government and the army, plus the advantage of being known by his Parisian constituency. In short, as a royalist who had freely served the Revolution and Napoleon, Dumas was acceptable to all parties opposed to Villèle.

Seventy-five, infirm and almost blind, Dumas did not take a very active role in the debates of the Chamber, offering by way of an apology the observation that:

l'expression des yeux est un complément nécessaire à la parole, et quand on ne peut juger son impression

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<sup>95</sup>Directeur de Police, "Rapport: Affaires de Grèce", 1 March 1828, AN F<sup>7</sup> 6722(44). The Société Philanthropique, in their letter to Baron Broughton, reported a total of 39,500 francs raised in conjunction with the Comité de Genève under Eynard. Lameth, Dumas, Cottier and Villenau to Baron Broughton, Paris, 4 November 1826, BM Add MSS 36463.

<sup>96</sup>Dumas received 775 votes as opposed to 334 for his opponent, Mitot, of 1,241 cast. Georges Six, Les Généraux de la Révolution et de l'Empire (Paris, 1934), p. 394. Dupont de l'Eure had been elected for two arrondissements - Paris and l'Eure. His option for the second created the vacancy which Dumas filled.



sur l'auditoire, on ne retrouve plus en soi la même confiance; on devient plus méditatif, plus réservé, plus timide.<sup>97</sup>

Yet he was not altogether silent. On 10 May 1828 he spoke out in strong support of "associations politiques" (defined as assemblies of electors under which term the proposer sought to attack the liberal societies), arguing that the proposal of M. Pina to outlaw them was unconstitutional "inutile et vaine".<sup>98</sup> His other speeches were largely on financial matters: he defended an article of the army's budget concerning pay, spoke on military pensions, and on two occasions attacked government expenditure on the budget of 1830.<sup>99</sup> He was also associated with the liberal fight against the impôt.<sup>100</sup>

Martignac, a partisan of compromise, who had succeeded

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<sup>97</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.603

<sup>98</sup>Dumas, "Revision des Listes Electorales", Chambre des Députés, 10 May 1828, Madival, op.cit., 2<sup>e</sup> série, LIII, p.755.

<sup>99</sup>Dumas, "Discours Sur l'Art. VII de la section II du Budget de la guerre", Paris, 24 July 1828, BN 80 Le58 14; "Pension Militaires", Chambre des Députés, 23 Mars 1829; Madival, op.cit., 2<sup>e</sup> série, LVII, p.698; "Budget de 1830", Chambre des Députés, 29 June and 8 July 1829, ibid., LX, pp.712-13 and LXI, pp.173-74.

<sup>100</sup>The Journal de Commerce listed the deputies opposing the impôt as: Labbey de Pompière, Lafayette, Mathieu Dumas, Jacques Lafitte, Alex. de Laborde, Chardel, Eusèbe, Salverte, Ternaux and Corcelles, joined later by Demargay, Dupont de l'Eure, Manguin, Benjamin Constant, Bignon, Portaille, Bavoux, Podenas, Louis, Cochin and the deputies for Seine-et-Oise. Cited in Pouthas, op.cit., p.428. A police report for Moyent Sur Seine indicates that Saint-Didier, le président du comité directeur, participated in the same opinions as his father-in-law. Prefecture de l'Aube, "Rapport: l'Arrondissement de Moyent sur Seine", Troyes, January 1830, AN F7 6776(4).

Villèle after his defeat in the elections of 1827, was himself replaced by Prince Jules de Polignac, one of the most unpopular men in France.<sup>101</sup> The government put off a show of force until March 1830 in the hope that success of the expedition against Algiers would restore its popularity. It was, however, doubtful whether even the conquest of the whole of Africa could have made Polignac's government less distasteful. The Journal des Debats summed up France's opinion by pronouncing "Coblence, Waterloo, 1815! Voilà les trois principes, les trois personnages du ministère . . . Pressez, tordez ce ministère, il ne dégoûte qu'humiliations, malheurs et dangers".<sup>102</sup>

The show of strength came with Charles X's speech from the throne, which opened the parliamentary session on 2 March 1830. In language reminiscent of Louis XVI's address to the States General (23 June 1789), he spoke of his determination: "si, par une fatalité loin de ma pensée, vous m'abandonniez dans une si belle entreprise, seul je ferais le bonheur de mes peuples, seul je me considérerais comme leur véritable représentant."<sup>103</sup> The Chamber of

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<sup>101</sup>This second change was brusquely announced on 8 August 1829. Broglie recalled: "Ce fatal Moniteur du 8 août 1829 fut porté à tire d'ailes par toute la France: quel cri d'indignation et de consternation tout ensemble il fit éclater de proche en proche et de bouche en bouche, on peut aisément se le figurer; les contemporains ne l'ont point oublié." Broglie, op.cit., III, p.216.

<sup>102</sup>Jean Paul Garnier, Charles X: Le Roi - Le Proscrit (Paris, 1967), p.122; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.424. The comment was referring to the persons of Polignac (foreign affairs), Bourmont (war) and LaBourdonnaie (interior).

<sup>103</sup>Garnier, op.cit., p.130.

Deputies was not long in answering this challenge. Their response to Charles was to declare that the unity of the government's views and the wishes of the people, necessary under the Charter for the conduct of public affairs, did not exist, and further that:

Une défiance injuste des sentiments et de la raison de la France est aujourd'hui la pensée fondamentale de l'administration; votre peuple s'en afflige parce qu'elle est injurieuse pour lui; il s'en inquiète parce qu'elle est menaçante pour ses libertés.<sup>104</sup>

The adoption of this address left Charles with only two choices: he could replace Polignac and his ministry and thereby yield to the Chambers or he could dissolve the Chambers and hope to gain a legislature which would accept his policies. Charles chose the latter course because it offered the only opportunity for the success of his policies and because he was convinced that it would be possible to win a majority.<sup>105</sup> But he and his ministers had miscalculated. The elections proved to be a disaster for the "Chateau". Of the 221 Liberals who had voted for the speech, 201 were returned, to be joined by other newly

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p.133. This address was approved by 221 votes (including Dumas') to 181. At least 30 deputies of the right were so incensed with Charles' speech that they voted with the left. Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.429.

<sup>105</sup>His calculations were based upon the assumptions that forty members of the right, who had supported the Liberals, were no longer prepared to do so, that the success of the Algerian expedition would restore the government's popularity and that, as in 1819, the Liberals' success would alarm the voters, causing a conservative reaction. Charles also counted upon his own, largely imagined, popularity and on 13 June issued a direct appeal to the voters. Garnier, op.cit., p.142.

electd candidates, raising the total in opposition to 274 against 143 for the minority and 11 undecided.<sup>106</sup> The Liberals were especially successful in the region of Paris. Dumas retained his seat with 1,222 votes of the 1,430 cast.<sup>107</sup>

The government was not completely unprepared for this result. As early as 16 May, the date of the Chambers' dissolution, Polignac, d'Hassez and Montbel had proposed that in the event of a Liberal majority the King should evoke article 14 of the Charter to annul the elections. The suggestion provoked the resignation of Courvoisier and Chabrol (Justice and Fincances respectively) who were replaced in the ensuing reshuffling of the cabinet by three ministers who declared that it was a perfectly constitutional action.<sup>108</sup> When the results of the election became clear, Charles, convinced in what one historian has described as his feudal simplicity<sup>109</sup> that Louis XVI had saved nothing by making concessions, re-examined the question and, on 24 July, signed four ordinances which suspended freedom of the press, dissolved the Chambers, changed the

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p.208; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.432.

<sup>107</sup>Opposing him was admiral Duperre, who received a scant 113 votes. Six, op.cit., p.394.

<sup>108</sup>The new appointments were Chantelauze, Capelle and Peyronnet. Garnier, op.cit., p.141.

<sup>109</sup>Droz, op.cit., p.111.

electoral law and called for new elections.<sup>110</sup>

Had the matter rested solely with the Court and the parties, these ordinances probably would have succeeded in at last producing a legislature which would accept his programmes. The Chamber elected in July had not had an opportunity to meet and even if it had had that opportunity its deputies desired only the resignation of the ministry, not the fall of the throne. The Liberals, such as Thiers, although declaring that a legal government no longer existed and that force alone ruled France, sought only to negotiate a compromise settlement.<sup>111</sup> However, to the mutual surprise of both parties, the people of Paris were roused by the Liberals' appeals and events were soon out of hand. The closing of retail stores and factories in the capital turned hundreds of workers into the streets where, with cries of "À bas les Bourbons!", "Vive la République!" and "Vive l'Empereur!" they were soon led by republicans to erect barricades and to turn the Liberals' words into action.<sup>112</sup>

As neither the government nor the Liberals were expecting

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<sup>110</sup>"Le texte des ordonnances, dont la rédaction avait été confiée à Peyronnet, prêt dès le 10 juillet, fut discuté minutieusement dans les jours qui suivirent, pour être finalement adopté, dans sa version définitive lors du Conseil de Cabinet du samedi 24." Garnier, op.cit., p.212.

<sup>111</sup>Plamenatz, op.cit., p.34.

<sup>112</sup>Garnier, op.cit., p.228; Drouz, op.cit., p.111; Bertier de Sauvigny, op.cit., p.447. The republican leaders were notably: Cavaignac, Bastide, Manast, Arago and Trelat. Lafayette and Auguste Fabre were involved. It was Fabre (editor of the Tribune) who gave the order to build the barricades on 27 July. Plamenatz, op.cit., p.34.



the reappearance of the crowd neither was prepared to prevent or control it. Polignac had obviously not taken the threat seriously, for the army could not have been more poorly deployed. Bouremont, with 37,000 picked men, was in Algeria, one regiment of the guard was in Normandy and 14,000 other troops were in Luneville on exercises, leaving Marshal Marmont a bare 12,000 men with which to meet the insurgents.<sup>113</sup> What of the Liberals? At the National on 26 July, Baron de Schonen advocated a policy of meeting force with force, to which Thiers had replied, "on ne s'insurge pas avec rien: qu'avez-vous pour vous soutenir? Le peuple ne remue pas."<sup>114</sup>

Dumas' role in the course of events began on 30 July when the Revolution had already succeeded and it was only a question of who or what should replace Charles X. The Liberals, that is the men of the centre and centre left who had never wished to completely overthrow the monarchy, now seized the initiative and sought to replace Charles with Orleans. A deputation consisting of Gallot, Bérard, Sebastiani, Benjamin Constant, Delessert, Duchaffau and Dumas was selected by lot from the deputies to offer him the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom.<sup>115</sup> Dumas next served as an emissary from Louis-Philippe to Lafayette,

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<sup>113</sup>Holyrod, op.cit., p.547; Garnier, op.cit., p.226.

<sup>114</sup>Garnier, op.cit., p.224; Plamenatz, op.cit., p.34.

<sup>115</sup>The assembly which authorised this proposal consisted of those deputies elected in July who were able to meet there. B. Sarrans, Lafayette, Louis Philippe, and the Revolution of 1830 (2 vols., London, 1832), I, p.210; Broglie, op.cit., III, pp.332-33; Guizot, op.cit., II, p.11.

commander of the Municipal Guard and, in theory, a republican.<sup>116</sup> Under his old general, Dumas rendered his most important service to the new regime by serving as Inspector General of the National Guard. In the nine cartons containing the Minutes of the Inspection General, over ninety per cent of the material carries Dumas' initials in his own much deteriorated handwriting and there are sufficient comments and corrections to indicate that, although almost completely blind, he was still far from being a mere figure-head.<sup>117</sup>

His re-election to the Chambre des Députés with another large majority in October 1830 was only the beginning of the recovery of his fortunes.<sup>118</sup> Louis-Philippe rewarded Dumas for his support by making him a Councillor of State (December 1830) and ultimately a Peer (19 November 1831). Christian, too, benefited with promotion to the rank of chef de bataillon (17 January 1831) followed by assignment as aide-de-camp to the King himself (20 September 1831).<sup>119</sup>

Although Dumas' failing health forced him to resign

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<sup>116</sup>Pouthas, op.cit., p.461.

<sup>117</sup>Cf. Minutes de l'Inspection Général, Paris, 1830, AN F<sup>9</sup> 402 411. His work varied from the enormous task of re-arming all the National Guard, involving the distribution of 322,596 muskets (Gardes Nationales, État de l'organisation Établi Au 12 December 1830, AN F<sup>9</sup> 416) to resolving a dispute in the Fourth Legion over the status of the Sapeurs Pompiers as a troupe d'élite (Brueller to Dumas, Paris, 21 September 1830, AN F<sup>9</sup> 420).

<sup>118</sup>Six, op.cit., p394. Dumas received 734 votes against 298 for Ganneron of 1,262 cast. He resigned his commission in the National Guard at the same time as did Lafayette (25 December 1830). Cf. Lafayette, op.cit., p.492.

<sup>119</sup>Cf. Lasseray, op.cit., under Christian Léon Dumas.

from the reserve cadres of the general staff,<sup>120</sup> he continued to attend the sessions of the Chamber of Peers and continued to interest himself in military affairs.<sup>121</sup> His last two original works, commentaries upon the type of fortifications best employed for the defence of Paris, were published in 1833.<sup>122</sup>

Mathieu Dumas died at his home in Paris on 16 October 1837.<sup>123</sup> He was the last member of that generation of his family (St. Fulcrand, the youngest brother, had died three months before<sup>124</sup>) and represented the pinnacle of its success. Dumas did not die a rich man, but for him this was not a mark of failure. The pursuit of wealth had never been a significant object of his ambition. He was, rather, like Napoleon himself, made for work - a man whose ceaseless energy demanded employment. His disregard for wealth can be found in his testament. According to its provisions,

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<sup>120</sup>The Bureau de l'État-Major on 17 May 1831 noted receipt of "une lettre par laquelle M. le lieutenant Général Comte Dumas, annonce que l'état de sa santé ne lui permet pas de reprendre un service actif, et demande à être à la retraite." (AAG GD 395) He was admitted on 28 May 1831 (Crampel, Note to the Chef de Bureau, Paris, 29 October 1831, AAG GD. 395).

<sup>121</sup>Cf. Count Paul Philippe de Ségur, "Discours Prononcé à l'Occasion du Décès de M. le C<sup>te</sup> Mathieu Dumas", (Paris, 1838), p.2.

<sup>122</sup>Dumas, Observations Sur les Fortifications de Paris (Paris, 1833), BN Lb51 1792 and Nouvelles Observations Sur les Fortifications de Paris (Paris, 1833), BN 8° Lb51 1792.

<sup>123</sup>Décès, Mathieu Dumas, 16 October 1837, AD (Seine), Reconstitution des Actes de l'État Civil de Paris no. 62484 (6 November 1874).

<sup>124</sup>Seine, Table Alphabétique des Successions et Absences, July 1837, AD (Seine) DQ 8° 483, Jerome Fulcrand Dumas (13 July 1837).

of wealth totaling 55,495.83 francs,<sup>125</sup> only 16,300.83 francs were to pass to his direct successors. The remaining amount was distributed to other relatives, including Combres and St. Marcel's two sons (Lion and Gustave), to old servants, to old companions in arms and to the poor.<sup>126</sup>

His son, Christian, following in his father's career, eventually rose to the rank of brigadier general, and also entered politics. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1845 and made a Peer in 1847, but never took as significant a part in events as had his father.<sup>127</sup> His son, George Mathieu Dumas, born in 1838, pursued an undistinguished career in the army and marked the disappearance of the family from civil prominence.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>The figure does not include rent of 12,881.75 francs received for the house no. 17 rue de la ville l'Evreque.

<sup>126</sup>These figures are taken from the Declaration des Mutations Par Décès no.119 p.65, AD (Seine), 29 March 1838. They are confirmed by the Table Alphabétique des Successions et Absences, October 1837, AD (Seine) DQ 8 483.

<sup>127</sup>Lasseray, op.cit., under Christian Dumas.

<sup>128</sup>The sole reference to George Mathieu Dumas occurs on the Extrait du Registre des Actes de Décès - 1873 (AAG 2<sup>e</sup>. Série, GB 3103) of Christian Dumas. His address is given as rue des Maronniers no. 23, but neither the departmental archives nor the records of the Mairie for the XVI<sup>e</sup> Arrondissement contain any reference to him.

## CHAPTER X

### THE THIRD CAREER

Today, if Mathieu Dumas is remembered at all it is as the author of the Précis des Événemens Militaires, not as a soldier or politician. Dumas certainly ranks as one of the foremost authorities on the Napoleonic wars<sup>1</sup> and, indeed, military studies occupied such a considerable portion of his life that they can be regarded as a third career. The previous chapters have concentrated upon Dumas as soldier and legislator; this chapter is devoted to the third Dumas - the military writer.

Unlike his contemporaries (Bülow, Jomini and Clausewitz), Dumas was a military historian, not a military theorist. The distinction is important because differences in approach to military events result from the separate objects of each field. Jomini, for instance, wrote military history but, although he did considerable research, his work suffered from the polemical nature of its undertaking.<sup>2</sup> Dumas, on the other hand, was motivated by the desire to clarify what

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<sup>1</sup>"Au premier rang, pour l'abondance des renseignements, l'intérêt du récit et les qualités du style, il faut placer les généraux Mathieu Dumas et Philippe de Ségur." Guillon, op.cit., II, p.83.

<sup>2</sup>Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini", edited by Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1943), p.83. Cf. Antoine Henri de Jomini, Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon (4 vols., Paris, 1827).



what he considered to be erroneous accounts of the wars and in a more general sense because he revelled in the achievements of his profession, whether attained by French or allied arms.<sup>3</sup> As a result, his work was more balanced and more reliable. Where facts were, for Jomini, the supports of his theory<sup>4</sup> and important in that sense alone, for Dumas they were important in themselves, as witnessed by the appearance of an apparatus criticus in the Précis in the form of "Pièces Justificatives" and "Pièces Inédites" by which he sought to verify his presentation.<sup>5</sup> Yet some notice must be taken of Dumas' comprehension of the theory of Napoleonic warfare for such an understanding is absolutely essential to the writing of an intelligible account of their events.

Napoleon never formulated any principles of war as such - indeed flexibility and innovation were the most salient aspects of his campaigns. Yet throughout his wars he did adhere to certain principles, among which that of the concentration of power against the principal object was one of the most important.<sup>6</sup> This conception of economy of force

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<sup>3</sup>On the origins of the Précis, see supra Chapter VII.

<sup>4</sup>He "tended to make the rules all important and Napoleon merely the instrument which brought them into play". Brinton, Craig and Gilbert, op.cit., p.92.

<sup>5</sup>Précis, op.cit., IV, pp.201-251; V, pp.209-343; VII, pp.245-317; VIII, pp.460-475; IX, pp.221-441; X, pp.201-294; XI, pp.185-307; XII, pp.239-378; XIII, pp.302-424; XIV, pp.201-352; XV, pp.330-363; XVI, pp.275ff; XVII, pp.367ff; XVIII, pp.288-564; XIX, pp.222-357.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Colin, op.cit., p.18. "Il ne faut donc point disséminer ses attaques, mais les concentrer."

did not originate with Napoleon, as he himself wrote in his Maxims, it was as old as organised war; but he practiced it on a scale never before contemplated and with unequalled genius.<sup>7</sup> Dumas fully appreciated the significance of this principle, as comments in the Précis reveal:

Il faut que le point d'attaque, celui sur lequel on se propose de porter la plus grande partie de ses forces, soit déterminé d'avance et presque invariablement. Il est rare qu'on puisse avec un égal succès conserver le parallélisme de deux attaques principales, sans qu'elles se nuisent l'une à l'autre . . .<sup>8</sup>

He saw neglect of the economy of force as the cause of the Allied failure in 1799. By attempting too much (i.e. the conquest of Italy, Switzerland and Holland) "elles se trouvèrent, avant la fin de la campagne, insuffisantes pour exécuter le plan général, et trop engagées, trop désunies pour se réduire à de moindres efforts."<sup>9</sup> He was still more perceptive when he discerned the extent to which Napoleon applied the principle of concentration as the basis for planning the war against Austria in 1805:

Le 1<sup>er</sup> et 2<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée formaient son aile gauche (Hanover and Holland); les 3<sup>e</sup>, 4<sup>e</sup>, 5<sup>e</sup> et 6<sup>e</sup> avec les réserves, dans lesquelles étaient compris le 7<sup>e</sup> corps, formaient le centre; le 8<sup>e</sup> corps (Italy) formait l'aile droite. Considérer comme un seul théâtre de guerre toute cette partie de l'Europe, et supposer une seule et même base d'operations . . .<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Chandler, op.cit., p.144. Cf. Conrad H. Lanza, Napoleon and Modern War (Military Service Press, 1943).

<sup>8</sup>Dumas, Précis, II, p.250.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., II, p.246.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., XII, p.153. Dumas also realized that Germany, not Italy, was the decisive theatre despite the fact that the Austrians' objective in beginning the war was to reconquer their Italian possessions.

While the foregoing are not the only examples to be found in the Précis, the best example of his understanding of Napoleonic principles comes from his Observations Sur Les Fortifications de Paris and Nouvelles Observations Sur Les Fortifications de Paris, both of which required the abstraction of these principles rather than the recounting of battles as in the Précis.<sup>11</sup> These two works also reveal Dumas' grasp of the future trend in warfare and are doubly valuable for that reason. The essence of the problem under discussion when these treatises were written was how to best reconcile national security with financial economy.<sup>12</sup> In Dumas' view, there had been no need for this under the Empire for "sous le gouvernement impériale, conquérir c'était conserver".<sup>13</sup> But having himself rejected war as a means of settling disputes over territory,<sup>14</sup> he did not feel that France's future security lay with the big army and the balance of power:

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<sup>11</sup>Observations Sur Les Fortifications de Paris (Paris, 1833) and Nouvelles Observations Sur Les Fortifications de Paris (Paris, 1833). (Hereinafter referred to as Observations and Nouvelles Observations respectively.)

<sup>12</sup>The commission, formed by Marshal St. Cyr in 1818, of which Dumas had been a member, first raised the question of fortifying the capital (under the Restoration) and recommended detached forts as the best means of accomplishing it. Dumas, Observations, p.2.

<sup>13</sup>Dumas, Nouvelles Observations, p.3.

<sup>14</sup>"C'est une déplorable condition de l'état des sociétés européennes, que le sort des armes décide du sort des peuples, et que les droits de souveraineté sur une nation puissent être transférés à de nouveaux dominateurs, sans qu'elle participe à l'acte qui change ses rapports, son existence et la forme de son gouvernement." Dumas, Précis, XIX, p.371.

Le repos des nations du continent d'Europe, l'équilibre si vanté, l'idéal de la politique, serait peut-être plus assuré par ce système de défense centralisée, et par la précaution de fermer et fortifier les capitales, que par ce continuél accroissement de forces militaires, et leur chimérique balancement.

He advances as an alternative the employment of fortifications to multiply the defensive power of a small regular army in order to thereby gain sufficient time for the mobilization of a mass army, the materials for which will have already been stockpiled throughout the country for just such an emergency. Thus: "le problème a été résolu en compensant la diminution des forces actives permanentes avec l'augmentation des forces matérielles."<sup>16</sup> In this way, the principle of the nation in arms can be retained without either the crippling expenses of a huge peacetime establishment or the danger to national security which an insufficiently large regular army would pose during the period of mobilization.

Despite the rejection of the Empire's military system, Dumas' proposals were based upon a sound appreciation of the principles of Napoleonic warfare. The lesson Dumas drew from Napoleon's objectives was that in future:

Le plus habile général sera celui qui saura ravager le plus promptement le pays ennemi, en y portant le théâtre de la guerre, et dont les combinaisons stratégiques auront pour but de la terminer d'un seul coup, par une grande bataille qui décide du sort de la capitale.

For the result of this manoeuvre, if successful, would be that:

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<sup>15</sup>Dumas, Observations, p.10.

<sup>16</sup>Dumas, Nouvelles Observations, p.2.

On y frappe au coeur le principe vital, on bouleverse les finances, on depouille les grandes dépôts, on arrête le mouvement des affaires, on sépare les intérêts privés de l'intérêt public et de la cause commune.<sup>17</sup>

If, in future, generals were to conduct their offensives along these Napoleonic lines and strike at France's vital position - Paris - her defence must be adjusted accordingly. Dumas' plan was to concentrate upon the essential - to defend Paris in depth beginning on the frontier and culminating with the city itself. Implied was a complete break with Vauban's system of fortifications which had been standard practice for over a century.<sup>18</sup> Instead of using fortifications linearly along the frontiers to save territory and therefore meeting the full brunt of the enemy blow with only the forces in the particular area where the frontier was violated, Dumas proposed to use them<sup>19</sup> in depth so as to gain time necessary for the army to concentrate.

Dumas also broke with Vauban's theories in supporting the construction of detached forts instead of a continuous

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<sup>17</sup>Dumas, Précis, VI, p.392.

<sup>18</sup>On Vauban's strategic thinking, see P. Lazard, Vauban: 1633-1707 (Paris, 1937) and Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War", Earle, op.cit., pp.26-48.

<sup>19</sup>The validity of this solution to the problem of security is best shown by its longevity. General Charles de Gaulle, faced with a mechanized assault by a superior German army, reached basically the same conclusions as Dumas - the most significant difference was that de Gaulle proposed to use armoured forces as the "couverture" in conjunction with and support of the Maginot Line to gain the necessary time for full mobilization. Cf. Charles de Gaulle, Vers l'Armée de Métier (London, nd) and Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot and Liddel - Hart, The Doctrine of Defence", Earle, op.cit., pp.365-375.



curtain of walls in the immediate defence of Paris. He offered several reasons for favouring this method of defence over the traditional system: it would allow for positions to be established further from the city itself, thereby reducing to a minimum the damage of any bombardment, it would enable the garrison to hold only the best natural positions (those which were to be fortified) and not commit it to the defence of areas where the advantage of the terrain lay with the attacker.<sup>20</sup> The second point leads to his third, which is that this system would then permit, indeed it would require, an active defence, with mobile columns, assaulting the enemy as he sought to penetrate between the forts.<sup>21</sup> In conception and in general plan this was the Napoleonic solution to the defence of Paris:

Quant à l'opinion de Napoléon . . . d'après sa manière de conduire la guerre, qu'il aurait préféré la défensive active sur un théâtre où, suivant les accidents favorables du terrain, il aurait fait préparer des points d'appui pour manœuvrer et combattre dans les intervalles . . .<sup>22</sup>

Dumas' technical competence as a military historian was another element which added greatly to the value of the

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<sup>20</sup>Dumas, Observations, pp.18-19.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.. The two disadvantages of the traditional system were: (1) that as the line had to be held everywhere the fortifications were only as strong as their weakest position, thereby requiring elaborate outer-works at points which lacked natural strength; and (2) that the very walls, ditches and obstacles which impeded the enemy also made large-scale counter attacks impracticable if not impossible.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p.15. The essence of Napoleon's feelings on this subject is expressed in the Souper de Beaucaire: "c'est un système dans l'art militaire que celui qui reste dans ses retranchements est battu; l'expérience et la théorie sont d'accord sur ce point." Cited in Colin, Napoléon, p.10.

Précis. It was not coincidental that Dumas, Jomini and Clausewitz all had been officers in the general staff of the French army. In many ways scientific military history, that is the systematic and critical study of warfare, owed its development to the rise of a specialist staff corps in the French army during the eighteenth century.<sup>23</sup> For example, the advances in topography for the first time enabled generals and historians to obtain a reasonably accurate knowledge of the ground over which their armies were struggling.<sup>24</sup> Equally important was the training members of the staff corps received through the preparation of accounts of former battles. Dumas himself conducted two such "Reconnaissances" - one of the battle of Fontenoy and the other of the battle of Malplaquet,<sup>25</sup> the objects of which were recorded in the former work as:

1. Rappeler un précis historique de la bataille;
2. Considérer la position de l'armée française en observation pour couvrir le siège de Tournai et son champ de bataille ou position retranchée en avant de son champ;
3. Discuter les mouvements des deux armées pendant l'action.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Cf. Dumas' "Sur le Services des États-Majors d'armée", Précis, II, p.430ff.

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Dumas' "Sur la Topographie", *ibid.*, I, pp.420-25.

<sup>25</sup>These two reports were made jointly by Dumas and Dezoteux in 1786. However, the cover letter addressed to the Marquis d'Aguesseau (Director General of the army) was signed by Dumas alone. Dumas to d'Aguesseau, Paris, 27 March 1787; Dumas and Dezoteux, "Reconnaissance du Champs de Bataille de Fontenoi" and "Reconnaissance du Champs de Bataille de Malplaquet", 15 December 1786, AHG MR 1446.

<sup>26</sup>Dumas, "Fontenoi", p.3.

However, in the rigorous pursuit and critical examination of his sources, in the scope of his approach and in the depth of his analysis, Dumas far exceeded the canons of his training in the general staff.

Traditionally the principal sources of information about a war or campaign were the official reports, the records of the orders, and the memoirs of the commanders. Dumas was fortunate that Napoleon allowed him free access to the records of the French army when researching the Précis.<sup>27</sup> Yet he had another equally important unofficial source as well in his personal and professional contacts with leaders of the French army. These Dumas transformed into a veritable information network. A typical letter was written by General Kellermann, the victor of Valmy:

Je ne doute pas que le Directoire ne vous donne le grand détail des derniers événements en Italie; dans le cas contraire, je vous le ferai passer et vous jugerez des fautes de l'ennemi, de la manière dont Bonaparte a su en profiter . . ." (report of Rivoli and LaFavorite, 14-16 January 1797 follow).<sup>28</sup>

Another, General Dampierre, sent Dumas no fewer than nine letters reporting the events of the battle of Marengo, while Colonel Miot prepared a 'précis' of Desaix's campaign in upper Egypt.<sup>29</sup> Other officers submitted unsolicited

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<sup>27</sup>On his access to the records of the army, see Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.225.

<sup>28</sup>Kellermann to Dumas, Chambéry, 10 Pluviôse V, Charavay (private dealer) AN Ch 706-6.61.

<sup>29</sup>Dampierre to Dumas, np, 3, 7, 10, 13 and 24 Prairial; 2, 9, 17 and 28 Messidor VIII, AHG MR 610. "Précis de la Campagne du Général Desaix dans la Haute-Egypte", cover letter Miot to Dumas, np, 15 December 1815, AHG MR 564.

reports on engagements. L. Marès of the Army of the Danube prepared one on the conduct of Massena before the battle of Zurich in 1799. Supposedly drawn from secret documents captured from General Korsakov after this battle, it accused Massena and the Directory of deliberately seeking to lose Switzerland.<sup>30</sup> A more plausible report was submitted by General Molitor on a later campaign in Switzerland. He wrote that because of the speed with which the official report was prepared "Il en est résulté que la Rapport officiel a omit des faits tellement important . . ."<sup>31</sup> This material enabled Dumas to supplement and often correct the official reports.

Dumas was not content, however, to follow uncritically either official reports or personal accounts. Each he submitted to a rigorous scrutiny based upon his own knowledge and experience of warfare. Characteristic of this examination was his disregard of official returns of a campaign's casualties. "It has long been observed," he wrote, "that if at the end of a campaign an estimate was made of the number of dead which the accounts of each party suppose on the opposite side, it would be found that it amounts to more than the effective force of the army to which those

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<sup>30</sup>L. Marès, "Notes Confidentielles Sur la Conduite du Directoire et Celle de Massena avant la Bataille de Zurich", 1799, AHG MR 610 (Notes Employées Pour la Correction de Son Vol. du Précis des Événemens Militaires 1799-1800), donated to the AHG by Christian Dumas on 17 July 1866.

<sup>31</sup>Molitor, Aux Redacteurs du Précis des Événemens Militaires, Cranenfeld, 20 Ventôse an VIII, AHG MR 610.

losses are attributed.<sup>32</sup> To compensate for every general's natural optimism, when determining the results of a battle, Dumas made the following observations:

1. That we have taken for certain only what is confirmed by the official returns of both parties and that we have almost always diminished the losses thus acknowledged.
2. That the number of wounded has never been wholly stated and that we have supposed that the half only of the number admitted is certain, had perished in the hospitals, or were maimed and unfit for service.<sup>33</sup>

One example of the balance which resulted from the critical control of the source material can be found in his description of the famous "ice incident" of Austerlitz. This occurred towards 3.00 p.m. on the evening of the battle as the Russians, under General Doctorov, sought safety from the French by fleeing onto the ice of the Satschan pond. In the Précis the scene is described as follows:

Les troupes du général Doctorow se voyant de plus resserrées, s'ébranlèrent, la plus grande partie de l'artillerie qu'il avait ralliée, trente-huit pièces de canon, beaucoup de caissons de canonniers, et deux ou trois mille hommes, ne pouvant se retirer par Aujezd, où le général Vandamme était établi, voulurent suivre une ancien digue submergée qui conduit d'Aujezd à Satschan. Les Guides, persuadés que la glace qui parassait assez forte, pourrait supporter cet énorme poids, hasardèrent d'y conduire; mais elle se rompit avec fracas; hommes, chevaux, voitures tout fut englouti. Napoléon vit de la hauteur de la chapelle cet affreux spectacle qui lui rappela celui de la bataille d'Aboukir.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Dumas, An Epitome of Military Events, I, p.235. The English edition of the Précis (1799) has been quoted because this note was omitted from the final French edition (1817).

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., I, p.236.

<sup>34</sup>Dumas, Précis, XIV, pp.202-03.



In contrast, French bulletins issued at the time claimed that as many as 20,000 men perished in the icy water, and most generals, notably Ségur, Marbot and Lejune, writing of this episode followed Napoleon's inspiration. The Russians, too, took up the theme of slaughter as a convenient excuse for abandoning Austria.<sup>35</sup> Even today the most recent history of the Napoleonic Wars concludes that "it is probable that 2,000 were drowned".<sup>36</sup> Yet three days after the battle, when the ponds were drained on Napoleon's orders, twenty-eight to thirty cannon, 150 dead horses and the corpses of only two or three humans were found.<sup>37</sup> In the failing light of that December afternoon, 2,000 men with horses and guns splashing about in the icy water may have resembled Aboukir, but as the true casualties were known only three days later, there was no reason for the repetition and exaggeration of the account. The merits of Dumas' account are immediately apparent. He supplied the reasons for the Russian manoeuvre, an accurate estimate of their numbers, and a description of how the scene appeared to the French soldiers watching. His only flaw was in neglecting to state that almost all those Russians who fell into the lake were able to extricate themselves.

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<sup>35</sup>Cf. John Holland Rose, "The Ice Incident at the Battle of Austerlitz", Napoleonic Studies (London, 1914), Appendix VII, reprinted from The English Historical Review (July, 1902).

<sup>36</sup>Chandler, op.cit., p.432. He does add that "some authorities put the figure as low as 200."

<sup>37</sup>Rose, op.cit., p.383. Rose added, "The two ponds have long been drained and are now arable land; but no bones or weapons have ever been found there, though these are often turned up on other parts of the battlefield."

To aid himself in evaluating campaigns, Dumas sought every opportunity to view fields of battle where he had not been present at the time of the engagement. Thus he utilized his mission from General Macdonald to General Moreau in 1801 as an opportunity "à reconnaître le champ de bataille de Hohenlinden".<sup>38</sup> Similarly, he toured the field of Austerlitz on 3 December 1805 with no lesser guide than the Emperor himself.<sup>39</sup> His own observations were supplemented by the utilization of maps and other secondary aids, such as "un petit vol. en 12/ intitulé 'Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire des armées 1805, 1806 et 1807'" which comprised part of a number of works borrowed from Roederer.<sup>40</sup> The importance which Dumas placed upon these aids is clearly demonstrated by his abandoning work on the Précis in 1826, when it was but half completed, because his failing eyesight no longer permitted him to study them.<sup>41</sup>

Quite often he referred to previous campaigns fought

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<sup>38</sup>Dumas spent two days in this occupation. Cf. Dumas to Macdonald, Munich, 24 Pluviôse XI, AN 169 AP doss. 6 (Andréossy).

<sup>39</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.270.

<sup>40</sup>Dumas to Roederer, Paris, 22 May 1821, AN 29 AP 10 (Roederer). A request made to Andréossy (Dumas to Andréossy, Paris, 11 Pluviôse X, AN 169 AP) in which Dumas wrote "J'ai besoin pour mon travail habituel de quelques secours des cartes" appears also to have been for material for the Précis, although a pencilled note added later indicates that it may have been in conjunction with a request of Napoleon's. A third request, one on the convention between France and Prussia, signed on 24 February 1812, has also survived. Cf. Dumas to Daru, Villepinte, 3 August 1817, AN 138 AP 99 (Daru).

<sup>41</sup>Dumas, Souvenirs, III, p.598.

in the same theatre to illustrate either the novelty or the commonplace nature of a particular manoeuvre. Prince Eugene's campaign in Italy was one of his favourite subjects, as his note on Marengo illustrates:

Bonaparte, après avoir vu plier son aile gauche, n'ayant pu forcer le centre de l'armée autrichienne, rétablit le combat à son aile battue, et gagna la bataille par la bonne disposition et l'emploi de ses réserves. Le prince Eugène avait fait exactement la même chose à la bataille de Turin, où, comme depuis à Marengo, une dernière charge de cavalerie que le prince dirigea lui-même decida la victoire.<sup>42</sup>

Often, too, this type of comparison would be employed as a form of criticism, as when he wrote of the French deployment in Italy in 1799:

ce qui fut bon et honorable en 1706, lorsque l'inutile défense de ces places n'eût fait que consumer des forces précieuses à la France après des grands revers, eût été justement taxé de faiblesse en 1799.<sup>43</sup>

The scope of analysis in the Précis extended to the political and social as well as the military factors, revealing Dumas' ability to perceive the inter-relationship between the nature of a war and the object for which it was fought:

Si la révolution qu'éprouve un état n'est pas, par son importance et par les principes qui la dirigent, de nature à inquiéter les gouvernements voisins, il n'en résultera que des troubles intérieurs; et si les partis se balancent, la guerre civile (i.e. the Fronde) . . .

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<sup>42</sup>Dumas, Précis, IV, p.365. Dumas differs from the fashion of the eighteenth century by drawing upon the immediate and relevant past for his examples and not antiquity, except, of course, in comparing the crossing of the Alps, where no modern parallel existed.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., I, p.247.

Lorsque la révolution tient à des principes généraux qui doivent influencer sur toute la société civile, il est naturel que la guerre devienne générale (i.e. 16th-17th century wars and those of the French Revolution).<sup>44</sup>

Unlike the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century, this war affected the entire nation and therefore "la nation française fut toute entière précipitée dans la fur de guerre . . ."<sup>45</sup> and this intensification of the war effort, in accordance with the new principles for which the nation was struggling, completely overthrew the old equilibrium in warfare. He saw too that the pressures of war affected the civil as well as the military aspects of French life: "La pression de toutes les forces de l'Europe, et la tyrannie sanguinaire du comité de Robespierre, produisirent de nouveaux phénomènes politiques . . ."<sup>46</sup> The end result of this pressure was that by 1800 "la France à cette époque n'existait que par ses armées et pour ses armées; elle n'avait aucune véritable existence civile et politique, tout était provisoire dans son économie . . ."<sup>47</sup>

It is clearly impossible to summarize all of what Dumas had to say about the Napoleonic Wars in the compass of a brief essay. However, two topics do merit discussion because both are part of continuing controversies. The first is of a tactical nature and is concerned with the utilization

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., I, p.11.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., I, p.15.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., I, p.14. For his opinion on how the war created and sustained the Terror, see supra Chapter IV.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., VI, p.8.

of light infantry and skirmishers (tirailleurs) by the French. The difficulties appear to arise out of the discrepancy between doctrine, as expounded in the regulations of 1791, and the actual practice in the field. Historians and commentators have attempted to identify the élite light companies (Voltigeurs) of the line battalions and the light infantry regiments proper as the total potential skirmisher strength of the army.<sup>48</sup> While such was the system of the other continental armies, including the British, it was not true of the French army. There the number of potential skirmishers was equal in theory to the total infantry strength of the army. Dumas explained in a "Note sur les Tirailleurs française":

Il ne faut pas tomber dans l'erreur trop commune et accréditée dans les armées étrangères, qu'il faut avoir deux espèces d'armes dans l'infanterie, et destiner exclusivement l'infanterie légère, les bataillons de chasseurs, les corps francs au service de tirailleurs. Cette erreur de leur part a donné aux Français pendant les dernières guerres un grand avantage, celui d'aborder plus tôt et plus franchement l'ennemi, de repousser ces troupes légères avec l'avantage du nombre et la supériorité d'un feu bien dirigé, sans affaiblir pour cela la ligne de bataille. Nous pensons que l'infanterie bien exercée doit être également propre à toute espèce de service de cette arme. Un quart à peu près de l'infanterie française portait sans doute la dénomination d'infanterie légère, mais on n'a jamais remarqué aucune véritable différence entre ces régiments et ceux d'infanterie de ligne. On a fait presque toujours indifféremment

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<sup>48</sup> For example, Christopher Duff (op.cit., p.21) has written: "In contrast the third category, the light troops (light infantry, chasseurs, voltigeurs, jaegers, etc.) were deployed ahead of the 'heavy' infantry in an extended order which permitted them to take some advantage of the natural cover of the ground". Cf. Chandler, op.cit., p. 344ff.



usage des uns et des autres.<sup>49</sup>

The reason for this interchangeability of roles lay in two factors according to Dumas. The first was the superiority in intelligence, agility and enthusiasm of the average French recruit which made him ideal material for this type of individual warfare,<sup>50</sup> and the second was the nature of training administered by the army, which instead of basing its instruction on "les moyens purement mécaniques", or the manual, gives its conscripts "les reconnaissances continues", and "les petites affaires de postes"; in other words, training in the field.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, short of adopting the same system, which was an impossibility for the allied armies as they were then constituted, there was no effective means of preventing a determined French commander from obtaining a superiority in skirmishers.<sup>52</sup> This becomes an important factor in

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<sup>49</sup>Dumas, Précis, XIX, p.411. Earlier in the Précis (loc.cit., XII, p.406) Dumas had gone so far as to suggest that there was no real reason to retain two different types of infantry: "Est-il nécessaire d'avoir deux espèces d'infanterie, infanterie de ligne, infanterie légère? . . . Nous croyons, avec Guibert, que toute infanterie doit savoir combattre en ligne ou en tirailleurs selon le besoin . . . le soldat français, à cause de son activité naturelle et de son intelligence, est également propre à ces deux genres de service . . . On est donc fondé à conclure que la diversité des armes, indispensable pour le service de la cavalerie, serait plus nuisable qu'utile dans le service de l'infanterie."

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., I, p.198.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p.440. N.B. The passage from which this quotation has been extracted relates to the camps of 1807-1808 in Poland, but the principle of field training applies throughout the period.

<sup>52</sup>The French were capable of developing such independence in their soldiers because the army was held together by moral force rather than by discipline. "It was an army inspired rather than trained, and quite unlike the Austrian, Prussian, Russian and British." Fuller, op.cit., II, p.415.

discussions of Wellington's peninsular victories because one aspect of his countertactics was to protect his vulnerable line by his own light infantry skirmishers. As Wellington was limited in the number of skirmishers he could deploy to the number of light companies in his army, in those battles where his skirmishers were successful in protecting the British line it was not a demonstration of the superiority of his tactical system, but only of the failure of the French to exploit the superior flexibility of their own system.

An example of the value of Dumas' work in the area of strategic affairs, lies in his observations upon the intent and feasibility of Napoleon's preparations for the invasion of England between 1803 and 1805. The principal points of the debate upon this subject fall into two categories: first, what was the Emperor's true intention - was he seriously intending to invade England or were his preparations just a magnificent bluff - and, second, how practical were the measures which the French actually did adopt? The two are obviously related because if the cross channel plans were impracticable, and Napoleon knew them to be so, then his whole programme could have been only a ruse.

In general, it was the military men who took Napoleon's threat most seriously. The great proponent of sea power, Capt. Mahan, was convinced that the invasion was seriously intended, but he also observed that Napoleon's strategy of deception was so well conceived that "to this day men doubt whether Bonaparte seriously meant to invade England,

and naval men then realized too keenly the dangers of the undertaking not to suspect a feint at it".<sup>53</sup> However, some later commentators upon this campaign have remained sceptical. Rose, for one, wrote: "I am not convinced that Napoleon seriously intended to invade England, even by the arguments brought together by Captain Mahan."<sup>54</sup> Instead, he contended that Napoleon sought to gain the advantages the threat of an invasion would confer without ever facing the risks of actually attempting one. These advantages, described in 1808 in a pamphlet entitled Britain Independent of Commerce, were that Britain would be forced to increase her expenditures to maintain a large army and fleet for home defence and that she would also have to reduce her commerce and have to suffer a loss of confidence as the threat mounted. Napoleon, on the other hand, would be able to mask his impotence to strike a moral blow against England and at the same time build up a large army for a continental war without arousing the suspicions of France or Europe.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Capt. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire (2 vols, Boston, 1897), II, p.125.

<sup>54</sup>Rose, op.cit., n. p.180. This idea originated with Bourienne, Napoleon's secretary at the time. However, Bourienne is not an altogether reliable witness. His memoirs were 'ghosted' by a pro-Bourbon journalist after he had been dismissed from both Imperial and Royal service for dishonesty. Shortly after their publication he was committed to a lunatic asylum. A. Vincent Cronin, Napoleon Bonaparte: an Intimate Biography (New York, 1972), p.10.

<sup>55</sup>Cited in Rose, op.cit., p.181. Rose felt that Napoleon's chief aim was to attain the "moral superiority" which a threatening posture confers: "In the autumn of 1804 Dumouriez prophesied that, if this state of things lasted, it would paralyze the energies of England." Rose, "Did Napoleon intend to Invade England", Pitt and Napoleon, Essays and Letters (London, 1912), p.126.

Dumas was in an excellent position to write with authority upon these matters, for as a member of the Council of State and as chief of staff to III corps, he participated directly in the preparations for invasion.<sup>56</sup> In his opinion, Napoleon was faced with three main difficulties in attempting to cross the channel: (1) to transport across at one time a complete army of 100,000 men, (2) to be able to disembark this army fast enough to be able to overcome all resistance which might be met on the beaches, and (3) to "classer, armer, organiser la flotille de telle manière qu'elle pût forcer le passage".<sup>57</sup> The first two problems were solved by the construction of four classes of small boats, designed to be rowed across the channel, so as to be independent of the wind and of a shallow draft to permit beaching.<sup>58</sup>

However, Napoleon never believed that these boats would have been a match for ships-of-the-line and therefore they could never force a crossing unaided. Somehow the channel had to be cleared of the blockading squadrons. At first the solution was to rely upon the weather:

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<sup>56</sup> See supra Chapter VIII.

<sup>57</sup> Dumas, Précis, X, p.39.

<sup>58</sup> The four classes were prames armed with six 24 pounders, chaloupes canonnières with four of 24 and one howitzer, bateaux canonnières with two of 24 and péniches demi-pontées with two of 24 and one howitzer (*Ibid.*, X, p.41). According to Mahan (*op.cit.*, II, p.111) the use of sail was impracticable because "the only conditions of wind under which they could move would expose them to be scattered and destroyed". On the other points of manoeuvrability and speed of disembarkation, he agreed with Dumas.

La totalité de la flotte, lorsqu'elle serait réunie à Boulogne et dans les petits ports voisins de Montreuil, de Vignareux, et d'Ambleteuse; que dans la belle saison, les calmes et les vents faibles d'est et de sud-est, favorables à la navigation des bâtimens légers, ne permettaient pas aux Vaisseaux de ligne manœuvrés et entraînés par la violence des courans de canal . . .<sup>59</sup>

Later in place of the weather the French battle fleet acquired the role of defeating the blockading squadrons and opening the channel to the flotilla.<sup>60</sup> In either case the feasibility of the plan rested upon the soundness of Napoleon's naval concentrations and the ability of the flotilla to defend itself against the frigates and lesser ships which would not necessarily be accounted for by a fleet action.

Dumas was equally positive in his response to each of these questions. On the nature of Napoleon's naval strategy he stated that: "Il ne considéra les opérations maritimes que d'une manière secondaire, et uniquement dans

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<sup>59</sup>Dumas, op.cit., p.52. Authorities differ as to the chances of such an attempt. Mahan (op.cit., II, p.112) felt that "It was possible that a number of such vessels once started and favored by fog or calm, might pass unseen, or even in defiance of the enemy's ships-of-war, lying helpless to attack through want of wind." Admiral Desbrière considered that to cross with boats alone was 'madness'. Cited in Harold C. Deutsch, "Napoleonic Policy and the Project of a Descent Upon England", Journal of Modern History (vol. II, 1830), p.542. Cf. Edouard Desbrière, Projets et Tentatives de Debarquement Aux îles Britanniques 1793-1805 (4 vols., Paris, 1900-1902).

<sup>60</sup>The plan of July 1804 was for Admiral Latouche-Treville to escape from Toulon with ten ships-of-the-line, then after faking a movement towards Egypt to sail along the Atlantic coast liberating the squadrons at Rochefort and Brest. The death of the Admiral six weeks later caused this plan to be abandoned. The final plan was considered only after Spain's entry into the war gave Napoleon an additional thirty-one ships. John Holland Rose, "Napoleon and Sea Power", The Historical Journal, I, (3, 1924), pp.149-150.



leur rapport avec celles des armées du terre".<sup>61</sup> In other situations this might have led to a disadvantageous naval policy, but as the channel was, in Fuller's term, "the strategic centre of gravity"<sup>62</sup> in 1804-5 the subordination of the entire fleet to the army's crossing produced a masterful plan, as Dumas acknowledged:

Nous croyons avoir démontré . . . que le combinaison des opérations maritimes était si juste, qu'elle ne laissait à la fortune, en faveur de l'Angleterre, que la seule chance d'une faute aussi grave que celle commise par le commandant de la flotte combinée. (sic. Villeneuve's retirement from the channel.)<sup>63</sup>

Based upon his own experiences, Dumas' remarks on the ability of the small boats to oppose vessels as large as frigates, represents a formidable argument in favour of the invasion's feasibility. On several occasions English squadrons attacked the invasion boats as they moved down the coast towards the assembly harbours. First on 12 May 1804 two frigates and a brig fired upon one convoy and were able to inflict only very slight damage - killing six

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<sup>61</sup>Dumas, op.cit., VII, p.91.

<sup>62</sup>Fuller, op.cit., II, p.379.

<sup>63</sup>Dumas, op.cit., XII, p.85. On this point there is unanimity amongst the critics: Rose (op.cit., p.153), for example, felt that "on few occasions have accidents and weather conditions more deranged the plans of our would-be invaders, and that too, at a time when their chances were good". "Napoleon's project for invading England", wrote William Morris, "certainly offered many chances of success. Except the skilful and sagacious Collingwood - and he guessed only part of the truth - no English seaman saw through the design, and the Emperor had the immense advantage of an attack concealed by profound strategem." William O'Connor Morris, Napoleon and the Supremacy of Revolutionary France (London, 1893), p.162.

and founding nine "presque tous légèrement".<sup>64</sup> Five frigates, two cutters and a brig under Sir Sidney Smith attacked on 16 May but again without success. In June a section of Cornwallis' fleet was repulsed and on two occasions in July (17 and 23) English squadrons, consisting of ships-of-the-line, frigates, corvettes and bombards, attacked the flotilla in port at Le Havre, each time without sinking a single boat.<sup>65</sup> From these encounters, Dumas calculated that the larger ships

n'ont pas tous les avantages qu'on leur suppose contre des bâtimens de flottille armées d'un petit nombre de pièces de gros calibre, tirant à fleur d'eau, se manoeuvrant facilement, et n'offrant, aux coups de l'ennemi supérieur dans leurs fréquens et rapides changemens de position, qu'un but très mobile, et trop incertain.<sup>66</sup>

The men-of-war and frigates had other disadvantages as well:

Les expériences faites avaient démontré que leur feu à grande portée était peu redoutable pour des bâtimens qui ne présentaient que de très petits surfaces, et n'étaient, pour ainsi dire, que des points marqués sur les eaux.<sup>67</sup>

Should they try to board instead, their problems only increased, because as they drew closer:

... l'élévation du vaisseau en diminuait beaucoup le danger; tandis que le tir à fleur d'eau des chaloupes et des batteaux canonnières se manoeuvrant facilement, virant de bord, changeant de position à la voile et à la rame, leur donnait un avantage

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<sup>64</sup> Contre-Amiral Verhuel (Chef de la Flotill Batave) to Davout, Ostend, 21 Ventôse (21 May 1804) AHG K<sup>1</sup> 1 (Archives Militaires du Maréchal Prince d'Eckmühl).

<sup>65</sup> Dumas, op.cit., XII, pp.15-28.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., XII, p.23.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., X, p.52.

décidé.<sup>68</sup>

Statements in the Précis also leave no doubt about Dumas' absolute conviction that Napoleon throughout the period from 1803 to 1805 fully intended to hazard an invasion once sufficient boats had been assembled. "Après de semblables témoignages, on ne saurait douter que Napoléon ne fût déterminé à effectuer ce qu'on a trop légèrement appelé sa prétendue expédition contre l'Angleterre rien de plus réel; ni dont le succès fût plus vraisemblable . . ."<sup>69</sup> His reasons for such a strong conviction were not based upon the foregoing arguments of its feasibility alone.

Although at the time "son ministre de la marine était seul dans la confiance de ses projets, dont le secret ne fut jamais pénétré",<sup>70</sup> after the event Madame la Duchesse Decrès permitted Dumas to examine his correspondence from which he concluded:

Napoléon ne passait pas un seul jour sans s'occuper de tous les détails du matériel, du rétablissement et de la réforme des institutions navales, et du complètement des équipages; . . . ses instructions . . . prouvent jusqu'à quel point cet objet important occupait sa pensée.<sup>71</sup>

In Napoleon's foreign policy Dumas also saw preparation for an invasion. St. Cyr was dispatched to the Gulf of

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid. Dumas cites Admiral Verhuel's opinion as well: "J'ai cru à la possibilité la plus entière de cette expédition." (Ibid., XII, p.399)

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., XII, p.84. The same opinion appears in his Souvenirs (op.cit., III, p.249) as well.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., XI, p.34.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., XI, p.95.

Toronto with a full corps d'armée to confirm Nelson's fears that any fleet leaving Toulon would head for Egypt, not Dover. The creation of the Kingdom of Italy was designed to ease tension with Austria, because instead of having Napoleon as president for its head it was intended that it would have one of his brothers as king.<sup>72</sup>

As the foregoing examples illustrate, the precision and intelligence with which Dumas prepared the Précis have ensured its continuing relevance as a military history even to the present. For most of the nineteenth century it was sufficient merely to cite the Précis in order to substantiate the facts of a particular battle or campaign, and with some reservations it is still accepted by present-day military historians.<sup>73</sup> Its success and reputation were so great that it was universally regarded as the unofficial "official history" of the early Napoleonic wars. Officers sent Dumas accounts of their actions in

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<sup>72</sup>Dumas' conclusion here (ibid., XI, p.159) is supported by Harold C. Deutsch's analysis (op.cit., p.564) of Napoleon's foreign policy during 1805.

<sup>73</sup>For example, Captain A. Longuet used the Précis as his sole source in his "Analyse des Campagnes de 1806 and 1807 du Précis des Evénemens Militaires du Lieutenant General Mathieu Dumas" (Paris, 1840). For another example of this acceptance, see Comte de Mosbource, "Notes Pris dans l'Ouvrage de Mathieu Dumas sur l'Expedition d'Egypte," sd, AN 31 AP 44 doss. 1 (Murat). More recent references are to be found in David Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon, as for instance in this passage about the campaign of 1808: "General Benningsen's army comprised the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Divisions, making a total (according to the nineteenth century German authority, von Hopfner) of 49,000 infantry, 11,000 regular cavalry and 4,000 Cossacks, 2,700 artillerymen . . . Dumas, however, doubts that the effectives of this army came to more than 55,000." Chandler, op.cit., p.518,

battle in the feeling that recognition in the Précis would confer a measure of immortality upon their deeds of valour. One such officer was General of Brigade Guenand who had commanded the 30th and 59th demi-brigades at the battle of Marengo and was promoted general of division "sur le champ" for his bravery. His letter to Dumas concluded: "Ce n'est pas ainsi que s'écrivent les annales de l'histoire du général Dumas aussi bon historien que bon militaire me rendre la seule récompense que j'ambitionne celle de la gloire qu'il attache aux noms justement et honorablement cités dans son excellent ouvrage. (Berthier had failed to mention his name in the army's report)"<sup>74</sup> Another letter, printed as a 'Note' in the Précis, came from General Baron Benningsen, who commanded the Russian army which fought at Eylau and Friedland in 1807. His letter was prompted not by Dumas' neglect of his role, but rather to explain the circumstances behind his conduct of the campaign,<sup>75</sup> and again it reflects the importance attached to the account given by Dumas.

Perhaps Major Vieufseux, of the Grévenitz Infantry Regiment of the Prussian army, summarized best the merits of the Précis and the regard with which it was received, when he wrote to Dumas after the appearance of the first

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<sup>74</sup>Guenand to Dumas, np, sd, AHG MR 610. General Guenand went so far as to validate his account by enclosing a letter he had written to Napoleon recalling the incident and the reply of the Minister of War, Carnot, (14 Vendémiaire, an IX).

<sup>75</sup>Dumas, "Note Remise par M. le Général baron de Benningsen au chevalier Beugnot, pour être remise à l'auteur du Précis des Événemens Militaires", Précis, XIX, pp.425-429.



volume in 1799:

L'estimable Journal qui paroît sous le titre de Précis des Evénemens militaires se distingue si avantageusement de la foule des productions littéraires, que je ne puis me refuser la satisfaction de faire parvenir à son rédacteur, l'hommage dû à ses talens, et l'expression du vif intérêt, qu'une lecture aussi instructive est fait pour exciter . . . Une impartialité d'autant plus étonnante, qu'elle est plus difficile à observer dans cette guerre, rend cet ouvrage à peu près unique, et doublement précieux pour l'histoire.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Vieufseux to L'Auteur du Journal Intitulé Précis des Evénemens Militaires, Glogau en basse Silésie, 9 February 1800, AGA MA 610.

## CONCLUSION

"Peu d'habiles militaires savent écrire; peu d'écrivains sont habiles militaires," wrote General Foy;<sup>1</sup> Mathieu Dumas was fortunate to have enjoyed distinction in both fields. Towards the end of his life time, as the acclaim of the Précis gradually eclipsed the memory of his active service, he became known and was remembered principally as a military historian. This was, perhaps, inevitable because having been a staff officer no great battles or feats of heroism were associated with his name, but Dumas always considered himself to have been a soldier not a writer (or politician) by profession and within military circles his reputation as an organiser remained undiminished as testified to by his employment with the National Guard in 1830.

In many respects the course of Dumas' military career was unique amongst those of that host of generals who served France under the Ancien Régime, the Revolution and the Empire. It was uncommon enough in the pre-revolutionary royal army for an officer from outside of the great families of the state and lacking a personal fortune to be able to rise as far and as fast as he had.

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<sup>1</sup>Foy to Préval, 2 April 1827, published in Opinions Sur le Règlement Concernant le Service des Armées en Campagne (Paris, 1844), p.5.

Yet more remarkable still was his successful resumption of that career under the Empire after it had been so completely interrupted by the Revolution, an achievement in which Dumas stands alone. The gulf between Dumas' two periods of service was so great that it is fair to say that they were two separate careers; the first ended in 1791 when he entered the Legislative Assembly and the second began in 1800 with his re-employment by Bonaparte. In the intervening nine years, the nature of warfare had been 'revolutionized' and a French army radically different in personnel, in doctrine and in inspiration from that of 1790 had emerged. Dumas was a virtual stranger in the army he sought to rejoin and, at first, Napoleon regarded him as such. But Dumas' energy and capability enabled him to adapt rapidly so that by 1807 he had again acquired a reputation as an able staff officer and administrator.

On the three occasions when Dumas either entered or was drawn into politics he derived considerable influence from his military reputation. In 1791 his experience on the Council of War, on his special missions, and at Metz made him the most prestigious of the Feuillant deputies. This experience also ensured his election to the Military Committee and, therefore, that he would play a significant role in the formation of the Assembly's military policy. The same pattern was repeated under the Directory with but a slight decrease in his influence as his experience was then four years removed. Similarly the great reputation Dumas had acquired under the Empire

and as a military historian ensured his election and respect in the Chamber of Deputies.

However, the reverse of this process was not beneficial to Dumas and his military career suffered greatly as a result of his political activities. It was not only the interruption of his active service which was harmful; the very nature of his political views also damaged his career. Napoleon never felt able to trust Dumas completely, for he doubted Dumas' absolute loyalty to the Empire,<sup>2</sup> and feeling this way he preferred to employ Dumas at the periphery of the Empire, as in Naples, for example, or in positions which required administrative ability but relatively little independence of judgement. To the extent that Dumas' qualities of judgement and coolness under the strain of command, which were revealed by his conduct in the Grisons (1800), at Burgos (1808) and in the winter of 1812-1813, were never fully utilized by Napoleon he was under-employed throughout the Empire.<sup>3</sup>

The root of Napoleon's distrust and of Dumas' political misfortunes in 1792, 1797, 1815 and 1822 lay in his stubborn adherence to the two incompatible ideals of the Feuillant party. These were most succinctly expressed by Dumas in his own political motto: Principatum et

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<sup>2</sup>See supra Chapter VIII.

<sup>3</sup>Based upon his performance as chief of staff to Brune, Macdonald and Davout, Dumas would have made an ideal replacement for Jomini as Ney's chief of staff. He might even have made an excellent replacement for Berthier or Soult as major-general for he had a cooler head than Berthier and he was better trained for the position than Soult.

Libertatem.<sup>4</sup> There is a certain irony in this motto, for although Dumas adopted it to express the underlying unity of his actions and intentions, the course of the Revolution was such that it was more expressive of the constant choice faced by him and his fellow constitutionalists. The refusal of the absolute monarchists to accept the advances made by the Revolution, their reluctance to place the interests of France as a whole before those of their own class, which led them to turn to France's traditional enemies and to prefer a restoration by foreign arms in order not to be in the debt of any other Frenchmen for that restoration, reduced the Feuillants to a choice between the monarchy, defeat and national humiliation on the one side and liberty, the Revolution and the national interest on the other.

For Dumas the choice should not have been an easy one. He was bound to the throne by his oath, by the army's tradition of loyalty to the sovereign and by gratitude for the personal marks of esteem Louis XVI had shown towards him. However, the émigrés' association of the royalist cause with the conquest of France by foreign armies evoked patriotic feelings against themselves and the crown. Under these circumstances Dumas was unswerving in his support of France. In 1792, when it appeared that nothing could prevent the Prussians from taking Paris and

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<sup>4</sup>Dumas (Souvenirs, I, p.425) defined Principatum et Libertatem as "l'alliance de l'autorité du prince et de la liberté de la nation."



restoring the monarchy, he risked his position and his life by joining the Girondins in the defence of Paris; in 1793 he willingly sought to serve the Republic, again despite the danger his unpopularity caused, and in 1815, after defending the King to the end, he preferred to support Napoleon rather than await a restoration of the monarchy by allied bayonets. Yet because of the royalists' folly in involving the Allies, the question remains whether Dumas would have preferred Principatum to Libertatem.

The social and political philosophy of the Feuillants found expression under several governments between its initial triumph with the Constitution of 1791 and what the Feuillants themselves hoped was its permanent success with the July Monarchy. As reflected by the close resemblance the Constitution of the year III bore to that of 1791,<sup>5</sup> the Thermidorians were the first to turn to Feuillant principles during the interval. In social policy the Consulate and Empire also "réalisa l'essentiel du système . . . des Feuillants."<sup>6</sup> Under the First Restoration and after the dissolution of the 'Chambre Introuvable' in 1816 Louis XVIII championed the principals

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<sup>5</sup> Georges Lefebvre (The Thermidorians, p.155) even suggests that in its definition of equality the Constitution of the year III expressed what the Constituent Assembly had meant to say.

<sup>6</sup> Georges Michon, "L'Histoire de l'Assemblée Constituante Par Alexandre de Lameth," AHRF (IV, 1927), p.230.

of Principatum et Libertatem through his efforts to obtain a moderate constitutional government in accordance with the Charter. Although all these attempts to reach the Feuillant ideal failed, Dumas was not presented with a clear choice under any of them. He was powerless to act in 1794, 1814 and 1818; in 1815 foreign intervention affected his decision and in 1830 he, like most liberals, did not believe that a choice had to be made or indeed that one had been made until it was too late.

However between 1795 and 1797 Dumas was in a position to support the Revolution or a restoration without any undue danger that the latter would entail foreign conquest. Louis XVIII's refusal to provide adequate assurances that he would accept a constitutional government and the activities of his royalist agency were clear indications that there could be no compromise solution. Faced with the decision, Dumas directed his support towards the preservation of the Directory. The fact that the Triumvirs rebuffed his proffered support in order to further their own purposes does not alter the significance of Dumas' action - he had shown himself prepared to sacrifice Principatum were it necessary to preserve Libertatem.

"Ainsi que Lafayette," wrote Brissot, "Mathieu Dumas avait peut-être au fond du coeur un certain penchant pour la République, ce qui ne les empêchait point de faire la guerre aux républicains. Comme lui, il avait pris goût à la liberté en Amérique."<sup>7</sup> However, Brissot was only

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<sup>7</sup>Brissot, op.cit., p.154.

partially correct; when faced with a clear choice Dumas consistently put the interests of France and the cause of liberty before considerations about the Bourbons, but like most Feuillants he refused to accept that Principatum and Libertatem were ultimately incompatible. This was the great weakness in Dumas' and indeed in the Feuillant position; not satisfied with only liberty or only the monarchy, they jeopardized the one they had in their efforts to obtain both. Dumas was fortunate to have died when he did, for in 1837 it was still possible to believe that the July Monarchy had reconciled the two principles and that no ultimate choice would ever have to be made.


## APPENDIX I

DUMAS GENEALOGY

Mathieu Dumas

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Anne de Loys



## APPENDIX II

## THE BOWEN QUESTION

In 1781, as the French army set off to join the Americans before Yorktown, Mathieu Dumas left a packet of papers, containing his observations on the colonies, with the youngest daughter of his host in Providence, Dr. Bowen.<sup>1</sup> This packet was carefully preserved for over forty years until the return visit of Lafayette to the United States (1824) provided her with an opportunity for its return. By an odd coincidence, neither Lafayette nor Dumas ever referred to the girl by her christian name, but each provided a partial description of her. In his letter to Dumas recounting the circumstances of the packet's preservation, Lafayette recalled that in 1781 she was "une jolie demoiselle de quinze ans" and added that she was the "fille du lieutenant gouverneur de cette époque."<sup>2</sup> Based upon Lafayette's report, Louis Gottschalk tentatively identified the young woman as Mary Bowen and further deduced

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<sup>1</sup>"J'avais laissé à Providence, chez le docteur Bowen, et confié particulièrement à ses aimables filles, une cassette . . . cette cassette . . . a été soigneusement conservée par mistress Ward, la plus jeune de ces demoiselles . . . c'est après un laps de quarante ans, qu'ayant rencontré à New York le général Lafayette, . . . Mistress Ward voulut bien s'enquérir de moi, et pria le général de se charger de me rapporter cette cassette avec un touchant témoignage de son ancienne amitié." Dumas, Souvenirs, I, p.159.

<sup>2</sup>Lafayette to Dumas, New York, 21 September 1824, The Pierpont Morgan Library, Lafayette volume, p.38.



that Dumas had been "enamored" of her.<sup>3</sup> Yet this deduction is open to question with regard to the identification of Miss Bowen and to the nature of her relationship with Dumas.

The major difficulty with the identification of her lies in the fact that no single member of the Bowen family fits Lafayette's and Dumas' descriptions completely. The deputy governor of Rhode Island to whom Lafayette was referring was without doubt Jabez Bowen, who held that office in 1780 and 1781, but Jabez's only daughter, Mary, was only nine years old in 1781 and died in 1792. Therefore, it must be presumed that Lafayette was mistaken about the relationship between the "jolie demoiselle" and the deputy governor. Jabez had a sister, also named Mary, who survived until 1844 but she was in her mid-thirties by 1781. However, Jabez's father, Dr. Ephraim Bowen, had another family by a second marriage and as Jabez was literally old enough to be the father of his step sisters, it is conceivable that Lafayette could have become confused about their relationships or mistaken Jabez for Ephraim in his recollections.<sup>4</sup> Betsey, one of Ephraim's daughters, was the correct age and she also appears to have married into the Ward family, which agrees with Dumas' reference to her.<sup>5</sup> Thus it would seem that Betsey (Eliza)

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<sup>3</sup>Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette at the Close of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1942), p.428.

<sup>4</sup>See infra the Bowen Genealogy - extracted from Representative Men and Old Families of Rhode Island (Chicago, 1908), II, p.1010.

<sup>5</sup>The Ward Genealogy mentions that Eliza Bowen, born on 7 March 1765 to Ephraim and Lydia, was the only Bowen female to marry into the Ward family. Since Betsey was born to the same parents three days earlier, she and Eliza were the same person. Clifford P. Monahan, Genealogy of the Ward Family (Providence, 1952), p.217.

and not Mary was the "demoiselle" Dumas knew in 1781.<sup>6</sup>


If this is the case, then Dumas' relationship with her can be established with relative certainty because a very illuminating letter from him to Abigail Angell has been preserved.<sup>7</sup> This letter, written to "charming Rosella", refers to "the sweet Eliza" (who is identified on the cover in another hand as Mrs. Ward) and to another woman as well. The tone and contents of this letter are such as to give the impression that their relationship was certainly no more than a light-hearted flirtation and recognised as such by all concerned.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>According to the Ward Genealogy (ibid.) Eliza died in 1823. There is no evidence to substantiate this date in the records of the Bowen family and it may, therefore, be a mistake, as was her date of birth.

<sup>7</sup>Dumas to Abigail Angell, Newton, 29 June 1781, Brown University, MSS. N.D. 0426868 RPJCB.

<sup>8</sup>The conclusion is typical: "Ask Eliza if she could guess my first idea in the morning, my last in the evening. Adieu, I am forever her's, their's, and yours." Ibid.

BOWEN GENEALOGY

## APPENDIX III

## ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD - 1815

The mobilisation of the National Guard in 1815, impressive as it undoubtedly was, still fell far short of the figures Napoleon projected for it. In the final report on the status of the Guard before the opening of the campaign (made on 15 June 1815) 317 battalions of the 424 forecast were reported as formed, but they contained only 159,132 guardsmen instead of the expected 305,280.<sup>1</sup> One of the major reasons for the failure of the Guard to reach its projected figures lay in the fact that Napoleon initially ordered the formation of 204 battalions on 10 April and then continuously augmented this total throughout April and into May so that 54 battalions had only one month instead of two for mobilization.<sup>2</sup> Another equally important factor was the shortage of arms and equipment which slowed the process

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<sup>1</sup>Based upon AN AF IV 8599 Dossier 6.969 and 7.017 and AF IV 1936 cited in Jean Regnault, La Campagne de 1815: Mobilisation et Concentration (Paris, 1935), p.271.

<sup>2</sup>Decree of 10 April - 204 battalions; 15 April - 57; 19 April - 48; 27 April - 60; 7 May - 1; 10 May (3 decrees) - 92; total 462 battalions of which 38 were suppressed on 19 May leaving 424. Ibid., p.253

up considerably.<sup>3</sup> As a result of this situation garrisons throughout France were under strength as were the Reserve Divisions. But, as the following table shows, by June, even in its reduced numbers the Guard was a significant auxiliary to the troops of the Line.

Division	Forecast Strength (battalions)	Real Strength (battalions)	Effectives
1 (Nord)	10	1	562
2 (Metz)	10	10	5622
- (Rhin)	6	6	2929
3 (Jura)	12	8	5010
4 (Jura)	12	9	5503
5 (Alpes)	12	12	5126
6 (Alpes)	12	8	3672
6bis (Var)	-	6	1537
7 (Alpes)	14	6	2635 <sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>"Les distribution faites aux gardes nationales depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> mai jusqu'au 5 juin étant de quatre-vingt-douze mille deux cent soixante-treize . . ." "Tous les bataillons de garde nationale arrivés dans les places ont été suffisamment armés . . ." Rapport à l'Empereur, "Etat des Fusils", 11 June 1815, cited in Henri Coudere de Saint-Chamant, Les Dernieres Armées de Napoléon (Paris, 1902), p.480.

<sup>4</sup>Regnault, op.cit., pp.274-76.



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X<sup>0</sup>40 Compagnies d'Artillerie à Cheval.X<sup>EM</sup>22 Représentats du Peuple en Mission.X<sup>M</sup>28-30 Garde Nationale- Cent Jours.Y<sup>a</sup>478 Troubles de Metz.Y<sup>a</sup>495 Ecrivains Militaires- dossiers individuels.

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AB XIX 1715,3374,3375 Documents entrées par des voies extraordinaires.

AF\*I 18 Archives du Pouvoir Exécutif- Régime royale.

AF III 44,46,51<sup>a</sup>,81,99,458,463 Archives du Pouvoir Exécutif-Directoire.

AF IV 1037 Archives du Pouvoir Exécutif- Consulat, Empire et Cent Jours.

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AF V 2 Archives du Pouvoir Exécutif- Première Restauration.

CC 245,492,992 Chambre et Cour des Pairs.

F<sup>4</sup>2135 Comptabilité générale.F<sup>7</sup>3688,4573,4687,4774<sup>46</sup>,6144,6145,6371,6722,6776 Police générale.F<sup>9</sup>141<sup>a</sup>,360,402-411,416 Affaires militaires.F<sup>1</sup>333<sup>b</sup> Bâtiments civils.

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T 100,1619 Séquestre.

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<sup>1</sup> Consulted with the permission of M. Pierre Sadi-Carnot.

<sup>2</sup> Consulted with the permission of the Countess Daru.

<sup>3</sup> Consulted with the permission of the Countess Daru.

<sup>4</sup> Consulted with the permission of Prince Louis Murat.

<sup>5</sup> Consulted with the permission of Lady Bonham Carter.

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